The Diaoyutai Conflict Affects the Strategic Triangle between US, Mainland China, and Russia

The Diaoyutai Conflict Affects the Strategic Triangle between US, Mainland China, and Russia
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
June 15, 2016 

Executive Summary: Sino-US differences remain. US-Russian grievances deepen. China and Russia are no longer enemies. This describes the new US, Mainland China, Russian strategic triangle. The US continues to rally the nations of the world against China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are naturally going to band together. In a triangular relationship, any two sides of the triangle are necessarily greater than the third side. Sino-Russian cooperation is a nightmare for the United States. It will also shatter the existing international order.

Full Text Below:

Mainland Chinese and Russian missile destroyers have appeared simultaneously in Diaoyutai Island waters. The Abe Cabinet was taken aback. It concluded that Mainland China and Russia have joined hands to oppose Japan. It held an overnight emergency meeting and lodged a strong protest. But the US merely reiterated that "The US-Japan Security Treaty covers Diaoyutai Island waters". Beijing sternly refuted Japan. Russia denied that the two fleets "acted in unison”. Have Mainland China and Russia joined hands to oppose the US and Japan?  More evidence is required. But the global strategic picture is rapidly coming into focus. Mainland China is attempting to ally itself with Russia in order to resist the US and Japan. A strategic triangle involving the US, Mainland China, and Russia is indeed taking shape.

During the Cold War the "strategic triangle" explained the triangular relationship between the US, Mainland China, and the Soviet Union.  It remains applicable today. Since the end of the Cold War, all manner of strategic triangles have emerged from within the international community. But those involving the US continue to attract the most attention. In recent years, Russia has gradually restored its national power under the leadership of strongman Vladimir Putin. Events in Crimea and Ukraine have made the strategic triangle between the US, Mainland China, and Russia the most important one in today's world.

The strategic triangle between the US, Mainland China, and Russia, has never been an equal one. During the Cold War, the balance of power involved the US and Mainland China vs. the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, Washington attempted to contain not only Russia, but also Mainland China. Hence its "China Threat Theory". Obama's Asian-Pacific rebalancing is clearly aimed at Mainland China's increasing military might. In response to the Ukraine crisis, the US joined with the EU, both to contain Russia, and to resolve South China Sea disputes. The US pressured other nations to join its patrols. It constantly challenged Beijing's territorial sovereignty. The result is today's Sino-Russian anti-US posture. US Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Moscow in late March, was intended to normalize US-Russian relations. The US is already feeling the pressure of the Sino-Russian strategic alliance.

Within the new US, Mainland China, and Russia strategic triangle, Beijing remains most concerned about Sino-US relations. Xi Jinping has long reiterated his desire for a new "no conflict, no confrontation, cooperation and win-win" big power relationship. Xi is aware of the ups and downs of Sino-US relations. He knows the two sides have differences despite cooperation, conflict despite dialogue. But he also sees potential for cooperation in many areas.

Mainland China-Russia relations are at a historic peak. They are currently limited to a strategic partnership. But they are gradually moving toward "equality and trust, tolerance and learning, cooperation and win-win". As the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, the Moscow 2015 "5.9" Beijing Red Square parade, the 70th anniversary War of Resistance "9.3" parade showed, Xi Jinping and Putin have established a strong personal friendship. The Mainland and Russia cooperate closely on international and regional security matters. They enjoy a relatively solid "quasi-allies" relationship. By contrast, the new big power relationship between the Mainland and the US remains a castle in the air.

US-Russian relations are comparatively simple, but also the most complex. After the Cold War, the United States took advantage of the disintegration of the Soviet Union to expand NATO eastward. It incited 'color revolutions". It provoked divisions in the South Caucasus. Its imposed sanctions against Ukraine, forcing Moscow to suffer from Western economic sanctions and a US missile defense system in Eastern Europe. This led Russia to bolster its Asian-Pacific strategy, and ally with Mainland China to oppose the United States and Japan.

The international situation is treacherous and changeable. The interests of the United States, Mainland China, and Russia are constantly in flux. Western economic sanctions have accelerated Sino-Russian energy cooperation and the sale of sophisticated military hardware. The two sides have signed or intend to sign economic and trade agreements amounting to three trillion USD. Bilateral trade volume is likely to exceed 200 billion within five years. Bilateral trade includes weapons such as the new S-400 air defense missile systems and Su-35 fighters. It includes energy deals, in the form of a natural gas pipeline. It includes war production, such as wide-body aircraft, helicopter gunships, and navigation systems. It includes joint military exercises, twice last year, once in the Mediterranean, and once in the Sea of Japan. These further enhance bilateral strategic cooperation.

Trust between Mainland China and Russia remains inadequate. Short-term historical grievances have not been forgotten. But realpolitik considerations have led to strategic military cooperation. Putin will visit Beijing again later this month. Mainland China's alliance with Russia is bound to continue. Russia does not want its economic development determined by Mainland China. Its arms sales to Vietnam and India are intended to balance the US-Mainland China-Russia trilateral relationship. By the same token, Beijing's economic assistance to Russia also has limits. In particular, it must consider the potential impact of Mainland China-EU relations on the Sino-Russian alliance. Sino-Russian relations also have their limitations.

Sino-US differences remain. US-Russian grievances deepen. China and Russia are no longer enemies. This describes the new US, Mainland China, Russian strategic triangle. The US continues to rally the nations of the world against China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are naturally going to band together. In a triangular relationship, any two sides of the triangle are necessarily greater than the third side. Sino-Russian cooperation is a nightmare for the United States. It will also shatter the existing international order.

