1992 Consensus is the Key to a Tsai Ing-wen Pardon for Chen Shui-bian

1992 Consensus is the Key to a Tsai Ing-wen Pardon for Chen Shui-bian
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 5, 2011

Legislator Chiu Yi says that Tsai Ing-wen has reached a secret accord with Chen Shui-bian. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, she will pardon Chen Shui-bian.

Chiu Yi's revelations contained hardly any direct evidence. But they also provoke little skepticism. The special meeting took place in the Guishan Penitentiary. The entire event was videotaped. This made it impossible for the two parties to openly make any flagrant quid pro quo deals. But on March 15, according to Chiu Yi, Chen Shui-bian said that "Both Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang should make clear their positions on a presidential pardon." "If they refuse to state their positions, how can I endorse their candidacies?" In early April, Tsai Ing-wen spokesman Cheng Wen-chan visited Guishan Penitentiary. Chiu Yi said Tsai was dropping Chen a hint. On April 12, Chen Shui-bian issued a statement entitled "Ten Reasons to Support Tsai Ing-wen." This sequence of events is worth pondering.

Were Chiu Yi's revelations true or false? That needs to be seen. But Chen Shui-bian hopes Tsai Ing-wen will pardon him. In the event she is elected, Tsai Ing-wen cannot avoid the question of whether to pardon Chen. On this we need have no doubt. Considering the situation the two are in, it is highly likely the two made a "I'll help you get elected if you grant me a pardon" political deal. The key is the 1992 Consensus.

Tsai Ing-wen has strong political momentum. But the 1992 Consensus remains her biggest Achilles Heel. Her past refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus remains an albatross around her neck. If she can rid herself of this albatross, she will be "a tiger who has sprouted wings." Her chances of being elected will skyrocket. Will Tsai Ing-wen be able to extricate herself from the 1992 Consensus? The answer lies with Chen Shui-bian. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected president. Just prior to his visit to the United States, he publicly declared that he considered One China, Different Interpretations and the 1992 Consensus acceptable. But the next day, Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen denied that Chen had made any such statement. She forced Chen Shui-bian to swallow his words. For the next eight years, from beginning to end, Chen was forced to consistently repudiate the 1992 Consensus. He never again returned to his "new centrist path." Tsai Ing-wen is afraid to recognize the 1992 Consensus today because she is afraid of what Chen Shui-bian might do. If Tsai accepts the 1992 Consensus, and Chen Shui-bian lashes out at her, Tsai Ing-wen will find herself in a pickle. That is how the 1992 Consensus became a political lever by which Chen Shui-bian is able to control Tsai Ing-wen.

If Chen Shui-bian wants Tsai Ing-wen to pardon him, he must first help Tsai Ing-wen get elected. Today the 1992 Consensus is virtually the sole obstacle standing in the way of Tsai Ing-wen's election victory. If Chen Shui-bian pulls his punches on the 1992 Consensus, in exchange for a pardon from Tsai Ing-wen, this would be the ultimate win/win political deal.

Consider the following scenario for the upcoming presidential election. Tsai Ing-wen suddenly accepts the 1992 Consensus, in toto, or in part. Perhaps she declares ambiguously that she no longer opposes the 1992 Consensus. Chen Shui-bian voices no objections. Perhaps he declares that "one nation on each side" is another form of "One China, Different Interpretations." Perhaps he declares that "times have changed, circumstances are different," and voices support and praise for Tsai Ing-wen's new position. Taiwan independence elements bite their tongues. The Green Camp reaches a tacit understanding, and allows Tsai Ing-wen to squeak by without objection. Suddenly, attitudes about the 1992 Consensus change, overnight. This is not inconceivable. The key lies with Chen Shui-bian. Would Chen Shui-bian be willing to swallow his resentment over Tsai Ing-wen's past stance on the 1992 Consensus? Would he be willing to grant Tsai Ing-wen more maneuveuring room on cross-Strait policy, in exchange for a pardon? This would be a partnership requiring him to put up no money. He would be only too happy to arrive at such a secret accord with Tsai Ing-wen.

We have long maintained that Tsai Ing-wen must accept the 1992 Consensus. But she may use a pardon for Chen Shui-bian as a bargaining chip, in exchange for recognizing the 1992 Consensus. If Tsai accepts the 1992 Consensus, the DPP will be forced to change its strategic posture on the One China Constitution. It will be forced to forsake Taiwan independence and support "One China, Different Interpretations." Unless it makes this major shift, it cannot win the confidence of the public on Taiwan, the Mainland authorities, and the international community. Will Chen and Tsai accept the 1992 Consensus? Consider their stands on the 18% preferential interest rate, the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant, and nuclear power generation. They changed their positions at the slightest provocation. They treated these matters as nothing more than campaign promises -- made to be broken. A major issue affecting the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has devolved into a political deal benefitting two individuals. This is something the public would not tolerate. But the DPP has demonstrated its willingness to engage in all sorts of dirty tricks and dirty deals. What wouldn't they be willing to do? That is why the public is naturally concerned about whether Tsai and Chen have reached a "secret accord."

