Thursday, July 30, 2015

US Should Accelerate Cross-Strait Integration

US Should Accelerate Cross-Strait Integration
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 31, 2015


Executive Summary: The presidential election is now in full swing. The final decision will of course be made by voters on Taiwan. But Taiwan is an island, caught between the United States and Mainland China. Both are major players that affect Taiwan. Both are watching closely from the sidelines, prepared with countermeasures. Both hope events will go their way, or at least not spin out of control. Both blue and green camps seek the blessing of the United States or the Mainland to ensure victory at the polls and the assumption of power.

Full Text Below:

The presidential election is now in full swing. The final decision will of course be made by voters on Taiwan. But Taiwan is an island, caught between the United States and Mainland China. Both are major players that affect Taiwan. Both are watching closely from the sidelines, prepared with countermeasures. Both hope events will go their way, or at least not spin out of control. Both blue and green camps seek the blessing of the United States or the Mainland to ensure victory at the polls and the assumption of power.

The US has been relatively consistent in its relations with the two sides of the Strait. Since President Nixon, US policy has involved the three joint communiques and opposition to or non-support of Taiwan independence, "one Taiwan, one China", and "two Chinas". The US is concerned about Taiwan's security. It has repeatedly stressed that it takes no position on reunification vs. independence, but the matter must be settled peacefully. Washington stresses process rather than result. The future of Taiwan should be decided jointly by people on both sides of the Strait. Authorities on the two sides must not arbitrarily disrupt the status quo -- as defined by the United States. Cross-Strait issues have yet to be resolved. But at least peace has been maintained.

In fact everything the United States does is in its national interest, even though its priorities and policies may change with the times. For example, when Washington and Beijing faced off against each other, the United States tended to emphasize relations with Taiwan in order to counter or provoke the CCP. When cross-Strait military strength changed, the United States sold arms to Taiwan. No wonder some have concluded that the United States and Japan say one thing but do another, and merely use Taiwan as a pawn by perpetuating long-term cross-strait separation. From a broader perspective, the United States cozied up the Mainland China to counter the Soviet Union. Eventually, in 1978, it abandoned Taiwan and established diplomatic ties with the Mainland. Such is the nature of US foreign policy. No wonder many on Taiwan believe Taiwan must be more than the United States' diplomatic pawn.

For the United States Taiwan has marginal value. For the CCP by contrast, Taiwan is a core national interest. In its pursuit of national unity, Beijing's stance has never changed. This is not merely a matter of nationalist sentiment. It is also a matter of the Chinese peoples' economic future, and involves long-term strategic considerations. From Taiwan's perspective, US-Taiwan relations are important. But Taiwan's relationship with the Mainland is a matter of life and death. Between the two giants, Taiwan can do little. Taiwan's plight is difficult. But in terms of geopolitics, economic development, and national identity, Taiwan's choice should be clear.

The rise of Mainland China is a fact. The Mainland has many internal problems. But the stability of the regime is not in question. Beijing's political, economic, and geo-strategic influence will only increase. Its recent One Belt, One Road and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank initiatives underscore CCP ambition. Taiwan must stand firm on many cross-Strait issues. But we all know time is not on our side. Which side is stronger is not hard to see. On matters political, economic, diplomatic, and international, Taiwan must rely on Beijing's goodwill.

Internal and external factors have strained Sino-US relations. But the Mainland is increasingly powerful. This is not something the United States can prevent. Mainland China's rise is not necessarily to the United States' detriment. The United States can take the high road and dialogue with Beijing in a more respectful manner. It can remember the big picture, seize the initiative, and resolve the impasse with Mainland China. Alas, current US-China relations are strained. The United States has resorted to cheap tricks. These include unilaterally announcing that military officers from Taiwan would attend official photo ops, upgrading US-Taiwan official exchanges in a one off manner to drive a wedge between Taipei and Beijing, and inciting pro-American, anti-Mainland populist sentiment. Meanwhile, the US refuses to give even an inch on Taiwan-US issues such US beef and pork imports. The US has no inerst in improved Taiwan-US economic relations. It has dragged its feet for years, preventing any progress.

The United States is a nation known for its emphasis on Christian morality. Yet it treats Taiwan as a disposable pawn in a strategic struggle. That is unfair to Taiwan. The US may sell out Taiwan to Beijing. It may exploit confrontation between Taiwan and the Mainland. Either way, it is using Taiwan as a pawn. Taiwan must not and cannot accept such an arrangement. Such an arrangement is not in the interest of any party, including the Mainland, the US, and Taiwan.

Taiwan's existence is beneficial to US strategic interests. A Chinese mainland that is moderate, rational, reformist, open, secure, integrated into the international community, and which abides by international norms of behavior, is in the interest of all nations. Today's China is not Maoist China. The Chinese people and Chinese culture have a moderate, rational, reformist, and open national character. If Taiwan can embark on the road to democracy, why can't the Chinese mainland? The United States should help Taiwan play a more active role in Mainland China's modernization. This would have a beneficial impact. This would result in a win-win-win scenario.

Washington has delayed cross-Strait integration. It has encouraged Taiwanese separatist proclivities. It has increased the suffering of the public on Taiwan by fostering illusions and delaying their awakening. In fact, it is creating its own enemies. The United States should help the two sides accelerate their integration. It should encourage political dialogue and the signing of a peace agreement. This would benefit both Sino-US and cross-Strait relations.

美國應協助兩岸加速融合
20150731 中國時報

如火如荼的總統大選,最後當然是由台灣民眾自己做出選擇,但不可諱言,台灣是小島,夾在美國與中國大陸間,兩者都是影響台灣的重大外部因素,也都在場邊密切觀戰,預擬因應對策,希望事情如果不能往有利於自己的方向發展,至少不要出現不受控制的意外。藍綠兩大陣營都想得到美國或中國大陸的加持,以利贏得選舉,掌握政權。

美國與台海兩岸交往,有相當程度的一貫性和延續性。自尼克森總統以來,美國政策宣示大體上不出:三個公報一個法案,反對(或不支持)台灣獨立、一中一台、兩個中國,美國關切台灣的安全,一再強調對於統獨結果並無特定立場,但必須以和平方式為之,華府重視的是過程而非結果,台灣的未來應由兩岸人民共同決定,兩岸當局都不能任意破壞由美國所界定的現狀等等。兩岸問題雖未解決,但也算維持了和平的局面。

但實際上,美國的所有作為都是配合其國家整體利益,在輕重緩急和策略作為上時有變化。比如說,當華府與北京交惡時,美國傾向於提升與台灣的關係來平衡或刺激中共;當兩岸軍力安全對比發生變化時,美國又加強對台軍售。難怪有人認為,美國與日本一樣,都是講一套做一套,其實是把台灣當棋子運用,製造兩岸長期分裂。放在更大的架構看,美國為拉攏中國大陸對抗蘇聯,於1978年放棄台灣與中國大陸建交,可見美國外交政策的本質。難怪許多台灣人認為,台灣不能只是美國的外交利益棋子。

對美國來說,台灣只具有邊際或重要利益,對中共而言,台灣卻是核心國家利益,北京堅持追求國家統一的立場從來未曾變過,這不只是民族主義情緒的問題,更有民族發展的長遠戰略考量。從台灣的角度,美台關係當然重要,但與大陸關係的好壞則是生死存亡問題。兩大之間難為小,台灣的處境艱難,但不管是從地緣政治、經濟發展、國族認同上來看,台灣的最佳選擇應該相當清楚。

中國的崛起已成事實,大陸內部問題不少,但政權的穩定應無疑義,北京在國際政治、經濟、地緣戰略方面的影響力只會越來越大,最近的一帶一路以及亞投行的成立都可看出中共的企圖心。台灣對於兩岸之間的許多問題雖然仍有必要的堅持,但大家已然看出時不我予,兩岸強弱易勢,台灣在政治、經濟、外交及國際上都必須依賴北京的善意。

出於內外因素的影響,當前中美關係轉趨緊張,但中國愈來愈強大,不是美國所能遏止,中國崛起未必是美國之患,美國可以更尊重的方式和北京對話相處,用新的高度、廣度與思維掌握主動,來處理與中國的僵局。但當前美中關係趨於緊張,美國卻利用廉價的方式,譬如片面公布台灣將領參加美軍官方活動照片、一次性提升美台官方交往層級等手段,企圖離間兩岸關係、提升台灣「親美離中」民粹力量,但在制度性的美台關係上卻寸步不讓,譬如美豬與美牛進口問題、台美經濟關係深化問題,美國卻毫無興趣,延宕多年沒有進展。

美國是一個高度強調基督教道德聞名的國家,若把台灣當成戰略利益的廉價棋子,這對台灣並不公平。無論出賣台灣與北京交易,或利用台灣與中國對抗,都是把台灣當成棋子來耍弄,在主觀或客觀上,台灣都不能、不願接受這樣的安排,也不合乎中美台任何一方的利益。

台灣的存在是美國戰略利益的正面因素。一個溫和、理性、改革、開放、具有安全感、融入國際社會、接受國際行為規範的中國,合乎所有國家的利益。今日的中國已完全不是毛澤東時代的中國,可見中國人與中國文化具備溫和、理性、改革、開放的本質。台灣可以走上民主的道路,中國大陸為何不可以?美國應該鼓勵、協助台灣在中國大陸現代化的過程中,扮演更積極的角色,產生正面的作用。這才是一個雙贏多贏的最佳結果。

華府遲滯兩岸融合過程,助長台灣分離主義傾向,增加台灣民眾不切實際的幻想和夢醒之後的痛苦,這種作法其實是在給自己製造敵人。如今之計,美國應該思考如何協助兩岸加速整合,鼓勵雙方進行政治對話,支持簽署中程或和平協議,才會對中美及兩岸關係產生正面效益。

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

Low Point of Civic Education: Politics without the Rule of Law

Low Point of Civic Education: Politics without the Rule of Law
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 30, 2015


Executive Summary: In recent years, the government has been utterly defenseless. The Sunflower Student Movement occupied the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan. High school students ostensibly opposed to curriculum changes broke into the Minister of Education's office. Just prior to this, green camp legislators even vandalized the Ministry of Justice, the nation's highest law enforcement agency. They kicked in the door of the Minister's office as part of their punitive expedition, and accused him of all manner of crimes.

