United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 1, 2016
Executive Summary: Xi Jinping said, "If the CCP fails to deal with Taiwan independence, the Chinese people will overthrow it". The Tsai government must ask itself, "If the DPP fails to deal with Taiwan independence, will it lose the support of the people of Taiwan one day?" The Tsai government must consider the possibility that the 1992 Consensus and “one China, different interpretations” are its way out of this dilemma .
Full Text Below:
The Hong Xi Summit reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus, and took another step in opposition to Taiwan independence. It left room for “one China, different interpretations", and reevaluated the possibility of a peace agreement.
First, it resolutely reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus. Hung and Xi referred to the 1992 Consensus three times during the summit. Xi said that changes in Taiwan's political situation do not change the historical facts and core implications of the 1992 Consensus. Recognizing or rejecting the 1992 Consensus is the difference between acknowledging that China is one country and alleging the existence of two countries. On this key issue the Mainland cannot possibly give way. This means that Beijing will not soften its stand on the 1992 Consensus as a concession to the Tsai government.
Second, the Hung Xi Summit took another step in opposition to Taiwan independence. Ma Ying-jeou said that "no Taiwan independence" was a declaration of his own position. He said he "would not make wild statements regarding one China”. Ma did not explicitly reject Taiwan independence. By contrast, during the Hung Xi Summit, Hung Hsiu-chu explicitly stressed that her "peace policy platform would oppose Taiwan independence", and declared war on the DPP's Taiwan Independence Party Platform.
Xi Jinping reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus, the one China principle, and opposition to Taiwan independence. Hung Hsiu-chu openly declared war on the Taiwan Independence Party Platform. This reinforced the link between the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. The Ma government, by contrast, linked the 1992 Consensus to “one China, different interpretations”. The Tsai government has never accepted the 1992 Consensus and “one China, different interpretations”. If one day the Tsai government is subjected to increased pressure from the Taiwan Independence Party Platform, it may prevent a wolf from entering the front door, only to allow a tiger to enter through the back door.
Third, in order to leave room for "one China, different interpretations", Ma Ying-jeou mentioned “one China, different interpretations” during the Ma Xi Summit closed session. During the Hung Xi Summit, Hung Hsiu-chu advocated "seeking common ground in the one China principle, while shelving differences regarding the definition of one China". Wu Po-hsiung first used this phraseology during his meeting with Hu Jintao in June 2012. Lien Chan used it again when he met Xi Jinping in February 2013. They never explicitly mentioned “one China, different interpretations”, but they were effectively referring to “one China, different interpretations”.
Hung made no mention of “one China, different interpretations” inside or outside the summit. Nor did she attempt to promote “one China, same interpretation”. This suggests that Hung's team knows when to advance and when to retreat. It also suggests that “one China, different interpretations” is not an arbitrary concept that can casually be dispensed with.
In fact, in November 2012, Sun Yafu, former deputy director of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, also spoke of "seeking common ground in one China, while shelving differences over the political definition of one China". This echoed the sentiments of Wu Den-yi, Lien Chan, and Hung Hsiu-chu. The Hung Xi Summit reaffirmed the meaning of one China and shelved differences. For this it deserves applause. Xi Jinping spoke of "the basis of the one-China principle". He did not slam the door shut on “one China, different interpretations”.
Fourth, Hung once again probed the possibility of a peace agreement. She hoped the two sides would consider the possibility of ending cross-Strait hostilities through a peace agreement. She spoke of the "possibility" because Taiwan remains mired in political controversy. Xi said the CCP's long held proposition is that the two sides can discuss a peace agreement on the basis of the one China principle. This shows that the two sides of the Strait have left behind the “no reunification, no independence, no use of force”, “Father and Son Ride a Donkey” mode of interaction behind. The two sides must agree on a goal. Even if the goal is not reunification, a peace agreement is still necessary. Can the KMT and CCP sign a peace agreement on the basis of "one China, different interpretations”? If they can, then perhaps a peace agreement can become the leading issue during the next stage of cross-Strait relations.
The KMT is not as strong as it was during the 2005 Lien Hu Summit. But the Hung Xi Summit shows that Beijing has no intention of allowing the DPP to assume control over cross-Strait relations. This has marginalized the Tsai government, just as it once marginalized the Chen government. A spokesman for the Presidential Office said, "We hope all political parties will unite behind the government on the matter of cross-Strait relations". The comment revealed the government's frustration and impotence.
President Tsai's comments regarding the Hung Xi Summit were exceedingly moderate. She once again urged Beijing to “acknowledge the existence of the ROC". But the Taiwan Independence Party Platform refuses to acknowledge the existence of the ROC. How does she intend to explain that away? She said "leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must demonstrate wisdom and flexibility. They must transform existing differences between the two sides into a win-win future". Is she truly unaware that the 1992 Consensus embodies just such this wisdom and flexibility?
