Does the Tsai Government Understand the Political Signal Sent by the Hung Xi Summit?

Does the Tsai Government Understand the Political Signal Sent by the Hung Xi Summit? 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
November 6, 2016

Executive Summary: The DPP finds itself in an awkward position. Its suspicion of and opposition to the Mainland has bound the DPP government hand and foot. This makes it impossible to achieve a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. The only way out of its dilemma is to break free of its ideological constraints and consider the actual interests of the people. It must change its cross-Strait policies. It must adopt new ideas, new rhetoric, and new attitudes when dealing with the Mainland. It must not cross the de jure Taiwan independence red line. .

Full Text Below:

The dispute over the KMT's political path is impacting KMT CCP relations. Cross-Strait relations face the prospect of “the earth moving and the mountains shaking”. The Hung Xi Summit is being convened under these conditions. Opinions are divided within the KMT. Meanwhile, the DPP is sharpening its swords as it looks on. Fortunately Hung Hsiu-chu has been able to withstand the pressure and successfully dialogue with Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping clearly explained his thinking on Taiwan. In short, it amounts to "strategic softness, tactical toughness". Xi hopes this will stabilize currently troubled cross-Strait relations. The strategic layout is clear. The future of cross-Strait relations depends on whether the three parties on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are able to a create a scenario beneficial to all.

Pundits initially assumed that once the KMT lost power, internal disputes would arise over the party's political path. Its future path would be unclear, and the Mainland would refuse to meet with the KMT at this moment. This view clearly underestimated the mutual trust established between the KMT and the CCP, and the Mainland's determination to ensure peaceful cross-Strait relations. In fact, the Mainland has repeatedly stressed that no matter how the political situation on Taiwan might change, it will continue to promote cross-Strait exchanges and cross-Strait peace. Xi Jinping used the Hung Xi Summit to reaffirm this position. In his six-point proposal for cross-Strait relations, he reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. The other four points concerned cross-Strait cooperation and cross-Strait public welfare. Clearly the Mainland attaches great importance to cultivating goodwill among the people of Taiwan. On the occasion of the KMT CCP Forum, the Mainland announced next year's cross-Strait youth exchange project, confirming its good intentions.

Strategic softness is one thing. The Mainland has simultaneously drawn a clearer line in the sand with regards de jure Taiwan independence. It used the Hung Xi Summit to send a clear strategic signal. It is firmly opposed to de jure independence. It utterly rejects any possibility of Taiwan independence. The DPP government refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. On the matter of Taiwan's international status, the Mainland is adhering to its long established "one China" policy, and is not about to compromise. The Mainland's Taiwan strategy is clear. The Tsai government can no longer use “both sides have misunderstood each other” as an excuse. The ball is now in Tsai's court.

Hung Hsiu-chu, the other protagonist of the Hung Xi Summit, cannot be ignored. The KMT faces endless difficulties, in particular doubts about its future from within the party. Hung Hsiu-chu preserved the KMT-CPC cooperation platform, and deepend trust between the two parties. Hung Hsiu-chuh's efforts assured the Mainland that Taiwan would not move toward de jure independence, and that a glimmer of hope for peaceful reunification remains. She prevented the Mainland from adopting a harsher policy toward Taiwan. The preservation of the KMT CCP platform will enable the KMT to continue fighting on behalf of the people of Taiwan. Therefore the KMT plays a key role in cross-Strait relations. Mutual trust will help the KMT maintain its cross-Strait advantage.

Even more importantly, during her meeting with Xi Jinping, Hung issued a clear statement reaffirming the Kuomintang's opposition to Taiwan independence. This was the first time KMT and CCP leaders held successive talks. The theme of the KMT CCP Forum was changed from "trade and culture" to "peaceful development". It left the Ma Ying-jeou era slogan of "no reunification, no independence, and no use of force" behind in the dust. It showed that the KMT had updated its position and was prepared to deal with political issues together with the Mainland, in the hope of breaking through the cross-Strait political deadlock. Its ground-breaking value should not be underestimated. Whether agreement on political issues can be achieved depends upon a number of factors, including the support of the public and the support of the United States. The KMT is hanging by a thread. It must be prepared. The slightest misstep and it could lose the public trust. It would then be beyond redemption, relegated to permanent opposition party status.

Unfortunately the Hung Xi Summit did not address economic and trade issues. Economic and trade issues remain the key to Taiwan's survival and growth. They are also the focus of cross-Strait interaction. Hung Hsiu-chu should make a greater effort to win more practical benefits for the people of Taiwan.

For the KMT, the results of the Hung Xi Summit brought both opportunities and threats. The main problem is that the KMT is in the opposition. It lacks a majority in the legislature. It cannot turn party policy into public policy. This means the KMT CCP consensus cannot be put into practice. Moreover, the KMT is subject to DPP government obstructionism and intimidation. Although it is determined to benefit the people of Taiwan, the KMT faces an entire array of obstacles. Under the circumstances, the KMT is limited to acting as an intermediary in cross-Strait interactions. It can only assist private sector cross-Strait interactions. It cannot take the political lead. The DPP has mocked the KMT as "an affiliate of the CCP". This is yet another form of McCarthyite red baiting. But it is a provocation that the KMT must be wary of.

