Our First Line of Defense: Not F16s, but One China, Different Interpretations

Our First Line of Defense:
Not F16s, but One China, Different Interpretations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 22, 2011

Summary: Washington will help Taipei upgrade its existing 145 F-16 A/B fighter planes. For years the Chen administration and the Ma administration tried to purchase F-16 C/D fighters. But neither was successful. The greatest benefit derived from Taipei's recent arms procurement attempt was the revelation that the Republic of China's first line of defense is not F-16s, but one China, different interpretations.

Full Text below:

Washington will help Taipei upgrade its existing 145 F-16 A/B fighter planes. For years the Chen administration and the Ma administration tried to purchase F-16 C/D fighters. But neither was successful.

Washington attempted to strike a balance between Taipei and Beijing. On the one hand, to mollify Taipei, Washington promised to upgrade Taipei's F-16 A/Bs. On the other hand, to mollify Beijing, it rejected Taipei's attempts to purchase F-16 C/Ds. According to reports, the upgrades to the A/Bs will increase their performance, making them functionally equivalent to the C/Ds. Essentially, Washington is playing a name game.

The arms purchase is more symbol than substance. Its political significance outweighs its military significance. For Washington, it strikes a strategic balance between Taipei and Beijing. For Taipei, it reaffirms the Taiwan Relations Act. It symbolizes Washington's military links with Taipei. For Beijing, Washington's refusal to sell Taipei the C/Ds, and its substitution of upgrades to Taipei's existing A/Bs, constitutes an abrogation of its political commitment to Taipei, and its military commitment to upgrade its weaponry.

Former premier Hau Pei-tsun commented on the U.S. arms purchases. He said that "Frankly, how many arms Washington sells us and what kind of arms Washington sells us, is not the most important thing. What is important is that this [buyer/seller] relationship exists, and that it have a legal basis. That is the purpose of the Taiwan Relations Act." The current arms purchase should be measured against this standard.

When one gets down to it, Washington is not selling fighter planes to Taipei so that Taipei and Beijing can go to war. Taipei is not buying fighter planes from Washington so that it can fight with Beijing. The Cold War is over. The Chinese mainland is on the rise. Washington's unilateralism is in decline. Taipei's arms purchases from Washington are primarily a political declaration. They are not however, a declaration of an intention to fight. Instead these military procurements are a political declaration. The are a declaration of an intention not to fight. In other words, they are more symbol than substance, and their significance is more political than military.

If the two sides go to war, the F-16 C/Ds will not be inadequate. If the two sides engage in peaceful development, the F-16 A/B upgrade will more than adequate -- as political symbolism. Washington has refused to sell Taipei the C/Ds. But it has agreed to upgrade the existing A/Bs, Washington has concluded that the two sides will not resort to force to resolve their differences, but instead will resolve their differences by peaceful and democratic means.

Therefore, the Republic of China's national defense thinking must change with the times. Ultimately its national defense will depend not primarily on submarines, aircraft, and missiles. It will depend on adherence to the One China, Different Interpretations strategy, consistent with the Republic of China Constitution.

The One China, Different Interpretations national constitution strategy involves several premises. One. It defends the Republic of China and upholds the Republic of China Constitution. Taiwan independence must inevitably lead to cross-Strait military conflict. Therefore it is hostile to peaceful development. Two. Upholding the Republic of China Constitution, and implementing constitutional republicanism, is defending the nation. As long as the Republic of China continues directly electing its president, as long as the Legislative Yuan continues to convene, then cross-Strait relations will be determined in accordance with Republic of China constitutional procedures. It will be determined by 23 million people, This is the basis of cross-Strait peaceful development. This is the basis of the Republic of China's national defense.

Expressed as a negative, the Republic of China's national defense means not giving Beijing an excuse for military action, for example, by moving toward Taiwan independence. Expressed as a positive, it means defending the Republic of China and upholding the Republic of China Constitution. It means maintaining cross-Strait peace and development, As long as our constitutional republic continues to operate, business as usual, it will be able to determine the future of cross-Strait relations, peacefully and democratically, A rational process will enable the two sides to better resolve their differences.

One China, different Interpretations is the best means of national defense. As long as we adhere to a constitutionally mandated One China, we can invoke One China, different interpretations to maintain the status quo. But once we repudiate the Republic of China Constitution, once we repudiate the Republic of China, we forfeit our right to demand different interpretations. We forfeit the basis for peaceful development. When we forfeit our right to different interpretations. Beijing will immediately attempt to impose its interpretation of one China. We will then forfeit the basis of our national defense.

In other words, the biggest threat to the Republic of China's national defense is Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen's recent policy statements did not explicitly advocate Taiwan independence. Clearly she knows the risks. But she repudiated the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. She spun her repudiation as a "Taiwan consensus." She also repudiated One China, different interpretations. This is not rational cross-Strait policy. It is definitely not rational national defense policy.

