Cross-Strait Crisis Management during Cold Confrontation

Cross-Strait Crisis Management during Cold Confrontation  
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
June 6, 2016

Executive Summary: President Tsai Ing-wen avoided any clear statement on the 1992 Consensus in her inaugural address. Everyone now expects the two sides of the Strait to enter an era of "Cold Peace". The first wave of DPP personnel appointments and policy moves have the Mainland wondering whether the new government is engaged in “stealth Taiwan independence” under the cover of the “Republic of China". As a result it has stepped up its criticism. Through official channels such as the Taiwan Affairs Office, ARATS, and the People's Daily, it has demanded that Tsai Ing-wen recognize the 1992 Consensus.

Full Text Below:

President Tsai Ing-wen avoided any clear statement on the 1992 Consensus in her inaugural address. Everyone now expects the two sides of the Strait to enter an era of "Cold Peace". The first wave of DPP personnel appointments and policy moves have the Mainland wondering whether the new government is engaged in “stealth Taiwan independence” under the cover of the “Republic of China". As a result it has stepped up its criticism. Through official channels such as the Taiwan Affairs Office, ARATS, and the People's Daily, it has demanded that Tsai Ing-wen recognize the 1992 Consensus.

That is not all. The Mainland has also interrupted cross-Strait exchanges and official communications. ARATS and the Taiwan Affairs Office no longer respond to MAC and SEF fax communications. It has taken concrete action to show the new government that it is serious. Mainland provincial delegations have ceased coming to Taiwan. Mainland group and corporate incentive group tours have also been suspended. Mainland inspections and quarantines of fruit imports from Taiwan have been tightened. Produce is frequently returned to Taiwan, provoking industry concern.

In other words, the cross-Strait situation is worse than the “Cold Peace" widely predicted. It has gone directly to "Cold Confrontation". Cross-Strait tensions are high, especially on the Mainland. Official declarations issued through various channels, have essentially left the Mainland "riding a tiger, and unable to dismount". There is no room for compromise or change whatsoever, unless Tsai is willing to compromise. Otherwise the Mainland authorities cannot back down.

If Tsai Ing-wen refuses to do so, then the cross-Strait "Cold Confrontation" will probably continue for a very long time. If the crux of the disagreement is not resolved, if conflict and stress escalates to a certain level, we could go from "Cold Confrontation" directly to "Hot Confrontation". Cross-Strait relations would then revert to what they were during the Chen era. This is something people on both sides cannot evade.

The Mainland is too big, and Taiwan is too small. The cross-Strait imbalance in power has increased. Tsai Ing-wen must actively seek solutions to problems. She cannot react passively. She cannot assume that as long as she offers no provocations, and makes no trouble, the Mainland will remain helpless. On the 1992 Consensus, the Mainland can make no concessions. If Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize it explicitly, she must offer an alternative, and seek consensus with the Mainland.

The key to the cross-Strait dispute is the nature of cross-Strait relations. Just what is the relationship between the two sides? The Mainland considers it a state of civil war within one China. The current DPP government's traditional position has been that it is “one nation on each side”. The DPP government has not repudiated its “one nation on each side” position. It has declared that it will handle cross-Strait affairs according to the Republic of China Constitution and
the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. The implication is that cross-Strait relations are relations between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. But what is the relationship between these two? Tsai Ing-wen declared that she would preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of China. But within the international community, the People's Republic of China is commonly perceived as “China”. So is their sovereignty overlapping, or unrelated?

During the Ma Ying-jeou era, the 1992 Consensus left significant room for “different interpretations”. But the Tsai government rejects the 1992 Consensus. Therefore there is no longer any room for different interpretations. On the third of this month, the Mainland Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared its sovereignty over Taiping Island, for the very first time. It said "China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters, including Taiping Island”. It clearly asserted People's Republic of China sovereignty over Taiping Island, and repudiated Republic of China sovereignty. This was unheard of during the Ma Ying-jeou era. The Mainland Ministry of Foreign Affairs implied that the two sides might well revert to the “Hot Confrontation” diplomatic war of the Chen Shui-bian era.

The DPP government is dependent upon the Republic of China. The best way to cope is to go beyond the sovereignty dispute, and expand Taipei's claim of sovereignty to include the whole of China. It should declare that relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China and not relations between independent nations, but rather betweeen two governments within a single nation. Tsai Ing-wen should also affirm that "People on both sides of the Strait are members of the same family". She must not perceive people on the Mainland as “The Other”. She must also make a genuine effort to help people know each other, understand each other, benefit each other, and trust each other.

The new government must learn from Lee Teng-ui era experience. Premier Lin Chuan could make the above two points in the legislature. He could lead the way for the government's handling of cross-Strait relations and cross-Strait policy. President Tsai could endorse Lin Chuan's statement through a spokesperson. That way the Mainland would no longer have any reason to continue pressuring Taiwan. Instead it would have to deal with the new government on practical matters. This would alleviate the cross-Strait crisis.

