Taipei and Bejing Must Value Each Other's Goodwill

Taipei and Bejing Must Value Each Other's Goodwill
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 5, 2011

Summary: The DPP argues that cross-Strait relations are overly dependent upon Beijing's goodwill. Therefore, it argues, this makes the relationship too fragile and unreliable. But one might well turn around and ask, if cross-Strait relations must not be based on Beijing's goodwill, what should they be based upon? Mutual ill will? The presidential election in January next year will be a severe test of the two sides' ability to maintain good cross-Strait relations. Even goodwill may not be enough. But goodwill is not something that should be casually tossed aside.

Full Text below:

The DPP argues that cross-Strait relations are overly dependent upon Beijing's goodwill. Therefore, it argues, this makes the relationship too fragile and unreliable. But one might well turn around and ask, if cross-Strait relations must not be based on Beijing's goodwill, what should they be based upon? Mutual ill will?

In fact, no matter how cross-Strait relations evolve, mutual goodwill will alway be essential in any relationship. One day the two sides may even sign a peace agreement. Therefore, one must never look askance at another person's goodwill. Good will is essential, and should be assidously cultivated.

The two sides should work toward a number of goals. Abstract expressions of goodwill must become concrete expressions of goodwill. Trust must replace deceit. Momentary expressions of goodwill must become long-term expressions of goodwill. The two sides must allow time for solutions to present themselves. They must adopt a rational process. A rational process will lead to clearer solutions. But the common denominator throughout the process, must be goodwill.

Conversely, Beijing counts upon Taipei's goodwill. The Lee Teng-hui era National Unification Guidelines and the Chen Shui-bian era Five Noes were ostensibly expressions of goodwill. But Beijing failed to express goodwill when it refused to acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China. Lee and Chen failed to express goodwill when it promoted "creeping independence," right under Beijing's nose. In sum, two decades of failed cross-Strait relations can be chalked up to a lack of goodwill on boths sides.

A favorable political development in 2008 allowed cross-Strait goodwill to be based on the 1992 consensus, on One China, Different Interpretations, and on "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force." This allowed peaceful development. Taipei promised no de jure Taiwan independence. In exchange, Beijing lowered the decibel level and "increased the peace." By promising no Taiwan independence, Taipei expressed goodwill. In exchange, Beijing agreed to no [immediate] reunification and no use of force. The 1992 consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. have promoted goodwill, by enabling the two sides to seek common ground under the One China Principle. cross-Strait relations can now evolve on the basis of peace and democracy. A rational process has facilitated the search for clearer solutions.

Today's cross-Strait opportunities were hard-won. The KMT lost the presidential elections in 2000 and 2004. During its eight years in office, the Chen regime exhausted all vestiges of goodwill between Taipei and Beijing. These setbacks however, made possible the 2005 Lien/Hu Summit, and the peaceful development of cross-Stait coopetition. From beginning to end, Lien Chan took the high road. He and Hu Jintao change the course of history with their boldness of vision. They laid the foundation for cross-Strait goodwill. According to Tsai Ing-wen, Ma Ying-jeou has "quiet strength," and Hu Jintao is a "rational person." Beginning In 2008, the two sides implemented peaceful development. Goodwill was no longer empty rhetoric. Fifteen agreements, including ECFA, heralded the advent of explicit and institutionalized goodwill.

Goodwill is not a hollow shell. It is the basis of cross-Strait relations. On the Taipei side, both Lee and Chen promoted creeping independence during their time in office. This showed that not everyone who assumes office will evince goodwill. For Beijing and Washington, Lee and Chen were "troublemakers." For the Republic of China, the two evinced no goodwill whatsoever. Instead, they plotted to "rectify the name of the nation, and author a new constitution." On the Beijing side, not every ruler in Beijing is willing to engage in peaceful development. For Beijing, the cost of peaceful development may be higher than the cost of allowing Taiwan to destroy itself from within. Therefore today's cross-Strait goodwill, is not something we can take for granted, It was won at high cost, after hard lessons and repeated failures. The two sides must realize this and cherish whatever goodwill exists.

Today's cross-Strait goodwill is based on the two sides' overlapping strategic interests. Therefore, the objective must be to maintain these conditions long-term. Beijing's strategic objective is to prevent de jure Taiwan independence and to facilitate reunification. Short of using armed force to swallow up Taipei, Beijing must resort to peaceful and democratic means. It must persuade the public on Taiwan to accept the concept and framework of "China," in their hearts and minds. It must do so by demonstrating genuine goodwill long term. Conversely, unless Taipei is determined to declare independence, to found a "Nation of Taiwan," and to break with the Chinese mainland, its most sensible strategic objective is "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It must defend the Republic of China. It can delay and reduce the pressure for reunification. It can ensure that cross-Strait relations remain peaceful and democratic. It must adopt a rational process in order to facilitate the search for clearer solutions. Therefore, why not maintain this goodwill?

