Shrill Demands for UN Membership are not Pragmatic Diplomacy

Shrill Demands for UN Membership are not Pragmatic Diplomacy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 22, 2009

Beginning In 1993, the Republic of China government in Taipei began actively seeking to rejoin the United Nations. For 16 years it knocked on the UN's door. This year, for the first time, it changed its strategy. It no longer asks its diplomatic allies in the General Assembly to petition on its behalf. Instead it seeks participation in the peripheral organizations. This change in approach has provoked some controversy. But the concept of "choosing one's battlefield" is the right one.
Over the past 16 years, Taipei has sought to rejoin the UN by means of high profile political gestures. It has urged its allies in the General Assembly to petition on behalf of Taipei. When Taipei and Beijing arranged their agendas, or when the General Assembly was in session, their allies would speak on their behalf. Other countries would also join the melee. Taipei meanwhile, would hold demonstrations outside the UN. Taipei has long made a mighty ruckus in its effort to gain readmission to the UN. Now that it has suddenly called a halt to such activities, the silence is deafening. Readmission to the United Nations has long been a public aspiration. Once the government says "Stop!" the public is bound to feel disappointed and dissatisfied.

But diplomats have explained clearly that this is merely a change in tactics. We are not forsaking our quest for readmission to the UN. But we are no longer asking diplomatic allies to petition on our behalf. Instead we are seeking a roundabout way to participate in organizations at the periphery of the United Nations. These include the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Taipei was successful in its effort to seek observer status in the World Health Organization in May of this year. Clearly it hopes to use this model to join other international organizations.

Choosing one's battles in this manner offers a greater chance of victory. It avoids major battles in which the result is certain defeat and pointless casualties. To determine whether such a change in tactics is cost-effective, one must compare gains and losses.

Taipei's past practice was a frontal assault with a great deal of fanfare. The goal was readmission to the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly was our stage. The advantage to this approach was that it was easy to attract attention and provoke debate. It prompted the international community to consider Taipei's aspirations, and consider better arrangements on behalf of Taipei in terms of its international status. In terms of initial impact, it was unquestionably an attention grabber.

But this tactic has disadvantages. Given Taipei's lack of international clout, the barriers are simply too high. Beijing has repeatedly checked our moves. It has also contributed to public frustration and anger. It has harmed cross-Strait relations and exacerbated conflict on Taiwan over the issue of reunification vs. independence. It has allowed diplomatic allies to take advantage of us by demanding "endorsement fees." It has squandered hard-earned taxpayer money. Each year, to ensure that a certain number of allies petitioned on our behalf, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would work itself to death. In terms of return on investment, this was an expensive and brutal tactic, with little chance of victory.

The new tactic is to temporarily avoid the main battlefield. It is to turn instead toward a number of peripheral organizations of practical significance for Taipei. These include the WHO, ICAO, UNFCCC, and other organizations affecting people's lives. If we can participate in these organizations, it will increase cooperation between Taipei and the international community. It will safeguard the interests of citizens of the Republic of China. Through increased interaction, it will make our existence increasingly felt in other countries and international organizations. It can also increase support for our formal acceptance.

Another advantage is that it concentrates our efforts and resources in practical exchanges and cooperation. By contrast, our previous attempts to gain readmission to the UN were nothing more than noisy rituals. The excitement soon died down. The boat would pass, leaving no trace on the water. It would be better to focus attention on a few peripheral organizations of vital interest to Taipei. It would be better to cultivate such exchanges and cooperation. This would give Taipei the opportunity to contribute and become a constructive member of the international community. This would enable Taipei and Beijing to inhabit an atmosphere of relative calm and rationality.

Of course, the new tactic has its risks. Taipei's participation requires Beijing's consent. Participation may involve bargaining. But basically the framework is Beijing's. Does this promote the Republic of China's national dignity, or does it sacrifice its sovereignty? This is a matter of debate. With the passage of time, will Taipei's participation lead to a "sub-sovereign" status? Will it become an obstacle to full sovereignty and dignity? Will Taipei's international space be decided by Beijing? These are matters of concern.

But considering the advantages and disadvantages, we support this new tactic. Because survival, prosperity, and dignity are the Republic of China's most basic national interests. Participation in the UN is merely one means of attaining this goal. The means are optional. To safeguard the Republic of China's legacy of democracy and civilization, we must prolong its survival. Increased international interaction will strengthen and deepen these values. Taipei's power is limited. A more economical use of its resources, and a more pragmatic approach to international exchanges, are to Taipei's advantage.