Next, it should consider how the Mainland can restore cross-Strait consultations communication channels. In any case, the cross-Strait "Cold Confrontation" would be eased. It would not develop into a “Hot Confrontation”. It  would revert to the status of "Cold Peace", or even “peaceful exchange”.

Appointing an SEF chairman is urgent. Tsai government national security personnel appointments, including its MAC chairman, have all been one-sidedly pro-American. This will increase cross-Strait instability. A timely chairmanship appointment acceptable to the Mainland would undoubtedly help the Tsai government ease cross-Strait hostility.

冷對抗時代的兩岸危機管理
2016年06月06日 中國時報

蔡英文總統在就職演講中沒有對「九二共識」做出明確論述，各界原本預期兩岸將進入「冷和平」狀態，但民進黨政府相關人事安排及首波政策推動，令大陸對民進黨企圖以中華民國之名行「隱性台獨」之實大感憂心，因而加大批判力度，並透過國台辦、海協會及《人民日報》等官方管道要求蔡英文接受「九二共識」。

不僅如此，大陸還中斷了兩岸官方交流與溝通管道，國台辦與海協會不再回應陸委會與海基會的傳真來函，以實際行動向新政府展示態度堅決。大陸省市代表團已完全停止來台，原本常見的大陸團體或企業獎勵旅遊團也宣告暫停。至於貨物貿易領域，大陸也加強進口台灣水果的檢驗檢疫，動輒整箱退貨，引發業者疑慮。

換句話說，兩岸現況低於原預期的「冷和平」，直接墜入「冷對抗」，雙方互動處於緊繃狀態，特別是大陸方面，接連通過官方管道宣示立場，幾乎等同於讓自己「騎虎難下」，根本沒有轉圜或者妥協的空間，除非蔡英文能夠先行做出妥協，否則大陸官方也無法再往後退。

若蔡英文拒絕，那麼兩岸「冷對抗」恐怕將持續很長一段時間，若歧見癥結得不到解決，矛盾和壓力累積到一定程度，也可能升級兩岸衝突，讓「冷對抗」狀態演變成「正面對抗」，兩岸關係將重回扁時代的劍拔弩張，這恐怕將是兩岸民眾的不可承受之重。

大陸太大台灣太小，兩岸實力對比更已失衡，蔡英文必須主動思考問題的解決辦法，不能以保守思維被動應對，更不要錯誤認為只要自己「不挑釁」、「不惹事」就可以讓大陸束手無策。「九二共識」大陸無可退讓，縱使蔡英文不正面接受，也得主動提出替代方案，與大陸謀求共識。

兩岸關係最核心爭議是兩岸關係的性質，也就是兩岸到底是什麼關係？大陸認為是「一個中國的內戰關係」，民進黨傳統立場認為是一邊一國關係，現在的民進黨政府並未否定一邊一國關係，但宣告將以《中華民國憲法》和《兩岸人民關係條例》來處理兩岸事務，隱含兩岸是中華民國與中華人民共和國的關係，那麼這兩個中國又是什麼關係？蔡英文宣示將維護中華民國的領土與主權，而中華人民共和國是國際普遍認知的中國，那麼二者到底是主權重疊關係還是互不隸屬關係？

這個問題在馬英九時代「九二共識」涵蓋下有很大的「各表」空間，但蔡英文政府不接受「九二共識」，各表的模糊空間不再。大陸外交部3日首次針對太平島主權問題發言，稱「中國對包括太平島在內的南沙群島及其附近海域擁有無可爭辯的主權」，明確主張中華人民共和國主權涵蓋太平島，是對中華民國主權的明示否定，這是馬英九政府時代所未見。大陸外交部的表態預示兩岸外交戰可能復燃，那就是陳水扁時代「熱對抗」的最壞情況了。

民進黨政府站在中華民國基礎上，最好的因應方式是超越主權紛爭，將主權主張拉高至整個中國，宣示中華民國與中華人民共和國不是國與國關係，而是一個中國下的不同政權與制度分立。蔡英文還應就「兩岸同屬一家人」提出論述，一方面不將大陸人民視為他者，另一方面也要提出具體政策致力實現兩岸人民的互知、互諒、互利與互信。

借鏡李登輝時代經驗，可由林全院長在立法院就上述兩點做出宣示，並將之引為未來政府處理兩岸關係和兩岸事務的政策基調。同時，蔡總統可透過發表談話為林全院長背書，如此一來，大陸就不再有理由繼續對台灣施壓，反而必須面對與新政府正面溝通的現實問題，兩岸危機得以解除。

接下來就看大陸能在多大程度上恢復兩岸協商的既有溝通管道，但無論如何，兩岸「冷對抗」將大為降溫，不僅不至於發展成正面對抗，而且會回到「冷和平」狀態，甚至有重回和平交流狀態的可能。

當務之急是海基會董事長人選，蔡政府的府院國安人事布局，包括陸委會在內，一面倒偏向對美關係，加深當前兩岸風雲詭譎情勢，適當時機提出一個能為大陸接受的董事長人選，無疑可以為蔡英文政府化解兩岸敵意的努力提供助力。