Full Text Below:

In recent years, the government has been utterly defenseless. The Sunflower Student Movement occupied the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan. High school students ostensibly opposed to curriculum changes broke into the Minister of Education's office. Just prior to this, green camp legislators even vandalized the Ministry of Justice, the nation's highest law enforcement agency. They kicked in the door of the Minister's office as part of their punitive expedition, and accused him of all manner of crimes.

People on Taiwan differ on their political allegiance. Some treat governments they dislike as brigands. Therefore they applaud those who engage in illegal trespass. When they see official offices occupied, or their doors kicked in, they consider it well deserved. By contrast, when police arrest students and reporters who broke into the Ministry of Education, they file suit against the Ministry of Education and vilify the police. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen and the ruling heads of 13 counties and muncipalities filed a joint statement. They demanded that the Ministry of Education withdraw its lawsuit. Even the Vice President of NTU stuck his nose in, and denounced the Ministry of Education as "despicable".

Leave the controversy over the curriculum change aside for a moment. Does breaking into government buildings really deserve applause? Does it really constitute courage? Do those who cheer such actions and demand that the Ministry of Education withdraw its lawsuit, actually believe that the government should throw open its doors and allow protesters to come and go as they please? If they do, will DPP ruled counties and municipalities apply the same rules in their own jurisdictions? Take Tainan for example. Property owners protested the Tainan City Government's expropriation of their land for railroads. Residents were angry because Mayor William Lai failed to appear before the City Council. They were kept out of City Hall by large numbers of police. Clearly William Lai does not think the mayor's office and the city government should be open to the public. University presidents and teachers would probably not agree that dissatisfied students have the right to invade the principal's office.

The main reason a democratic society implements the rule of law, is to ensure adherence to objective standards, regardless of who is in power. Based on such objective standards, the law forbids certain actions. People are not exempt merely because they belong to a particular class or enjoy special status. People cannot violate these laws merely because they are displeased with certain agencies. Students and others who illegally invade the MInistry of Education, occupy the Minister's office, damage computers and other items, must be prosecuted in accordance with the law. They are in violation of the codes against criminal trespass and destruction of property. This is true even if they invade ordinary residences, let alone government buildings.

Worse still, some people have attempted to spin the students' conduct as "civil disobedience". Civil disobedience requires the willingness to accept legal sanctions in order to express one's ideas. But students protesting curriculum changes violated laws and broke rules. They then demanded immunity from prosecution. They often invoke the logic of revolution, civil war, and counter-insurgency on democratic Taiwan. This has led to endless absurdities, including the Sunflower Student Movement milksops being cast as "heroes".

These political movements trample over the rule of law. They are providing young students with a very poor lesson in civics, for the following reasons.

One. Citizens must live in peace with others who hold different views. When people differ on policy, they can debate, vote, advocate, and litigate. But they may not adopt the attitude that "Whatever I say, goes." If other people's views differ from one's own, one may not resort to illegal force or coercion. If that is tolerated, whither democracy? Some oppose changes in the curriculum. Some support them. Do those opposed to changes have a monopoly on halos?

Two. Civic debate in a democratic society must be based on facts, not on ignorance or blind obedience. Those opposed to curriculum changes endlessly repeat false arguments. They object to passages such as "The highest mountain peaks in our country are the Himalayas". They claim that "The 2/28 Incident has been omitted". All such allegations are false or misleading. Even the painful ordeal of the comfort women is spun as "voluntary". The Taipei High Administrative Court ruled that "the minutes of curriculum revision meetings and voting records should be made public". This has no bearing on the validity of curriculum decisions, which are still being appealed. Yet those opposed to curriculum changes falsely claim that they are illegal and must not be implemented. Given this twisted logic, "ignorance is strength". Is such behavior befitting self-proclaimed champions of democracy?

Three. Citizens are members of a democratic society. Individual freedom is not unlimited. Struggles between those holding different views must take place within legal limits. If one chooses to fight illegally, but also expects legal immunity, then one is either an ignoramus or a tyrant. Enforcement of the law cannot be selective, based on one's status. Can students invade government offices and engage in vandalism with impunity? Can they break into school buildings and burn their academic records? Can they steal other's property on the streets? If reporters are merely reporting and interviewing subjects, their freedom of expression must be protected. But if they are inciting or participating in illegal conduct, that is a different story. This can all be clarified through investigations and the judicial process. Only then can we know if their actions were legitimate.

A sound civic education teaches students independent thinking. It makes them understand they are members of a community. It teaches them they have legal responsibilities and obligations, and must learn to get along with others. But politicians have actually been inciting student violence, and assuring them that their student status offers them immunity from prosecution. This tramples over the rule of law, and constitutes the nadir of civic education.

最糟的公民教育:要政治不要法治
2015-07-30聯合報

近年,台灣的政府機關似乎成了最不設防的地方。繼太陽花學運占領立法院並衝撞行政院後,又有高中生為「反課綱微調」而侵入教育部長辦公室。在此之前,綠營立委甚至直搗全國最高執法機關法務部,踢破部長辦公室大門,興師問罪。

在政治認同分歧的台灣,有些人把「自己不喜歡的政府」視如寇讎,因而對這些非法侵入行為大聲叫好;看到首長辦公室被占據、大門被踹破,都覺得只是「剛好」而已。相對的,警察逮捕侵入教育部的學生與記者,教育部依法提告,反而遭到批評。民進黨主席蔡英文和十三個執政縣市首長共同聲明,要求教育部撤回告訴;連台大副校長也即興插上一腳,嚴厲抨擊教育部「可惡」。

先撇開課綱爭議不談,「侵入政府建築」真是值得鼓掌的「英勇行為」嗎?那些按讚、主張教育部應撤告的人,真的相信政府機關應該大門敞開讓抗議者來去自如?那麼,民進黨執政的縣市要不要比照辦理?以台南為例,為了南鐵遷移徵收抗議的群眾,和對賴清德未出席議會而不滿的人,都被大批警力擋在市府之外;可見,賴清德並不認為市長辦公室及市府機關是開放區域。大學校長與教師們,大概也不會同意學生對校規不滿就有權入侵校長室。

民主社會施行法治的主要目的,在維持廣大公民可以一體遵行的客觀準則,不因人而異。基於這個客觀的規範,法律不許可的事,不會因為某一類人身分特殊而得以豁免,或者因為某些機關、人物因為不受特定民眾所喜,人們即可任意侵犯。反課綱學生和其他群眾違法侵入教育部、占領部長室、毀損電腦等物品,就法論法,違反了刑法的「侵入罪」和「毀損罪」,就算他們入侵的只是一般民宅,也一樣有罪,何況是政府機關。

更糟的是,有人抬出「公民不服從」理論,企圖美化學生的作為,這其實是對「公民不服從」的曲解。「公民不服從」運動的根本精神,是在願意接受法律制裁的前提下,進行理念表達的抗爭;而現在,學生為了反課綱,做出違法逾矩的行為,卻又要求免於法律處分。動輒拿革命、內戰、戡亂年代的邏輯,套在現在的民主台灣,就出現了無窮無盡的怪論,這是從太陽花學運以來的荒謬現象,把狗熊當成了英雄。

這些政治凌駕及干預法治的現象,將帶給年輕學生極不良的公民教育,原因如下:

第一,公民必須學習在社會上與「不同意見」和平相處。政策上有不同見解,可以辯論、投票、倡議、訴訟,但態度不能「唯我獨尊」。如果政策意見與自己不同,就可以謾罵甚至違法衝撞,那就是用強暴手段脅迫他人退讓,這是什麼民主?有人反課綱微調,有人支持課綱微調,為何「反」的一方能獨占道德光環?

第二,民主社會的公民討論要基於事實,而不能本諸無知或盲從。這次的反課綱論述一再無的放矢,例如所謂「喜馬拉雅山是我國最高峰」與「二二八事件被刪除」,都是基於錯誤事實的錯誤批評;而為了抗爭,居然連慰安婦的痛苦經驗都扭曲成「自願」。再者,台北高等行政法院只判決「課綱會議紀錄與投票名單應公開」,並不影響課綱決策的效力,且尚在上訴中,卻能被說成「違法不應施行」。這種理歪氣壯、無知就是力量的行為,豈是自命民主鬥士的公民所當為?