Of course, even if such a "regional power beseiging the central power" tactic works, the process will be long and arduous. We are bound to suffer setbacks. Our diplomacy must strike a balance between different interests. The new tactic for gaining readmission to the UN offers new opportunities, but also conceals new risks. Those calling the shots must carefully plan their steps. Only then will the new battlefield win new space.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2009.09.22
社論－敲鑼打鼓爭取入聯 絕非務實外交
本報訊

自一九九三年起台灣開始積極尋求重返聯合國，十六年來不斷叩門，今年首度改變策略，不再委請友邦在大會代為提案，改為尋求參與周邊組織。這項調整雖然引發若干爭議，但就「選擇戰場」的思維觀之，卻是正確的抉擇。

過去十六年來，台灣一直大動作地爭取入聯，敦請友邦在大會中提案、為台灣發聲，在安排議程及大會舉行時，兩岸更各自動員友邦代為發聲，加上其他參與討論或表達意見的國家，以及台灣宣達團在場外的熱鬧造勢，台灣的參與案在聯合國舞台上敲鑼打鼓了這麼久，如今突然偃兵息鼓，確實落差甚大。尤其重返聯合國一直是國人的渴望，一旦政府停下動作，難免有人感到失望與不滿。

但外交當局說明得很清楚，這只是策略的改變，並非放棄尋求入聯。我們不再委請友邦代為提案發言，而且迂迴地尋求參與聯合國若干周邊組織，包括國際民用航空組織（ＩＣＡＯ）、聯合國氣候變化綱要公約（ＵＮＦＣＣＣ）、國際海事組織等。很明顯的，這是想將我國今年五月獲邀以觀察員身分出席世界衛生組織年會的成功模式，進一步在其他官方國際組織中複製。

這其實是一種「選擇戰場」─選擇贏面較大的戰場，避免在必敗的大戰場上蒙受不必要的慘重傷亡。要評價這種策略調整是否合算，必須先比較得失。

過去的做法是大張旗鼓地直搗黃龍，以重返聯合國為目標、聯合國大會為舞台。好處是容易受到注目及討論，促使國際社會正視台灣的訴求，並且思考為台灣創造更好的國際地位安排。就一個初登場者而言，確實產生了先聲奪人的效果。

這種策略的缺點包括：對台灣的國際實力來說難度太高，中共一再的封殺，也造成台灣民眾的挫折與憤怒，影響到兩岸關係與台灣內部統獨對立。而友邦往往藉機索討「代言費」，耗損台灣納稅人大筆血汗錢，每年為了有多少友邦連署及發言的業績，外交部拚得嘔心瀝血，算得膽顫心驚。就投注的資源與獲利相比，這是一場高成本、低贏面的慘烈戰爭。

現在的新策略是暫時不進攻主戰場，轉而向幾個對台灣有實際意義的周邊組織下手。世衛、民航、氣候公約等都攸關民眾生活，若能參與，將有助於增加台灣與國際社會的合作，維護台灣民眾的權益。藉著愈來愈多的互動，希望讓台灣的存在逐漸為其他國家與國際組織認可，也讓正式接納台灣的主張得到更多支持。

另一個好處，則是這樣比較能把心力與資源投注在務實的交流合作中。與其把每年的入聯搞成大拜拜，熱鬧一場後船過水無痕，還不如把注意力放在幾個對台灣有切身利害的周邊組織，好好經營彼此的合作交流，讓台灣有機會做出貢獻，學習成為國際社會建設性的一員，也讓兩岸關係有個較平和理性的氣氛。

當然，新的策略也有其風險。因為台灣的參與是經由中共的同意，對於參與模式，兩岸雖然可以討價還價，但基本上是在中共設定的框架下。這究竟是增進了台灣的國家尊嚴，還是讓渡了部分主權地位，可能會引發爭議。而且時日一久，台灣參與模式的上限是否會鞏固成一種難以掙脫的「次主權」地位，反而阻擋了實現完全主權尊嚴的機會，甚至形成台灣的國際空間由中共決定的慣例，也必須格外注意。

然而，分析其中的利弊得失後，我們還是支持這項新的策略。因為生存、繁榮、尊嚴是台灣最基本的國家利益，參與聯合國只是達到目的的手段之一，而手段是可以有變通的。要維護台灣及其珍貴民主文明價值，就必須盡量延續生存，讓台灣做為一個主權國家的存在，在更多的國際互動中不斷強化，也讓我們的民主與文明的價值有機會深化。台灣力量有限，更經濟地運用資源，更務實地推動國際合作，對台灣最為有利。

當然，即使「從地方包圍中央」的策略奏效，都還會需要一段漫長艱苦的過程，其中也難免遭遇挫折倒退。我們的外交必須在各種利益得失中求取最好的平衡，現在的入聯新策略帶來了新的機會，但也隱藏新的風險，決策當局必須在審慎拿捏中積極開拓耕耘，才是善用轉進戰場後獲致的新空間。