Taipei and Beijing Respond to the Dalai Lama's Visit

Taipei and Beijing Respond to the Dalai Lama's Visit
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 1, 2009

The Dalai Lama's visit to Taiwan is a test. If the authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait can withstand this test, then mutual trust between Taipei and Beijing is more substantial than anyone previously imagined. Based on the current situation, this is a realistic assessment.

Why did President Ma Ying-jeou, after five hours of high-level consultation, allow the Dalai Lama to visit? His decision-making process was not made public. But President Ma's decision had two consequences. One, it forced the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to confront the Beijing authorities. Two, it forced the DPP to confront the public on Taiwan.

President Ma may well have decided to turn the DPP's strength against itself. He may have decided to fight fire with fire. He may have decided to give the DPP enough rope to hang itself. Sure enough, the DPP walked into the trap Ma set for it. Events have shown that the DPP and the Dalai Lama cannot withstand pressure from Beijing. The DPP originally assumed President Ma would not approve the Dalai Lama's visit because he was afraid of Beijing. Who knew the DPP and the Dalai Lama would turn out to be the ones afraid of Beijing? Who knew they would turn out to be the ones incapable of withstanding pressure from Beijing? Two, even more importantly, the DPP and the Dalai have discovered that the public strenuously opposes exploiting humanitarianism for political purposes. The DPP has shown that in addition to being unable to withstand pressure from Beijing, it is also unable to withstand pressure from the public on Taiwan. It has been hoisted on its own petard. It is in dire straits, unable to either advance or retreat.

In sum, the DPP has suffered a serious political setback. One, its attempt to make political hay on the backs of disaster victims provoked an intense public backlash. The DPP was short-sighted and opportunistic. It failed to see the forest for the trees. It refused to distinguish between right and wrong, and weigh costs against benefits. This left a lasting impression on the public. When the DPP speaks out on cross-Strait policy in the future, the public will remember its ruthless and irrational attempt to exploit the Dalai Lama's visit to its own political advantage. The DPP ran hot and cold, ignored right and wrong, refused to weigh costs against benefits, and cared only about power games. In the end, it seriously undercut its own credibility. The DPP has lost the public trust. Two, during the Kaohsiung World Games, Chen Chu deceitfully extracted a whole range of political concessions from Beijing. Now, by inviting the Dalai Lama to Taiwan, she has unceremoniously turned on Beijing. This will make it even harder for the DPP to change its cross-Strait policy. This will make it even harder for the DPP to normalize relations with Beijing. If the DPP cannot improve relations with Beijing, why would the public agree to let it rule the country?

The Dalai suffered even more serious damage. One, under intense scrutiny from the general public and the religious realm, the Dalai Lama's public image suffered severe damage. Two, during his previous visits, the Dalai Lama came to Taipei as an ambassador. This time, by accepting the DPP's invitation, he allowed himself to be debased to the level of a partisan political tool. Three, the DPP was unable to withstand pressure from Beijing and questions from the public. It could neither advance nor retreat. Four, the Dalai Lama was humiliated. He was forced to cancel a press conference. He was forced to downgrade the status of his lecture series. Five, the Dalai damaged his relationship with Beijing. In order to repair the damage, he has been canceling his press conferences. Six, the Dalai Lama damaged his relationship with Taipei. The two have become more distant.

On August 26th and 27th, the Presidential Office announced that it had approved the Dalai Lama's visit. Crises arose, putting cross-Strait relations at risk. But overnight the situation took a swift turn for the better. The primary reason was the public on Taiwan had sent the DPP an unmistakable message. It opposed using disaster relief as a pretext for political maneuvering. The public considered it unwise to undermine cross-Strait relations by inviting the Dalai Lama. This allowed President Ma to escape, and pushed the DPP and the Dalai Lama into the trap it set for Ma Ying-jeou.

Beijing's immediate reaction was right on the mark. It pointed the finger at "forces within the DPP." It avoided blaming the Ma administration. This set the tone for what followed. It forced the DPP to confront Beijing. It forced the DPP to confront the public on Taiwan. The DPP may be able to ignore pressure from Beijing. But it cannot ignore pressure from the public on Taiwan. Beijing adopted a strategy of "lashing out at the Green Camp, but not at Ma Ying-jeou." Beijing had a clear feel for public opinion on Taiwan. As a result, it was able to effect a reversal of fortune at the lowest possible cost.

Taipei and Beijing did not conspire to lure the DPP into a trap. But the degree to which Taipei and Beijing were on the same page is amazing. It makes no difference what President Ma might have been thinking. He may not have been aware of the larger picture. But when he agreed to allow the Dalai Lama to visit, he forced the DPP to confront Beijing and the public on Taiwan. Beijing correctly read the situation and lashed out only at the DPP. It avoided a rift with the public on Taiwan and the Ma administration. In retrospect, it was masterful decision-making. Who defused the crisis? The Ma administration or the Hu regime? In the final analysis it was an informed and resolute public. If the public had not challenged the DPP and the Dalai Lama, forcing them to retreat, the political mess would have been far tougher to clean up.