Kissinger warned Washington in the 1970s. He said that in the triangular relationship between the US, Mainland China, and Russia, relations between the US and China, and relations between the US and Russia, must be better than relations between China and Russia. But the current US, Mainland China, Russia strategic triangle is clearly inconsistent with Kissinger's expectations. The 2013 Joint Communique may not contain the words "based on the principles of non-alignment". But the term "non-group" implies an imminent bilateral alliance.

Sino-Russian relations have long involved a high degree of political friendship, a moderate degree of strategic cooperation, and a limited degree of economic cooperation. Even so, the Sino-Russian "quasi-alliance" is strong enough to threaten US global hegemony.

社論－釣島新風雲 牽動美中俄戰略三角
2016年06月15日 04:10 主筆室

中國與俄羅斯導彈驅逐艦同時出現在釣魚台海域，安倍內閣受到強烈震撼，認為是中俄聯手對抗日本，連夜召開緊急會議並提出強烈抗議，美國僅輕描淡寫強調「美日安保範圍包括釣魚台海域」。北京隨即嚴詞駁斥日方，俄羅斯則否認「聯合艦隊」的說法。中俄是否聯手對抗美日可能還需要更多證據，但全球戰略大局正在快速重整，中國企圖拉攏俄羅斯抗衡美日，「美中俄戰略三角」的確儼然成形。

冷戰年代就可以用「戰略三角」概念解讀美中蘇三邊互動，今日似乎依然適用。冷戰結束後國際社會出現各類型的戰略三角關係，但美國參與的戰略三角仍最受矚目。近年俄羅斯在強人普丁領導下國力逐漸恢復，經過克里米亞及烏克蘭事件考驗，「美中俄戰略三角」似漸成為今日世界最重要戰略三角。

美中俄戰略三角從來就不對等。冷戰時代，美國的權力平衡是「聯中制蘇」，後冷戰時期，華府的戰略既圍堵俄羅斯，又散播「中國威脅論」，歐巴馬的亞太再平衡，擺明是針對中國軍事崛起。因應烏克蘭危機，美國聯歐制俄，解決南海爭端，美國慫恿他國共同巡航，不斷挑戰北京護衛領土主權的底線，演變成今日中俄有意聯合抗美的態勢。美國務卿凱瑞3月下旬訪問莫斯科，意在重啟美俄正常化關係，似已感受到中俄戰略聯手的壓力。

美中俄新的戰略三角，北京最在意的還是中美關係。習近平多次重申願與美國建立「不衝突、不對抗、合作共贏」的新型大國關係，就是意識到中美關係起伏不定，雙方分歧中有合作、衝突中有對話，卻不乏多領域的潛在合作空間。

中俄關係正處於歷史巔峰，目前雖僅止於戰略協作夥伴，但逐步走向「平等互信、包容互鑒、合作共贏」。從2014索契冬季奧運、2015莫斯科「5.9」紅場閱兵與至北京紀念抗戰勝利70周年的「9.3」閱兵，習近平與普丁已建立深厚私誼。中俄在國際和區域安全事務的密切合作，已具有「準盟國」的架勢，較中美仍處於空中樓閣的新型大國關係，顯然紮實許多。

美俄關係相對單純，卻也最複雜。冷戰結束後，美國乘蘇聯解體之危，推動北約東擴、點燃「顏色革命」、分化南高加索國家，美國因烏克蘭危機的制裁，讓莫斯科再嘗西方經濟制裁及美國啟動東歐導彈防禦系統的苦果。加強亞太布局與「聯中抗美（日）」，成為其必要的戰略選擇。

國際情勢詭譎多變，美中俄新三角的利益交織亦隨之改變。西方的經濟制裁加速了中俄能源合作與尖端武器交易，雙方已簽訂或準備簽署的經貿協議總額高達3兆美元，5年內的雙邊貿易額更可能突破2000億美元。雙邊不斷就軍售（新型S-400防空導彈系統與蘇愷35型戰機）、能源（天然氣管線）、軍工生產（廣體客機、武裝直升機、導航系統等）尋求合作，去年兩次先後在地中海與日本海舉行的聯合軍演，進一步提升中俄戰略合作的層級。

中俄政治互信依然不足，歷史心結短期內亦難消除，但現實政治的考量，促使雙方走向軍事戰略合作。本月底普丁將再訪北京，勢必延續中俄結盟的態勢。論理，俄方不會樂見經濟發展受到中國牽制，其軍售越南與印度的作法，無非要平衡美中俄三邊關係；同樣，北京經濟援助俄國也有其限度，尤其要考量中俄結盟對中歐關係可能造成的衝擊，中俄關係緊密程度有其限制。

美中俄新三角的現狀是：中美分歧與摩擦不斷、美俄心結根深蒂固、中俄不再為敵。美國不斷塑造全球國家群起對抗中俄，北京與莫斯科自然會聯手。三角形的兩邊相加必然大於第三邊，中俄合作不僅是美國的噩夢，也會打破現有的國際格局。

季辛吉1970年代就警告華府，美中俄三角關係中的美中及美俄互動必須勝於中俄關係，但從現狀看來，美中俄新三角顯然不符季辛吉的預期。2013年中俄總理聯合公報雖未出現「依據不結盟原則」的字眼，但有關「非集團化」的表述暗喻了雙邊關係趨近於結盟。

中俄關係或有一段長時間處於「政治高度友好、戰略中度配合、經濟有限合作」的模式。即便如此，中俄的「準同盟」關係，卻足以威脅到美國獨霸全球的局面。