The DPP finds itself in an awkward position. Its suspicion of and opposition to the Mainland has bound the DPP government hand and foot. This makes it impossible to achieve a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. The only way out of its dilemma is to break free of its ideological constraints and consider the actual interests of the people. It must change its cross-Strait policies. It must adopt new ideas, new rhetoric, and new attitudes when dealing with the Mainland. It must not cross the de jure Taiwan independence red line. Time is not on Taiwan's side. But Taiwan must nevertheless avoid immediate conflict. If Taiwan continues to provoke the Mainland over issues such as cultural Taiwan independence and the East Asian strategic situation, or even move toward de jure Taiwan independence, the two sides of the Strait risk a shooting war. The people will be uneasy. The economy will stagnate. And the nation will undergo yet another change in ruling parties.

蔡政府看懂洪習會政治訊號了嗎
2016年11月06日 中國時報

國共在國民黨路線之爭愈演愈烈、兩岸關係瀕臨「地動山搖」大背景下舉行洪習會，不但國民黨內部意見分歧，民進黨政府更虎視眈眈，但洪秀柱還是頂住壓力，與習近平順利舉行對話。習近平清晰說明了對台思維，簡言之就是「戰略柔軟、戰術強硬」，可望對混沌的兩岸關係定錨。今後兩岸關係發展，就看兩岸三黨如何在清晰戰略格局下，創造最有利己方的局面。

原本外界評估，國民黨失去政權後，內部陷入路線分歧，未來發展方向也不清晰，大陸不會在此刻與國民黨會晤。這種看法顯然低估了國共間深厚的互信，也未深刻體察大陸推動兩岸關係和平發展的誠意。事實上，大陸已多次強調，無論台灣政局如何變動，都會繼續推動兩岸交流與和平發展。習近平藉洪習會再度重申這一立場，在他提出的兩岸關係發展6點意見中，除重申九二共識和反台獨外，其他4點都著重在兩岸合作和增進兩岸民眾福祉，顯見大陸對此問題的高度重視，其對台灣民眾的善意也由此可見一斑。在國共論壇召開之際，大陸公布了明年的兩岸青年交流項目，可見其用心。

軟的一手以外，大陸更為法理台獨畫下紅線，利用洪習會發出清晰的戰略訊號，就是堅決反對法理台獨，完全否定了台獨的任何可能性。民進黨政府不接受九二共識，台灣的國際空間問題，大陸會堅持「一個中國」既定立場，不再妥協。大陸對台戰略清晰，蔡政府將再也沒有藉口將責任推託給「雙方誤判」，剩下的就是蔡政府的抉擇而已。

洪習會另一主角洪秀柱不能被忽視，在國民黨面臨重重困難、特別是黨內存在質疑的惡劣情勢下，洪秀柱確保了國共合作平台的延續，並進一步深化了國共之間的互信。洪秀柱的努力，讓大陸對台灣不走向法理分裂，仍存有一絲希望，也避免了對台政策走向極端。國共平台的延續也可以讓國民黨繼續為台灣民眾爭取利益，讓國民黨在兩岸關係扮演關鍵角色。深厚的互信基礎下，國民黨的兩岸優勢可望維繫。

更重要的是，洪秀柱在會晤習近平時，清晰陳述了國民黨反台獨立場，這是國民黨與中共領導人歷次會談的首次，國共論壇主題也由「經貿文化」改為「和平發展」，意味洪秀柱時代對馬英九時代「不統不獨不武」的超越。顯示國民黨調整定位，準備與大陸共同處理政治議題，希望突破兩岸政治僵局。其開創性價值不可低估，但政治議題的處理涉及一般民眾是否認同、美國是否支持等因素，國民黨已氣若游絲，必須做好萬全準備，若稍有閃失讓國人產生疑慮，就可能萬劫不復，長期在野。

令人遺憾的是，洪習會並未涉及經貿議題，但經貿仍是台灣生存發展癥結所在，也是兩岸互動重點，洪秀柱若要幫助台灣民眾爭取更多現實利益，還是應該多在這一領域下功夫。

對國民黨來說，洪習會成果既帶來機會也帶來威脅。主要問題在於，國民黨在野地位，立法院也不掌握多數，不能將政黨立場轉換成公共政策，這意味國共共識無法付諸實施。不僅如此，國民黨還要面臨民進黨政府的杯葛、封鎖與威脅，即便有心幫助台商和台灣民眾爭取更多利益，也要面臨重重挑戰。在不利情勢下，國民黨很可能淪於兩岸互動的中介角色，只能為兩岸民間互動提供協助，卻無法成為政治主導力量。民進黨人譏諷國民黨是「中共附隨組織」，這種論調是另類「紅帽子」，卻也是國民黨必須警覺的挑釁。

民進黨角色尷尬，「疑中抗中」政策基調讓民進黨政府作繭自縛，難在兩岸關係求得突破。唯一脫困策略，是拋下意識形態束縛，以台灣民眾實際利益為依歸，上策是調整兩岸政策思路，以新觀念、新論述、新姿態面對大陸，中策是謹守法理台獨紅線，不輕易碰觸，時間雖然不站在台灣這邊，但以拖待變起碼可以避免立即衝突。若在文化台獨與東亞戰略問題上繼續挑釁大陸，甚至走向法理台獨，兩岸兵凶戰危、民心不安、經濟困頓，政黨再度輪替勢所難免。