Factions Pass the Baton, But DPP Sacred Cows Live On

Factions Pass the Baton, But DPP Sacred Cows Live On 
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 4, 2016 

Executive Summary: Some Party Representatives have already proposed the authoring of a new Party Platform during the upcoming Party Congress, one that substitutes “maintaining the status quo" for the "Three Major Resolutions". Will their proposal be successful or not? Frankly that is more important than any factional distribution of power within the Central Standing Committee and Central Executive Committee. Unfortunately, senior DPP officials have already decided to ignore their proposal. As a result, the proposal will be nothing more than “a dog chasing a train". The Party Congress will be reduced to nothing more than a DPP “company picnic”.

Full Text Below:

The DPP will convene its Party Congress in the middle of this month. This is the first Party Congress it has convened since its return to power. Therefore it is receiving greater attention than others in the past. In particular, it will be the first election of Central Executive Committee and Central Standing Committee members. These are important to the party power structure. Will the attention given to this event be commensurate with its impact on the future? That remains to be seen.

According to Democratic Progressive Party regulations, 365 Party Representatives will elect 30 Central Executive Committee members, and 11 Central Committee Judges. The Central Executive Committee will then elect 10 Central Standing Committee members. Altogether 38 people have registered as candidates for the Central Executive Committee, and 16 people have registered as candidates for Central Committee judges. Based on the numbers, competition is not particularly fierce. What has attracted attention is former Central Executive Committee members Frank Hsieh and Yu Hsi-kun, who are fading out and being replaced. Less than half the 13 current Central Executive Committee members are seeking reelection. Only four of the current Central Committee judges are seeking re-election. Party officials are being replaced at a surprisingly rapid rate.

But closer scrutiny shows that these new elites, who are about to enter the DPP power center, are not actual power holders, but merely factional representatives. These seven factions include the Tsai Ing-wen faction, the Chen Chu faction, the Frank Hsieh faction, the Su Tseng-chang faction, the Green Friendship Connection, the Yu Hsi-kun faction, and the so-called "Hai Pai". Whether the candidates will win or lose depends upon the relative strengths of the factions, but even more importantly, on all manner of factional quid pro quos.

The most interesting aspect of all this, is DPP boasts that it "abolished factions" years ago. In fact, whether the DPP was in the opposition or in power, factions remained. They merely changed names. The "Welfare State faction" became the "Frank Hsieh faction", the "Mei Li Dao faction” became the "Green Friendship Connection", and the "New Wave faction" became the “Chen Chu faction". The "abolition of factions" claim is even more ironic, now that the DPP has reassumed power.

The faction that has attracted the most attention is the “Hai Pai” faction. It represents the owner of a certain television station. He has backed two candidates for the Central Executive Committee. He may be the person every faction wants to cozy up to during the Central Standing Committee election. As we all know, the DPP has long held high the banner of social justice and "separating political parties, the government, and the military from the media" and "opposition to a media monopoly". Now however, the media has its own faction within the ruling DPP, in a naked attempt to share power and participate in policy making. How can the DPP possibly rationalize this?

These factions compete with each other for party offices. But the power center remains in the Presidential Office, not the Party Central Committee. Also, the DPP central government and local governments enjoy “total rule”. Executive powers are held by the Executive Yuan and local governments. Legislative powers are held by the Legislative Yuan and local leguislatures. Under such a division of powers between the party and the government, the Central Executive Committee members and Central Standing Committee members exercise very little power. They are akin to past KMT Central Standing Committee members, who are allowed to express themselves, but do little else.

One role that DPP party officials may be able to fulfill is determining the DPP's future by determining its party platform. After all, the DPP's ideological sacred cows, including Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation, the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, and the Resolution for a Normal Nation, were the result of party decisions. If the DPP changes its ideological path, and moves toward the middle or toward Taiwan independence, it will do so via the party machinery. Only party officials have the authority to alter party policy.

Of course, power within the party is held by President Tsai, who is also Party Chairman Tsai. Any amendment to the party platform would require her approval or at least acquiescence. These historic documents have bound the DPP hand and foot, making progress in cross-Strait relations impossible for the foreseeable future. Even "maintaining the status quo" is now impossible. Despite all this, the likelihood that the situation will change is near zero.

