United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 11, 2016
Executive Summary: Wild Man Trump has been elected president of the United States. He has sent ripples across the pond, both domestically and internationally. He has upset the world's power structure and value framework. Take Asia, where we are situated. Most nervous of all are Japan and South Korea, traditional allies of the US in Asia. They have requested early visits to Washington to get a handle on Trump's foreign policy. Now take the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. What if Trump abandons the Obama regime's TPP and "Asian rebalancing" policies? What if the United States ceases to contain Mainland China? How will Taiwan deal with the situation? That too must be addressed, as early as possible.
Wild Man Trump has been elected president of the United States. He has sent ripples across the pond, both domestically and internationally. He has upset the world's power structure and value framework. Take Asia, where we are situated. Most nervous of all are Japan and South Korea, traditional allies of the US in Asia. They have requested early visits to Washington to get a handle on Trump's foreign policy. Now take the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. What if Trump abandons the Obama regime's TPP and "Asian rebalancing" policies? What if the United States ceases to contain Mainland China? How will Taiwan deal with the situation? That too must be addressed, as early as possible.
Trump is an entrepreneur. He has no political experience. He has no diplomatic experience. This means his foreign policy will depart from the traditional political power and balance of power framework. US interests will be his point of reference. If he does not change significantly after taking office, the United States under his administration will no longer sacrifice its own economic interests to win over allies. Nor will it spend huge sums of money to play the role of world policeman. Its overseas military tentacles will be dramatically shrunk. The US will no longer be as internationally active as it used to be.
From past experience, a US president's remarks during an election may not represent his position after taking office. Trump is unfamiliar with foreign affairs. The bureaucracy will play an even more important role during a Trump administration. In any case, Trump's individualist colors are bright. The possibility of compromise is extremely low. When applied to international affairs, US foreign policy during his regime may yield three qualitative changes.
First, it will change from aggressive expansionism to "new isolationism". Trump has long believed that United States intervention after 2001, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and in the South China Sea, has squandered United States military power and resources. The nation has not benefited. Instead its people have become victims. Following this logic, the United States will focus more on domestic economic development in the future, rather than remain actively involved in global affairs. This new isolationist approach will ease the confrontation between the United States and China in the South China Sea. But it may lead to changes in the Asian-Pacific region. The United States' abstention may allow Mainland China to further realize its "Rise of a Great Power" dream.
Second, it will change US priorities, from “The global order first”, to “US prosperity first”. To counter the Mainland China led RCEP, the US has sacrificed its domestic market in order to lead the TPP. Trump thinks this has allowed cheap goods into the US and caused the US economy to suffer. He wants the United States to abandon TPP regional alignment. He favors giving priority to the US economy, and punishing nations that engage in unfair trade practices with high tariffs. This new trade protectionism may lead to economic conflicts between the United States and other nations.
Third, it will change unequal relationships to “peer ally” relationships. The United States is helping Japan and South Korea contain the threat of China and North Korea. It has stationed large numbers of troops in the Asian-Pacific region. The cost of this military assistance is exorbitant. Trump will emphasize a more equal alliance, and demand that Japan and South Korea cover more of the costs. If the two sides cannot come to an agreement regarding the economic burden, the military alliances between the United States and Japan, and between the United States and South Korea will be shaken. As for North Korea, Trump will dispense with Obama's "strategic patience", and advocate dialogue between the US and North Korea over the nuclear issue. This too will affect the strategic situation in Northeast Asia.
Trump's new isolationism may impact the Asian-Pacific order in two ways. First it may affect the relationship between Mainland China and the US. Trump will discontinue the "Asian Rebalancing" policy. This will reduce Sino US confrontation in the South China Sea and help the Mainland promote the RCEP and One Belt, One Road (OBOR). Once Sino US relations ease, Taiwan's past role as a counterweight to the Mainland will be weakened, changing the cross-Strait power balance. Once Taiwan loses US backing, how can it continue to engage in “cold confrontation” with the Mainland? Second, it may affect US-Japan relations. When the United States announced its "Return to Asia" move in 2009, Japan took the lead in joining the ranks of those containing the Mainland in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. If United States forces gradually withdraw from the Asian-Pacific, Japan will lose its backing. This is Abe's nightmare.
Once the DPP assumed power, its changed government strategy from “close to the US, at peace with the Mainland, and friendly with Japan”, to cozying up to the United States and Japan in order to confront the Mainland. Meanwhile the DPP chose to join the TPP and abandon the RCEP. Now however, changes brought about by Trump mania have tossed a monkey wrench into Tsai government plans. If the United States does not play an active role in Asia, the DPP's policy of cozying up to the United States in order to resist Mainland China will have no support. If the TPP is aborted, the Tsai government's economic and trade policies will also fall short.