One China, different interpretations is a three way consensus among Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. On March 26, 2008, Hu spoke to Bush on the hotline. He told George W. Bush that the two sides were about to resume talks on the basis of One China, different interpretations. Washington has repeatedly affirmed the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy achievements, Of course it knows these achievements are predicated upon the 1992 consensus, and one China, different interpretations. Therefore "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use force" and one China,different interpretations is the greatest common denominator among Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. It is also the Republic of China's first line of defense. To repudiate one China, different interpretations, is to subvert the cross-Strait status quo.

The greatest benefit derived from Taipei's recent arms procurement attempt was the revelation that the Republic of China's first line of defense is not F-16s, but one China, different interpretations.

國防主要憑藉：不在F16，而在一中各表
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.22

美國當局將協助台灣提升現有一四五架Ｆ十六Ａ／Ｂ戰機機隊性能；至此，扁馬兩屆政府爭取多年的Ｆ十六Ｃ／Ｄ戰機採購案終未實現。

這是美國在現階段對台美中三邊關係的衡量結果。一方面仍然承諾了Ｆ十六Ａ／Ｂ的升級案，這是向台灣交代；另一方面則拒絕了Ｆ十六Ｃ／Ｄ的採購案，這是向北京交代。消息並指出，升級的Ａ／Ｂ，性能等同於Ｃ／Ｄ，這是美國在「名」與「實」之間的操作。

總的來說，這項軍購案，其象徵意義大於實質意義，政治意義大於軍事意義。對美國言，是表達在台北與北京之間的戰略平衡；對台北言，是在再次確定《台灣關係法》的地位，並藉以表徵美國與台灣的軍事關聯；對北京言，則美國拒Ｃ／Ｄ而改售Ａ／Ｂ升級，也形同阻擋了美國對台政治承諾及軍事承諾在名目上的升級。

前行政院長郝柏村論台美軍購，曾說：「美國賣多少（軍備），賣什麼，老實說不是最重要的；但這個（軍售）關係一定要存在，且一定要有法律基礎，這就是《台灣關係法》。」本次軍購案，亦可用這個標準評量。

說到底，美國賣戰機給台北，不是要台北與北京開戰；台北向美國買戰機，也不是要與北京打仗。冷戰結束、中國崛起、美國單邊主義式微以後的台美軍購，主要是在作政治宣示，目的不在「要打仗」，反而是在借軍購作出政治姿態，目的在「不要打仗」。這就是說：象徵意義大於實質意義，政治意義大於軍事意義。

如果兩岸要開戰，Ｆ十六Ｃ／Ｄ也不夠用；如果兩岸能「和平發展」，則Ｆ十六Ａ／Ｂ升級，已足作為政治象徵。美國拒Ｃ／Ｄ，而升級Ａ／B，可視為它認定兩岸的未來不能訴諸武力解決，而必須循和平民主的途徑解決。

因而，中華民國的國防思維，亦必須與時推移；歸結而言，未來國防的憑藉，不再只是潛艇、戰機、飛彈，而主要是在堅持「一中各表」的國憲戰略。

「一中各表」國憲戰略的主要內涵是：一、堅持中華民國與中華民國憲法，亦即「不獨」；台獨必會升高兩岸軍事衝突，有違「和平發展」的國防基調。二、堅持基於中華民國憲法，實行民主憲政，即是堅實的國防憑藉；因為，只要中華民國繼續直選總統、立法院如常運作，則兩岸關係的未來，必然須由中華民國憲法程序決定，亦即由兩千三百萬人決定，這是兩岸「和平發展」的憑藉，更是中華民國的國防憑藉。

換句話說，中華民國的國防，在消極面，就是不要授予北京採取軍事動作的口實（如台獨）；在積極面，則應堅守中華民國與中華民國憲法的國憲戰略，秉持兩岸和平發展的立場，只要民主憲政正常運作，自有可能使兩岸關係的未來透過和平與民主的途徑，「由合理的過程到改善之目的」。

「一中各表」是最佳國防憑藉。因為，堅守「憲法一中」，始能藉「一中各表」維持現狀；倘若否定中華民國憲法，否定中華民國，即失「各表」的憑藉，亦失「和平發展」的憑藉；且既然拒絕「各表」，就會直接面對北京「一中」的壓力，國防即失憑藉。

也就是說，中華民國最大的國防威脅即是台獨。以蔡英文近日的競選政見言，她雖不敢直接倡議台獨（可見亦知風險），卻否定中華民國及中華民國憲法為「台灣共識」，又否定「一中各表」；這絕非理智的兩岸政策，更絕非理智的國防政策。

「一中各表」可謂是當前台美中三方的「三邊兩岸共識」。胡錦濤在二○○八年三月二十六日「布胡熱線」中，即告知小布希，兩岸將以「一中各表」恢復談判；而華府屢次盛譽馬政府的兩岸政策成就，自然亦知是植基於「九二共識／一中各表」。因此，毫無疑問，「不統／不獨／不武」的「一中各表」，是台美中三邊對「兩岸現狀」的最大默契，這當然也是中華民國最主要的國防憑藉。否定「一中各表」，就是顛覆「兩岸現狀」。

此次軍購案給台灣最大的啟示是：國防的主要憑藉，不在Ｆ十六，而在一中各表。