China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 22, 2016
Executive Summary: Since the election, the ruling DPP has been taking one step at a time. But it is now the ruling party. It must answer to the people of Taiwan. It must offer them a clear direction. As Tsai Ing-wen herself conceded during the DPP's recent Party Congress, if ruling party change fails to solve problems, if it fails to effect structural change, the people will be disappointed not only in the DPP, but in democracy itself. Tsai Ing-wen can no longer afford to remain silent.
Taiwan is currently beleaguered by a host of problems. Yet President Tsai Ing-wen has evaded responsibility for every one of them, by wishing them out of existence.
When the “ruling” on the South China Sea was announced, It miraculously demoted Taiping Island to the status of a "reef". The Tsai government publicly declared that it "would never accept it". But it refused to reaffirm the U-shaped line in the South China Sea and Taiwan's historic rights to the territory within. Tsai was determined to distance Taiwan from the Mainland's “joint defense of China's heritage, and resolute rejection of arbitration". As Tsai saw it, this would enable her to avoid association with the Mainland, help her avoid being denounced for selling out Taiwan, and enable the United States and Japan save face.
The DPP recently convened its 17th Party Congress, the first such gathering since its return to power. Delegates proposed two mutually contradictory amendments to the DPP party platform. One did away with the Taiwan independence party platform. The other did away with further reference to the Republic of China. The former put an end to Taiwan independence. The latter de-Sinicized Taiwan and stepped up moves toward Taiwan independence. Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen remained tight-lipped and suppressed both amendments. During deliberations, she declared that she was “maintaining the status quo”. She resorted to the same ploy used to such effect during the general election.
Equivocation, flexibility, and silence on critical issues. This are President Tsai's means for coping with cross-Strait and international problems. How will the new regime deal with the South China Sea issue? It will refuse to echo the Mainland's "joint defense of China's heritage”. It will refuse to mention Ma Ying-jeou's Ten Points Proposal for the South China Sea. It will instead attempt to use the South China Sea issue to gain a pulpit in Asian-Pacific multilateral negotiations, a seat in multilateral organizations, and expand its international presence. The South China Sea issue could become an entry point. It could also become a bargaining chip.
Taiwan's multilateral relations may provide the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia pretexts by which they can intervene. As for cross-Strait relations, Tsai suppressed both extreme amendments during the Party Congress. Tsai intends to do everything possible to suppress cross-Strait controversy and to avoid conflict in the Taiwan Strait. While "maintaining the status quo", she intends to turn cross-Strait relations into multilateral relations between the Mainland, the United States, and Japan. In particular, she intends to promote her New Southern Strategy. It is not hard to understand why the new regime has resorted to equivocation and flexibility to avoid dealing with difficult international issues.
Singapore is the model of a small nation thriving among larger nations by means of multilateralism. But Singapore's history, geographical advantages, economic openness, and sense of timing, distinguish it from Taiwan. Politically Singapore is resigned to being surrounded by larger powers. It is adept at balancing the interests of its neighbors. It relies on its status as a free port, its transnational investments, its separation of state and economy, its efficient government, and total openness to outside capital. Its economic achievements power its diplomacy. Its success would be difficult to replicate within Asia.
To achieve multilateral win-win, the new regime must find its way as soon as possible. Unfortunately two months after assuming power, the DPP clings to its "maintaining the status quo" strategy. Internally and externally, its policy remains equivocal. For two months, it has issued no clear foreign policy guideline. Just the opposite. It is aggressively calling for economic localization. The result has been declining imports and exports, and declining foreign investment. Taiwan is geographically small and densely populated. It is highly dependent on outside capital. But the current regime blocks outside capital. This renders its thoroughly deluded "From the world to Taiwan, from Taiwan to the World" logic even more irrelevant.
As Tsai Ing-wen said during the DPP Party Congress, the ruling DPP has been confronted with a series of crises only two months into its term. Responding to them has not been easy. The crises include the Taoyuan Airport flood, the China Airlines strike, the Hsiung Feng missile lauch fiasco, as well as battering from by typhoon. She said "Some of Taiwan's problems are the result of long-term structural defects. Others are the result of short-tem emergencies. But the only thing people care about is what the DPP government intends to do about them". Among these, the crises caused by long-term structural defects are the most serious. They are the ones that will determine Taiwan's future.
Several issues in particular demand clear thinking. First, is alienating Taiwan from the Mainland really necessary for a multilateral win/win strategy? If Taiwan severs its close connection with the Mainland, it will lose it most important economic partner. It will lose a major bargaining chip during negotiations with foreign nations and the other side of the Strait
Secondly, if Taiwan wishes to join the TPP, if it wishes to promote its New Southern Strategy, does it not need to play ball with the US and Japan? How can it permit the importation of US pork? How can it throw open the door to food imports from the Fukushima nuclear disaster area? How can any of these be good for Taiwan?