Some Party Representatives have already proposed the authoring of a new Party Platform during the upcoming Party Congress, one that substitutes “maintaining the status quo" for the "Three Major Resolutions". Will their proposal be successful or not? Frankly that is more important than any factional distribution of power within the Central Standing Committee and Central Executive Committee. Unfortunately, senior DPP officials have already decided to ignore their proposal. As a result, the proposal will be nothing more than “a dog chasing a train". The Party Congress will be reduced to nothing more than a DPP “company picnic”.

派系世代交替，神主牌仍是那尊
2016-07-04 聯合報

民進黨將於月中舉行全國黨代表大會，由於這是民進黨重新執政後的第一次全代會，所受到的關注自然不同於以往。尤其是屆時將要登場的中執委、中評委和中常委的選舉，更被認為可能具有黨內權力結構調整的關鍵意義。不過，這樣一場盛會，所受的關注和其未來影響是否能成正比，恐怕還是得打上個問號。

依照民進黨的黨內規章，中執委將由六百六十五位全國黨代表選出三十位中執委和十一位中評委，再由中執委選出十位中常委。總計中執委部分共有三十八人登記參選，中評委也有十六人。從人數來看，並不特別激烈，較受外界關注的，倒是原本擔任中執委的謝長廷、游錫堃等派系大老，都已經淡出第一線，改由其他人披掛上陣。而在現任中執委當中，竟只有不到一半的十三人爭取連任。中評委爭取連任的，也只有四人，交替之快，令人驚訝。

但進一步分析，這些即將進入民進黨權力中樞的黨內新貴，與其說是「權力接班人」，不如說是「派系代理人」。其組成來自「七大派系」，包括泛英系、菊系、謝系、蘇系、綠色友誼連線、游系和所謂的「海派」。是否能夠當選，除了派系實力，更重要的可能還有彼此間的合縱連橫和權力交換。

最有趣的地方，是民進黨早在幾年前就已經宣示「解散派系」，但從在野到執政，幾年下來派系依舊，只是換湯不換藥。如「福利國」變成了「謝系」，「美麗島」變成了「綠色友誼連線」，「新潮流」變成了「菊系」而已。所謂的「解散派系」口號，在民進黨執政後，更顯諷刺。

而在諸多「派系」裡，最引人注意的，是由某電視台老闆代表的所謂「海派」，也被認為推出了兩人參選中執委，並是下一階段中常委選舉時，可能被各派系拉攏的對象。但眾所周知，「黨政軍退出媒體」和「反媒體壟斷」，一向是民進黨高舉的社會正義大旗之一，如今竟有媒體在執政黨內「自成一派」，企圖赤裸裸分享權力、參與決策。對此，不知民進黨內要如何自圓其說？

各派系如此煞有其事地競逐黨職，但從權力分配的角度來看，權力的中心仍在總統府，而不在黨中央。此外，民進黨從中央到地方都已「完全執政」，行政體系有行政院和地方政府，民代體系有中央到地方的立法院、議會黨團，並設有各種黨政協調平台。在這種黨政分野下，要說中執委、中常委真能扮演什麼權力角色，恐怕也只是如過去國民黨執政時中常會的「各言爾志」罷了。

但有一點，倒是民進黨的黨務體系最可能扮演角色之處，就是對未來黨的路線甚至黨綱的討論。畢竟，民進黨諸多意識形態的「神主牌」，包括台獨建國、台灣前途決議文以及正常國家決議文等，都是透過黨內機制的決策產生。假如民進黨要在意識形態的路線上有所調整——不管是更往中間靠攏或者向獨派傾斜——都必須透過黨內機制完成，才具有「轉彎」的正當性。

當然，在黨內權力定於蔡總統兼蔡主席一尊的情況下，若真的有黨綱的修正，也必定是來自黨內最高層的授意或至少是默許，才可能推得動。但儘管這些歷史文件已經綁住民進黨的手腳，讓兩岸關係在可預見的將來無法再向前推動，甚至連「維持現狀」都不可得；然而，目前看來，改變神主牌的可能性仍幾近於零。

這一次民進黨全代會，已有黨代表連署提案制訂新黨綱，想用「維持現狀」取代民進黨的「三大決議文」。平心而論，這樣的討論無論成功與否，都比「派系權力分配」的中執委、中常委、中執委選舉重要得多。可惜在民進黨高層已經定調將會冷處理的情況下，這些提案終究只會變成「狗吠火車」，讓這場民進黨的全代會，淪為派系的大拜拜而已。