Beijing's Soft Landing for the Dalai Incident

Beijing's Soft Landing for the Dalai Incident
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 3, 2009

Beijing has closed the file on the Dalai incident. It has decided that enough is enough, and that it is best to bring the matter to a close.

News that the Dalai Lama would visit came out on the 26th of last month. The Dalai Lama leaves Taiwan tomorrow morning. The public on Taiwan has arrived at a clear and unmistakable consensus on the incident. It was wrong for the DPP to invite the Dalai Lama to Taiwan in order to undermine cross-Strait reconciliation. The public hopes the Dalai Lama's visit will not set back cross-Strait relations.

Beijing's response should not be to exact revenge upon the Ma administration or punish the Democratic Progressive Party. Instead it should acknowledge mainstream public opinion on Taiwan. Any overreaction on Beijing's part will merely provoke suspicion and anger among the public on Taiwan.

We have repeatedly reminded Beijing that Taiwan has a system of democracy. This is precisely why the Dalai Lam's visit turned into an incident. But it is also the reason the incident was resolved so swiftly. First, Taiwan is characterized by partisan politics. The DPP used the Dalai Lama as a weapon to attack President Ma. In response, President Ma was forced to fight back by resorting to populist political gestures. This is all part and parcel of democracy. Secondly, the ultimate arbiter in the struggle between the ruling and opposition parties is the public. The consensus on Taiwan was that the Dalai Lama's visit to the DPP, in flagrant disregard of the larger picture, was a malicious provocation. The public felt it would have been better not to allow the Dalai Lama to come. In partisan political struggles under democracy, the public is the court of final appeal. Thirdly, public sentiment during this incident shows that mainstream society considers cross-Straits reconciliation over the past year or so, a thing of considerable value. It has a clear understanding of both right vs. wrong, and benefits vs. costs. It has proven that a commitment to cross-Straits reconciliation is firmly rooted in the hearts and minds of the people. This is not something the Democratic Progressive Party can undermine by means of demagoguery. In sum, the Dalai incident may have been an inevitable consequence of partisan politics, but it was also resolved by means of democratic politics.

Beijing avoided any direct attack upon the Ma administration. It pointed the finger at "forces within the DPP." This strategy forced the Democratic Progressive Party to directly answer to the public on Taiwan. The public also arrived at a clear and unmistakable conclusion. The DPP fell into a trap of its own making. Beijing should ask itself whether current and future cross-strait relations will meet the expectations of the public. Will the people be accorded the dignity and benefits they desire? If the answer is yes, then rather than resort to revenge or punishment in response to the Dalai incident, it would be better to respond to mainstream society on Taiwan.

The Dalai incident lasted 10 days. During these 10 days, far more problems were solved than created. For example, the DPP's reckless decision to invite the Dalai Lama put the DPP's cross-Strait policies in an even more dubious light. The public on Taiwan now has an even more pragmatic and balanced understanding of Taiwan's relations with Tibet. Had President Ma evaded the problem, or forbidden the Dalai Lama to visit, Blue vs. Green infighting might have erupted. The public on Taiwan arrived at its own conclusions regarding cross-Strait reconciliation. Beijing witnessed this process with its own eyes. This may be hindsight, but it illustrates once again the miracle of Taiwan's democracy.

Therefore Beijing's response to the Dalai incident should end here. Enough is enough. It is best to leave well enough alone. The public's greatest fear about cross-Strait exchanges is that Beijing may be attempting to "deceive, support, bind, kill." The public is afraid that Beijing may engage in indiscriminate retaliation and punishment. It is afraid that any intentional disruption of substantive exchanges might suffocate Taiwan. Beijing is not so ignorant as to use the issue of the Dalai Lama as an excuse to engage in "deceive, support, bind, kill" against Taiwan. The Dalai incident was merely a tempest in a teapot. But if it provokes suspicion among the public on Taiwan regarding Beijing's intetions, the damage will be difficult to repair.

The Dalai incident has exploded and subsequently flamed out. The Ma administration experienced an accidental discharge. By some miracle the bullet hit the DPP. For the DPP the incident was a nightmare. For the Dalai Lama the trip was a costly mistake. For Beijing it was an opportunity to get a clearer understanding of the intricacies of cross-Strait relations. In the wake of this ordeal, cross-Straits relations actually rest on a firmer foundation than before. This may not have been anything anyone could have forseen in advance. But neither did it just happen. One of the key factors was democracy. The public on Taiwan has endured 20 years of internal and external political and economic upheaval. It understands the difference between right and wrong, benefits and costs, truth and falsehood, illusion and substance.

Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and allowed cross-Strait exchanges. His purpose was to make the Republic of China's system of democracy a moderating factor in cross-Strait relations. During the Dalai incident, democracy on Taiwan was on full display. If Beijing has learned anything, it has learned that a soft landing for the Dalai incident is the right approach.

北京對達賴事件以軟著陸為宜
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.09.03 03:39 am

北京對達賴事件的反彈，宜點到為止，適可而止，最好能到此為止。

因為，自上月二十六日達賴來訪的消息傳出後，至明晨達賴即將離台，台灣主流民意對此一事件的評價是明確而有力的，那就是：不認為應當用邀訪達賴來破壞兩岸和解關係，更不希望因達賴來訪而果然破壞了兩岸和解關係。

北京對此事的回應，不應從「報復馬政府」或「懲罰民進黨」為出發點；而應面對台灣主流民意，北京任何過激過分的手段，將使台灣主流社會產生質疑與反彈。

我們屢次提醒北京：台灣是一個民主體制。這正是此次達賴事件之所以發生的原因，但這也是此一事件能夠迅速緩和澄清的原因。一、台灣是政黨政治，民進黨以達賴為攻擊馬總統的武器，而馬總統在回應時必須考慮爭取民粹鬥爭的空間，這些皆是民主政治的天經地義。二、朝野鬥爭的終極裁判是民意，而台灣主流民意大體視此次達賴來訪為民進黨罔顧大局的惡意挑釁；此一結論，當然較倘若不允達賴來台所可能發生的結局更佳。這也是民主體制中政黨鬥爭的最高裁判。三、在此一事件中的民意民情，顯示台灣主流社會對一年多來所形成的兩岸和解關係相當珍惜，亦即對其中的是非利害有十分清明的認知，足證和解政策已深入人心，非民進黨所能挑撥。綜上所論，可知此次達賴事件是因政黨政治的必然而發生，又因民主政治的當然而化解。

北京在第一時間未直接攻擊馬政府，而將矛頭指向「民進黨部分勢力」；此一戰略迫使民進黨必須直接面對台灣的民意，而民意也作出了明確而有力的裁斷，民進黨遂墜入自設的陷阱之中。北京應當自問：現在正在進行及未來可能發展的兩岸關係，是否能夠滿足台灣人民在「尊嚴／利益」兩方面的期待？倘若答案是肯定的，則如達賴事件這樣的風波，與其訴諸「報復／懲罰」，不如回應台灣的主流民意。

經過十天來的達賴風波，可以發現，其間解決的問題，其實比製造的問題多得多，也大得多。諸如：民進黨魯莽邀訪達賴使其兩岸政策更受質疑，台灣人民對台灣與西藏的關係有了更實際、更平衡的體會與理解，馬總統則迴避了若不允達賴來台而可能爆發的藍綠肉搏戰，北京也看見了台灣主流民意對兩岸和解政策的評價……。這一切雖可能皆是後見之明，卻不啻是台灣民主政治又一次展現了動人的奇蹟。

所以，北京對達賴事件的反彈，宜點到為止，適可而止，最好能到此為止。因為，台灣主流民意對兩岸交流的最大疑懼，就是「騙／養／套／殺」；亦即最怕北京濫施「報復／懲罰」的手段，任意中斷實質交流而可能使台灣窒息。北京當局應當不會愚至用達賴這個題目，向台灣民眾展示一場「騙／養／套／殺」的大演習吧？達賴只是茶壺裡的風暴，但倘若因此引爆台灣人民對北京的猜疑，卻可能難以修補。

達賴事件自轟然爆發至平緩熄火，對馬政府是歪打正著，對民進黨是一場惡夢，對達賴則是走了一趟冤枉路，對北京則更加認清兩岸關係在操作上的精緻與微妙。經歷此事，兩岸的信任關係其實已較事前更為堅實穩固。這一切雖或並非初始所能預見，但皆不是偶然發生，其中的主導因素，只有兩個字：民主。台灣人民經二十餘年來的內外政經激盪，已經知道什麼是：是、非、利、害、真、偽、虛、實。

蔣經國解嚴並開放兩岸交流，就是要使台灣的民主體制成為兩岸關係的節制因素。在此次達賴事件中，台灣的民主元素又有一次精彩的展示。北京若有所領悟，就知達賴事件以軟著陸為宜。