China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 18, 2016
Executive Summary: President Tsai vowed that her government would be the most communicative government in history, and that she would not "turn the clock back" on cross-Strait relations. Even when cross-Strait official interactions shut down, she alleged that many cross-Strait communication channels were still open. In fact cross-Strait relations have clearly been frozen. Taiwan's latitude in international relations has clearly shrunk. All the MAC can do is periodically call on the Mainland and ask it to communicate. It cannot take any real countermeasures. Clearly the communication channels President Tsai talked about are not in operation. Is this a government that is able to communicate? Obviously not.
Full Text Below:
President Tsai vowed that her government would be the most communicative government in history, and that she would not "turn the clock back" on cross-Strait relations. Even when cross-Strait official interactions shut down, she alleged that many cross-Strait communication channels were still open. In fact cross-Strait relations have clearly been frozen. Taiwan's latitude in international relations has clearly shrunk. All the MAC can do is periodically call on the Mainland and ask it to communicate. It cannot take any real countermeasures. Clearly the communication channels President Tsai talked about are not in operation. Is this a government that is able to communicate? Obviously not.
Communication has three prerequisites. First of all, it requires self-knowledge. We must recognize our own legal status and actual strength. In particular, we must strictly abide by the Constitution of the Republic of China and its relevant laws. Second, we must walk a mile in another man's shoes. We must understand our strengths and weaknesses, as well as other peoples' strengths and weaknesses. We must demonstrate flexibility. Lastly, we must be transparent and predictable. Only then can we communicate with others and prevent misunderstandings. Only then can mutual trust lead to consensus.
As these three criteria show, the Tsai government has many problems communicating with the Mainland.
First of all, President Tsai refuses to acknowledge the reality of cross-Strait relations. She evades the core meaning of the Republic of China Constitution. It is true that in her inaugural address, President Tsai clearly declared that cross-Strait affairs will be handled in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Regulations Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the People of the Mainland China Area. But cross-Strait affairs are merely a matter of governing in accordance with the law. They do not define the nature of the relationship between the two sides. In other words, the Tsai government may ringingly declare that it abides by the Constitution and relevant laws at the administrative level. But as everyone knows, cross-Strait exchanges and cross-Strait relations are no longer at the administrative level. They have entered the deep water area of political agendas. If these political problems are not resolved, they will compromise interaction at the administrative level.
Secondly, President Tsai has never fully appreciated the power differential between the two sides of the Strait, which is unlike that for other nations. Or perhaps President Tsai is aware of it, but chooses to rely on American and Japanese power to resist pressure from the Mainland. But President Tsai failed to realize America and Japan care only about themselves. Relying on them will not yield any results, but will exact a huge price. In other words, President Tsai's strategic premise was wrong from the start. How could it possibly lead to effective interaction with the Mainland?
Just what is the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait? President Tsai has dodged the issue. Meanwhile she has aided and abetted cultural Taiwan independence and educational Taiwan independence. This makes the Mainland doubt her sincerity, and continue applying pressure. Many long overcome obstacles have resurfaced, such as participation in international events. In the past, the relationship between the two sides was clearly defined. Therefore Taiwan could openly take part in international events. Today however, the Mainland is worried that Taiwan is moving toward Taiwan independence. It must take precautions, and refuse to allow Taiwan to participate. Clearly, the Tsai government's approach lacks predictability and flexibility. It has forced the Mainland to adopt a hard line policy in response.
The Mainland's position, by contrast, is quite clear regarding the above three conditions. The Mainland, through a variety of ways, has conveyed a clear strategic message to the Tsai government. It is promoting cross-Strait relations on the basis that the two sides are one family. Cross-Strait exchanges are viewed from the perspective of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. As long as the Tsai government reaffirms the relationship between the two sides of the Strait, the Mainland will abandon all hostility and interact with Taiwan in a friendly manner. Its message is quite clear. There can be no misunderstandings. But if the Tsai government turns a blind eye to the matter, it will not be a failure to understand, but a refusal to understand.
In the early days following her inauguration, President Tsai showed a certain degree of flexibility. When confronted with Mainland proposals, she was willing to change directions. Unfortunately, this rosy scenario did not last. The Tsai government demanded goodwill gestures from the Mainland, but refused to take the right path in return. Instead it embraced its Taiwan independence fundamentalist political base. This signaled President Tsai's retreat, and revealed the lack of clarity in her cross-Strait policy strategy. She bowed to various political forces, constantly seeking to juggle them. She lost sight of the strategic picture. President Tsai's problems originated not merely from within Taiwan. They also came from without, and exacerbate her internal problems. The inevitable result is that internal problems remain unresolved, while external problems mire Taiwan in further difficulties.
If President Tsai is still willing to get back on track, she can. The Mainland now wields more power, both soft and hard. Its Asian-Pacific situation is increasingly favorable. The Mainland no longer needs to make concessions to Taiwan. It has a clear strategy. Nevertheless it is willing to be flexible. This amounts to goodwill toward Taiwan. The Mainland is willing to view both sides of the Taiwan Strait as one family, and make them part of the Chinese peoples' cultural rebirth. President Tsai should appreciate this. Taiwan has an opportunity to maintain the peaceful cross-Strait status quo.
