Tsai Regime: Lost in the South China Sea

Tsai Regime: Lost in the South China Sea
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 14, 2016 

Executive Summary: Once the unfavorable ruling by the Hague on the South China Sea was announced, the Tsai regime immediately dispatched the cruiser Dihua to the South China Sea. President Tsai Ing-wen stood on its deck and declared her determination to defend the homeland. The Ministry of Defense established response centers. The scene revealed three things. One. The government was much too slow to respond militarily. Two. The government totally misjudged the situation. Three. President Tsai cannot rule by speech making.

Full Text Below:

Once the unfavorable ruling by the Hague on the South China Sea was announced, the Tsai regime immediately dispatched the cruiser Dihua to the South China Sea. President Tsai Ing-wen stood on its deck and declared her determination to defend the homeland. The Ministry of Defense established response centers. The scene revealed three things. One. The government was much too slow to respond militarily. Two. The government totally misjudged the situation. Three. President Tsai cannot rule by speech making.

Earlier plans called for Tsai Ing-wen to issue a statement the same night as the “ruling”. But her statement was delayed until yesterday. The reason for the delay was quite simple. The “ruling” was not at all what the government expected. Taiping Island is now in grave danger. As a result, the president's original statement had to be circular filed, and a new statement drafted overnight.

The Tsai government deluded itself with wishful thinking. It assumed that because Taiping Island is clearly an island, the tribunal could hardly rule otherwise. It assumed that Mainland China's "U-shaped line", on the other hand, would face serious challenges. The Tsai regime could then distance itself from Beijing. It could show the United States and other nations that it was on their side, rather than the Mainland's. But who knew the Permanent Court of Arbitration would be so unfriendly? Who knew it would slap Taiwan right across the face, along with the Mainland? Who knew it would demean Taiwan independence by referring to Taiwan as “China's Taiwan”?

These changes in the South China Sea rules of the game took the Tsai regime completely by surprise. The “ruling” was not at all what it expected. As a result, those agencies responsible were caught totally off-guard and unprepared. The most obvious example occurred during the large scale military exercises held by the United States and the Mainland in the South China Sea. The Tsai regime, citing "Typhoon Prevention" as pretext, pulled two ROC Coast Guard cutters from Taiping Island. When questioned by the Legislative Yuan, Coast Guard Administration Chief Li Chung-wei had the temerity to claim he “never considered the impact the South China Sea “ruling” might have. Under Legislative Yuan pressure, the government temporarily reassigned the ROC Navy cruiser Wei Hsing to Taiping Island. When the “ruling” was announced, the Tsai regime cited “inadequate defensive capability" as pretext. Still later, it flip-flopped, and dispatched the ROC Navy cruiser Dihua to defend our southern border. The National Security Council's response reminds one of the old anecdote about “Father and Son Ride a Donkey”.

Beijing, by contrast, seized the initiative. It blasted the tribunal's credibility and the validity of its “rulings”. The Mainland understood its situation. As a result, its response covered all the baes. The Tsai government, on the other hand, was sleepwalking. This brings us to several points that need to be acknowledged.

First, Tsai regime hostility toward the Mainland blinded it to ROC national interests. In politics there are no perpetual enemies or perpetual friends. For those in authority, the most important consideration must be national interests. On the South China Sea issue, the two sides may have divided jurisdiction. But their sovereignty claims are overwhelmingly congruent. The legitimacy of ROC claims to South China Sea islands such as Taiping Island and Dongsha Island, is closely related to PRC claims regarding the “U-shaped line”. But the DPP hates the Mainland. President Tsai refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. The new regime feels smug in its recent victory. It hoped to use the “ruling” to distance itself from the Mainland, and show the international community it was a “staunch ally”. But the “ruling” trampled over the sovereignty of both the ROC and the PRC simultaneously. It denied ROC sovereignty over Taiping Island. For the new regime the debacle came as a complete surprise .

Second, the makeup of the National Security Council was too uniform. As a result its judgments were skewed. President Tsai listened to reports from a wide range of responsible agencies. She considered a wide range of possible scenarios. But her staffers were overly optimistic. Therefore they lacked an integrated response. Never mind a back-up plan. This was the reason for the new regime's incoherence. On the eve of the tribunal “ruling”, green camp policy on the South China Sea was set almost exclusively by Taiwan Braintrust Deputy Executive Director Lin Ting-hui. He was absolutely certain "our rights to Taiping Island will not be undermined". Wang Ting-yu echoed his assumption, and protested that Taiping Island was not even on the agenda. Their entire aim was to defame Ma Ying-jeou. How could they possibly be objective? The new regime does not like listening to contrary opinions. Why else would it fall into the trap of “selective perception”?

