End KMT-CCP Hostilities, Create New Cross-Strait Opportunities

End KMT-CCP Hostilities, Create New Cross-Strait Opportunities 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
June 20, 2016 

Executive Summary: A KMT that finds itself in the opposition need not belittle itself. It must have courage. It must be determined to prove its worth to the Taiwan public. If the KMT and CCP can make peace, then a KMT CCP forum makes sense, and a Hong Hsiu-chu-Xi Jinping has value. If the KMT can take this step, history will affirm it, and people will remember it. This may be the only way the KMT can return to power.

Full Text Below:

Ma Ying-jeou was in office for eight years. During that time his cross-Strait policy was "one China, different interpretations”, "no reunification, no Taiwan independence", "maintain the status quo", and “economics not politics”. This policy failed to end the 60 year long civil war between the two sides. It failed to create a stable framework for lasting cross-Strait peace and mutual trust.

Private sector interactions without a peace agreement are destined to remain unstable. Cross-Strait relations without mutual trust are destined to remain fragile. Ma Ying-jeou governed for eight years. Cross-Strait relations ended where they began. The party was over, and the guests went home. Worse still, Ma allowed the green camp to paint him as a cross-Strait pimp, “pandering to China and selling out Taiwan”. The result was eventual defeat and loss of power. This is Ma Ying-jeou's place in history. Put nicely, he was a well-meaning bungler. Put less nicely, he rejected heaven's mandate, only to receive heaven's retribution.

Over the past eight years, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party's cross-Strait rhetoric has not evolved. The party still clings to separatism. But once it felt assured of victory, even before the election, Tsai Ing-wen began parroting the KMT. She began talking about “maintaining the status quo". She substituted the "1992 spirit", the "facts of 1992", and the "acknowledgement of 1992" to win Beijing's approval. Beijing ignored her. As a result, some DPP members want this year's Party Congress to replace the “Taiwan independence party platform” with "maintain the status quo". But these expedients were rendered moot when the new Minister of Education issued an executive order repealing any and all corrections to the public school history texts.

The DPP's refusal to correct the public school history texts betrays the party's overeagerness. In fact, the original history texts featured "one version of history for each side". The so-called "fine tuning of the course curriculum” did not change this structure. It merely modified a few terms and added a few historical facts. Nevertheless the DPP considered it intolerable, and demanded immediate rejection. Ironically, this move touched Beijing's most sensitive nerve, namely the DPP's "cultural Taiwan independence", the instrument by which the DPP advances "soft Taiwan independence" and "creeping Taiwan independence".

The DPP's "cultural Taiwan independence" will make trust between the DPP and CCP over the next four years utterly impossible. Mainland intelligentsia are now concerned that “We will eventually lose Taiwan". They have concluded that the public on Taiwan no longer supports the Mainland's traditional arguments for reunification. Taiwan's rapid alienation from the Mainland also makes peaceful reunification virtually impossible. Therefore only military force can prevent a split between the two sides.

Cross-Strait developments truly are worrisome. The DPP cannot possibly accept the 1992 Consensus, which demands that the two sides be reunited. Beijing cannot possibly accept "cultural Taiwan independence" and allow Taiwan independence sentiment to reach  a point of no return. Fundamental contradictions in political stance make trust between the DPP and CCP impossible. That means that over the next four years cross-Strait relations will be plagued by anxiety, even war.

At such a time the opposition Kuomintang's responsibility is greater than ever, even greater than when it was in office. It must make Beijing feel that peaceful cross-Strait relations are still possible. It must let the public on Taiwan know that only the KMT can prevent cross-Strait war. The situation is similar to what it was in 2005. Without the Lien-Hu summit and the five-point consensus, it is difficult to imagine how cross-Strait relations could have successfully survived the late Chen Shui-bian era.

When the KMT was in office, the China Times called on the KMT and CCP to jointly announce an end to hostilities or issue a declaration of peace. The two governments could then legally end the civil war. But in a democracy the ruling party's political position is not necessarily the government's. Such an action by the Kuomintang would not have been appropriate. Now however, the Kuomintang is in the opposition. It can reach a consensus with the CCP on the two sides' political status. The two parties can even sign a declaration of peace, and propose a framework for continued cross-Strait peace.

The KMT must have the courage to make peace. Can the KMT and CCP complete the above mentioned transactions? If they can, then the KMT, Taiwan, and both sides of the Strait can enjoy an historic breakthrough. First, the KMT can fundamentally distinguish its cross-Strait policy from the DPP's. Ma Ying-jeou's "one China, different interpretations", and "maintaining the status quo" served its purpose. In the wake of the Sunflower Student Movement, it is obsolete. Now that Tsai Ing-wen is spouting "maintaining the status quo" along with the KMT, the catechism has lost its rhetorical value. A KMT in the opposition must offer a whole new cross-Strait strategy. Only then can it justify its continued existence. Second, Mainland intelligenstia have lost confidence in peaceful reunification. They now think military reunification may be unavoidable. If the KMT and the CCP can reach a consensus to legally end the civil war, continued peace may still be possible. This would be the KMT's contribution to Taiwan. Third, if the KMT and the CCP can take the first step toward legally ending the civil war, the DPP may decide to follow. Only then can an official cross-Strait peace treaty become a reality.

