From Miaoli to Da-an to Taipei County

From Miaoli to Da-an to Taipei County
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 7, 2009

We could begin our tale in Taitung County, with Kuang Li-cheng. Kuang's declaration that she would "go to war in her husband's place" made her a laughing stock. Undeterred, the KMT stuck with her strategy in the Miaoli County Legislative by-election. The result? Even ultra popular Miaoli County Executive Liu Cheng-hung, who backed Chen Luan-ying, was shaken by the final count. Apparently the voters knew the score. Their conclusion? Go to war in your husband's place if you like. But don't expect us to go with you.

The KMT lost in Miaoli because their prime directive was: accomodate the vested interests. They never bothered to ask how the voters felt. Liu Cheng-hung is a Big Shot in Miaoli. What he says, goes. If he says "Back Chen Chen Luan-ying," then back Chen Luan-ying it is. He ignored public antipathy toward Chen Luan-ying "going to war in her husband's place." He rejected the possibility of alternative candidates. In the end, Liu Cheng-hung overestimated his own clout. In the end, he could not override the will of the electorate.

In Da-an District, the Diane Lee incident was left unresolved. Again, the prime directive was: accomodate the vested interests. KMT leaders weren't willing to be the bad guys who made the tough decisions. They waffled endlessly. They never bothered to ask how the voters how felt. When the Diane Lee incident erupted, the KMT had just scored smashing victories in the legislative and presidential elections. They were confident the public was behind them. The relationship between the Lee family and the KMT leadership was tangled and complex. Diane Lee's image was positive. Her ability to cope was estimable. As a result, both the KMT and Diane Lee adopted a wait and see attitude. They crossed their fingers and hoped for the best. They made the same mistake over and over again, digging themselves in, deeper and deeper. In the end, Lee had no choice left but to resign. The KMT lost popular support, and in the by-election scored a humiliating "victory."

How to interpret the results of the Da-an District by-election is to some extent subjective. But the key message was Pan Blue voters are alienated and angry, while Pan Green voters are relatively united. Compare the Da-an District by-election to the 2008 Legislative Elections. The Pan Blue turnout fell by 44%. The Pan Green turnout fell by only 25%. In other words, the total voter turnout was under 40%, but Pan Green voter turnout was 75%. If we take Yao Li-ming into account, the KMT received 54% fewer votes than last time.

The results of the Da-an District by-election is a model that reflects the existing political scene. It shows that political evolution has accelerated. It shows that the KMT's "victory" in 2008 is rapidly being eroded, and that the DPP is unable to dig itself out of its hole. On the one hand, the public is disillusioned with the KMT. On the other hand, the public has no confidence in the DPP either.

The upcoming County and Municipal Elections, Taipei County in particular, merely reinforce these perceptions. Su Tseng-chang will run. That is a foregone conclusion. Rumors suggest several former DPP legislators will run for Taipei County township and village mayors. How this will play out is difficult to predict. The DPP has already seized the initiative. It is gathering momentum, and preparing for a comeback. But the DPP has not even begun to reform and restructure itself. Unless Su Tseng-chang's candidacy leads to some sort of breakthrough, factions within the Green Camp will collide over national identity and cross-Strait policy. Sowing discord through negative campaigning and street theater, in the hope of snatching a few chesnuts out of the fire, will lead only to partial victories, possibly in Taipei County. Without genuine reform, the DPP will find itself mired in myopic political intrigue, inside and outside the party, domestically and internationally. If the DPP is preoccupied with ratcheting up political tensions, internally and externally, how can it possibly have energy left over for reform?

The KMT has the same problem with Chou Hsi-wei that it had with Chen Luan-ying and Diane Lee. On the one hand, Chou Hsi-wei may no longer be a viable candidate. On the other hand, Chou Hsi-wei is unwilling to withdraw. The KMT is unable to prop him up, and unable to force him out. Chou Hsi-wei may well turn out to be Diane Lee redux.

The KMT's problem is a lack of leadership. The KMT is adrift. By bowing to realpolitik, the KMT avoids its responsibility to lead. Making tough decisions, acting decisively, and changing the course of history, is only necessary if one wishes to lead. For example, the Public Servants' Unaccounted For Assets Act has been stalled in the Legislative Yuan for years. Only after public opinion turned against the KMT, did it sheepishly put the bill up for a vote. The KMT Legislative Caucus has betrayed its constituents. The reason is the KMT party leadership lacks leadership. The Public Servants' Unaccounted For Assets Act, the Diane Lee incident, and most other problems stem from the KMT's lack of leadership. This includes its current problems with Chou Hsi-wei, which did not begin yesterday. Most of these problems stem from a lack of decisiveness. The public could not tolerate Chen Luan-ying "going to war in her husband's place," because in Liu Cheng-hung's eyes there was only Chen Luan-ying.