第三,公民是民主社會的成員,不是無拘無束的自由個體;即有不同意見進行抗爭,也應在合法的限度內為之。如果選擇非法抗爭,卻還要法律退讓,這是無知,還是霸道?再說,法律的施行,不能隨便因「身分」而轉彎。若學生侵入公署破壞公物可以免罰,那麼他們是不是可以侵入學校燒毀成績,或者在街上偷搶財物也該無罪?記者的行為,若只是單純在現場從事報導與採訪,其言論自由自應加以保護;但若是以運動「指導者」或「參與者」的身分參與,那情況便有不同。這些,都可以透過司法程序的偵查加以釐清,才知道正當性如何。

良好的公民教育,是教導學生養成獨立思辨的習慣,認識自己作為社會一分子的法律責任和義務,學習與他人相處之道。現在,居然是政治人物唆使學生盲動,並告訴他們可以「學生」身分享受不被法律規約的特權;這真是踐踏法治、扭曲公民概念的最糟示範。

Tuesday, July 28, 2015

Lee Teng-hui's Cornell Visit, Tokyo Edition

Lee Teng-hui's Cornell Visit, Tokyo Edition  
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 29, 2015


Executive Summary: Lee Teng-hui's Tokyo visit is likely to increase Beijing's awareness and understanding of the Taiwan independence movement. Beijing may not be able to respond to Lee Teng-hui, but it can take aim at Tsai Ing-wen. Lee Teng-hui has just handed Tsai Ing-wen a ticking time bomb. On the eve of the 2012 presidential election, Lee Teng-hui went on stage and hugged Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to break free from his embrace. And Lee Lee Teng-hui is not about to let her do so.

Full Text Below:

Lee Teng-hui's visit to Tokyo might well be characterized as the Tokyo Edition of his Cornell visit. The backlash will smack Tsai Ing-wen squarely in the face.

In June 1995, Lee Teng-hui visited the United States and delivered a speech at his alma mater, Cornell University. The visit hogged the spotlight. But the Cornell visit was instigated by lobbying firms, and led to major frictions with the White House, the State Department, and Congress. It swiftly worsened cross-Strait relations to the breaking point.

At the time Lee Teng-hui and Beijing still maintained contact through secret emissaries. Lee wanted Beijing to support his visit to Cornell and boost voter support for him in next year's presidential election. Lee pledged to significantly improve cross-Strait relations. But Lee Teng-hui's behind the scenes double-dealing raised Beijing's suspicions. The visit was seen as a move toward Taiwan independence. Beijing concluded that Lee was "already wallowing in the mud of Taiwan independence", and even vowed to "use force to defend Taiwan". This ended Lee Teng-hui's secret channel to Beijing.

Over the following months acrimony between Beijing and Lee persisted. The following year, the 1996 ROC presidential election was marred by the Straits missile crisis and a US carrier group in the Taiwan Strait. Lee Teng-hui won the election because Beijing threatened military intervention. But cross-Strait relations deteriorated. In 2000, Lee trotted out his two states theory, and James Soong deserted the KMT. As a result, the KMT lost the presidential election and revoked Lee Teng-hui's party membership. Lee turned around and became the standard-bearer of the Taiwan independence movement. The key to this sequence of events was Lee's Cornell visit.

Actually, Lee Teng-hui's rhetoric during his Cornell visit was relatively measured and cautious. He spoke of the "Republic of China", and averred that "sovereignty belongs to the people". The United States initially announced that is would disallow the visit, but later reversed itself. This, plus the earlier Shiba Ryotaro incident, plus the presence of Taiwan independence forces on the reception committee, intensified the confrontation over the Cornell visit, which eventually spun completely out of control.

Twenty years later, Lee Teng-hui visited Tokyo. His political status may not be what it was when he visited Cornell. But his stature within the Taiwan independence movement has increased. Did Beijing read too much into Lee's visit to Cornell back then? Possibly. But this year's visit to Tokyo left no room for misunderstanding whatsoever.

Lee Teng-hui's address to the Japanese Diet on the 22nd includes three main points. One. Orthodox Taiwan independence rhetoric. He called for "discarding the old and adopting the new", for "thorough clarification of the half century long relationship between Taiwan and China", for the discarding of "one China", and "the constraints of the Chinese legal system". Two. He acknowledged that cross-Strait policy is rooted in deception and fraud. For example, the so-called "National Unification Guidelines" are nothing more than a "means to an end". They were merely a means of deceiving Beijing and "allaying the suspicions of the ruling Kuomintang." Three. The Taiwan independence movement uses "backdoor listing" as its main strategy. It retains the name "Republic of China", but empties it of all ROC historical, constitutional and spiritual substance.

Lee Teng-hui's own testimony reveals the character of Taiwan independence advocates. One. They may change their outward appearance, but they remain completely unchanged in their bones. Two. Deception and fraud count for everything. Political integrity counts for nothing. Three. Backdoor listing and deception. Lee Teng-hui is no longer in charge of state affairs. Therefore Beijing has no leverage over him. But what if Beijing sees Lee Teng-hui as representative of Taiwan independence? What if Beijing sees the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen as alter egos of Lee Teng-hui? Cross-Strait interaction is certain to be impacted by Lee Teng-hui's Tokyo visit. Lee Teng-hui used his Tokyo visit to give himself a political makeover. But the backlash is likely to impact Tsai Ing-wen, who is taking part in the presidential election, and undermine her election prospects.

Lee Teng-hui gazes into the mirror and feels sorry for himself. But Tsai Ing-wen bears the brunt of his self-pity. As far as the impact on Tsai Ing-wen is concerned, the Cornell trip and the Tokyo trip differ in certain respects. One. When Lee confronted Beijing in 1999, Lee Teng-hui issued his "two states theory". That same year, Chen Shui-bian issued his "Resolution on Taiwan's Future". Chen Shui-bian was not held hostage by Lee Teng-hui. The two were on an equal footing. Tsai Ing-wen's situation is different. She has yet to emerge from Lee Teng-hui's shadow. Two. Lee is old Taiwan independence. The Sunflower Student Movement and the Anti-curriculum movement are young Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen finds herself trapped between old and young Taiwan independence forces. Chen Shui-bian's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" is not as explicitly linked to Taiwan independence. Three. Lee proudly admitted that the Taiwan independence movement relied on deception and fraud. This is certain to undermine confidence in Taiwan independence inside and outside Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen initially denounced ECFA as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan". She later changed her tune and vowed that she would "accept ECFA unconditionally", proving she could not be trusted. Three. Tsai Ing-wen has pledged to abide by the "existing constitutional framework". But Lee Teng-hui has publicly confessed that this is nothing more than "backdoor listing". How much credibility, if any, do he and Tsai still have after this? Four. When the Cornell visit took place, the two sides were relatively isolated from each other. Beijing foolishly launched missiles. Now however the two sides are joined at the hip. Missiles may not fly, but the earth will surely move.

Lee Teng-hui's Tokyo visit is likely to increase Beijing's awareness and understanding of the Taiwan independence movement. Beijing may not be able to respond to Lee Teng-hui, but it can take aim at Tsai Ing-wen. Lee Teng-hui has just handed Tsai Ing-wen a ticking time bomb.

On the eve of the 2012 presidential election, Lee Teng-hui went on stage and hugged Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to break free from his embrace. And Lee Lee Teng-hui is not about to let her do so.

李登輝的「東京康乃爾之旅」
2015-07-29聯合報

李登輝的此趟東京行,可稱為「東京康乃爾之旅」,其後座力將彈射到蔡英文身上。

一九九五年六月,李登輝訪問美國,在母校康乃爾大學發表演說,八面風光。但康乃爾之行是透過遊說公司勉強促成,造成了美國白宮、國務院及國會的重大摩擦,並成為當時兩岸關係急遽惡化以致斷裂的拐點。

當年,李登輝與北京尚維持密使過從。李透過密使,希北京支持其康乃爾之旅,藉此衝高他次年總統直選的得票率,並保證他將大幅改善兩岸關係。但北京卻因李登輝對康乃爾之旅幕前幕後的兩手操作,對李失去信任,當時即以台獨定性此事,謂李登輝「已經在台獨深淵裡滾得連泥帶水」,甚至發出「武力保台」之論。北京與李登輝建立在密使上的私密關係,就此反目破裂。

接下來的幾個月,北京與李登輝不斷惡言相向。次年一九九六年總統大選,發生飛彈危機及美國航空母艦通過台灣海峽,而李登輝亦因北京以武嚇介入選舉而贏得大選,但兩岸關係已急轉直下。至二○○○年,因李鋌而走險倡兩國論,又發生宋楚瑜出走,使國民黨輸掉總統選舉,卒致李登輝被國民黨逐出,轉身變為台獨旗手。這一連串變化,關鍵皆在康乃爾之旅。

其實,李登輝在康乃爾之行的操作,仍可謂謹慎與保留,論述尺度亦僅及「中華民國」及「主權在民」而已。北京是因美國原表示不允此行到後來放行,及稍早的司馬遼太郎事件,與發現有台獨人士參與接待工作等,而升高了與康乃爾之行的對抗,以致一發不可收拾。

相距二十年後,此次東京行,李登輝個人的政治角色雖已不如當年康乃爾之旅時的總統地位,但他在台獨陣營的政治象徵地位卻已大幅提升。若謂當年北京對李的康乃爾之行,容有過度解讀或誤解之處,此次東京之旅已無誤會可言。

李登輝二十二日在東京國會議員會館的談話有三點特徵。一、是正宗的台獨論述。主張「脫古改新」,「應當徹底釐清台灣與中國延續半世紀以上的曖昧關係」,「(要)擺脫『一個中國』、『中國法統』的約束」。二、承認其兩岸操作皆出自權謀變詐。例如,謂《國家統一綱領》是出自「於是我心生一計」,只是用在欺騙北京及「對我心懷疑懼的國民黨當權派」。三、其台獨主張以「借殼上市」為主體,保留中華民國之名,但掏空中華民國的歷史、憲政及精神內涵。

李登輝的自我見證,示範了許多台獨人物的共同性格。一、台獨思維雖有變貌,但深入骨髓。二、以權謀變詐為操作,無政治誠信可言。三、借殼上市,自欺欺人。如今,李登輝已不操持實際國政,北京對其無施力之處;但北京若視李登輝為台獨之代表,而認為民進黨及蔡英文是另一群李登輝,則雙方互動之發展,必然會受李登輝東京行的衝擊。也就是說,李登輝以東京行在自己臉上塗政治胭脂,但其後座力會彈射到正在參與總統選舉及有可能當選的蔡英文身上。

