The Party Chairmanship won't help a Teflon President

The Party Chairmanship won't help a Teflon President
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 17, 2009


Last year, following Ma Ying-jeou's May 20th inauguration, a controversy erupted over whether he ought to stand on the "first line" of battle or the "second line." At the time President Ma declared that he had "absolutely no intention" of assuming the KMT party chairmanship.

At the time, we had two comments. First, for the President to assume the party chairmanship, is an important strategic weapon. It is also a kind of lifeboat. The President can choose not to assume the party chairmanship. But he must never say "I absolutely will not assume the party chairmanship." Because on a rapidly evolving political battlefield, no one should ever declare that he will never make use of a strategic weapon or a lifeboat. Secondly, given the situation following the 2008 Presidential Election, President Ma must not "retreat to the second-line." Therefore, if necessary, he must consider assuming the party chairmanship.

President Ma should assume the party chairmanship for two reasons. One. When Ma was elected president in 2008, the electorate expected him to be a leader of the nation. But he apparently only wants to be a President as spelled out in the wording of the constitution. There is a world of difference between a "sitting President" and a "leader of the nation."

Two. Fundamentally speaking, three different relationships are possible between a nation's ruling government and the ruling party. One. Under a cabinet system, with its internally created political parties, the Premier is also the party chairman. Two. Under a presidential system such as the United States, the executive and the legislature are separate. The party is merely a machine for fund-raising and for waging election campaigns. It cannot control the legislature. Naturally there is no party chairman to rival the President. Three. Under Communist dictatorships, with their externally created political parties, the party chairman trumps the head of state, and can assume the role of head of state. The Kuomintang and Democratic Progressive Party were originally Leninist political parties. The party was the government. Following the nation's democratization, the President could still choose to act as party chairman. To wit, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. The party and the government will then be in synchronization. If the president chooses not to, then a party chairman can organize a legislative caucus and make trouble for the directly-elected president. Broadly speaking, the last possibility is structurally defective. It stands outside the first three possibilities.

In fact cooperation between Ma and Wu is quite smooth. It is unlikely to lead to the sort of scenario outside agitators describe. But Ma and Wu are "two heads." Wu Poh-hsiung is Ma Ying-jeou's senior. He has his own political style, his own political consciousness, and his own political connections. That is why Chiu Yi was able to scuttle Shen Fu-hsiung's nomination as Vice President of the Control Yuan. That is why the "Public Servants' Unaccounted For Assets Act" ran aground. That is why the Diane Lee incident dragged on past the point of remedy. Ma Ying-jeou "respects Uncle Wu." He respects the separation of party and government. Wu Poh-hsiung has his own political style, political consciousness, and political connections. This ensures that such fiascoes will occur again and again, and this is what the public will sees. An old saying in the West states that "When two ride on a horse, one must ride behind." Ma and Wu may be close, but two heads cannot ride a horse side by side.

Ma Ying-jeou's problem is not limited to whether he should assume the party chairmanship. If the "teamwork" method of doing business remains unchanged, assuming the party chairmanship will only increase the burden. The situation will only become more difficult. We would like to offer the following two suggestions.

First, Ma Ying-jeou must give up his Teflon Presidency. Ma has enormous charisma. But his key staffers are removed from the public. In fact, Ma Ying-jeou need not assume the chairmanship of the party. All he needs to do is unite Ma Ying-jeou, Vincent Siew, Liu Chao-hsuan, Wang Jyng-ping, and Wu Po-hsiung. If he can inspire the other four to unite and dedicate themselves to their comrades, the structure of his administration will be decided. But Ma Ying-jeou's "sense of propriety" could easily degenerate into a reluctance to assume responsibility and alienation from the public. Otherwise, Ma, Siew, Liu, Wang, and Wu would not be watching their backs and so fearful of each other. They would not have allowed Shen Fu-hsiung's nomination to be scuttled, the Public Servants' Unaccounted For Assets Act to run aground, and the Diane Lee incident to deteriorate past the point of remedy. What are these five leaders doing for the nation? They are standing right next to each other. They are not at opposite ends of the world. The crux of the problem is a "Teflon Presidency" concerned only with a sense of propriety.

Secondly, Ma must establish a dedicated task force. The Ma administration is populated with thinkers, not doers who are inclined to empty talk, and unable to make things happen. Nan Fang-shuo's criticism of Ma Ying-jeou as "style over substance" is dead on the mark. Ma Ying-jeou initially hoped to "retreat to the second-line." This is decadent Confucianist "Heaven is silent and the seasons pass in orderly fashion" thinking. In today's democratic politics, crises arise daily. In such hand-to-hand combat, there is no "second-line." If Ma is only about style, and has no team that can produce anything of substance, he will find it impossible to shake off his image as "just another pretty face." For example, together the Presidential Office, the Cabinet, and the Party have three Secretary-Generals. They lack vitality, lack creativity, or are merely assigned to the wrong positions. They have been assigned to their posts merely on the basis of seniority or to keep up appearances. Such individuals have no ability to lead or unite whatsoever. If Ma Ying-jeou assumes the party chairmanship, he must not be a top down KMT leader. He must inspire his team to lead from the bottom up. To lead the party, he must transform his political style into a political mission, and his political mission into political accomplishments.