Confronted with these important variables, the Tsai government cannot simply wait to see what Trump does. It must take positive measures to protect Taiwan's interests.
川普狂潮來襲，政府須注意兩岸和亞太變數
2016-11-11 聯合報
狂人川普當選美國總統，不僅吹皺美國一池春水，也打亂全球的權力秩序與價值結構。就我們所處的亞洲而言，最緊張的，莫過於日韓等美國在亞洲的傳統盟友，紛紛要求儘早訪問華府，以探詢川普外交政策的虛實。對兩岸而言，川普若放棄ＴＰＰ及「亞洲再平衡」政策，美國制約中國的戰略即失其主軸；台灣如何面對變局，也應及早因應。
川普是企業家出身，他素無政治歷練，更缺少外交實務經驗，這顯示其外交政策將跳脫傳統大國政治及權力平衡的框架，回到以美國利益為中心的原點。如果他就任後的思維沒有太大變化，他主政下的美國將不再犧牲自身經濟利益來拉攏盟國，也不會耗費鉅資來扮演世界警察的角色，在海外的軍事觸角也將大幅縮減，美國的國際角色將不再像過去那麼活躍與積極。
以過去的經驗來看，美國總統在競選時的言論未必代表其上台後的立場，川普既不熟悉外交事務，官僚體系將會扮演更重要的角色。但無論如何，以川普個人主義色彩濃厚、妥協性極低的本質，投射在國際事務上，他主政後的美國外交政策可能產生三種質變：
首先，從積極擴張主義到「新孤立主義」：川普一直認為，美國二○○一年後在伊拉克、阿富汗、敘利亞以至南海到處介入插旗，這種擴張主義使美國耗費龐大的軍力及資源，國家未蒙其利，反受其害。依此邏輯，未來美國將更專注於國內經濟的發展，而不再積極介入全球事務。這種新孤立主義論調，雖有助緩和美中兩國在南海的對峙，但也可能使美國卻步的亞太地區出現新變數和新空間，讓中國的「大國崛起」夢進一步推進。
其次，從全球秩序優先到「美國經濟優先」：川普認為，美國為了抗衡中國主導的ＲＣＥＰ，要犧牲國內市場來換取主導ＴＰＰ，這將讓廉價商品大量進入美國市場，讓美國經濟蒙受重大損失。他主張，美國將放棄ＴＰＰ的區域結盟路線，轉而強調美國經濟優先，並對不公平貿易國家課以高關稅。這種新貿易保護主義，可能引發美國和其他國家的經濟衝突。
第三，是從不對等關係到「對等同盟」關係：川普認為，美國為了協助日韓圍堵中國和北韓的威脅，而在亞太駐紮大量美軍，讓美國負擔龐大的軍事費用；今後美國將強調更對等的同盟關係，要求日韓負擔更多的軍費。如果雙方就軍事負擔談不攏的話，美日和美韓的軍事同盟關係勢必受到動搖。至於在北韓問題上，川普將改變歐巴馬的「戰略耐心」，主張以美朝對話來解決北韓核問題，這也將牽動東北亞的戰略格局。
川普新孤立主義對亞太新秩序的可能影響，可從兩方面觀察。首先，在美中關係方面：川普不再延續「亞洲再平衡」政策，可減緩美中在南海的對抗，有助於中國推動ＲＣＥＰ及一帶一路政策。一旦美中關係趨於緩和，台灣過去扮演抗衡中國大陸的角色將逐漸式微，這將使兩岸關係變得失衡。一旦台灣失去美國強而有力的後盾，要如何對大陸進行冷對抗？其次，在美日關係方面，二○○九年美國宣布「重返亞洲」後，日本一馬當先加入圍堵行列，在東海及南海與中共相抗。未來美國勢力若逐漸從亞太消退，勢將使日本頓失所依，這是安倍的噩夢。
民進黨執政後，在戰略上改變「親美、和中、友日」的平衡政策，改以拉攏美日來對抗中國大陸；在經貿上則一面倒地選擇加入ＴＰＰ，棄ＲＣＥＰ於不顧。但川普狂潮帶來的變化，將打亂蔡政府的如意算盤，美國若不在亞洲扮演積極角色，民進黨的「聯美抗中」政策將無枝可棲。ＴＰＰ若胎死腹中，蔡政府的經貿政策也將出現偌大缺口。
面對這些重大變數，蔡政府不能只是消極觀望川普的動向，而要採取積極的因應對策，以維護台灣的利益。
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