If an event as dramatic as the Dalai Lama's visit could not undermine cross-Strait mutual trust, then cross-Strait relations are indeed on a sound footing. When events even more significant than the Dalai Lama's visit take place, our primary support will be an informed and resolute public.

兩岸當局因勢利導達賴事件
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.09.01 03:13 am

如果兩岸當局能夠禁得起此次達賴事件的考驗，足證兩岸之間的信任關係遠較想像中的更為堅實穩固。從當前勢頭看來，這個評論是有現實基礎的。

馬英九總統在經過五小時的高層會商後，為何會作出同意達賴來台的決策，其間的評估過程仍未公開。但是，無論如何，馬總統此一決策的立即效應有二：一、迫使民進黨直接面對北京當局；二、迫使民進黨直接面對台灣民意。

也就是說，馬總統有一種可能的決策思考是：借力使力、將計就計，打蛇隨棍上，把民進黨作給他（馬總統）的陷阱，變成了民進黨自己作給自己的陷阱。事實如今顯示：一、民進黨及達賴未能抵擋北京的壓力。（原本民進黨以為馬總統不敢批准，怕中國；現在發現，民進黨與達賴也顧忌中國，不能承受北京的壓力。）二、最重要的是，民進黨及達賴發現，台灣的民意強烈反對以人道為藉口來操弄政治。民進黨既抵擋不住北京的壓力，又抵擋不住民意的強烈質疑，於是如今自陷於自己所構築的政治陷阱中，進退失據，狼狽萬狀。試總結此事的效應：

民進黨受傷慘重：一、將災難作為政治操作的籌碼，引發民意強烈不滿。而民進黨在此次短線操作所顯現的見樹不見林、是非利害不分的嘴臉，亦已深烙國人的認知之中。未來民進黨在兩岸政策上的發言，國人只要憶起他們此次操作達賴事件的無情無理、前倨後恭、沒有是非、罔顧利害、只有權謀，就會對其大打折扣。也就是說，經歷此事，民進黨更加失去了台灣民意的信任。二、陳菊剛從北京方面騙得高雄世運會的好處，如今翻臉就以邀請達賴來訪將屎盆子往北京的頭上扣。這將使民進黨未來兩岸政策轉型的道路更加崎嶇，也使民進黨與北京的關係更無正常化的可能性。而民進黨若不可能改善其與北京的關係，台灣民眾還有可能再讓民進黨治國主政嗎？

達賴受傷更重。一、達賴在台灣主流民意及宗教界的強烈質疑中來訪，損傷了他在台灣民間的地位與情誼。二、達賴過去二次來訪，皆是「國賓」身分；如今接受民進黨邀請，陷入黨派鬥爭。三、民進黨撐不住北京的壓力與民意的質疑，使達賴軟硬不得，進退維谷。四、達賴被迫取消了中外記者會，並取消或降低了演講會的規格，甚為屈辱。五、達賴與北京的關係更加惡化，已經開始用取消記者會等方法來修補關係。六、達賴與台灣官方的關係亦受重傷，漸行漸遠。

廿六、廿七日，總統府宣布同意達賴來台後，兩岸關係面臨撕裂、翻覆的危機；卻幾在一夕之間就出現急轉直下的緩和局面，主要是因台灣主流民意的表現十分明確與強烈。民意反對藉救災操作政治，民意更不認為用邀訪達賴來傷害兩岸關係為明智。因此，馬總統跳出了民進黨的陷阱，而民進黨自己卻反而抱著達賴掉入自己構築的陷阱之中。

北京在第一時間的反應十分精準。將箭頭指向「民進黨部分勢力」，而避開了馬政府及馬總統個人。這個動作擺定了大局大勢，如前所述，也迫使民進黨直接面對北京，並迫使民進黨直接面對台灣的民意。民進黨也許可以不在乎北京的壓力，但不能罔顧台灣的民意；從北京對此事「打綠不打馬」的戰略，可看出北京對台灣民意掌握的精準。因此可用最低的代價，將瀕臨破裂的局面轉危為安。

我們不相信這是台北與北京共同「預謀」給民進黨下的圈套；但是，台北與北京在第一時間顯現的「默契」卻令人驚異。馬總統不論是基於何種思考，甚至可能是在連他自己也不自覺或無把握的情形下，以同意達賴來台，逼迫民進黨直接面對北京及民意；而北京竟能正確解讀，只針對民進黨而未與整個台灣及馬政府撕裂，如今看來，應是相當精準的決策。不過，無論是馬政府或是胡政權，最後憑以化解危機的，仍是台灣明智而有力的民意；倘若不是民意強烈質疑民進黨，逼迫民進黨（及達賴）退讓，此事必將難以收拾。

如果連達賴來訪這樣的劇烈衝擊，亦不能動搖兩岸的互信；則未來兩岸關係的堅實穩固，可望更勝於此次達賴事件之前。其間的主要支撐就是：台灣明智而有力的民意！