From Miaoli County, to Da-an District, to Taipei County, the political scene is deadlocked, again. Suppose as a result of Chou Hsi-wei the KMT suffers an election defeat in 2008, and loses the chance to fulfill its election promises. Suppose the DPP, which has yet to undergo genuine reformation, moves up its 2012 presidential campaign for the sake of Su Tseng-chang. What will become of the long-suffering public on Taiwan?

從苗栗經大安區到台北縣
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.04.07 06:04 am

事情甚至可從台東縣長鄺麗貞談起，她的「代夫出征」成為話柄。但國民黨在苗栗立委補選仍搞這一套，結果輸得連力挺陳鑾英的超人氣縣長劉政鴻也面色鐵青；可見，選民心中自有一把尺，妳要「代夫出征」，我們不抬轎子總可以吧！

苗栗輸在國民黨遷就既得利益及既成事實，不問選民的感受。劉政鴻在苗栗走路有風，他要挺陳鑾英就是陳鑾英；不計「代夫出征」的爭議性，也排除了另覓人選的可能性。但是，劉政鴻自我高估的民間聲望，畢竟未能高過選民的自主意識。

大安區李慶安事件終至不可收拾，同樣也因國民黨遷就既得利益及既成事實，鄉愿，和稀泥，不問選民的感受。李案伊始，國民黨在立委及總統選舉新勝，覺得在民意上倘可支撐，且對李家在國民黨高層盤根錯節的關係亦多顧忌，而李慶安又是形象及應對能力均不差的角色；因而，國民黨及李慶安皆心存僥倖，猶豫觀望，一錯再錯，愈陷愈深，結果仍然不免落到李慶安辭職，國民黨流失民心，一場補選更「贏」得灰頭土臉的下場。

大安區的開票結果，有見仁見智的解讀。但其中最重要的政治訊息應是：藍營選民的疏離憤懣，及相對而言綠營選民的團結。倘與二○○八年立委選舉相較，藍營選民此次有四十四%未投票，綠營則僅二十五%；換句話說，在不到四成的總投票率下，有七十五％的綠營選民出門投票。另若計入姚立明的因素，國民黨的選票更較上次少了五十四%。

倘若大安區此次開票可以視為反映現今政局的一個「型模」，已足顯示：政治演變的時間表似乎已經壓縮加速，國民黨二○○八年的「勝利」效應正在快速消蝕，而民進黨則不無從谷底漸漸走出來的可能性。此中透露的警訊是：國民黨的政績難如民眾期許，而民進黨的改革轉型亦可能無望。

再往下看縣市長選舉，尤其是台北縣長選舉，更可強化此種預感。蘇貞昌出馬似成定局，且傳將率領幾名前立委出馬競選北縣的鄉鎮市長；此雖難料後續發展如何，卻已有先聲奪人的氣勢，大有捲土重來的氣概。然而，此時此際民進黨改革轉型根本尚未開始，倘若即以蘇貞昌參選找到了突破口，則必仍是在綠營各種勢力的扭曲平衡中向前衝撞，國家認同依然混沌，兩岸政策仍舊錯亂，而僅憑藉「負面政治」及街頭運動來攪亂政局，渾水摸魚，火中取栗。這樣的民進黨，可能會獲得局部的勝利，如北縣選贏；卻不可能再有改革，而必會再陷於黨內外、國內外的短線政治鬥爭中，難以自拔。今後，民進黨僅為維持高張力的內外政治鬥爭已恐不逮，如何再有餘裕進行轉型改革？

反觀國民黨與周錫瑋的處境，其實已與陳鑾英及李慶安二事如出一轍。一方面，周錫瑋撐不住的危機已經浮現；但另一方面，周錫瑋卻不認栽，國民黨則扶不起他又勸不下他。倘係如此，提不起、放不下，周錫瑋恐又是另一個李慶安。

國民黨的問題是沒有「領導」。隨波逐流、遷就現實，即不需「領導」；打破鄉愿，不和稀泥，扭轉乾坤，才需要「領導」。例如，「財產來源不明罪」在立院擱淺近年，鬧到如今輿論與國民黨翻臉，才狼狽不堪地立案；這固然是立院黨團背叛民意，卻更是黨政中樞沒有「領導力」所致。其實，財產來源不明罪與李慶安事件，及國民黨現今出現的絕大多數問題，包括今日面對的周錫瑋難題（周的難題已非一日之寒），大多皆出自沒有大開大闔的「領導力」。正如，為什麼老百姓不能再忍受「代夫出征」，而國民黨及劉政鴻的眼中卻只有陳鑾英？

從苗栗經大安區到台北縣，政局儼然再陷僵局。倘若國民黨因周錫瑋敗選而將二○○八大選的改革契機盡付東流，而根本尚未調整體質的民進黨，又因蘇貞昌當選而將二○一二總統大選提前開打；苦命的台灣，苦命的台灣人，將伊於胡底？