A KMT that finds itself in the opposition need not belittle itself. It must have courage. It must be determined to prove its worth to the Taiwan public. If the KMT and CCP can make peace, then a KMT CCP forum makes sense, and a Hong Hsiu-chu-Xi Jinping has value. If the KMT can take this step, history will affirm it, and people will remember it. This may be the only way the KMT can return to power.

真道理性真愛台灣》社論－國共結束敵對 開創兩岸新機會
2016年06月21日 04:10 主筆室

馬英九執政8年，以「一中各表」、「不統不獨」、「維持現狀」定位兩岸關係，使得兩岸關係「只經不政」，既沒有結束長達60多年法理內戰狀態，解除兩岸敵對狀態；也沒有為兩岸創造穩定安全的和平架構，建立真正的互信與永遠的和平。

缺少和平結構的民間互動絕不穩定，沒有互信的兩岸關係必然脆弱，馬英九執政8年的兩岸關係最終落得人走茶涼、人去政息，還讓國民黨背上傾中賣台、兩岸掮客惡名，終至慘敗，失去政權。這就是馬英九在兩岸關係上的歷史定位，說得好聽些是「為德不卒」，說得嚴苛點是「天予不取、反受其咎」。

這8年以來，在野的民進黨在兩岸論述上也沒有進展，仍維持其分離主義的立場。但是在自認即將贏得選舉前與取得勝選後，蔡英文也牙牙學語跟著國民黨喊「維持現狀」，改用「九二精神」、「九二事實」、「九二認知」等修飾語，期盼獲得北京的認可。看到北京沒有正面回應，一些著急的民進黨員甚而希望在今年全代會中，以「維持現狀」來取代以往的台獨黨綱及相關決議文。不過，這些權宜之計，因為新任教育部長一紙廢除課綱微調的行政命令後已全部破功。

廢除課綱微調，暴露了民進黨過於急切的企圖。原有的課綱其實已是「一邊一史」的結構，所謂「課綱微調」並沒有撼動原有的結構，只是一些用語的調整、史實的增加而已。即使如此，民進黨仍然難以忍受，要去之而後快。但是此一行為恰恰觸動到北京最敏感的神經，坐實了民進黨以「文化台獨」為工具，走一條「柔性台獨」與「穩健台獨」的道路。

民進黨的「文化台獨」作為，使得未來4年民共之間幾乎不可能建立互信。大陸知識界已有「我們終將失去台灣」的警語，認為大陸傳統的統一論述已經無法再得到台灣人民的支持，台灣對大陸認同的快速疏離也使得「和平統一」幾乎已經絕望，因而出現唯有武力才能促使兩岸不分裂的「武統」言論。

兩岸的發展的確讓人憂心忡忡。民進黨不可能接受在本義上兩岸不可永久分裂的「九二共識」，北京也不會輕易地讓「文化台獨」成為一條不歸路。立場上的根本矛盾使得民共之間不可能建立互信，這也使得蔡英文政府未來4年的兩岸關係注定不安，衝突的可能也並非全無。

此時在野的國民黨，責任較執政時期更為重要，一方面要讓北京感覺到兩岸和平發展的機會仍然存在，另一方面要讓台灣民眾了解，國民黨有能力讓兩岸關係避免衝突。其情形類似於2005年的情景，如果沒有當時的連胡會及五點共識，我們很難想像，兩岸關係如何能夠平穩地度過陳水扁後期的兩岸敏感期。

國民黨執政期間，《中國時報》曾呼籲國共兩黨應率先宣布結束敵對狀態，或共同發表和平宣言，為兩岸政府未來結束法理內戰創造條件。但是，基於民主責任政治原則，執政黨的立場與行為必須與政府一致，當時由國民黨採先行主張並不適當。不過，既然國民黨現在已經在野，可以嘗試與共產黨就兩岸應有的政治定位達成共識，甚而簽署和平宣言，提出兩岸和平發展應有的框架。

國民黨要有勇氣創造和平。如果國共兩黨能夠完成上列重大事務，對國民黨、台灣及兩岸均是一大突破與貢獻。第一、對國民黨而言，可以在兩岸論述及政策上與民進黨做出根本性的區隔。馬英九的「一中各表」、「維持現狀」論述，在太陽花運動以後已經失去其階段性的功能。在蔡英文也提出「維持現狀」後，國民黨基本上也不再享有論述的優勢。在野的國民黨必須要創造兩岸和平論述，才有存在的價值。第二、對台灣而言，大陸的知識界已經開始對「和平統一」失去信心，視「武統」為可能的必要選擇。國共兩黨如果能夠就結束法理內戰達成共識，和平發展的聲音將不致成為絕響，這是國民黨對台灣的貢獻。第三、對兩岸而言，國共兩黨能夠往結束法理內戰跨出第一步，民進黨才有可能認真思考是否要跟進，官方的兩岸和平協議也才有簽署的可能。

在野的國民黨切勿妄自菲薄，應當勇敢向台灣人民證明國民黨存在的價值。從國共兩黨共同創造和平這個角度出發，國共論壇才有意義，洪習會也才有價值。國民黨如果能夠成功地跨出這一步，歷史會正面評價，人民也不會忘記，這或許才是國民黨重返執政的必由之路。