China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 1, 2016
Executive Summary: The Hung Xi Summit offered little in the way of flash. But the two sides are currently mired in cold confrontation. Increased cross-Strait exchanges and communications are beneficial for people on both sides of the Strait. Hung Hsiu-chu proposed a path that would advance cross-Strait peace. Xi Jinping expressed the desire for peace. That was his bottom line. This made Mainland strategy for Taiwan clearer, and was the greatest achievement of the Hung Xi Summit.
Full Text Below:
The Hung Xi summit will affect trilateral relations among the blue, green, and red camps. Dissent has emerged from the blue camp, and ridicule from the green camp. Public statements issued by Hung Hsiu-chu and Xi Jinping suggest that the two sides followed the anticipated script, thereby completing a routine talk between the KMT and the CCP. But the Kuomintang has lost power for the first time. Cross-Strait relations remain uncertain. As a result the very first exchange between Hung and Xi carries with it unusual significance.
The two sides are seeking stability. The Hung Xi Summit was indeed short of flash. That was no surprise. But that does not mean its impact on cross-Strait relations and Taiwan's political evolution was insignificant. In fact, the public pronouncements issued by the two parties during the Hung Xi Summit contain a number of important messages.
Let us look at where Hung and Xi agree. The two sides agreed on four specific points. First, they agreed on the 1992 Consensus. Xi Jinping mentioned it three times. Hung Hsiu-chu also mentioned it three times. One time she referred to “the consensus reached in 1992". The second point of agreement concerned peace. Hung Hsiu-chu mentioned "peace" seven times. Xi Jinping mentioned peace eight times. The third point of agreement concerns opposition to Taiwan independence. Xi Jinping mentioned it two times, both after mentioning the 1992 Consensus. Hung Hsiu-chu mentioned it two times as well. The only difference was that she spoke of "opposing the Taiwan independence party platform", and "eliminating the dangerous turbulence caused by Taiwan independence separatism".
The fourth point of agreement was rather special, and differed from the first three points of agreement. The two party leaders refrained from mentioning "reunification". This amounted to passive agreement.
These four points of agreement can be further interpreted from the perspective of the KMT, the DPP, and the CCP. Take the case of the KMT. Hung Hsiu-chu did not commit any verbal gaffes. The 1992 Consensus remained the greatest point of agreement for the two sides. The two sides' affirmations of "peace" and "opposition to Taiwan independence" echoed the “no use of force” and “no Taiwan independence” in Ma Ying-jeou's Three Noes policy. Neither side elaborated on reunification, the fourth point of agreement. They refrained from mentioning Ma Ying-jeou's “no reunification”. Therefore the 1992 Consensus and Ma's Three Noes were unaffected. The KMT, including Ma Ying-jeou and Wu Den-yih, were fearful that Hung Hsiu-chu's views on reunification would undermine the KMT's election prospects. They can now relax.
Did Hung Hsiu-chu mention “one China, different interpretations”? As this newspaper's past editorials have repeatedly noted, during past KMT CCP party leader meetings, even the Ma Xi Summit, the KMT never demanded any public affirmation of “one China, different interpretations”. Demanding that Hung Hsiu-chu make such an affirmation was clearly unfair.
In fact Hung did more to reaffirm “one China, different interpretations” than her predecessors. She spoke of "seeking agreement on the one China principle, while exercising wisdom regarding different interpretations of one China”. She was already half a step ahead.
For the DPP, Xi Jinping's message was clear. For the CCP, the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence are the bedrock foundation for cross-Strait relations. If the DPP wishes to unfreeze cross-Strait relations, it cannot evade these two issues. It must revise or improve its position on the 1992 Consensus. It must at a cross-Strait stance that the Mainland can live with, no matter how distasteful. Only that will prevent the further deterioration of cross-Strait relations. Only that can reduce friction between the DPP and the CCP. That may not be easy for Tsai Ing-wen, but it is not impossible. At least it is easier than dealing directly with the holy relic known as the Taiwan Independence Party Platform.
Alas, Tsai Wen-wen's poll numbers continue to fall. Therefore it is unlikely that she will make any breakthroughs regarding the 1992 Consensus or Taiwan Independence Party Platform, at least in the foreseeable future. This means that cross-Strait relations will continue to spiral downward. This is a concern for Tsai Ying-wen. It is also a danger to Taiwan's growth.
For the CCP, the Hung Xi Summit was a “paint by the numbers” affair. First, the Mainland made certain that the public on Taiwan knows where it stands. The Mainland has neither tightened nor loosened its cross-Strait stand. Second, the Mainland was probably reluctant to let Hung Hsiu-chu's visit add too many variables that would lead to uncertainty within her party and the rest of Taiwan. Third, the Mainland is probably aware of the covert jockeying for position leading up to next year's KMT party chairmanship election. It did not want closer or more distant relations resulting from Hung Hsiu-chu's visit to be interpreted as CCP support or opposition to Hung's candidacy.
During the Hung Xi Summit, Hung Hsiu-chu advanced the possibility of a peace agreement. Among the five shared visions, this was the one with the highest profile. Ma Ying-jeou persistently avoided mention of it during his eight-year term of office. Hung Hsiu-chu advanced the issue of a peace agreement for the very first time during the talks. But the Mainland side downplayed the issue. That was unfortunate. The notion of a peace agreement has been severely stigmatized on Taiwan in recent years. But in fact a peace agreement is worth debating and can withstand scrutiny.