李登輝攬鏡自照,蔡英文首當其衝。康乃爾之旅當年造成的情勢,與蔡英文在李登輝東京行陰影下的處境,有幾點差異:一、李與北京交惡時,在一九九九年,李登輝發表「兩國論」,陳水扁則同年公布了《台灣前途決議文》。亦即,陳水扁非但未被李所挾持,且有分庭抗禮的態勢,但蔡英文卻迄今跳不出李的陰影。二、李是老台獨,太陽花及反課綱是小台獨。蔡英文今日處在老小台獨包夾的情勢中,此與當年陳水扁以《台灣前途決議文》區隔台獨大異其趣。三、李沾沾自得地將台獨標榜為權謀變詐的操作,使台獨人物更加喪失內外信任;而蔡英文在「ECFA傾中賣台」至「ECFA概括承受」的諸種變異,亦無可信任。三、蔡英文的「現行憲政體制推動論」,在李登輝公然揭示的「借殼上市」論述下,尤難建立可信性。四、康乃爾之旅的時代,兩岸關係比較隔絕,北京愚至發動飛彈事件;但此時此際,兩岸已至肌理血肉相連,雖不動飛彈亦可能「地動山搖」。

李登輝的東京行,極可能激化及深化北京對台獨情勢的認知及判斷,雖不能回應李登輝,但箭頭會指向蔡英文,這可視為李登輝把一顆引信著火的政治炸彈交到了蔡英文手上。

李登輝在二○一二總統大選投票前夕,曾在台上將蔡英文摟入懷中。至今,蔡英文仍未脫此懷抱,而李登輝亦不容她脫離。


Monday, July 27, 2015

Democratic Civil War or Democratic Progress?

Democratic Civil War or Democratic Progress?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 28, 2015


Executive Summary: The green camp is waging democratic civil war.The 2016 election will inevitably be a showdown between anti-China and anti-anti-China forces. On this battlefront, the KMT and those who advocate the "China concept" have no reason to shrink or retreat.

Full Text Below:

Blue vs. green political opposition and the defects of democracy have plagued Taiwan ever since democratization. Taiwan seems destined to change ruling parties every eight years. Go back seven or eight years. The Chen Shui-bian regime was neck deep in corruption. It was could not complete the nation's economic transformation. It could not narrow the nation's wealth gap, Therefore it provoked the Chinese mainland in order to win populist support on Taiwan. Democratic civil war escalated. Blue vs. green opposition intensified to unprecedented levels. The DPP went to extremes. It permitted itself to be hijacked by Taiwan independence fundamentalists and deep green media. It conducted an intraparty witch hunt for "traitors" such as Lin Cho-shui, Li Wen-chung, Julian Kuo, and the rest of the "Eleven Brigands."

Seven or eight years later, Ma Ying-jeou finds himself lost in political confusion. An election platform that stressed cross-Strait peace got him elected president twice, both times with an absolute majority. Most members of the public hoped to transcend "ethnic" politics and blue vs. green divisions. They hoped for a peaceful and stable cross-Strait environment. They hoped to focus on solving economic problems and ensuring sustainable development. But the Ma administration was surprisingly inept at domestic policy. The DPP refused to act responsibly. Instead it accused the Ma administration of "cozying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan". It accused it of "pandering to [Mainland] China". Alas, the KMT's debating skills were non-existent. It could not defend itself. It could not govern the nation. Peoples' livelihoods were affected. Wave upon wave of political struggle ensued. Last year's nine in one local elections were ostensibly about local governance. But the green camp argued that "Unless the KMT falls, Taiwan will not prosper". It turned the election into a one-sided democratic civil war. This civil war did not end with the KMT's election defeat and the resignation of its chairman. Instead, it escalated.

The term "democratic civil war" was coined on Taiwan. In 2005, Lee Teng-hui alleged that "Some people are taking advantage of Taiwan's democracy to wage civil war. They are using freedom and human rights as cover. They are part of [Mainland] China's united front conspiracy. The people of Taiwan must distinguish between friend and foe. They must see where the enemy is." Lee spun blue camp oversight of Democratic Progressive Party rule as a "struggle between [Mainland] China and Taiwan". This grotesque attempt at red-baiting swept aside reason. More importantly political opponents were cast as Communist sympathizers and as enemies of the people. Fighting against them was not considered anti-democratic. it was not considered persecution of political opponents. Instead, it was transformed into a "Love of Taiwan" Holy War.

Taiwan independence extremist Chin Heng-wei has been demagoguing Lee's rhetoric. He has spun the Red Shirt anti-corruption movement as an attempt by "reactionary forces" to prevent "nativist rule". He demands democratic civil war because "It is essential to the development of Taiwan's democracy." To Taiwan independence extremists, only by voting out the KMT can they transform the "China Party" into the "Taiwan Party". Only by voting out the KMT, can they "resolve the civil war, and complete the consolidation of democracy". Only by voting out the KMT, can they transform Taiwan into a "normal nation". Their words show that "democratic civil war" is nothing more than hatred of Mainland China and antipathy toward Mainland China. It is the substitution of reunification vs. independence "ethnic" antagonism for democracy and conventional party politics. It is crypto-fascist dictatorship and dangerously bigoted ultranationalism.

The DPP may not have formally endorsed the concept of democratic civil war. But in 2007, when Frank Hsieh ran for president. he too characterized the struggle between Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties as democratic civil war. He said future national leaders must "End the Civil War". He said they must "reconcile and co-exist". He apparently hoped to distance himself from Chen Shui-bian. But during the 2008 election Frank Hsieh continued to incite hatred against of the Mainland in an attempt to reverse his political fortunes.

Eight years later, the green camp continues to believe that "democratic civil war is indispensable". The 2016 election looks promising for the DPP. Yet it persists in playing its "hate China" and "anti-China" card.

Tsai Ing-wen has paid lip service to "maintaining the status quo" and "honoring the ROC constitutional framework". She has used feel-good language to reduce outside wariness towards Taiwan independence. But she has never done a thing to show that the DPP is willing to forsake Taiwan independence.

The Democratic Progressive Party advocates Taiwan independence. But most people focus on the Taiwan independence party platform. In fact the "Resolution for a Normal Nation" approved by the DPP in September 2007 is a clearer and more concrete declaration of democratic civil war. It is the DPP's basic program to change the name of the nation, author a new constitution, and eradicate vestiges of Chinese tradition. The DPP has not forsaken its agenda. It is merely waiting for an opportune moment to implement it.

Tsai Ing-wen as DPP leader may present a more rational, moderate, and temperate front. But she still betrays a democratic civil war mentality in certain venues. Several days ago, she addressed a Southern Society fundraising luncheon. She pontificated, saying that "If the DPP does not shape up, the KMT will never fall". She appeared to be urging DPP reform, but her premise that the KMT must fall is antithetical to healthy partisan competition and necessary democratic oversight.

Following the Sunflower Student Movement, the green camp demanded an amendment to the referendum law that would eliminate blue camp legislators and wipe out KMT party assets. These and other issues failed to rebuild anti-STA momentum. Society's "quiet force" continued to moderate the forces of extremism. When the KMT nominated Hung Shiu-chu, the green camp democratic civil war of 2015 and 2016 officially began. The object of this wave of democratic civil war is of course to bring down the Kuomintang, and promote hatred of Mainland China.

The DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union support the "anti-curriculum movement". Tsai Ing-wen and green camp county chiefs and city mayors have even intimidated the Ministry of Education, warning it not to file suit. The "anti-curriculum movement" constitutes a new battleground in the "anti-democratic civil war". Lee Teng-hui was the initiator of "democratic civil war". He urges "gratitude for Japanese rule" and alleges that "the Diaoyutai Islands belong to Japan". Those too are part of the battleground for democratic civil war.

The green camp is waging democratic civil war.The 2016 election will inevitably be a showdown between anti-China and anti-anti-China forces. On this battlefront, the KMT and those who advocate the "China concept" have no reason to shrink or retreat.

民主內戰或民主進步?
20150728 中國時報

由於藍綠對立及民主體制的缺憾,台灣民主化以來,政黨惡鬥激化,似乎注定每隔8年就得面臨一次政黨輪替。回首78年前,陳水扁政權深陷貪腐疑雲,又無能解決經濟轉型、貧富差距等問題,就藉著在兩岸關係上挑釁中國大陸,以凝聚民粹支持力量。「民主內戰」逐漸升級,不但藍綠對立空前激烈,民進黨也走向極端,被基本教義派與深綠媒體綁架,在內部追剿所謂「叛徒」,如林濁水、李文忠、郭正亮等「十一寇」。

78年過去了,馬英九在人心厭亂思治的政治氛圍下,憑藉兩岸和平發展的主訴求,獲得民眾兩度以過半數支持當選總統,原本多數民眾期待台灣能夠跨越族群政治及藍綠對立的鴻溝,在兩岸和平穩定的大環境下,集中力量解決民生經濟難題,打開台灣永續發展的前途。出乎意料的是,馬英九政府在內政上出現諸多敗筆,而民進黨也不願就事論事監督,卻祭出「親中賣台」、「傾中」的大帽子打擊對手。偏偏國民黨論述貧乏、回擊無力,不但出現更嚴重的治理失能,民生受累,更掀起了一波波激烈的「政治鬥爭」。去年九合一地方選舉,分明是地方治理良窳之爭,卻在綠營側翼發動的「國民黨不倒、台灣不會好」聲浪中,成了一面倒的「民主內戰」。國民黨的崩壞並未因為選舉失利、主席下台而停止,如今已有越演越烈的趨勢。