Ma Ying-jeou should consider assuming the chairmanship of the party. Throughout the government and the party, there must be a single political vision, and not several "heads," each attempting to promote his own vision. This new political vision must demand integrity and transform style into substance.

不沾鍋不改，兼黨主席也沒用
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.04.17 05:44 am

去年五二○後，爆發「第一線／第二線」風波，馬英九總統並宣布「絕對沒有」兼任黨主席的意思。

當時，我們曾有兩點評論。一、總統兼任黨主席，可說是一項重要戰略武器，也可說是在重大情況下的救生艇。總統可以不兼黨主席，但是不能說出「絕對不兼黨主席」等語；因為，沒有人會在瞬息萬變的政治戰場上，自己宣布放棄戰略武器及救生艇。二、二○○八大選後的情勢，馬總統不可能扮演「退居第二線」的角色，因而在必要時即應考慮兼任黨主席。

馬總統應兼黨主席，理由有二：一、馬當選二○○八總統，選民期待的是他成為一個「國家領袖」，但他卻似乎僅以做為一個受到憲法形式條件規範制約的「總統」自命。「總統府裡的總統」與「國家領袖」，其間有極大落差，必須彌補。

二、舉世大約有三種政體，而有不同的黨政介面。一是內閣制，內造政黨，閣揆就是黨魁。二是總統制，如美國，行政與立法分立，但黨部只是募款與選舉機器，不能指揮國會黨團，自然亦無與總統分庭抗禮的「黨魁」。三是共產專制，外造政黨，黨魁高於國家元首，亦可「兼」國家元首。然而，國民黨（民進黨亦仿效）則原屬「列寧式政黨」，黨政一體；但在國家憲政民主化以後，總統若兼黨主席（如李登輝與陳水扁），即屬黨政同步，若不兼，則可能出現一位領導國會黨團而與直選總統分庭抗禮的「黨魁」。橫豎看來，後者都是一個畸形體制，竟在前述三種政體之外別樹一幟。

其實，馬吳的「磨合」已是相當密切，似非外界挑撥所描繪的那種狀況。但是，馬吳並稱「二巨頭」，而吳伯雄的輩分又高於馬英九，且有其自己的政治風格、品牌意識，又有自己的人情世故要考慮；所以，就出現了邱毅毀了沈富雄的監院副院長提名、「財產來源不明罪」擱淺，及李慶安事件拖至不可收拾等局面。馬英九「尊重伯公」，也尊重黨政分際；吳伯雄則有自己的風格品牌與人情世故，這類事情層出迭見，於是就成了國人如今所見的這個畫面。西諺有云：「二人共騎一馬，必有一人坐在前頭。」即使以馬吳的親密，也不可能在馬背上並排坐著「兩巨頭」。

但是，馬英九的問題，尚不只在兼不兼任黨主席；倘若其「團隊工作」（Team Work）的經營方法不變，兼黨主席後，恐只是更增勞瘁而已，反而可能更陷捉襟見肘的境地，在此也有兩點評論：

一、馬英九不沾鍋的調子要改。馬在群眾間極有親和力，但左右大員要角對他卻有「咫尺天涯」的感覺。其實，馬英九也未必要兼黨主席，只要他能在「馬蕭劉王吳」五人之間，扮演好強力黏著劑的角色即可；若能與其他四人結交成推心置腹、肝膽相照的同志與知交，則整個統治結構即可泰半底定。但是，馬英九的「分際」，卻可能演成「疏離」；「不沾鍋」，亦可能演成「咫尺天涯」；倘非如此，馬蕭劉王吳五人，也不至於你看我、我看你，坐視沈富雄提名、「財產來源不明罪」，及李慶安事件惡化至那般地步。五人之不治，何以天下國家為？明明近在咫尺，何以竟如遠在天涯？一切癥結，豈不皆在太重形式分際的「不沾鍋」？

二、必須建立精粹的工作部隊。馬團隊是書房族而不是田野族，頗易流於空談，不能證驗於實際。南方朔批評馬英九「以風格替代政績」，誠是一針見血。馬英九原本想「退居第二線」，那是「天何言哉，四時行焉」的腐儒思想；今日民主政治，天天都有狀況，形同肉搏戰，豈有什麼第二線可言？馬若只有「風格」，卻無工作部隊將之化為「政績」，即不可能擺脫花瓶形象。但是，例如，現今府閣黨三個秘書長，不是已無活動力及創新力，或是根本放錯了位置，要不就是只擅身段或擺譜；這類人格性向，可謂根本談不上穿針引線、化異求同的效益。馬英九若兼黨主席，不只是由上而下君臨國民黨，而是要用工作部隊由下而上來帶動這個黨，領導這個黨，將風格化為使命，由使命化為政績。

馬英九應考慮兼任黨主席。整個政府與整個黨，未來只有一個品牌意識，而不是幾個「巨頭」以自我的品牌來互別苗頭。這個新的品牌意識就是：應堅持廉能風格，並堅定地將風格化作政績。