Would Tsai Ing-wen Have Cross-Strait Relations Revert to the Macau Model?

Would Tsai Ing-wen Have Cross-Strait Relations Revert to the Macau Model?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 6, 2011

Joseph Wu was Representative from the ROC to Washington, and Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council under the Chen administration. Recently Wu said that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, she will not overturn ECFA and other cross-Strait agreements. She will however, refuse to accept such political premises as the 1992 Consensus and the One China Principle. He said that if the DPP returns to power, "The door that has been opened will not be closed." He said however, that the other side might break off talks between the SEF and ARATS.

Joseph Wu's logic is worth noting. He clearly knows that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power but refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, Beijing may break off cross-Strait negotiations. Nevertheless he thinks "President Tsai" will refuse to accept the 1992 Consensus.

Joseph Wu offered a solution. He said that if Tsai Ing-wen wins next year's presidential election, cross-Strait communication channels may not require the 1992 Consensus. They could revert to the "Macau model." When the so-called Macau model was being used during the Chen administration, the two sides were at loggerheads with each other. The SEF and ARATS negotiation mechanism had been disrupted. The two sides resorted to "industry to industry" and "organization to organization" channels to communicate with each other. These industries and organizations acted as surrogates or buffers. This mechanism allowed the two sides to reach consensus over Spring Festival charter flights and other matters. Joseph Wu's rhetoric is revealing. The Democratic Progressive Party knows that if it refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, the two sides will find it diffult to continue using current cross-strait negotiation mechanisms. It knows that existing consultation mechanisms may well disintegrate, and revert to the Macau model. Neverthelss the DPP intends to stick to its position, regardless of the consequences.

In fact, Joseph Wu's expectations strike one as wishful thinking. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power but refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, no one can forsee how far cross-Strait relations will be set back. On what basis can Joseph Wu say they will merely revert to the Macau model? Why wouldn't they degenerate to a level even lower than the Macau model? Besides, cross-Strait consultations and exchanges have already progressed to where they are today. Reversion to the Macau model is inconceivable.

During the Chen era, the Macau model may not have required the 1992 Consensus. But if Tsai Ing-wen assumes power, the absence of the 1992 Consensus will mean that even the Macau model would be difficult to achieve. Joseph Wu said that if Tsai Ing-wen assumes power, she will not overturn ECFA. He said that "The door that has been opened will not be closed." But the 1992 Consensus is the premise and foundation for current cross-Strait peace and development. Without the 1992 Consensus, Tsai Ing-wen may choose "not to close the door." But can she command Beijing "not to close the door?" This is the blind spot in Joseph Wu's rhetoric.

In 2000, President Chen Shui-bian was all set to recognize One China, Different Interpretations and the 1992 Consensus. But he was stopped dead in his tracks by Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. After which, Beijing said it would "listen to what he said, and watch what he did." It broke off two negotiations, leaving the Chen administration mired in an eight year long domestic and international dilemma. Today, Tsai has repeatedly touted her commitment to "rationality." But she knows perfectly well that if she repudiates the 1992 Consensus, "the door will close," the two sides will once again find themselves at loggerheads. A diplomatic war will erupt. Society will be ripped in two. Nevertheless she still refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. What manner of "rationality" is this?

The DPP equates the 1992 Consensus with Beijing's One China Principle ("China = PRC"). But by doing so, it is painting itself into a corner. It is handing Beijing a lever. The ROC's position is that the 1992 Consensus means One China, Different Interpretations ("China = ROC"). We absolutely refuse to go along with Beijing's assertion that the 1992 Consensus equals Beijing's One China Principle. Besides, Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi recently said that "Relations between the two sides are good. The two sides may differ about the meaning of "One China" in the 1992 Consensus. But we can seek common ground. This is the essence of the 1992 Consensus." We should seek common ground on the premise of One China, Different Interpretations. If the DPP insists on repudiating and abandoning even One China, Different Interpretations, Then it may as well take a clear stand. it may as well proclaim its determination to achieve Taiwan independence and found a new nation. Why bother bringing up the Macau model?

