Tsai Ing-wen's Visit to the US Underscores Her Dilemma

Tsai Ing-wen's Visit to the US Underscores Her Dilemma
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 19, 2011

Summary: The Democratic Progressive Party's real reason for opposing the 1992 consensus is that it cannot accept the "One China" part of One China, Different Interpretations, even though the "One China" part refers to the Republic of China, as specified by the Republic of China Constitution. Where should consensus be sought? Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP must seek it within themselves, through introspection. If they cannot even accept the Republic of China Constitution, where can they possibly find consensus on Taiwan?

Full Text below:

DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen recently visited the United States. The biggest bonus for voters on Taiwan was a partial explanation of what she means by "Taiwan consensus." Unfortunately her explanation was extremely vague. Also, her explanation changed from day to day over her three day visit. This underscored Tsai Ing-wen's dilemma, and highlighted the DPP's inability to face its cross-Strait Achilles Heel.

Tsai Ing-wen raised the issue of "Taiwan consensus" one month ago, at home on Taiwan. But she has never fully explained what it means. Her very first explanation was made not to fellow citizens, but to a think tank in Washington -- the American Enterprise Institute. Apparently a "Taiwan consensus" is something that must be explained to Americans first. Apparently this how Tsai Ing-wen seeks a national consensus.

Her choice of venue was strange. So was what she said. She said that if she was elected president, she would emulate the precedent set by the Taiwan Relations Act, which is domestic US law. She would turn her "Taiwan consensus" into domestic law. She said this would enable rival political parties to reach some degree of understanding with each other. Tsai Ing-wen was supposed to explain what her "Taiwan consensus" meant. Instead, she merely explained how her "Taiwan consensus" would be implemented. She implied that the Ma administration's 1992 consensus was merely an agreement between two parties, and not a consensus among the public on Taiwan. Therefore, if she was elected president, she would turn her "Taiwan consensus" into the law of the land.

Tsai Ing-wen's argument is seriously out of step with the assumptions of a modern democracy. After all, the KMT is the ruling party. Fifteen agreements were signed with the Chinese mainland based on the 1992 Consensus. These agreements, including ECFA, were approved by the Legislative Yuan. Tsai's "consensus legislation" is dangerous sophistry. According to her, legislation passed by the national legislature under a KMT legislative majority is not "consensus legislation." Therefore it lacks legitimacy. So-called "consensus legislation" presumably requires taking to the streets and railing against the legislature. So-called "consensus legislation" presumably requires only a minority stonewalling the majority. Such confrontational practices have nothing to do with seeking consensus. They have nothing to do with any manner of political order.

Tsai Ing-wen's "Taiwan consensus legislation" is a non-solution that only makes matters worse. Three days later, she visited the United States and held several press conferences in New York. Again and again, she told us what a "Taiwan consensus" is not. Apparently a "Taiwan consensus" is not simple majority rule. A "Taiwan consensus" is not ordinary legislation. A "Taiwan consensus" is not an ordinary public policy issue. A "Taiwan consensus" is not a ordinary domestic policy issue. A "Taiwan consensus" requires talks with the Chinese mainland. Tsai talked about "consensus legislation" for three straight days. Her explanations were internally self-contradictory, and never really explained what a "Taiwan consensus" is. She spoke only about procedure, not about content. She spoke only about vague abstractions. She said "A Taiwan consensus seeks commonalities among different beliefs. It seeks something acceptable to all through mutual compromise."

Such formulations might be appropriate for a religious leader or talking head. But Tsai Ing-wen is running for president. The stakes are high in this election. She is not some unconcerned bystander. She is the candidate for the largest opposition party on Taiwan. She must offer concrete and practical policy proposals. She cannot say: I'll wait until everyone has debated the issue, and tells me what the Taiwan consensus is." Tsai said "If I tell you now what the Taiwan consensus is, it would not be the product of the democratic process." But party leaders in a democracy have a responsibility to lead, not just follow. Tsai's argument is totally at odds with the concept of political leadership.

Most bizarre of all, she agreed that "Reunification is one option for a Taiwan consensus." In fact this election is not primarily about reunification vs. independence. Even Beijing seldom mentions reunification these days. On Taiwan the most pressing question is how to shelve controversy over reunification vs. independence, to allow Taipei and Beijing to carry on exchanges. The greatest achievement of the Ma administration's 1992 consensus is a tacit understanding between the two sides, founded on One China, Different Interpretations. Only such a foundation can advance public welfare on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The Ma administration has already progressed to "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force," Tsai Ing-wen meanwhile, is still seeking to resolve disputes over reunification vs. independence. The Ma administration has already established a Taiwan consensus. Tsai Ing-wen on the other hand, is apparently still casting about for one.