If the Tsai government is willing to reaffirm the constitutional framework of the Republic of China, the two sides of the Strait can cooperate. This of course is what people want, and where the opportunity for communication lies.
高估自己、低估對方 害慘台灣
2016/11/19 中國時報
蔡英文總統曾說，她的政府將會是最會溝通的政府，有關兩岸關係，蔡總統也曾保證「不會倒退」，甚至在兩岸官方互動停擺的情況下，還是堅持兩岸保有多元溝通管道。但兩岸關係顯然進入冰凍期，國際空間愈來愈緊蹙，陸委會只能跳針式地呼籲大陸要溝通，卻拿不出實質對策。顯然，蔡總統口中的溝通管道並沒有在運作。這個政府還是一個會溝通的政府嗎？答案當然是否定的。
溝通要有3個前提，首先是正確認識自己，對台灣來說，要意識自己的法理身分與實力，特別是要嚴格遵守《中華民國憲法》和相關法律。其次是要在本位基礎上做到換位思考，既要清楚自己的優缺點，也要意識到對方的優劣勢並展現彈性。再次是透明和可預測，溝通雙方才能避免誤判，進而在互信的基礎上達成共識。
按照這3個標準檢視蔡政府作為，可以看到蔡政府與大陸溝通時，確實存在許多問題。
首先，蔡總統不肯面對兩岸的現實關係，更迴避《中華民國憲法》的核心內容。誠然，蔡總統在就職演說中已經明確宣示，會按照《中華民國憲法》和《兩岸人民關係條例》的相關規定處理兩岸事務，但是，處理兩岸事務只是一種依法行政的概念，並未對兩岸關係進行界定，也就是說，蔡政府只是在事務層級宣示尊重憲法和相關法律，但在政治層面則採取了迴避的態度。殊不知兩岸交流發展早已讓兩岸關係超越事務層級，進入政治議題深水區，如果政治問題得不到解決，只會損及事務層級的互動。
其次，蔡總統始終沒有真正意識到兩岸實力對比今非昔比，或者說可能蔡總統已經意識到，所以才選擇藉助美、日力量來抵抗大陸的壓力，但蔡總統想不到的是，美、日也自顧不暇，依靠他們並不會得到什麼結果，反而要先付出巨大的代價。換句話說，蔡總統的戰略前提就先錯了，又怎能與大陸建立有效的互動呢？
蔡總統迴避兩岸關係定位，卻在內部縱容文化台獨和教育台獨，這只會引起大陸的疑慮，進而不斷在此問題上施壓，許多過去已經解決的爭議如今又浮上檯面，如國際場合的參與問題，過去兩岸定位明確，台灣自可大方參加，如今大陸擔心台灣走向台獨路線，只得採取預防做法，堅壁清野拒絕台灣參與。顯而易見，蔡政府的做法對大陸來說缺乏可預測性，也沒有足夠的彈性，迫使大陸只能以強硬態度回應。
反觀大陸，在以上3個前提的表現卻是相當清楚，大陸通過各種方式向蔡政府發出清晰的戰略訊息，以兩岸一家親的理念推動兩岸交流，兩岸關係則要放在中華民族偉大復興的高度來思考。只要蔡政府確認兩岸非國與國關係，大陸就會摒棄前嫌，與台灣繼續友好互動。這些訊息都十分清楚，根本不會讓人產生誤判，如果蔡政府還對此視而不見，那恐怕就不是看不懂，而是故意裝作看不懂。
蔡總統在就職初期，曾展現一定的彈性，面對大陸的主張，也有過相向而行的舉動，可惜好景不常，蔡政府一味要求大陸釋放善意，自己卻沒有沿著正確的道路繼續前進，反而開始擁抱基本盤，這反映了蔡總統進退失據的困境，這也說明，蔡總統的兩岸政策因為缺乏清晰的戰略目標，最後流於討好不同的政治勢力，不斷在不同力量間尋求平衡，反倒讓自己失去了戰略的立基點。蔡總統面臨的問題不光來自台灣內部，甚至可以說，外部危機不解決，只會進一步牽連內部問題的解決，讓台灣深陷內外交困的深淵。
蔡總統若要回到正軌，現在仍未失去機會。大陸軟硬體實力遽增，亞太形勢對大陸更有利，已無對台灣讓步的必要，但即便如此，大陸仍然在戰略清晰的同時，保持了彈性的可能，這正是對台灣善意之所在。蔡總統應該認真領會大陸所謂兩岸一家親，及中華民族偉大復興的核心意涵，既然大陸願意以兩岸同胞命運共同體的理念處理兩岸關係，台灣當然有機會繼續維持兩岸和平發展現狀。
前提是，蔡政府願意在中華民國的憲法架構之下，回到憲法所確立的兩岸非國與國關係，在此基礎上兩岸就可以積極尋求合作的機會，而這也當然是民共之間建立共識、推進溝通的機會之所在。
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