Wednesday, September 2, 2009

Cast Aside Political Calculations, Mend Cross-Straits Ties

Cast Aside Political Calculations, Mend Cross-Straits Ties
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 2, 2009

When a ship passes, it can't help leaving a wake. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu invited the Dalai Lama to Taiwan, "to pray for victims of the 8/8 Floods." The Green Camp hoped to toss President Ma a political hot potato. The Ma administration had already gotten its lumps from fumbled efforts at disaster relief. A visit from the Dalai Lama would rub salt in Ma's wounds. But the Green Camp overplayed its hand. The event turned into Chen Chu's star vehicle. It relegated other elected officials to the status of bit players. Yet no one in the Green Camp dared complain. The Blue Camp, on the other hand, imagined that by approving the Dalai Lama's visit, Ma Ying-jeou would get himself off the hook for turning him down last year. They imagined the invitation would relieve the pressure on Premier Liu, whose ratings had reached new lows. There were totally oblivious to the fact that hard-won cross-Straits ties were stretched to the limit. High level mutual trust so painstakingly rebuilt over time was now on the line. The Ma administration must give serious consideration to repercussions of the Dalai's visit.

Tibet has long been Beijing's number one concern. It is Beijing's most sensitive issue, the one Beijing is least willing to compromise with the international community over. Whenever other countries host the Dalai Lama, and he meets their leaders, they are invariably subject to severe retaliation. Beijing's position can only be described as hard-line. Taiwan is another issue on which Beijing is utterly immovable. Cross-strait relations may be special. Beijing's approach and style may have changed in recent years. But the Taiwan issue plus the Tibet issue equals trouble, far beyond what most people on Taiwan can imagine. Therefore, the Ma administration must not assume that Beijing will make concessions to the Ma administration regarding the Dalai's visit merely to ensure its political survival. The problem is not something the Ma administration can sweep under the rug merely by dispatching a special envoy.

According to media reports, a number of Taiwan affairs officials known to be moderates expressed disappointment and frustration over Ma Ying-jeou approval of the Dalai Lama's visit. "You are subject to internal political pressures. But we are subject to political pressures as well." Cross-Strait exchanges and liberalization have taken place over the past twenty years. Mainland policy toward Taiwan has long been a matter of contention between hawks and doves. During the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administrations, the doves were at a tremendous disadvantage. They had to bite their tongues. The second change in ruling parties allowed Beijing to change its practices. With the doves in power, everything was handled with kid gloves. For the past year and a half, Beijing has behaved like a rapid expeditionary force, demonstrating unprecedented goodwill toward Taipei. It has heaped unprecedented benefits upon Taipei. Why? Some on Taiwan call it "tong chan" or "reunification tactics." They see it as a campaign to change how the public on Taiwan perceives the CCP, and to change the public mood on Taiwan from "No reunification!" to "No independence!" Beijing even avoids mentioning timetables. Its policy is proactive. Its attitude is gentle. Taiwan wants to revive its economy? Beijing hands down an order, and Taiwan receives the highest priority in everything from tourism to procurements. Taiwan has profitted handsomely. It was impacted far less than other economies during the global financial crisis, and is gradually recovering.

Who knew the Dalai Lama's visit would upset the tempo of cross-strait exchanges? Was the Ma administration really blind to the potential repercussions? In fact high-ranking officials in the Presidential Office held five hours of secret talks on the eve of the Dalai Lama's visit. Opinions were sharply divided along occupational lines. Elective officials felt the Dalai's visit should be approved. Non-elective officials, on the other hand, considered the timing inappropriate. Elective officials didn't need to think twice about whether the Dalai should be allowed to visit. For them it was all a question of electoral calculations and political advantage.

The public understands that the Mainland market was an important contributor to Taiwan's economic recovery over the past year and a half. Politicians have electoral concerns. Ordinary people, on the other hand, have the most practical of economic concerns. Most people find the Green Camp's attempt to make political hay out of the Dalai Lama's visit intolerable. Nor will they tolerate the Blue Camp using the Dalai Lama's visit to alleviate the political pressure on itself. The Dalai Lama was personally heckled wherever he went. Even basic necessities such as food, clothing, housing, and transportation became grist for the dissident's mill. The treatment was rather different from what he was accorded in other countries. What is one to make this? Taiwan allowed an internationally respected religious leader to suffer embarrassment. But the Dalai Lama was not the only one who was embarrassed.

The Dalai Lama's visit to Taiwan was characterized as a humanitarian gesture, as concern for the victims. He would not talk politics. He would not provoke controversy. He would not meet with political leaders. He canceled his press conferences. He even reiterated that he did not advocate Tibetan independence. He praised the close relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland, in areas such as the economy and defense. He called on the ruling and opposition parties to join hands in Taiwan's interest. If Blue and Green political leaders have consciences, they will take this religious leader's call to heart. At the very least they should agree that increased cross-Strait tensions are not in Taiwan's interest.