The diplomatic truce was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. Visa-free treatment by 117 countries was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. ECFA was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. Mutual legal assistance was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. The Free and Independent Travel Policy for Mainland tourists was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. cross-Strait goodwill is not assured. But we can hardly negate these achievements merely because cross-Strait goodwill is not assured. On the contrary, we must use these achievements to encourage and strengthen cross-Strait goodwill. The two sides have been separated for 62 years. The first 59 years were a failure, because ill will prevailed over goodwill. The last three years of peace and democracy are the manifestation of goodwill. They are the resut of one's vision transcending one's limitations. They are the result of rational thinking leading to clearer solutions.

The presidential election in January next year will be a severe test of the two sides' ability to maintain good cross-Strait relations. Even goodwill may not be enough. But goodwill is not something that should be casually tossed aside.

兩岸應當珍惜彼此的善意
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.05

民進黨認為，兩岸關係建立在依賴北京當局的「善意」之上，這種關係太脆弱，太無保障。然而，可以反過來問：難道兩岸關係應當建立在彼此的「惡意」之上？若不依賴彼此的「善意」，另將何所憑藉？

其實，兩岸關係不論走到什麼階段，即使有朝一日簽署了「和平協議」，彼此的「善意」仍是維持良性關係最根本的憑靠。因此，不要否定善意，必須建立善意，應當鞏固善意。

兩岸應當努力的目標是：將彼此的善意，從表面變成本質，從權謀變成信仰，從暫時變成長久；以時間換取空間，從「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」，其間貫徹始終者皆賴「善意」。

相對而言，北京其實也依賴台灣方面的「善意」。在李登輝時代的「國統綱領」，及陳水扁時代的「四不一沒有」，皆是「善意」的表示；但是，一方面北京未在「中華民國的存在問題」上回以善意，另一方面李扁操作台獨亦被北京視為不具善意。所以，總結那二十年的兩岸關係之失敗，主因應在雙方皆不知建立及維持善意。

「○八機遇」之後，兩岸關係的「善意」，是建立在「九二共識，一中各表」，及「不統，不獨，不武」之上，因此始有「和平發展」。究其實際，台北是以「不法理台獨」，換取北京的「放低統一分貝，提升和平發展」；亦即以「不獨」的善意，換取「不統，不武」的善意。再者「九二共識，一中各表」，亦使「一中原則」存有「求同存異」的善意。彼此有了此種善意，兩岸關係始有可能在「和平」與「民主」的主軸上，經「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」。

今日兩岸機遇得來不易。若不是國民黨在二○○○年及二○○四年兩次總統大選失敗，若不是扁政府執政八年與大陸朝野喪盡「善意」，即不可能有二○○五年的連胡會，更不可能建立「和平發展」的兩岸競合基調。連戰自始至終「為而不有」的胸襟，與胡錦濤扭轉大局的瞻矚，是建立兩岸善意的基礎。至二○○八後，由於馬英九的「沉默的魄力」與胡錦濤是「理性的人」（蔡英文對胡的評語），兩岸遂得以共同具體落實了「和平發展」的運作架構，使「善意」不再是空言；而ＥＣＦＡ等十五項協議，即成為「明文化的善意」及「法制化的善意」。

「善意」不是虛無空洞之物，而是兩岸關係的根本憑藉。就台灣而言，畢竟經歷過李扁二任政府操作台獨，可見並非每一主政者皆能維持善意；李扁非但屢屢對北京及華府成為「麻煩製造者」，且二人根本對「中華民國」亦無「善意」，而欲「正名制憲」。再就北京而言，我們亦認為，亦非每一北京主政者皆能有「和平發展」的善意；因為，對北京來說，「和平發展」的運作成本，也許高於聽任台灣內耗而自取滅亡的成本。所以，兩岸今日的善意，並非理所當然，而是在獲得教訓及失敗後，以重大代價所建立，雙方皆應知所珍惜維護。

然而，今日兩岸的善意，亦與各自的戰略利益合轍，因此也有得以長久維繫的客觀條件。北京的戰略目標，低標是不容法理台獨，高標是促成統一；而在不採武力併吞的情勢下，必須以「和平」及「民主」的方法，使台灣人民在感情及理智上接受「中國」這個概念及體制，當然要憑藉長久與真誠的善意來經營。相對的，台北的戰略目標，除非是要台獨建國，欲與大陸決裂，則以「不統，不獨，不武」的戰略架構為最明智：一者在捍衛中華民國，另者可放緩降低統一的壓力，再者亦使兩岸關係得以維持「和平」及「民主」的善意基調，爭取「從合理的過程到改善之目的」；那麼，為何不維持這樣的善意？

外交休兵，因兩岸善意；一一七國免簽證，因兩岸善意；ＥＣＦＡ，因兩岸善意；司法互助，因兩岸善意；陸客自由行，因兩岸善意……。不能因兩岸善意未必靠得住，即否定及抵拒這些成就；反而要用這些成就，來鼓勵及鞏固兩岸的善意。兩岸關係六十二年，前五十九年的失敗，正是敗於惡意大於善意，近三年則是和平與民主的善意得以伸張，眼界提升了境界，思路開創了出路。

明年一月的總統大選，將是兩岸善意能否維繫的嚴峻考驗；即使善意不能完全憑靠，但更不能任性推翻。