Third, the Tsai government lacked an independent and sovereign mindset. It naively assumed its allies would back its play. On the eve of the “finding”, the Presidential Office boasted about how it complied with international law and with the Convention on the Law of the Sea. It expressed naive faith in the tribunal. It ignored the fact that the tribunal denied the ROC any participation in the case, and accorded it zero respect. Nor did the United States provide the Tsai regime with useful information. The new regime assume it was invincible. It lowered its guard. In hindsight, it may have been misled by the United States. It may have been misled by its own unrequited love. In any event, it lost the ability to defend our sovereignty. It unwittingly brought catastrophe down on our heads. The United States and Japan have joined hands to contain Mainland China. If the Tsai government refuses to change its ways, if it persists in being a willing pawn on behalf of US hegemony, the consequences will be disastrous indeed.

The tribunal alleged that Taiping Island was a "reef". It claimed it lacks a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone. This international body demeaned our status. The Tsai regime's days of issuing feel-good national security alerts have come to an end.

蔡政府何以走上誤判的險境
2016/07/14 聯合報

隨著南海仲裁案的不利判決出爐，我國昨天緊急派出迪化艦巡弋南海，蔡英文總統並登艦宣示捍衛國土之決心，國防部則成立應變中心。這些場景，其實集中說明了三件事：一是國軍因應遲緩，二是政府誤判形勢，三是總統不能光靠演說治國。

依稍早的計畫，蔡英文原訂在仲裁結果揭曉之夜發表談話，卻臨時打住，延至昨日才公開講話。原因無他，這次仲裁結果較政府原先的預判落差太大，太平島處境陷於險惡；在這種情況下，總統的原講稿只能作廢，連夜重寫。

政府原先的如意算盤是：太平島是「島」，這是鐵打的事實，仲裁法院不可能推翻；而中國大陸的「Ｕ形線」則可能受到嚴重挑戰，因此台灣或可在此與對岸略作切割，向美國及相關國家示好。誰料，國際仲裁法院卻出乎預料地不友善，給了大陸一巴掌，也賞了台灣一耳光，更把我國矮化為「中國台灣」。

南海戲碼的變化，完全超乎蔡政府的想像與推演，至少不是預判的首要選項，也因此相關單位疏於部署，錯漏重重，面對驟變措不及防。最明顯的例子是，美中兩國在南海進行大規模軍演之際，我國卻將派駐太平島的兩艘海巡艦以「避颱」為由撤回；海巡署長李仲威在立院答詢時，竟稱他「沒有想到」南海仲裁的因素。為了應付國會壓力，政府臨時改派「偉星艦」前往太平島；在仲裁判決出爐而遭輿論指責「守土不力」後，又決定增派海軍迪化艦巡護國土南疆。國安應對鬆散猶如父子騎驢，令人失望。

相對於北京近來頻打預防針，猛烈抨擊仲裁之公信與效力，顯示對岸的情報準確，因應也更完整。至於我國，為何會走到陷於險境而幾無自覺的地步，則有幾點值得檢討。

首先，兩岸對峙的心態，蒙蔽了蔡政府對國家利益的追求。政治上沒有永遠的敵人，也沒有永遠的朋友，主政者最重要的考慮就是以國家利益為先。在南海議題上，兩岸雖然分治，但主權主張卻有相當大部分的重疊，我國占有太平島和東沙的地位也都與Ｕ形線息息相關。但因民進黨敵視北京，蔡總統又不承認九二共識，新政府因而心存儌倖，企圖利用仲裁之機切割對岸，向國際社會示好。孰料，仲裁結果卻是兩岸的權利同時受損，我國太平島更遭莫須有的矮化，這是政府始料未及的挫敗。

第二，國安團隊結構太過單薄，以致研判失準。蔡總統事先聽取過相關部門的報告，也對各種可能狀況作出研判；但幕僚人員的分析似多指向從寬料定，也因此，民眾看不到各部門的整合因應，遑論後備計畫，才會步調紊亂。在仲裁結果出爐前夕，綠營的南海主張幾乎一面倒地盲從新台灣智庫副執行長林廷輝之見，認為「太平島的權利不會受到限縮」，王定宇更附和稱太平島根本未列仲裁標的。這些人完全從「批馬」的角度切入，如何可能客觀？新政府不喜聽取刺耳的言論，又如何不墜入偏聽的陷阱？

第三，缺乏獨立的主權意識，致對盟邦過度誤信與附和。宣判前夕，總統府高呼遵守《國際法》及《海洋法公約》的主張，一副對仲裁心悅誠服的姿態，全未思及我國在仲裁案毫無角色，也絲毫未受尊重。再看，美方這次並未提供我任何有用訊息，新政府自以為立於不敗之地，而鬆懈以對。從事後看，這可能是我方受到美方的誤導，亦可能出於我方自作多情的胡亂投射，乃至失去自己對主權的嚴肅判斷，竟致大禍臨頭而渾然不覺。在美日聯手抗中的大戲中，我國若不改甘為霸權棋子的心態，後果將極險峻。

太平島被仲裁法院貶抑為「礁」，不僅使我國喪失南疆兩百浬經濟海域的權利，更飽嚐遭國際組織矮化之苦。如此一來，也使得蔡政府的國安能力警報大作，「自我感覺良好」的日子即在此宣告結束。