The more Chen Shui-bian expresses support for Tsai Ing-wen, the more the public wonders whether Tsai Ing-wen will pardon Chen Shui-bian if she is elected president. Suppose Tsai Ing-wen is elected. Members of the Green Camp will surely demand that Chen Shui-bian be pardoned. They will demand that President Tsai implement "transitional justice." If she does not play ball, her presidency could be at risk. Tsai Ing-wen might cite other reasons for granting Chen a pardon. But she must not use the 1992 Consensus as a bargaining chip.

Such Machievellian transactions would not be the result of genuine reforms on cross-Strait policy within the Green Camp, They would be the result of a conspiracy by Chen and Tsai to dupe voters. Could dirty deals such as these ever bring peace and prosperity to a country? Could they ever escape the judgment of history?

蔡英文特赦陳水扁的關鍵在九二共識
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.02

立委邱毅透露，蔡英文已與陳水扁達成祕密期約：蔡英文若當選總統，就特赦陳水扁。

檢視邱毅爆料的內容，雖難謂有直接證據，卻也不無令人將信將疑之處。當然，龜山監獄的特別會見，全程皆有錄音錄影，雙方不可能明目張膽做成交易；但邱毅稱陳水扁在三月十五日特見時說「蔡英文、蘇貞昌應對特赦表態」，「不表態要我怎麼支持？」，至四月初，蔡辦發言人鄭文燦即赴龜山探監，邱毅指此為蔡對扁示意，四月十二日陳水扁即發表「支持蔡英文的十個理由」，這段情節確實頗堪玩味。

邱毅爆料的真偽如何，尚待撥雲見日。但陳水扁寄望蔡英文若當選能特赦他，而蔡英文若當選亦不能迴避是否特赦扁，這卻是毋庸贅論的當然之事。其實，就扁蔡二人的相對情勢而言，雙方極有可能達成「我幫妳當選／妳給我特赦」的政治交易，關鍵是在「九二共識」。

蔡英文聲勢洶洶，但「九二共識」卻是她最大的罩門；如果她能自「不承認九二共識」的枷鎖中解套，將是如虎添翼，當選的機率更大。而蔡英文能否自「九二共識」解套，關鍵卻在陳水扁。因為，二○○○年陳水扁初任總統時，曾在美國訪客前公開表示可以接受「一中各表」的「九二共識」，但次日即被任陸委會主委的蔡英文所否定，迫使陳水扁又吞回了那句話；此後，扁執政八年即一路否定「九二共識」到底，再也回不到他的「新中間路線」。因而，蔡英文之所以不能、不敢承認「九二共識」，主要是對陳水扁有顧忌；如果蔡接受了「九二共識」，而引爆扁的反彈，蔡就很難收拾那個攤子。亦因如此，「九二共識」也就成了陳水扁足以操控蔡英文的政治槓桿。

陳水扁想蔡英文特赦他，首須幫蔡英文當選；如今，「九二共識」幾乎成了阻擋蔡英文當選的「唯一障礙」，陳水扁倘對「九二共識」放水，以交換蔡英文若當選後對他特赦，誰說這不是一樁買賣雙贏的政治交易？

因而，或許可以想像總統大選下一個可能的場景：蔡英文突然接受了「九二共識」，或有條件地接受了「九二共識」，或以模稜兩可的口吻不再反對「九二共識」；而陳水扁方面或不表異議，或稱「一邊一國」即是另類的「一中各表」，甚或以「時空環境不同」而支持及讚譽蔡英文的新立場，獨派則一概噤聲不語。如此一來，整個綠營在「頭過身就過」的政治默契中，即有可能在一夕之間皆對「九二共識」的態度大轉彎。這不是不能想像之事，關鍵則在陳水扁；而陳水扁若能吞下「九二共識」，給蔡英文在兩岸政策上較大空間，以交易蔡英文若當選即給他特赦，這對他而言只是一宗無本生意而已，當然樂與蔡英文做成「祕密期約」。

我們一貫主張，蔡英文必須接受「九二共識」；但她不能以「特赦陳水扁」做為承認「九二共識」的交易籌碼。因為，蔡若接受「九二共識」，那就應觸動民進黨對「一中憲法」、「放棄台獨」、「一中各表」等整個國家戰略的大調整、大轉向，非此不能取信於國內、兩岸及國際；扁蔡二人若將接不接受「九二共識」，看成像十八趴、國光石化、核電一樣說變就變，只是當做「選舉詐術」來操弄，而竟將兩岸大政變成二人之間的政治交易，這將是天理民意所不容。然而，從過去的不良紀錄看，民進黨有什麼不可思議的權謀及交易不會做、不敢做？因而，蔡扁有否「祕密期約」，國人自應給予高度關注。

陳水扁越支持蔡英文，越使人想問蔡英文若當選會否特赦陳水扁。蔡英文若當選，綠營必會出現主張特赦陳水扁的呼聲，要求「蔡總統」實現「轉型正義」；她若不從，即難安其位。然而，蔡英文或許可用其他理由特赦陳水扁，但不可用「九二共識」做為交易籌碼。

因為，這種權謀交易，必非出自綠營對兩岸政策的真誠改革，而將只是扁蔡二人共謀欺騙選民的伎倆；這種猙獰汙穢的政治交易，如何能安邦定國？更如何能逃得過歷史的制裁？