「民主內戰」這個名詞在台灣首先被使用,應該是出自李登輝,他在2005年時指出:「有人在台灣內部利用民主從事內戰;並以自由人權作為掩護,呼應中國統戰陰謀。台灣人民要有敵我意識,看清楚敵人在哪裡。」李登輝的說法,是把藍營對民進黨執政的監督與反對,用「中國vs.台灣」這樣簡化、粗暴的二分法加以扭曲、抹紅,企圖抵消反對黨存在的合理性,更重要的是,既然反對黨是中共同路人,是人民的敵人,與他們對抗不但不是反民主,不是打擊政敵,還是一場愛台灣的聖戰。

極端獨派的金恆煒就繼續「闡揚」了李登輝的說法,他把當年紅衫軍反貪腐運動視為「反動勢力」的反撲,是企圖打垮本土政權,所以就有了「民主內戰的必要性」,因為這「對台灣民主政治發展而言,卻是正面而必要的效應」。對於極端台獨來說,只有用選票推倒國民黨,「轉化中國黨為台灣黨」,才能「解決內戰,完成民主鞏固」,台灣也才能成為「正常國家」。由他們的言論也可以清楚地發現,所謂的「民主內戰」本質上始終是仇中、反中的,是以統獨族群對立取消、代換民主政治、政黨競爭,這是隱性的法西斯獨裁思想,是褊狹危險的極端民族主義。

更重要的是,民進黨雖然沒有肯定過「民主內戰」的論述思維,謝長廷在2007年被提名參選總統時還說,台灣朝野互鬥就像「民主內戰」,未來的國家領導人要「終結內戰」、「和解共生」,彷彿要和陳水扁切割。但實際上,謝長廷在2008年大選中仍然不斷大力散播仇中恐中,希望能夠實現「逆轉勝」。

8年過去了,在綠營人士的腦海中,「民主內戰的必要」極端思維從未消失。2016年大選民進黨聲勢一片看好,但始終未放棄他們慣用的「仇中牌」、「反中牌」。

蔡英文提出「維持現狀」和「中華民國憲政體制」,用模糊的語言軟化外界對台獨的戒心,但她從來沒有採取實際行動,證明民進黨願意放下台獨思維。

談到民進黨的台獨主張,人民往往只聚焦在台獨黨綱,實際上,民進黨在20079月通過的「正常國家決議文」是更為具體、更為清晰的「民主內戰綱領」,是民進黨推動正名、制憲、去中國化的基本綱領,他們至今不但仍未加以放棄,反而不斷伺機推動。

位居領先地位的蔡英文雖然擺出理性、中道、溫和的姿態,卻仍然會在特定場合流露「民主內戰」的心態,日前,她在南社募款餐會上就高談「民進黨不好,國民黨不倒」,雖然看似在勉勵民進黨改革進步,但卻是以「國民黨倒」為其前提,這已經完全背離了政黨良性競爭、相互監督的民主精神。

太陽花運動之後,泛綠陣營推動的「公投法補正」、「割藍委」以至於「黨產歸零」等議題都沒有重現反服貿運動的氣勢,社會的「沉默力量」依然節制著極端力量。但隨著國民黨正式提名洪秀柱參選,泛綠陣營20152016「民主內戰」已經正式開打。這一波的民主內戰,當然還是以「打倒國民黨」為總目標,以「反中」、「仇中」為武器。

從民進黨、台聯對於反課綱運動的介入、支持,以至於蔡英文率綠營縣市長恫嚇教育部不得提告的動作看來,「反課綱微調」可說是「反中民主內戰」另闢的新戰場。民主內戰始作俑者李登輝在日本的「日本統治感謝論」和「釣魚台日本主權論」,當然也是民主內戰的新戰場。

面對綠營民主內戰的攻勢,2016選戰必定是一場反中與反反中的對決,在這個戰線上,國民黨及支持「中國概念」者,沒有任何猶豫退縮的理由。

Sunday, July 26, 2015

Hung Hsiu-chu's Unorthodox Pat Hand

Hung Hsiu-chu's Unorthodox Pat Hand
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 27, 2015


Executive Summary: Cross-Strait relations have significantly improved over the past seven years. But the low-hanging fruit has already been picked. Further progress is now more difficult. The Republic of China government on Taiwan will hold a presidential election next year. Cross-Strait relations will soon be in limbo. The foundation for continued cross-Strait relations must be firmed up. Progress must not be set back. This is something the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait must work for.

Full Text Below:

Cross-Strait relations have significantly improved over the past seven years. But the low-hanging fruit has already been picked. Further progress is now more difficult. The Republic of China government on Taiwan will hold a presidential election next year. Cross-Strait relations will soon be in limbo. The foundation for continued cross-Strait relations must be firmed up. Progress must not be set back. This is something the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait must work for.

Xi Jinping came to power during the 18th National Congress. Xi did not want "cross-Strait political differences to persist, generation after generation".  Xi hoped to seize the initiative and take concrete action to improve cross-Strait relations. The Ma government hoped to use the 1992 Consensus to institutionalize cross-Strait exchanges. But Ma's effort was limited. It was confined to the MAC and the Taiwan Affairs Office referring to each other by their offiical titles and holding regular meetings. Negotiations over the establishment of representative offices are still ongoing. Other initiatives have met with resistance. The Sunflower Student Movement and the nine in one election results made the Ma government more timid about cross-Strait policy. The STA and MTA have been stalled by DPP pressure. The two associations interact as usual, but progress remains limited.

The presidential campaign is heating up. Most of the focus is on the candidates. Their cross-Strait policies have attracted the most attention. Tsai Ing-wen lost the 2012 election during the final mile over cross-Strait relations. This time she did her homework. First, she pledged to "maintain the cross-Strait status quo" in order to win US support. Then she pledged to comply with the "ROC constitutional framework" in order to win Mainland support. These two pledges have passed muster with the US. But the Mainland still has doubts about her, and disbelieves her assurances.

The Mainland opposes Taiwan independence. In this regard, Tsai Ing-wen has yet to given an inch, After all, these ideals represent her roots. If she yields on these issues, even the Taiwan independence fundamentalists will forsake her. But if she refuses to yield, "the earth will move". She not only refuses to yield on Taiwan independence. She even refuses to yield on "One China". We know that because she has refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus from beginning to end. Therefore even former Defense Minister Lin Chong-pin and former Vice President Annette Lu have predicted "an avalanche of severed diplomatic relations" in the event Tsai Ing-wen is elected.

Consider Hung Hsiu-chu's cross-Strait policy. During the primaries she proposed an upgraded version of the 1992 Consensus. She hoped that the two sides could reaffirm opposition to Taiwan independence and the use of force. This was what she meant by One China, Same Interpretation, and her Cross-Strait Peace Agreement. She crossed the nomination threshold and became the KMT presidential candidate. She was then blasted by her comrades, by party members who argued that the election would be lost under such a policy. After talks with President Ma and Chairman Eric Chu, Hung Hsiu-chu agreed to revert to the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.

Forbidding Hung Hsiu-chu to promote her cross-Strait policy will obviously hinder progress in cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen's policies are likely to turn the clock back on cross-Strait relations. Improper handling of the South China Sea issue could even offend nationalists on the Mainland, and lead to a repeat of the 1995 Taiwan Straits crisis. Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Susan Shirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, fear an accidental war between the two sides. They want the United States to promote an interim agreement. Taiwan will pledge not to move toward Taiwan independence. The Mainland will pledge not to use military force. This has since become the mainstream view in the US, but obviously back then the time was not ripe. A flurry of interest was followed by silence. After 2008, cross-Strait relations stabilized. Mention of an interim agreement ceased. Why has it now been set forth? The reason is obvious. The United States fears a collision between Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen.

US anxiety is shared by the public on Taiwan, perhaps even more intensely. After all, Tsai Ing-wen is likely to be elected. The Sunflower Student Movement and the nine in one elections show that the public on Taiwan fears being swallowed up by the Mainland. Therefore they fear a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement will sell the into slavery. During the 2012 election campaign, President Ma set forth such a proposal, but withdrew it a mere two days later upon encountering strong public opposition. Hung Hsiu-chu also advanced this concept. But she did not even get a chance to put it into action before being lambasted by fellow party members. She has been force to temporarily abandon it.

The two sides of the Strait require a mechanism to prevent collisions. US think tanks have proposed an "interim agreement" as most appropriate. On the one hand, it would prevent the DPP from moving toward independence upon assuming power. This would reassure the Mainland. On the other hand, it would prevent the Mainland from resorting to military force, saber rattling, and frightening the public on Taiwan. If the two sides can learn to trust each other in the short term, a permanent peace agreement will eventually become possibile.

Cross-Strait relations have reached this point will great difficulty. This is the fruit of many peoples' effort on both sides of the Strait. This is the crystallization of shared wisdom. If a spur of the moment misjudgement leads to a collision, neither side will benefit. The Chinese people on both sides of the Strait will suffer. We realize that the signing of an interim agreement will be difficult. But it is something the two sides must consider. At the very least, the KMT should sign a KMT/CCP peace agreement. This would make "No Taiwan independence, no Mainland use of force" part of Hung Hsiu-chu's presidential campaign. Such an agreement might well turn out to be an "unorthodox pat hand".


Thursday, July 23, 2015

CCP: Who Made Human Rights Lawyers Necessary?

