China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 30, 2016
Executive Summary: On August 4, 2000, when she was chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, Tsai Ing-wen said, Taiwan cannot escape the one China issue. From a cultural and geographical perspective, a "future one China" is the only possible choice for the people of Taiwan. In 2016, the question for President Tsai Ing-wen should not be whether to repudiate "one China". It should be what kind of relationship should the two sides have. Should it be a master-slave relationship, or an undivided, share and share alike relationship? Should the two sides jurisdiction be independent of each other? Should it be a central government vs. local government relationship? Should it be constitutionally divided rule?
Full Text Below:
The two sides of the Strait are still wrestling over the 1992 Consensus. American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Raymond Burghardt recently joined the fray. He told the VOA that when Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan met, they never used the term 1992 Consensus in his presence, but that Koo sometimes used the term "1992 understanding". MAC Chairwoman Katharine Chang immediately latched onto Uncle Sammy's comment, and argued that the 1992 Consensus was merely an agreement to “seek common ground, while shelving differences”. She conveniently forgot the part about “one China, different interpretations”. Taiwan independence elder Lin Cho-shui published an article claiming that the United States has abandoned “joint management of the Taiwan Strait”. The Liberty Times published an article entitled “Taps for the 1992 Consensus". It would appear that the DPP government has the United States' backing, and no longer intends to deal with the dispute over the 1992 Consensus.
We have repeatedly made clear that the 1992 Consensus is an artificial term. It was coined by Su Chi as a good will gesture, to extricate the incoming Chen Shui-bian government from a tight spot. He used the neutral sounding term “1992 Consensus” in order to avoid reference to the "one China principle". But the DPP failed to appreciate it. The DPP did not object to the term itself. It objected to what it meant. The term is merely one of convenience. For example, from a distance we see a mountain. But as we come closer, we see towering trees, rocks, streams, plants, and animals. Mountain is merely a term for everything associated with the mountain. Chuang Tzu once related a story about a group of monkeys. The monkeys would be happy when they received four berries in the morning and three at night, but angry if they received three berries in the morning and four at night. The monkeys' minds were fixated on appearances and could not recognize substance.
1992 Consensus includes two areas of agreement, and one area of disagreement. The two sides agreed to "adhere to the one China principle," and to "seek national reunification". The two sides disagreed about the meaning of "one China". In other words, the two sides disagreed about the nature of cross-Strait relations. Beijing saw the 1992 Consensus as an administrative matter. Therefore it adopted a "one China, no interpretations” stance. Taipei argued that the two sides should adopt a "one China, different interpretations" stance, and argued that "one China" means the Republic of China.
Had Koo characterized the meeting as a "1992 Understanding" with “common ground as well as differences”, he would not have been wrong. In 1992, both sides recognized the "one China principle". Koo knew this. Taipei wanted to emphasize "one China, different interpretations". Beijing wanted to emphasize "opposition to Taiwan independence". This was merely a case of “four berries in the morning, and berries at night” vs. “three berries in the morning, and four at night”. Upholding one China is synonymous with “opposing Taiwan independence". The key point was that neither side advocated separatism. Taken a step further, opposition to separatism is merely another name for opposition to war. Put even more simply, it is merely the advocacy of peace. In short, the essence of the 1992 Consensus is the desire for peace.
Taipei equated the 1992 Consensus with "one China, different interpretations". But Lee Teng-hui's "special state to state relations" formulation in 1999, had Beijing worried that "one China, different interpretations" would be interpreted as "one country on each side". As a result, Beijing rejected it. Ma Ying-jeou also advocated "one China, different interpretations". But for him the two sides were not two nations. Therefore Beijing voiced no opposition. But when the same label refers to different things, it acquires a different meaning.
The Tsai Ing-wen government cannot use the term, 1992 Consensus. But Tsai must swear that she will "uphold the one China principle" by some other means. She may wish to swear that she “will not to divide China as a whole". Tsai Ing-wen must find a way to express her cross-Strait policy that Beijing can accept, and that will enable the two sides to enjoy peace.
Since 1949, the two sides have not engaged in a shooting war. They have conducted frequent exchanges. But legally speaking, the two sides are still in a state of civil war. The 1992 "consensus, understanding, facts, talks, spirit, acknowledgement" has already dealt with one problem. But it has not dealt with another problem, namely that the civil war must not lead to permanent division. Just what is the relationship between the two sides? The 1992 Consensus did not say. As a result, the two sides continue to talk past each other.
If the Tsai government insists that cross-Strait relations are foreign relations, and that the two sides do not belong to the same nation, then it is not a case of “four in the morning and three at night” vs. “three in the morning and four at night”. It is tantamount to “walking into the sea”. It is calling the mountain before us by another name. Names are sometimes meaningful. The sequence of events is sometimes important. But when the meaning changes, then labels are either self-deception or deception of others.