Cross-Strait peace must be formalized. But the notion of a peace agreement has long been stigmatized, mainly because the KMT is afraid to turn it into a political issue. It is afraid that it is untenahble. A positive response from the Mainland would encourage debate and discussion on Taiwan.
The Hung Xi Summit offered little in the way of flash. But the two sides are currently mired in cold confrontation. Increased cross-Strait exchanges and communications are beneficial for people on both sides of the Strait. Hung Hsiu-chu proposed a path that would advance cross-Strait peace. Xi Jinping expressed the desire for peace. That was his bottom line. This made Mainland strategy for Taiwan clearer, and was the greatest achievement of the Hung Xi Summit.
洪習會維繫了兩岸和平曙光
2016/11/1 下午 10:42:03 主筆室
牽動藍、綠、紅三邊政治關係的洪習會，在藍有雜音、綠多嘲諷的波濤中登場。從洪秀柱、習近平公開談話內容來看，雙方大體按照外界預期的腳本，穩健完成國共兩黨行之有年的領導人會談，但放在國民黨首次徹底失去政權，兩岸關係陷入高度不確定狀態下，洪習首次對話還是具有重大意涵。
由於雙方力求穩健，洪習會確實少了一些驚豔，但也沒有太大的意外。但這不表示洪習會對兩岸關係與台灣政治發展的影響無足輕重。事實上，從洪習兩方的公開談話，還是可以比對出幾個重要訊息。
先看洪習談話的「交集處」，雙方大體有4個具體交集。第一，是九二共識，習近平說了3次，洪秀柱也剛好說了3次（其中一次以「1992年達成的共識」來表述）；第二是和平，在洪秀柱的談話中「和平」兩字出現7次，習近平則出現8次；第三是反對台獨，習近平提了2次，2次都是連在九二共識後說的，洪秀柱也提了2次，但分別是用「對抗台獨黨綱」與「消除因台獨分離主義引發的危險動盪」來表述。
第四個交集比較特別，與前3項積極性交集不同的是，兩人均未提到「統一」，這是消極性的交集。
這4個交集，可以分別從國民黨、民進黨與共產黨等幾個面向進一步解讀。就國民黨而言，洪秀柱並無「意外言行」，九二共識仍是雙方最大公約數，「和平」與「反對台獨」這2個交集，更積極呼應了馬英九任內「三不政策」中的「不武」與「不獨」。雙方均未表述統一的第四個交集，也保留了馬英九主張的「不統」，所以「九二共識」與「三不」均未動搖，國民黨內包括馬英九與吳敦義等人，疑慮洪秀柱主張統一將不利國民黨選舉的問題，應可安心。
至於洪秀柱要不要說出一中各表，就如同過去本報社論一再指出，在過去兩黨領導人會面乃至於馬習會，在公開會面談話中，國民黨一方從來不曾公開表述過「一中各表」，以此要求洪秀柱顯然不公道。
甚至，洪秀柱還比前人多做了一點「類一中各表」的表述，提及「求一中原則之同、存一中涵義之異的智慧」，已是多開了半步路。
在民進黨方面，習近平釋出的訊息再清楚不過，「九二共識」與「反對台獨」，是中共在應對兩岸關係的銅牆與鐵壁。兩岸關係要融冰復進，民進黨繞不開這兩道題。更正面或更進一步承認「九二共識」，至少在兩岸定位問題上，要有一個讓大陸「雖不滿意卻可以接受」的論述，才可以阻止兩岸關係繼續惡化，讓民共關係進入摩擦可控的緩衝地帶，這一點對蔡英文來說不容易，卻不是絕不可能，至少比直接處理《台獨黨綱》這塊神主牌要容易得多。
但蔡英文由於民調持續下滑，不管是九二共識這道銅牆，還是《台獨黨綱》這道鐵壁，在預見的未來要打破，機率都不高，這也意謂，兩岸關係還會盤旋下挫，這是蔡英文執政之憂，也是台灣發展之險。
在共產黨方面，洪習會的「照表操課」，一方面意謂陸方不願釋出讓台灣民眾誤解的訊息，不管是誤解陸方在兩岸立場上是多鬆了一些，還是多緊了一些；二方面，也可能是不願讓洪秀柱此行所多添的變數，造成她在黨內與台灣內部多增疑慮；三方面，也可能是意識到國民黨內部在明年黨主席的角力上仍有暗潮，不願有任何對洪秀柱的「加進或加遠」，讓外界解讀中共是較支持或較不支持洪秀柱。
洪秀柱在洪習會提出「和平協議」議題，這是連胡五項共同願景中最受矚目的訴求，但馬英九8年任期始終避談，洪秀柱第1次讓「和平協議」4個字重回會談桌，但陸方對此也採相對冷處理，這是有些可惜的。和平協議雖然這些年在台灣被嚴重汙名化，但「和平協議」議題本身，是經得起辯論也經得起檢驗的。
因為和平必須制度化，但和平協議長期被被汙名化，關鍵因素就是國民黨不敢將之放進政治議題，也不敢為站得住腳的理念辯護。陸方若能正面回應，實有助於和平協議在台灣的辯論與討論。
雖然沒太多驚豔，但在兩岸陷入冷對抗的此刻，兩岸交流與溝通能多一分，對兩岸民眾就好一分，洪秀柱提出了深化兩岸和平的路徑，習近平表達了和平的意願與底限，讓大陸對台戰略更清晰，這是洪習會最大成就。
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