CCP: Who Made Human Rights Lawyers Necessary?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 24, 2015


Executive Summary: In Shakespeare's "Henry VI", a butcher utters the ironic phrase, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." On July 10, the CCP interrogated and arrested large numbers of human rights lawyers. Its action evoked a surreal "let's kill all the lawyers" terror. The motives for its action are hard to tell. But they have clearly undermined the credibility of Xi's "rule of law".

Full Text Below:

In Shakespeare's "Henry VI", a butcher utters the ironic phrase, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." On July 10, the CCP interrogated and arrested large numbers of human rights lawyers. Its action evoked a surreal "let's kill all the lawyers" terror. The motives for its action are hard to tell. But they have clearly undermined the credibility of Xi's "rule of law".

The July 10 roundup of human rights lawyers has alarmed the international community. The timeline was strange. Just nine days before the National People's Congress, the party implemented a constitutional oath system. It assumed a "rule of law" posture. Yet nine days later, it began large-scale police roundups of lawyers. This paradoxical behaviour is leading to speculation about internal dissent over the Mainland's future.

Politically speaking, rounding up the lawyers is like throwing gasoline on the fire. Netizens on the Mainland mocked the action. They said "The authorities are cultivating China's future political leaders", and that "They all have the same name: human rights lawyers." Repression of dissent often creates a succession of public heroes. These heroes lead to "downtrodden masses rising in rebellion".

In a more open society, shysters often lie, whitewash the truth, play word games, and invert right and wrong, just to win cases. They misinterpret evidence, distort the truth, and misinterpret the laws in order to spare criminals from punishment. They care only about profit, and not about justice. But if the government uses authoritarian methods to deal with such lawyers, they may lionize them. They may even give them a new lease on life. Examples include Chen Shui-bian and Roh Tae Woo, both of whom were human rights lawyers turned president.

Human rights lawyers on the Mainland mostly help defend the rights of ordinary citizens in a "rule of law" vacuum. So many people petition the government, one after another, because official abuse of power renders them helpless and in need of legal redress. They need human rights activists because the people's rights have been ignored by the system far too long. Human rights lawyers, paradoxically, are a product of the communist system. Most of them fight only for the right to life, liberty, and property. They work inside the legal framework, dealing with those in power. They seek justice within a system deficient in political rights. They brave all manner of pressure and dangers, using the nation's legal code to fight those in power.

In either a democratic or authoritarian society, the law is the peoples' last line of defense. Lawyers provide legal representation for citizens. Without the freedom to practice law, even distinguished and impartial judges are of no use. People would remain at the mercy of the state, because justice requires an adversarial system. Only by arguing the pros and cons of a case, can justice truly prevail.

The Ministry of Public Security crossed provincial borders north and south. Over 200 human rights lawyers or human rights advocates were interrogated, arrested, or threatened. The public was left fearful and anxious. Some were arrested without charges, then tried and convicted inthe media. Human rights lawyers for the Fengrui Law Firm were accused of "collusion with other petitioners, inciting disorder, and consorting with criminal syndicates."

The crackdown has led to considerable speculation. The crackdown began with female human rights lawyer Wang Yu. Yu assisted parties who sued Jiang Zemin in June. Some think this struck fear in the Jiang faction, launching it into action. In other words, Xi Jinping may not be the instigator of the crackdown. The current climate is unusual. The signs are unusual. They include political czar Zhou Yongkang being sentenced to life imprisonment, the Fourth Plenary Session "rule of law" decisions last year, Xi Jinping's special meeting with Myanmar democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi in June, revisions to the official oath by the Peoples Congress in July, which stipulated that officials must swear allegiance to the constitution, the state, and the people, rather than the party, and the elimination of the term "Chinese characteristics" and the addition of "democracy". These were all important political signals issued by Xi Jinping. But why was Zhou Yongkang left out of this "Zhou Yongkang formula" for arrests?

Clearly, the CCP still does not understand the "rule of law". The majority of the ruling class still worships power and not the law. The arrests were conducted under Xi Jinping's eyes. He did nothing to stop them. Will the CCP address the problems with the legal system? Will it prevent abusive practices that violate people's rights? As long as the people lack confidence and hope, human rights lawyers will continue to practice and gain popular support. No matter how high the walls, the mind yearns for freedom. Those who should be locked in cages, are those who abuse power, not human rights lawyers.

中共應自問:是誰逼出了維權律師
2015-07-24聯合報

莎士比亞在《亨利六世》裡,透過一位屠夫之口,說了一句反諷之語:「我們最要緊的事兒,就是殺光所有的律師。」七月十日前後中共對維權律師大規模約談、抓捕,就帶著這種「殺律師」的超現實恐怖感。背後緣由仍難摸透,但習近平的「依法治國」這支大旗卻不免損傷。

這起驚動國際的七一○維權律師抓捕事件,從時間軸上觀察,透出一股詭譎氣息。原因是,僅僅在九天之前,中共的全國人大常委會剛通過了實行憲法宣誓制度的決定,作出了「依法治國」的姿態,而九天後,警察竟然開始大規模抓捕律師,這些前後不一的行為邏輯,難免引發內部是否有路線之爭的揣測。

就統治的層次來看,抓捕律師其實是潑油滅火之舉。如同大陸網民所反諷的:「當局在培養中國未來的政治領袖」,「他們有一個共同的名字:維權律師。」統治者對異議者的壓制,常常是炮製出一個接一個的人民英雄,而這些英雄將愈來愈引發「萬家墨面」的歌吟動地。

維權律師實即人權律師的代稱。在法律制度較為開放的社會,有些「訟棍型」的律師常可能說謊、粉飾、矯詞,為了贏得訴訟而顛倒是非,將證據演繹成跟事實相左的反論,或將法條寬泛地解讀成犯罪的保護令,他們關心的只是牟利,而不是正義。但是,統治者用威權手段來對付律師,卻可能為他們戴上冠冕,甚至替他們開闢政治生命;包括陳水扁與盧武鉉,都是人權律師出身的總統。

大陸的維權律師,主要在中國法治的荒漠中幫基層人民捍衛權利。之所以有許多民眾接踵上訪,豈不是因為體制的無助與官員的霸道令人民呼救無門嗎?之所以需要「維權」,不正是因為人民的權利被體制忽視已久嗎?維權律師其實是中共體制的產物,他們多數只為了正當的生命、人格、財產權,在合法的制度內與當政者周旋,在政治權利從缺的情境下曲線救國。他們冒著各種壓力與危險,以國家法典裡的正義去抗衡權力。

無論在民主或專制社會,法律都是正義的最後防線,律師則是協助公民自我捍衛的法律代理人。若是沒有自由執業的律師,縱有一批傑出、公正的法官也將無補於事,人民仍將暴露於權力的網羅之下,因為正義必須經過辯證,在進行了正反的往復辯詰之後,正義的容顏才能真正浮現。

這次由公安部主導的行動,跨省區遍及南北、超過兩百位維權律師或人士被約談或抓捕,威嚇逼人,留給社會恐懼和不安的感受。若干媒體在被捕律師及其事務所未經起訴、審判前,就為他們戴上有罪帽子,稱以鋒銳律師事務所為主體的維權律師們是「與訪民相互勾連、滋事擾序的涉嫌重大犯罪團伙。」

鎮壓行動引來諸多揣測。整個逮捕行動最早起於維權女律師王宇,而王宇六月間曾聲援控告江澤民行動。有人推測,這造成了江派的恐懼,進而發動了此次行動。亦即,如今當家的習近平或許並非始作俑者。不過,這場行動的反常氣氛,讓人感到其中的不尋常跡象:政法沙皇周永康已被判決無期徒刑;中共在去年四中全會通過「依法治國」的決定;今年六月習近平特別邀訪並會晤了緬甸民主象徵翁山蘇姬;七月人大通過的官員宣誓文字,官員將只向憲法、國家與人民效忠,而不必宣示效忠於「黨」,取消了「中國特色」,增加了「民主」。這些,皆是習近平釋出的重大政治訊號,但在這個脈絡底下,怎還能發生這樁沒有周永康的「周永康式抓捕」?

很顯然,中共並未真正理解「依法治國」的意涵,統治階層中的多數依然崇拜著權力,而不是「法」的權威,抓捕依然在習近平的眼皮下進行,他並未制止。但是,中共不解決法制體系的沉痾,不防止侵犯人民權利的濫權行徑,只要人民除了「維權」再無信心與希望,維權律師就一定會繼續出現,繼續獲得民眾的支持。再高的牆也關不住嚮往自由的心靈,應該被關進籠子裡的,是被濫用的權力,而不是律師。

Wednesday, July 22, 2015

US Pork Imports: What is Tsai Ing-wen's Solution?

US Pork Imports: What is Tsai Ing-wen's Solution?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 23, 2015


Executive Summary: Vice Minister of Economic Affairs Cho Shih-chao recently said that if Taiwan wants to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it must allow US pork imports. US pork may not taste good. It may taste "gamey". But we can label the place of origin and allow consumers to decide what to buy. The very next day however, Cho Shih-chao changed his tune. He said "That was merely my personal opinion". He said if he had known a reporter was present that day, he would not have said it out loud.

Full Text Below:

Vice Minister of Economic Affairs Cho Shih-chao recently said that if Taiwan wants to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it must allow US pork imports. US pork may not taste good. It may taste "gamey". But we can label the place of origin and allow consumers to decide what to buy. The very next day however, Cho Shih-chao changed his tune. He said "That was merely my personal opinion". He said if he had known a reporter was present that day, he would not have said it out loud.