The DPP has long been adept at gauging public sentiment and inciting public indignation. The “ruling” on the South China Sea will not permit the DPP to exploit the results of “international arbitration”. It will not permit her to sell out ROC sovereignty over Taiping Island in exchange for US opposition to the Mainland. The DPP must be clear on this. Public opinion has enabled the DPP to defeat its opponents. But public opinion may come back to bite the DPP as well.
Since the election, the ruling DPP has been taking one step at a time. But it is now the ruling party. It must answer to the people of Taiwan. It must offer them a clear direction. As Tsai Ing-wen herself conceded during the DPP's recent Party Congress, if ruling party change fails to solve problems, if it fails to effect structural change, the people will be disappointed not only in the DPP, but in democracy itself. Tsai Ing-wen can no longer afford to remain silent.
沉默的蔡英文 危機四伏的台灣
2016/7/22 中國時報
近期台灣遇到的幾個複雜話題，統統被蔡英文總統「巧門」化解於無形。
南海仲裁案裁決結果出爐，太平島成「礁」，蔡政府公開表態「絕不接受」，但隻字未提U形線和台灣在南海的歷史性權利，以區隔大陸在南海仲裁上「共守祖產、一致拒絕仲裁」的提議，既不靠攏一中，又不被罵賣台，還兼顧了美、日的面子。
17日民進黨再度執政後第一次黨代會，代表們分別提出了修改台獨黨綱和撤廢中華民國兩個相互背離矛盾的提案，一個要「中止台獨」，一個要「去中急獨」，都被黨主席蔡英文按下不表，交付中執會研議，機巧延續了蔡英文自大選至今「維持現狀」的一貫立場。
模糊、柔軟、對關鍵性爭議保持沉默，這就是蔡總統因應兩岸問題及對外關係的「巧門策略」。按照這個策略邏輯，對南海問題，新政府最可能的做法是，不正面呼應「維護祖產」的提議，也不正面回應馬英九提出的南海十點建議，而是以南海為契機，藉此謀求亞太地區的多邊談判機會、加入多邊機制，爭取更多國際參與的空間。南海可能是切入點，也可能是籌碼。
未來台灣的多邊外交關係，可能加大美國、日本、東南亞各國的權重；而兩岸關係上，從黨代會擋下兩個極端化提案看來，蔡英文打算將一切可能挑起兩岸爭議的話題抹平在萌生階段，最大限度地避免矛盾激化，在台海兩岸「維持現狀」的情形下，加緊推進陸、美、日之外的更多面向的外部關係，尤其是新南向策略。由此不難理解新政府為何一再以模糊、軟化的行動，來處置尖銳的外部問題。
以小博大、多邊多贏，新加坡堪稱典範。但回顧新加坡歷史，其地理優勢與經濟開放度、時代節點的把握，都與台灣大不同：政治上新加坡接受周邊多個大國的存在，善於營造各國利益均勢；經濟上依託自由港、跨國投資、政經分離等，強力的政府加之充分的對外開放，以經濟成就了外交，這種成功，在亞洲範圍內可以說很難複製。
要經營多邊多贏的格局，新政府應盡速找到明確的路徑。遺憾的是，民進黨執政兩個月，在「維持現狀」的沉默「巧門」指導下，無論內部或外部，政策方向都非常模糊。兩個月來，看不出政府任何積極外向的施政指引，相反是積極對內呼應經濟在地化方向，任令進出口貿易持續萎縮，外來投資繼續衰退。台灣地狹人稠，必須依賴外來活水，但當下情形卻在阻絕外來活水。「從世界到台灣」、「從台灣到世界」的外部邏輯，就更無從談起了。
當然，正如蔡英文在黨代會上所說的，民進黨剛剛執政兩個月，面對了連串危機，因應實屬不易：桃園機場淹水、華航空服罷工、雄三飛彈誤射、颱風重創。她說：「台灣有些危機是長久的結構問題，有些是臨時的突發狀況，但人民唯一在意的，就是民進黨政府如何因應」。這其中，長久結構問題帶來的危機，攸關台灣的未來。
但我們仍應對幾個問題有清晰的思考：首先，背離大陸是不是台灣多邊多贏的必須選項？失去了與大陸的高度關聯，一方面台灣經濟將失卻主要夥伴，另一方面也會在國際空間中失去兩岸關係這個重大籌碼。
其次，如果要加入TPP，要推進新南向，是不是就要更加順應美日的指引，更緊密地捆綁，比如引進美豬？或給福島災區食品開門？對台灣究竟是好是壞?
民進黨歷來善於理解民意，南海仲裁激起的民眾憤慨，不會容許民進黨借國際仲裁結果的機會，以出賣太平島權利為籌碼連美抗中。看清楚民意的風險，民意可擊敗政敵，但也要當心民意反噬。
可以說，自大選以來，民進黨政府一直抱著「走一步，看一步」的戰術，但進入執政期，必須本著對台灣人民負責任的態度，對台灣的未來給出清晰的戰略考量。正如黨代會上蔡英文的自述，如果政黨輪替不能解決問題，不能改革結構，人民不只是對民進黨失望，更會對民主政治失望。小英，不能再沉默了。
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