The day after tomorrow, the Dalai Lama will end his third visit to Taiwan. The Taiwan issue is not the focus of his attention. He is not in a position to deal with the complexities of cross-Strait relations, Just as Taiwan is not in a position to resolve or intervene in the affairs of Tibet. When the curtain rings down on this act of "disaster politics," ruling and opposition party leaders should return to the problem at hand. They should refrain from provoking endless cross-Straits incidents for electoral motives. The Ma administration in particular must must lead the country in the right direction. The national interest and the public interest, must take priority over partisan and personal electoral considerations.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2009.09.02
社論-拋開政治算計,盡快修補兩岸關係
本報訊

船過,不會水無痕。達賴喇嘛應高雄市長陳菊之邀,來台為八八災民祈福。綠營的算盤本想是給馬總統一個燙手的政治山芋,讓救災滿頭包的馬政府雪上加霜,沒想到操作斧鑿太深,讓災區其他民選首長淪為跑龍套不說,主場變成是陳菊的政治秀,這一點連綠營內部都有雜音;藍營方面則是喜孜孜的認為同意達賴來訪,既可為馬英九去年婉拒達賴訪台解套,更為民意低落的劉內閣解壓,絲毫未體認得來不易的兩岸關係正陷入緊張,苦心經營的高層重建的互信業已一夕動搖,這些後座力,此刻的馬政府都得認真面對。

西藏一直是北京最介意、最敏感、也是在國際社會中最無法妥協的議題。往昔達賴出訪各國,只要是國家領導人接見者,事後無不遭到北京嚴厲的報復,這可謂是中國立場最強硬的政策。台灣問題,同樣是大陸無法動搖的底線,儘管基於兩岸關係的特殊性,北京當局這幾年在做法與風格上改變甚多,但一旦是台灣問題碰上西藏問題,其複雜程度,遠遠超過台灣能有的想像,因此,馬政府千萬不要以為北京為了維繫馬政權於不墜,可能在達賴訪台事件上有所退讓,質言之,這個問題已不是馬政府藉特使溝通就能私了的。

媒體報導若干對台灣熟悉且向例溫和的涉台官員,談起馬英九拍板接受達賴來訪,曾滿懷遺憾和怨氣地說,「你們有內部的政治需求,我們也有我們的政治需求啊!」的確,兩岸開放交流這廿多年來,大陸內部對台灣政策始終都有鷹派、鴿派,從李登輝到陳水扁,鴿派一路吃癟,悶了這麼些年,政黨再輪替,北京換了套作法,鴿派當道,一切軟調先行,像急行軍般地在這一年半多,釋出前所未有的善意與對台利多,所為何來?台灣部分人士的說法叫「統戰」,講穿了就是要改變台灣人民對中共政權的看法,要把「不統」的氣氛轉化為「不獨」,連時間表也不多談,政策上積極,態度上和緩,台灣要振興經濟,北京政策令下,從觀光客到對台採購,一律列為最優先項目,台灣也的確因此獲利,並在全球金融海嘯的風暴中,相對受創不那麼嚴重,並漸次復甦中。

沒想到,這趟達賴來訪卻整個打亂了兩岸交流的節奏和步調,馬政府難道辨識不出其後果嗎?事實上,在達賴訪台前夕,總統府高層密商的五個小時中,與會黨政要員意見紛歧,唯一相同的是,民選出身者一律主張應該同意,非民選者則縝密認為此時不宜,宜與不宜的考量很簡單:政治利害和選舉算計。

台灣民眾應該清楚,這一年半多的經濟復甦,大陸市場是無法忽視的重要因素。政客們有選舉需求,民眾卻有最實際的經濟需求,多數民意不認可綠營拿達賴消費災難,同樣也不會認可藍營拿達賴做為政治舒壓的工具。包括達賴本人,因為來台祈福,所到之處總遭到嗆聲,衣食住行都能成為異議者作文章的題材,迥異於他出訪各國所受到的禮遇,孰令致之?台灣讓一位國際敬重的宗教領袖碰上這樣為難的處境,尷尬的豈只是達賴而已。

達賴訪台,定位為人道立場,關懷災民,不談政治,不搞爭議,他不與政界領袖碰面,取消國際記者會,甚至重申他並不主張西藏獨立,讚許台灣與大陸之間從經濟到防禦的緊密關係,還呼籲朝野兩黨應該為台灣的共同利益攜手團結。如果藍綠政治領袖還有點良心,心口合一地接受這位他們力邀、無法拒絕的宗教領袖點化,至少應該同意:兩岸關係緊張絕非台灣人民的共同利益。

後天,達賴即將完成他的第三次訪台行,台灣問題不是他關切的重點,他也沒有能力為台灣處理複雜的兩岸關係;就像台灣也沒有能力解決或介入西藏問題一般。當這幕救災政治大戲落幕,請朝野領袖把心思拉回來,不要再為了選舉無端製造兩岸關係不必要的變數,特別是馬政府,身為執政者就要有能力帶領國家走向正確的方向,國家利益、人民利益,永遠都要擺在政黨和個人選舉利益之上。

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