Cho Shih-chao's panic and backpedaling is easy to understand. If we wish to join the TPP, we must of course comply with TPP regulations. If we unilaterally impose limits on US pork imports, we will not be allowed to join the TPP. One cannot have one's cake and eat it too. The trade-offs must be weighed against one another. A general election looms. If the ruling party touches these hot button issues, it is certain to invite opposition party allegations that the government is "indifferent to the interests of pig farmers". Pig farmers are certain to take to the streets in protest. The KMT's election prospects are already dim. Cho Shih-chao hastily backpedaled. He knew he stirred up a hornet's nest.

The problem is threefold. One. Do we want to join the TPP or not? If we do not, can we confidently thrive amidst international competition? Two. If we must join the TPP, the United States will insist that we allow the US pork imports. If we refuse, won't we be prevented from joining? Is there is some loophole that would allow us to join the TPP regardless? Three. Are we willing to safeguard the interests of Taiwan's pig farmers at the expense of other industries? Do they not matter? Does joining the TPP no longer matter?

Cho Shih-chao said that "We must allow US pork imports".  That means that the Ma government considers the overall benefits of Taiwan joining the TPP, outweighs any impact on the pork industry. We can use "country of origin" labeling as a way to remind people to buy less US pork. Allowing imports is consistent with international trade principles. Using "country of origin" labels enables consumers to reduce demand for US pork imports, and support local pig farmers. Such a solution is eminently reasonable. But Ma government timidity, makes it difficult to implement. Another question is even more intriguing. Namely, how does the DPP intend to deal with this problem?

Tsai Ing-wen recently met with former US Vice President Dan Quayle. When parting, she said "I'm sure we'll be in power next year". Tsai Ing-wen's confidence is not unfounded. But suppose the Ma government fails to resolve this problem? Once the DPP becomes the ruling party, US pork imports will be its responsibility. When that happens, will Tsai Ing-wen have a better solution than the KMT? Probably not.

In fact, when Tsai Ing-wen visited the US last month, she arranged a secret visit to the US Trade Representative. The visit is rumoured to have been about allowing US pork and beef organ meat imports. Joseph Wu paved the way for Tsai Ing-wen's visit in advance. Tsai may have reached an understanding with the US on the matter. Tsai Ing-wen may have made all sorts of secret commitments to the US. Once in power, she would then agree to allow US pork imports, perhaps in exchange for US support for her cross-Strait policy.

Is Tsai Ing-wen putting on a show of opposing US pork imports, even as she accuses the KMT of ignoring the interests of Taiwan pig farmers? Will she change her tune next year once she is in power? Will she suddenly begin talking about "the greater good" and allow US pork imports? How does the public on Taiwan feel about that? If she repeatedly engages in deceit, how will she maintain the public trust?

In fact, US pork imports is merely an issue the public is familiar with. Given the current state of affairs, politically and economically, many choices must be made between the general interest and special interests. Many issues are unraveling, or await closer scrutiny before the problems become apparent. Amidst the "fog of war", the truth remains hidden. This is why Tsai Ing-wen must come clean on issues she has evaded or concealed. These include the abolition of the death penalty, low wages, inequities in economic restructuring, the STA, the MTA, and pension reform. Currently the Democratic Progressive Party is in the opposition. It bears no responsibility for administration policy. But that does not mean opposition parties can hide their positions. In particular, DPP obstructionism often means they do whatever it takes to achieve their goals. They care nothing about legitimacy or principles. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power yet again, people must know whether it has any answers. They must know whether it has any tricks up its sleeve.

The Ma government is afraid to mention US pork imports. That is its chronic weakness. But Tsai Ing-wen has her own calculations. If she is elected president, will she brazenly announce the beginning of US pork imports to Taiwan? If she does, would that not amount to brazen deceit? Many people are currently mocking everything President Ma does. They are hardly about to allow the Ma government to import US pork products. But if the decision to allow US pork imports falls to Tsai Ing-wen, and the public fails to make even a peep, would that not be democracy's greatest irony?

What is Tsai Ing-wen's position on joining the TPP? What is her position on US pork imports? Has she made any secret promises to the United States? Tsai Ing-wen, please tell the public where you stand on these matters, in plain language.

美豬叩關,蔡英文的答案是什麼?
2015-07-23聯合報

經濟部次長卓士昭最近在演講中提到,台灣要加入TPP(跨太平洋夥伴協定),一定要開放美國豬肉,美豬雖不好吃,「有騷味」,但可以標示產地,讓消費者決定。但卓士昭次日隨即改口,稱這只是他「個人意見」,若知道那天有記者在場,就不會這麼說了。

卓士昭的惶恐與退縮,不難理解。台灣要加入TPP,當然要遵守該組織的相關規範;我方若片面對美豬設限,那麼加入TPP的計畫便可能受阻。這是魚與熊掌的問題,必須權衡輕重作出取捨。然而,正當大選當前,執政黨若輕率碰觸這個棘手議題,勢必遭反對黨抹黑,指責政府「不顧農民利益」,豬農也必然接踵上街抗議;如此一來,國民黨已然塗炭的選情就更水深火熱了。卓士昭急急收回自己的話,自是唯恐捅了馬蜂窩。

這項問題,可以從三個方向思考:第一,台灣是不是非加入TPP不可?若不加入,我們是不是仍可以在國際競爭中活得很好,無懼威脅?第二,如果非要加入TPP不可,那麼在堅持不開放美豬的情況,會不會受到阻撓?有沒有其他蹊徑或巧門可以進入TPP?第三,為了維護台灣豬農的利益,是不是犧牲其他產業的利益也無所謂,甚至放棄加入TPP?

卓士昭會說出「一定要開放」,顯示馬政府評估過,認為加入TPP對台灣的整體利益大於對養豬業的個別衝擊;至於減緩美豬衝擊之道,則可藉「標示產地」的方式,提醒民眾減少購買。同意「開放」,是遵從國際貿易原則;「標示產地」,則是藉消費者力量抑低美豬進口數量,共同支持本土豬農。這樣的思維,堪稱合理;但由於馬政府的畏怯,卻難以付諸行動。然而,更令人好奇的是,民進黨對此將有什麼對策?

蔡英文日前會見美國前副總統奎爾,告別時,她說了一句:「我確信,我們明年會執政。」蔡英文的自信滿滿當然不是全無道理,不過,如果馬政府不處理這個問題,明年一旦政黨輪替,開放美豬進口問題就要落在民進黨手上。屆時,蔡英文能拿出比國民黨更高明的辦法嗎?答案是恐怕未必。

事實上,蔡英文上月的訪美之行,安排了一個訪問美國貿易代表署的祕密行程;據了解,即可能與開放美豬及美牛雜議題有關。在此之前,吳釗燮赴美為蔡英文鋪路,亦與美方就此議題有過默契。簡言之,蔡英文可能就此向美方作過不明形式的承諾,一旦執政,會同意開放美豬進口;甚至可能以此為籌碼,換取美方對她兩岸立場的支持。

在這種情況下,如果蔡英文在國內擺出一副反美豬的姿態,指控國民黨不顧台灣豬農利益;而一旦明年政權到手,她卻可能改口「以大局為重」,親手放行美豬,台灣人民將作何感想?若是如此反反覆覆,表裡不一,她將如何維持自己的公信?

其實,美豬只是社會大眾更耳熟能詳的議題之一,當前國家政經大政中,還有許許多多要在個別群體與社會整體利益之間作出抉擇的事,還有許多必須抽絲剝繭或等待時日檢驗才能見真章的事;但在漫天的政治硝煙中,許多事實真相卻不斷遭到蒙蔽或欺瞞。正因如此,我們認為蔡英文有必要在大選過程中更清楚地說明她一直迴避或企圖隱藏的立場,例如廢死、低薪問題、分配不公、經濟轉型、服貿貨貿、年金改革等。民進黨目前只是在野黨,當然沒有執政責任的問題,但這並不表示在野黨可以不必表示態度;尤其民進黨杯葛政府施政的理由與手段常常無所不用其極,只求達到目的,不問手段與理念之正當。民進黨如果要再執政,民眾必須知道它是否真的胸有成竹,它的袖裡乾坤確實藏有錦囊妙計。

馬政府不敢提開放美豬,那是它懦弱的痼疾;但以蔡英文的盤算,若是她當選總統後大剌剌宣布開放美豬,那難道不是狡詐?目前許多民眾對馬總統一舉一動充滿譏嘲與謾罵,更不可能支持政府開放美豬;但如果開放美豬的決定最後換手由蔡英文拍板,而人們竟然也甘之如飴,這種迷亂狀態,豈不是民主最大的諷刺?

蔡英文對於加入TPP的立場如何,對開放美豬等項目的態度如何,是否對美國作過什麼承諾,請坦誠向民眾交代清楚吧!

Tuesday, July 21, 2015

Does the Mainland Really Buy Tsai Ing-wen's Cross-Strait Proposals?

Does the Mainland Really Buy Tsai Ing-wen's Cross-Strait Proposals?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 22, 2015


Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen remembers the lesson of the 2012 presidential election. This year, she is fully prepared on cross-Strait policy. She has adopted "maintaining the status quo" and "affirming the Republic of China constitutional framework" as her campaign planks. Both of these campaign planks run counter to Democratic Progressive Party tradition. She also "unconditionally accepts" the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy. She is playing the safety card. So far cross-Strait policy has not become the focus of debate. Having ducked discussion of her weak points, her poll numbers continue to rise.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen remembers the lesson of the 2012 presidential election. This year, she is fully prepared on cross-Strait policy. She has adopted "maintaining the status quo" and "affirming the Republic of China constitutional framework" as her campaign planks. Both of these campaign planks run counter to Democratic Progressive Party tradition. She also "unconditionally accepts" the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy. She is playing the safety card. So far cross-Strait policy has not become the focus of debate. Having ducked discussion of her weak points, her poll numbers continue to rise.

