Taiwan Fishermen Must Not Be Sacrificed to Curry Favor with Japan
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 26, 2016
Executive Summary: The Tsai regime's attitude toward maritime cooperation and dialogue with Japan is highly ambivalent. It may even ignore the interests of Taiwan fishermen during negotiations. One cannot help wondering whether it intends to sell out Taiwan's fishermen in exchange for certain strategic interests, real or imaginary. Taiwan and Japan have had a channel for maritime dialogue since the Ma administration. It was originally intended to deal with fishing rights disputes caused by overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones. Taiwan and Japan were able to reach an agreement on fishing rights in waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. They ought to deal with fishing rights around Cong Zhi Niao Reef the same way. But the Tsai regime has already left fishing rights out of the first round of negotiations. It did this without even consulting Taiwan fishermen. One has to wonder. Does the Tsai regime even care about the rights of Taiwan's fishermen?
Full Text Below:
The Tsai regime's attitude toward maritime cooperation and dialogue with Japan is highly ambivalent. It may even ignore the interests of Taiwan fishermen during negotiations. One cannot help wondering whether it intends to sell out Taiwan's fishermen in exchange for certain strategic interests, real or imaginary. Taiwan and Japan have had a channel for maritime dialogue since the Ma administration. It was originally intended to deal with fishing rights disputes caused by overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones. Taiwan and Japan were able to reach an agreement on fishing rights in waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. They ought to deal with fishing rights around Cong Zhi Niao Reef the same way. But the Tsai regime has already left fishing rights out of the first round of negotiations. It did this without even consulting Taiwan fishermen. One has to wonder. Does the Tsai regime even care about the rights of Taiwan's fishermen?
Taiwan fishermen have the right to fish in waters surrounding Cong Zhi Niao Reef, since it is merely a reef, and not an island. Reefs lack Exclusive Economic Zones. Taiwan fishermen are naturally entitled to fish in the area. The South China Sea “ruling” on what constitutes an island and what constitutes a reef defined Cong Zhi Niao Reef as a reef, and not an island. Taiwan has objected to the proposterous classification of Taiping Island as a reef. Nevertheless according to the “ruling”, Cong Zhi Niao Reef is not an island. This is an embarrassment for Japan. On the one hand, Japan is demanding that Mainland China comply with the “ruling”. On the other hand, Japan refuses to comply with the “ruling” as it applies to Cong Zhi Niao Reef. That explains why Japan has remained silent on this issue. It has no desire to draw attention to the fact that Cong Zhi Niao Reef is merely a reef. Taiwan must of course argue its case as vigorously as possible. It must flatly reject Japan's claims regarding Cong Zhi Niao Reef. Sadly, the new regime's political agenda is seriously muddled. It is reluctant to publicly repudiate Japan's claims, because it is terrified of offending Japan. It is also concerned about a domestic backlash. It is afraid it will not be able to pacify Taiwan fishermen. Hence the bizarre situation noted above. On the whole however, the Tsai regime prefers to appease Japan, then maintain as low a profile as it can on the issue.
Since the new regime took office, it has cozied up to the US and Japan, and distanced itself from the Mainland. This is no secret. For the Tsai regime , friendly relations with Japan is of important strategic value. From this perspective, one might argue that the new regime's approach is “logical”. We understand the logic. That does not mean we agree with the logic. Still less does it mean we accept its negative consequences, particularly the harm inflicted upon Taiwan fishermen. The Japanese position on Cong Zhi Niao Reef is obviously pure sophistry and selective enforcement of the law. It refuses to apply the law consistently, but only selectively, when it is to its selfish advantage. The recent Dong Sheng Chi 16 incident is typical. The Japanese have the Tsai regime's number. They know the Tsai regime is terrified of giving offense to Japan. That is why the Japanese are being so tough on Tsai.
Must Taiwan unilaterally cave every time it negotiates with Japan? Or can it consider Taiwan's best interests vis a vis the strategic situation in East Asia? In fact, sound relations with Japan do not require automatically caving in to Japan's demands. International relations have always been a matter of quid pro quo exchanges. Taiwan is hardly the only party that wants something. Taiwan and Japan each want something from the other. Japan regularly sends warships into waters surrounding Cong Zhi Niao Reef. Why? Because it knows full well its claim to an Exclusive Economic Zone is cannot withstand scrutiny. The South China Sea “ruling” is lethal to Japan's claims. The Tsai regime can easily claim that Japan has no right to prevent Taiwan fishing vessels from fishing in waters near Cong Zhi Niao Reef. It can do so in exchange for its silence on Japan's spurious claims to an Exclusive Economic Zone. It need not cave in before negotiations have even begun. This of course can be interpreted as a gesture of goodwill towards the Japanese. But if such gestures of goodwill fail to win concessions from Japan, the Tsai regime must get tough. It must ensure that the Japanese understand Taiwan's concerns. It must make reference to Japan's spurious claims regarding Cong Zhi Niao Reef.
The Tsai regime's policy toward Japan must be reexamined. Taiwan has close trade and people to people relations with Japan. Sound relations with Japan are of course conducive to Taiwan's economic growth. The Tsai regime assumes that Taiwan's membership in an anti-Mainland axis will win Japanese support for Taiwan, and enable it to resist pressure from the Mainland. But if this is achieved at the expense of the fundamental rights of the people of Taiwan, then it becomes a highly questionable proposition.