On August 4, 2000, when she was chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, Tsai Ing-wen said, Taiwan cannot escape the one China issue. From a cultural and geographical perspective, a "future one China" is the only possible choice for the people of Taiwan. In 2016, the question for President Tsai Ing-wen should not be whether to repudiate "one China". It should be what kind of relationship should the two sides have. Should it be a master-slave relationship, or an undivided, share and share alike relationship? Should the two sides jurisdiction be independent of each other? Should it be a central government vs. local government relationship? Should it be constitutionally divided rule?
蔡總統如何面對蔡主委？
2016年06月30日 中國時報
兩岸「九二共識」之爭還在角力，美國在台協會主席薄瑞光加入戰局。他接受美國之音訪問時指出，過去和辜振甫與汪道涵會面，兩人都沒對他講過「九二共識」，只是辜振甫有時會說「九二諒解」。陸委會主委張小月立刻扣緊老大哥的話，強調「九二共識」就是「求同存異」的共同認知，對「一中各表」則選擇遺忘，台獨大師林濁水發表文章，認為美國已放棄與大陸「共管台海」立場，《自由時報》也發表文章稱「九二共識熄燈號」。看來民進黨政府已取得美國背書，將不再處理「九二共識」兩岸爭議。
我們曾一再闡明，「九二共識」只是人為的名相，是蘇起當時善意「借箸代籌」，希望替即將上任的陳水扁政府解套，乃使用中性的「九二共識」來迴避「一個中國原則」。但是，民進黨並不領情，因為民進黨不接受的不是名詞，而是其內涵。「名相」僅是一種方便的法門，例如，遠看是一座大山，走進大山，看到的卻是參天的大樹，石頭、小溪、花草、動物。大山只是一整體的名相，內部仍有不同的名相。莊子曾以猴子陷於「朝三暮四」或「朝四暮三」的怒喜而不自覺，來暗喻這些猴子執著於「名相」，而忽略實質其實沒有改變。
「九二共識」包括兩個同與一個異。同的部分是，兩岸在給對方的信函中，都表示要「堅持一個中國原則」、「謀求國家統一」，異的部分是在「一個中國」的內涵上，也就是對於兩岸之間是甚麼關係，彼此有不同看法。北京認為1992年要處理的是事務性問題，因此「一中不表」；但是台北方面認為應該同意「一中各表」，而且主張「一中」就是中華民國。
辜振甫如果稱這樣的「同中有異」為「九二諒解」，也沒有錯，但是1992年兩岸對「一個中國原則」的共同認知卻是事實，相信辜振甫也會同意。至於台北希望多強調「一中各表」，而北京凸顯「反對台獨」，都不過是「朝三暮四」或「朝四暮三」。如果說「堅持一中」、「反對台獨」也是一個名相，那麼其核心的法義應該就是當時兩岸均各自表示「不分裂」的意願。再進一步說，如果「不分裂」也算是一個「名相」，那麼更簡單的法義就是雙方不想打仗，希望和平相處。簡單來說，「九二共識」的法義本質就是「和平的渴望」。
台北方面將「九二共識」等同於「一中各表」，但李登輝於1999年提出「特殊國與國」後，北京擔心「一中各表」會被詮釋為「一邊一國」，因而不接受。馬英九雖然也主張「一中各表」，但認為兩岸非「國與國」關係，因而北京也沒有明確反對。這就是看似同樣的「名相」，當其內涵法義變化時，名相也就有不同的意義。
蔡英文政府當然可以不要用「九二共識」這個名相，但是她必須要提出一個包括「堅持一個中國原則」內涵的名相，或者她要提出一個可以承諾「不分裂整個中國」的名相。蔡英文必須提出一個可以讓北京接受，兩岸可以確保和平的說法。
從1949年起，兩岸目前雖然表面上沒有硝煙戰火，交流頻繁，但是就法理上而言，兩岸仍然沒有結束內戰狀態。1992年的「共識、諒解、事實、會談、精神、認知」已經處理了一個問題，就是雙方確定內戰的結果不應該是「永久的分裂」，但是兩岸到底是甚麼樣的關係，1992年並沒有解決，而是自說自話。
蔡英文政府如果堅持兩岸關係為外國關係、兩岸主權互不隸屬，那麼就不是「朝三暮四」或「朝四暮三」何者為佳的辯證；也等於是明明走進大海，口中卻告訴對方，可否用另一個名字稱前面這座「大山」。名相有時有意義，看事情的順序角度有時也很重要，但是當其本質改變時，名相與角度不是自欺就是欺人。
2000年8月4日，時任陸委會主委的蔡英文曾表示：台灣無法逃避「一個中國」問題，從文化、地理來看，「未來的一個中國」是台灣民眾唯一的選擇。2016年的蔡英文總統，應該要做的，不是否定「一個中國」，而是與大陸共同商定兩岸現在應是甚麼樣的關係，是主權互不隸屬、主從關係、還是共有共享的不分裂的關係，兩岸治權是相互獨立、中央與地方、還是憲政分治的關係？
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