Xi Jinping departed from the script and said, "If the CCP fails to deal with Taiwan independence, the Chinese people will overthrow it". The Tsai government must ask itself, "If the DPP fails to deal with Taiwan independence, will it lose the support of the people of Taiwan one day?"
The Tsai government must consider the possibility that the 1992 Consensus and “one China, different interpretations” are its way out of this dilemma .
聯合／民進黨不處理台獨 能獲台灣人民多久支持？
2016-11-03 03:15聯合報 聯合報社論
洪習會再度夯實「九二共識」，在「反對台獨」上進了一步，為「一中各表」留下空間，並重新試探「和平協議」的可能性。
一、再度夯實「九二共識」：據點計，洪與習在此會各說了三次「九二共識」。習近平說，台灣政局的變化改變不了「九二共識」的歷史事實和核心意涵，承不承認九二共識，關係認定一個國家還是兩個國家的根本問題；他說，在這個大是大非的問題上，大陸不可能有絲毫鬆動。習的這番話，可解讀為北京無可能在「九二共識」上對蔡政府退讓。
二、在「反對台獨」上更進一步：馬英九說「不獨」，是宣示自己的立場，並說「不會一中亂表」，且馬也未正面說過「反對台獨」。洪秀柱在洪習會上挑明「以和平政綱對抗台獨黨綱」，則有針對性，是直接向台獨黨綱宣戰。
習近平再次強調，以「九二共識」與「一中原則」及「反對台獨」連結，洪秀柱則挑明要對抗台獨黨綱；至此，「九二共識」與「反對台獨」的連結更加牢實（馬政府是以一中各表與九二共識連結）。蔡政府始終不接納「九二共識／一中各表」，未來若面臨內外對「台獨黨綱」的更直接壓力，儼然將成前門拒狼、後門迎虎的局面。
三、為「一中各表」留下空間：馬習會閉門會上，馬英九提到「一中各表」。洪秀柱在洪習會上則說：「求一中原則之同，存一中涵義之異」。此說首見於吳伯雄在二○一二年六月對胡錦濤說，再見於二○一三年二月連戰對習近平說。這些說法，雖未提「一中各表」，但說的都是「一中各表」。
洪在會內會外雖未說一中各表，但亦未再向一中同表推進，這或許顯示了洪團隊的知所進退，也反映了「一中各表」不是任意可以甩掉的概念。
其實，國台辦前副主任孫亞夫在二○一二年十一月也說過「求一個中國之同，存對一個中國政治涵義認知之異」；此與前述吳連洪三人的論述，可謂已是異口同聲。因而，此次洪習會能維持「一中涵義／求同存異」應值肯定，而習近平也把話只說到「在一個中國原則的基礎上」為止，亦未封堵「一中各表」的發展空間。
四、重新試探「和平協議」的可能性：洪說，希望兩岸探討以和平協議結束兩岸敵對狀態的可能性，「可能性」三字是在預留台灣內部政治的爭議空間。習稱，在一個中國原則的基礎上達成和平協議，也是中共的一貫主張，國共兩黨可就此進行探討。這顯示，兩岸已然脫離了「不統／不獨／不武」的騎驢看唱本走著瞧的互動模式，而必須有一指向，目標即使不是統一，亦必須以和平協議為歸趨。倘若國共能在探討和平協議上，就「一中各表」的簽約主體獲得解決方案，或許和平協議即可成為下階段兩岸間的引領議題。
此時，國民黨的實力與條件固然不如二○○五年連胡會時；但洪習會顯示北京斷然無意由民進黨操持兩岸關係的主導權，這將使蔡政府與當年扁政府一般同處邊緣化的地位。總統府發言人稱，「希望所有政黨應對外團結一致，支持由政府主導的兩岸關係」，語意即顯露了失落。
蔡總統對洪習會的評論十分緩和，她再度呼籲「北京應正視中華民國的存在」，但她如何解釋在台獨黨綱下中華民國的存在？至於她說「兩岸領導人應共同展現智慧和彈性，一起把兩岸現存的分歧帶向雙贏的未來」，但這智慧與彈性，難道不正存在於九二共識中嗎？
習近平脫稿說出：「如果中國共產黨不處理台獨，中國人民會推翻他們。」此話說得極重。蔡政府應自問：「民進黨若再不處理台獨，有無可能有一天也會失去台灣人民的支持？」
蔡政府應慎思：「九二共識／一中各表」，也許是比較有可能選取的出路。
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