Joseph Wu said that "The door which has been opened will not be closed." He said that we can simply revert to the Macau model. As we can see, the DPP knows that the door between the two sides must not be shut. The DPP knows the two sides must not be without a consultation mechanism. Nevertheless if Tsai Ing-wen assumes power, she will repudiate the 1992 Consensus. She will walk into a trap. Beijing will say, "You are the one who was faithless. Don't blame me for what I do next." Once Beijing closes the door, will Tsai Ing-wen really be able to knock on the door by citing the Macau model?

Is this what Tsai Ing-wen considers "rational?"

蔡英文要將兩岸帶回澳門模式？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.06

刻在華府訪問的扁政府駐美代表及陸委會主委吳釗燮說：蔡英文若當選總統，不會推翻ＥＣＦＡ等兩岸協議，但也不會接受「九二共識」及「一中原則」等政治前提；他說，民進黨若再執政，「門開了就不會關上」，但他認為對岸可能會中斷海基會、海協會的協商機制。

吳釗燮論述邏輯值得重視處在於：他明知如果民進黨再執政而不接受「九二共識」，北京可能中斷兩岸協商交流；但他認為，即使如此，「蔡總統」也不會接受「九二共識」。

吳釗燮甚至提出了解決方案。他說：如果蔡英文贏得明年總統大選，兩岸溝通管道可能是「無需九二共識」的「澳門模式」。所謂「澳門模式」，是在扁政府時代兩岸交惡，海基、海協兩會協商機制中斷，兩岸在澳門透過「行業對行業／團體對團體」的「複委託」或「兩層白手套」所進行的交涉機制，曾經達成春節包機等共識。吳釗燮的論調顯示：民進黨明知若執政不接受「九二共識」，兩岸現行協商機制即難維持；但即使現行協商機制解構，倒退至「澳門模式」，民進黨仍將堅持立場，不惜代價。

其實，吳釗燮的預期似乎太過一廂情願。因為，若民進黨再執政而不承認九二共識，兩岸關係之倒退程度當非任何人所能逆料；吳釗燮憑何而言可以倒退至「澳門模式」？有否可能連「澳門模式」亦不可得？何況，兩岸協商交流已臻至今日境地，若真倒退至「澳門模式」，豈堪想像？

在扁政府時代，「澳門模式」雖然「不需九二共識」；但至蔡英文若執政，倘無「九二共識」，應可斷言必連「澳門模式」亦難成立。吳釗燮說：蔡英文若執政，不會推翻ＥＣＦＡ，「門開了就不會關上」；但「九二共識」是兩岸現行「和平發展框架」的前提與基礎，既無「九二共識」，則即使蔡英文「不關門」，難道她也能教北京「不關門」？吳釗燮的論述之盲點正在此。

二○○○年，總統陳水扁一度承認「一中各表」的「九二共識」，但被時任陸委會主委的蔡英文所阻擋；此後，北京以一句「聽其言，觀其行」，中斷了兩會協商，使扁政府八年陷於內外交迫的境地。如今，蔡英文口口聲聲以「理性」自詡，但若明知否棄「九二共識」，將面臨「門會關上」，兩岸交惡、烽火外交、社會撕裂之慘重境地，卻仍偏偏不接受「九二共識」，這算是什麼「理性」？

民進黨將「九二共識」說成「一中原則」，這非但是作繭自縛，且形同是授北京以柄；因為，在我方立場，「九二共識」即是「一中各表」，絕不能隨北京唱和而謂「九二共識」是「一中原則」。何況，北京方面國台辦主任王毅最近亦稱：「兩岸目前的良好關係，是體現一個中國的九二共識；儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」這應即是「求同存異」的「一中各表」的空間。而民進黨如果連「一中各表」都要否定、都要棄守，則何不乾脆旗幟鮮明地標榜台獨建國，則連「澳門模式」亦可不屑一顧。

吳釗燮說「門開了就不會關上」，又說可以退回「澳門模式」；可見，民進黨亦知兩岸之門不可關，亦不可沒有協商機制。但是，蔡英文若執政而否認「九二共識」，必將落入北京「是妳無情，休怪我無義」的套索之中，一旦北京關上了門，莫非蔡英文真的要用「澳門模式」去敲開？

這難道就是蔡英文所說的「理性」？