But the DPP has yet to publicly renounce Taiwan independence, and Tsai Ing-wen has yet to recognize the 1992 Consensus. The KMT has been tardy in nominating Hung Hsiu-chu. She and the KMT have yet to fire the opening salvo on cross-Strait issues. That is the only reason Tsai Ing-wen's evasive strategy of not rocking the boat is temporarily working. To her, the presidential election is nothing more than a KMT tempest in a teapot. But this state of affairs cannot be sustained. Those outside Taiwan have long known that the winds of change are coming, and that the America Factor and the China Factor are increasingly important.

On the surface, Tsai Ing-wen received red carpet treatment during her US visit. But as this newspaper noted yesterday in an editorial, the fact that the US rolled out the red carpet does not mean that it bought her cross-Strait rhetoric. In fact, in the month following Tsai's visit, some unusual pronouncements have emerged from inside the Beltway. For example, Joseph R. Donovan Jr., Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, now says cross-Strait policy must be acceptable to people on both sides of the Strait, rather than just the people of Taiwan. This is an obvious change. This change was proposed by recognized experts on cross-Strait issues. They argue that the United States should seek a cross-Strait "preliminary agreement" to ensure cross-Strait peace and stability.

American attitudes are gradually changing. The signs are clear. Xi Jinping is about to pay Washington his first state visit. Officials and aides from the two governments are shuttling back and forth, making arrangements and determining the agenda of the talks. Mainland President Xi Jinping is resolute and determined on cross-Strait issues. The United States realizes that Tsai Ing-wen's equivocal cross-Strait policy path is more perilous than previously imagined. The United States may or may not buy Tsai's rhetoric. But as long as the Mainland does not, cross-Strait tensions are likely to escalate to dangerous levels.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies is a Washington think tank. Senior CSIS researcher Bonnie Glaser and Assistant Researcher Jacqueline Vitello recently published an article in the National Interest. They made several points worthy of attention. One. No matter what Tsai Ing-wen says, Beijing remains suspicious because of her past record. Two. If Tsai Ing-wen pursues de jure independence, Beijing will react violently. It will impose a diplomatic blockade or even resort to military force. Three. The various parties must not underestimate Xi's reaction, especially given internal pressure not to show weakness regarding Taiwan. Four. If Tsai publicly rejects the existing framework, including the 1992 consensus, she will damage cross-Strait relations. Five. The United States must take concrete action, the sooner the better. Glaser and Vitello argue that the United States should seek a cross-Strait "preliminary agreement". Arguments in favor of a Provisional Agreement first appeared in 1999. Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirk, suggested ensuring that Taiwan would not move toward independence and the Mainland would not resort to the use of force. Mainstream public opinion in the US caused it to die a natural death. But this old wine has now appeared in new bottles, revealing US anxiety.

The solution to Mainland Chinese mistrust and United States anxiety is in the 1992 consensus reached by the two cross-Strait associations in 1992. The 1992 consensus is the basis for understanding and trust between the two sides. It has three implications, including two agreements and one disagreement. |A. Both sides adhere to the One China Principle. B. Both sides pursue national unity. C. Taipei advocates One China, Different Interpretations, but but Beijing does not accept One China, Different Interpretations. It considers the 1992 Consensus an administrative matter. Therefore it feels no need to stress "One China". The result was "One China, No Interpretation". After 2008, the Ma government narrowed the meaning of the 1992 Consensus to One China, Different Interpretations. To expedite cross-Strait exchanges, Beijing tolerated the Ma government's interpretation. But according to Beijing's understanding, the 1992 Consensus does not mean "Different Interpretations". It means "opposition to Taiwan independence", or "Both sides are part of one China." Xi Jinping says the core of the 1992 consensus is recognition that the Mainland and Taiwan both are part of one China. As long as they agree on this point, political parties or groups on Taiwan and the Mainland can enage in exchanges without obstacles. Without the 1992 consensus as a solid foundation, the earth beneath our feet will move.

Tsai Ing-wen now faces two problems. She may be able to use vague remarks about "maintaining the status quo" or "affirming the ROC constitutional framework" to persuade the public on Taiwan or Washington that she can maintain cross-Strait stability. But the Big Picture in East Asia and relative strength of the Mainland have changed. Cross-Strait relations are not determined by unilateral decree. Can the DPP accept the premise that "both sides are part of one China", along with One China, Different Interpretations? Can it cease its program of indoctrination in separatist history? If not, it will touch the lethal third rail and Beijing will not remain silent.

Voters on Taiwan are not afraid of Mainland threats. Nor are Beijing's core principles sacrosanct and inviolable. But Tsai Ing-wen and Hung Hsiu-chu have an obligation to explain their visions, directions, strategies, and the possible risks of their cross-Strait policy paths. They must enable the voters to make a rational and wise choice. Only then will the outcome of the vote be freely chosen and represent what the voters actually want.

大陸接受蔡英文的兩岸主張嗎
20150722 中國時報

蔡英文記取2012年總統大選教訓,今年在兩岸政策上做了充分準備,以「維持現狀」及「中華民國憲政體制」為論述主軸。這兩項主張顛覆了民進黨傳統,也對馬政府兩岸政策「概括承受」。這是一張安全牌,選戰至今,兩岸政策並未成為熱點議題,避開軟肋,她的當選機率愈來愈高。

不過,迄今為止,民進黨並未公開放棄台獨,蔡英文也沒表明接受「九二共識」。可能因為國民黨提名洪秀柱程序才剛剛完成,洪秀柱本人及國民黨還沒有開始針對兩岸議題「開槍」,蔡英文的模糊策略才能暫時「持盈保泰」,總統選情也始終只是國民黨「茶壺裡的風暴」。但這種「水波不興」狀態不可能長期維持,事實上,台灣外部早已「山雨欲來風滿樓」,「美國因素」與「中國因素」兩大外部力量逐漸發酵。

表面看來,蔡英文這次訪問美國獲得高規格接待,但正如本報昨天社論所指出,高規格接待並不表示對她的兩岸論述全盤接受。事實上,蔡英文結束訪美一個月來,華府開始有些不尋常的聲音傳出。譬如美國在台協會執行理事唐若文在綠營主場演說強調,美國堅持在「兩岸人民都接受」前提下處理兩岸問題,而非一貫的「台灣人民」,這是很明顯的轉變。最新發展是知名兩岸議題專家紛紛主張,美國應設法促成兩岸達成「臨時協議」,以確保兩岸和平穩定。

美國態度逐漸轉變,有軌跡可循。習近平即將首次國事訪美,兩國官員及幕僚正絡繹於途,就會談的議題與細節進行安排。大陸國家主席習近平在兩岸問題上展現的強硬風格與決心,已讓美國意識到,蔡模糊的兩岸路線,風險超出美方預期。不論美國是否接受蔡的說詞,只要中國大陸不接受,兩岸緊張即可能升高至危險的地步。

華府智庫「戰略暨國際研究中心」資深研究員葛來儀與助理研究員維特羅在美國《國家利益》發表文章,文中有幾點值得台灣注意。一是不管蔡英文怎麼說,北京仍然不放心,這是因為她過去的紀錄。二是如果蔡追求法理台獨,北京會激烈反應,包括外交封殺,也包括動武。三是各方不可低估習近平的反應,尤其是在面臨內部壓力時,更不可能在台灣議題上示弱。四是如果蔡公開拒斥現有架構,包括「九二共識」,會損害兩岸關係。五是美國應有具體作為,且宜早不宜遲。葛來儀與維特羅因而主張,美國應設法促成兩岸達成「臨時協議」。臨時協議說法最早見於1999年,當時美國國務院東亞助卿陸士達、副助卿謝淑麗等人相繼提出,主張「訂定過渡期,台灣保證不獨,大陸保證不武」,成為當時美國的主流意見,但後來無疾而終,舊菜新炒可見美國的焦慮。

中國大陸的不放心與美國的焦慮,關鍵還是在「九二共識」,1992年兩岸兩會所達成的「九二共識」,是雙方的基本諒解與互信。其中包括「兩同一異」的三個內涵:(一)雙方均堅持一個中國原則,(二)雙方均追求國家的統一,(三)台北方面主張「一中各表」,但是北京並沒有接受「一中各表」,而認為是處理事務性協商,所以不需要表述「一個中國」的內涵,即所謂的「一中不表」。2008年後,馬政府將「九二共識」窄化為「一中各表」,北京以兩岸交流為大目標,容許了馬政府的詮釋,但是將「九二共識」定義為「反對台獨」。簡單來說,北京的「九二共識」沒有所謂的「各表」,只有「反對台獨」,或「兩岸同屬一中」。習近平表示,「九二共識」的核心是「認同大陸和台灣同屬一個中國」,「只要做到此點,台灣任何政黨和團體與大陸交往都沒有障礙」。沒有「九二共識」就是「基礎不牢、地動山搖」。

蔡英文現在面臨兩個難題,她或許可以用「維持現狀」及「中華民國憲政體制」的模糊說法,讓台灣民眾或美國認為她可以維持兩岸穩定,但東亞大局、兩岸關係與中國的實力均已改變,兩岸關係也不是一方說了算。民進黨如果無法接受「兩岸同屬一個中國」為前提的「一中各表」,如果持續在歷史教科書中堅持「分離史觀」,就等於碰觸到大陸的核心原則,北京不會緘默。

台灣選民無懼大陸恫赫,北京的核心原則也不是神聖不可侵犯,但蔡英文與洪秀柱,有義務就雙方兩岸的願景、路線與策略及可能的風險展開辯論,讓選民做出理性、智慧的抉擇,投票結果才能「甘願做、歡喜受」。