During the Ma administration the two sides had no need to compete with each other in the international arena. This enabled the Ma administration to remain tough in the face of Japanese pressure. In order to accommodate Taiwan, Japan had to grant concessions. This enabled the Ma administration to win many concessions for Taiwan fishermen. The Tsai regime's actions show that it lacks this ability.
Cross-Strait friction within the Chinese nation is clearly the result of Tsai regime provocation. As we can see, cross-strait relations affects more than cross-Strait exchanges. It also affects Taiwan's interaction with other governments. The Tsai regime must acknowledge the importance of cross-Strait relations. It must not see the Mainland only as an opponent. It must change its policy towards Japan. Relations between Taiwan and Japan must be equal and mutually beneficial. Only then can the people of Taiwan fully enjoy their rights.
台日友好不能犧牲漁民權益
2016/7/26 中國時報
蔡政府對台、日海洋事務合作對話態度十分曖昧,甚至刻意排除漁會參與,不禁令人憂心,是否企圖犧牲漁權,以交換戰略利益。台、日海洋對話機制的成立,本是為處理雙方經濟海域重疊所造成的漁權糾紛,馬政府執政期間,台、日雙方就釣魚台漁權紛爭達成協議,現在本應繼續處理沖之鳥漁權爭議,但本輪對話卻首次排除漁會參與,甚至未徵詢漁民意見,政府真的有心維護漁民的權益嗎?
漁民前往沖之鳥礁附近海域捕魚,正當性來源是沖之鳥是礁不是島,不能主張經濟水域,台灣漁民自然有權在此區域捕魚。南海仲裁結果出爐,仲裁庭關於島礁界定的嚴格標準,為判定沖之鳥的法理地位提供了充分依據,儘管台灣方面反對仲裁庭有關太平島的界定,但根據仲裁庭的界定,沖之鳥毫無可能被認定為「島」。在這種情況下,日本也陷入尷尬境地,一方面其要求大陸方面遵守仲裁庭的仲裁決定,另一方面又不接受相關判例延伸用於沖之鳥礁上。也正是這個原因,日本在此問題上極其低調,不希望沖之鳥礁議題引起過多關注。對台灣來說,理論上當然應該據理力爭,完全否定日本有關沖之鳥的主張,但現在新政府有其他政治考量,在此問題上陷入混沌不清狀態,既不願意公開否定日本的主張,以免影響台、日關係大局,另一方面又擔心台灣內部反彈,無法安撫漁民反對情緒,於是就有了上述令人匪夷所思的局面,但總體來看,政府還是更傾向於照顧日方的感受,配合在此問題上盡量低調。
新政府上台以來奉行親美日、遠大陸策略,已經不是祕密。對蔡政府來說,建構友好的台、日關係有其重要的戰略價值,因此新政府的做法也在情理之中。我們理解其政策邏輯,不代表我們認可這個邏輯,更無法接受其可能衍生出的負面結果,尤其是對漁民利益的可能損害。具體而言,在沖之鳥議題上,日本方面明顯強詞奪理,且其在沖之鳥附近海域的所謂執法行為也有選擇性,對各國漁船並非一體適用,反而是挑軟柿子捏,前段時間的東聖吉16號事件即是典型表現。某種程度上說,日本吃定蔡政府不敢對日強硬才會如此咄咄逼人。
我們不禁要問,對日協商談判難道只有妥協一途?還是可以在考量東亞戰略格局的基礎上據理力爭,為台灣爭取最大利益?事實上,台灣要鞏固對日關係,並不一定要一味地妥協。國際關係向來強調有來有往,更何況台灣絕非單方面有求於日本,而是台、日互相有求於彼此。日本之所以頻繁派出公務船在沖之鳥附近海域執法,正是因為其有關經濟海域的主張受到挑戰,而這次南海仲裁案出爐,更是對其有致命影響,蔡政府大可理直氣壯要求日本,應允許台灣漁船在沖之鳥礁附近海域捕魚,以換取台灣在相關經濟海域主張問題上低調,而不是像現在這樣,尚未談判就先配合演出。當然,這或許也可以理解為蔡政府向日方釋放的善意,但如果這種善意最終換不來日方的讓步,那麼蔡政府就必須展現強硬立場,讓日本了解台灣的核心關切,並引用相關判例否定日本的主張。
回到蔡政府的對日政策本身,我們也認為有重新檢討之必要。台、日經貿關係密切,民間互動頻繁,友好的台、日關係自然有利於台灣經濟發展,但如果蔡政府台、日關係定位在「準反中同盟」的層面,為了爭取日本對台灣的支持,以抗衡大陸的壓力,因而不惜犧牲台灣民眾的基本權益,那就很有可議之處。
過去馬政府時期兩岸關係穩定,兩岸之間不必為了彼此競爭而在國際場合內耗,因而馬政府在面對日本時也硬氣許多,日本反而為了拉攏台灣而選擇做出讓步,因而馬政府在對日談判中為台灣漁民爭取到許多權益,但現在蔡政府的所作所為卻讓我們看不到這種氣派。
兩岸內耗已經若隱若現,顯然這是蔡政府首先挑起的。從這個角度也可看出,兩岸關係的好壞不光影響到兩岸的直接往來,也牽涉到台灣與其他國家的互動。蔡政府如能正視兩岸關係的重要,不要以對立思維面對大陸,並在此基礎上重新調整其對日策略,將台、日關係回復到平等交往、互利合作的軌道上來,才能夠切實為台灣民眾爭取權益。
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