Tsai Ing-wen remains unable to offer specific policy prescriptions. On the one hand, she wants to attract moderate voters. Therefore she cannot obsessively promote hatred and antagonism toward the Chinese mainland. On the other hand, she is afraid to offend Deep Green voters. To many of these voters, any contact with the other side is construed as "pandering to Beijing and selling out Taiwan." The 1992 consensus is construed as a secret accord with the CCP, one that betrays "the people of Taiwan." Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP characterize the 1992 consensus as fictitious. But that is a subterfuge. Many institutional arrangements among human beings are fictitious. When former president Lee Teng-hui advanced his "Two States Theory," it too was an artifice. It too was fictitious.

The Democratic Progressive Party's real reason for opposing the 1992 consensus is that it cannot accept the "One China" part of One China, Different Interpretations, even though the "One China" part refers to the Republic of China, as specified by the Republic of China Constitution. Where should consensus be sought? Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP must seek it within themselves, through introspection. If they cannot even accept the Republic of China Constitution, where can they possibly find consensus on Taiwan?


美國之行 曝露蔡英文當前困境
2011-09-19 中國時報

民進黨總統參選人蔡英文這一趟美國行，台灣選民最大的收穫是，她終於對「台灣共識」提出一些說明；可惜的是，這一連串的說明不但非常模糊，而且是三日一變，這凸顯的不但是蔡英文的困境，也曝露民進黨還是無法面對長年無解的兩岸罩門。

首先還是要表達一點遺憾，蔡英文自從月前在國內提出「台灣共識」以來，從未予以闡釋，她的首度說明竟然不是對著國人，而是在華府智庫「美國企業研究所」演說時提出，「台灣共識」竟要先對著美國人說，這豈是尋求國人共識之道！

其實，不只是發表的場所怪異，內容也頗為詭異，她表示，未來若當選總統，將仿效美國制定的《台灣關係法》，透過立法將「台灣共識」變成國內法，讓不同政黨的執政都能維持一定的穩定性。在這一段談話中，原該談「台灣共識」實質內容的，蔡英文卻以程序語言來表達，潛台詞還是在批評馬政府的「九二共識」是國共兩黨的協議，並非台灣人民的共識，因此她如果當選總統，要另將「台灣共識」立法。

蔡英文的說法相當違背現代民主政治的認知，畢竟，國民黨是執政黨，以九二共識為前提與大陸簽訂的十五項協議，這些協議及ＥＣＦＡ都還是要經過立法院；「以共識立法」說法的危險性在於，如果國民黨的國會多數立法還不能算是共識，因此不具立法的正當性，則所謂的共識，難道要發動街頭對抗國會，或以少數來扺制多數，這種衝突作法別說要尋找共識，政治更可能完全脫序。

蔡英文丟出的「台灣共識立法」可說是治絲益棼，三天後她在紐約舉行訪美記者會，則以一連串的否定來說明「台灣共識」：不是簡單的民主多數決、不是普通的立法或公共議題、不是單純的國內議題，也牽涉和中國協商往來；這一段說法不但和三天前的「共識立法」前後矛盾，而且還是沒說出何為「台灣共識」，她的語言不但是程序性語言、而且相當抽象，「台灣共識就是把不同理念的相同點找出來，或是透過相互妥協找出大家都能接受的部分」。

坦白說，這番話如果出自宗教界或輿論界領袖，可算恰如其分，但蔡英文畢竟是參選總統，在這場攸關重要的大選中，她可不是第三者，作為最大在野黨的參選人，她必須要提出具體可行的政見，可不能說：等你們都討論好了，再告訴我台灣共識是什麼！她那一番「如果我現在就告訴你台灣共識是怎樣的話，那就不會是經過民主過程所產生的東西了。」可說是完全違背政黨領導人的責任。

最怪異的莫過於，她面對媒體詢問時還不否認，「統一也是台灣共識選項之一」，事實上，統獨爭議並非這次大選主軸，連北京近來都不常提及統一大業，而台灣當前最關切的是如何在擱置統獨爭議前提下，兩岸可以正常交流互動；馬政府「九二共識」最大的優勢在於，至少可透過「一中各表」來取得兩岸默契，然後才能在此一基礎上建構對人民有利的兩岸關係；相較起來，當馬政府已經進展到「不統、不獨、不武」的階段，蔡英文卻還在尋求化解統獨爭議時，看來，馬政府已經達到某種台灣共識，蔡英文卻還在尋尋覓覓。

蔡英文之所以無法提出具體政見，最大的困難在於，她一方面要拉攏溫和的中間選民，不能一昧仇中反中；偏偏她也不敢得罪深綠選民，在這些選民心目中，只要和對岸往來就是傾中賣台，「九二共識」因此是國共密談、出賣台灣人；民進黨及蔡英文抨擊「九二共識」是虛構的，這其實是托詞，人類許多制度安排都是虛構的，當前總統李登輝提出「兩國論」時，何嘗不也是一種創造、虛構。

民進黨反對「九二共識」的真正癥結在於，他們無論如何都無法接受「一中各表」中的「一中」，即使「一中」指的是中華民國或是中華民國憲法。共識何處尋？蔡英文還是應該反求諸己，問問民進黨，如果他們連中華民國憲法都無法接受，又如何能尋求台灣共識！