Joseph Wu Waylays Tsai Ing-wen

Joseph Wu Waylays Tsai Ing-wen
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 10, 2011

During the Democratic Progressive Party presidential primary, Joseph Wu said "Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy must not be made too explicit. If it is made too explicit, its many problems will be exposed, People will attack it as infeasible. The real point will be lost in the shuffle."

Who knew that Joseph Wu, during his visit to the US, would be the person who makes the DPP's cross-Strait policy "too explicit." Who knew that his remarks would be the ones that invited attacks? Who knew that his attackers would include DPP leaders and Tsai Ing-wen?

While he was in Washington Joseph Wu said that if Tsai Ing-wen was elected president, she would not accept the 1992 Consensus. He said however, that if negotiations between the SEF and ARATS were interrupted, Tsai Ing-wen could fall back on the Macau model. Tsai Ing-wen said that Joseph Wu's too explicit remarks did not represent the views of the DPP.

Actually Joseph Wu shares Tsai Ing-wen's views on at least one issue. On one issue at least, Wu speaks for Tsai Ing-wen. Joseph Wu said that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she will not accept the 1992 Consensus. On this point at least, Tsai Ing-wen has long been consistent.

Joseph Wu said that if Tsai assumes office she will not accept the 1992 Consensus. In that case, Beijing might break off consultations between SEF and ARATS. Tsai Ing-wen must concede this point. She can hardly argue otherwise. In fact, if Tsai refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, not only could consultations between SEF and ARATS run aground, so could ECFA. A cross-Strait diplomatic war could break out. Mainland tourists could stop coming. Mutual legal assistance could end. Direct cross-Strait flights could be grounded. These are all possibilities. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen cannot refute Joseph Wu's prediction. Consultations between the SEF and ARATS could be terminated. Nor can Tsai Ing-wen deny that her refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus will unavoidably have political and economic consequences. Her statement that Joseph Wu does not speak on her behalf is mere subterfuge. Joseph Wu pointed out that her refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus could provoke a major change in the cross-Strait situation. On these points, he differs not with Tsai Ing-wen. She cannot say this does not represent the DPP's position.

Tsai and Wu differ only on one point. Joseph Wu proposed using the Macau model as an alternative. Once the 1992 Consensus has been repudiated, he suggested "association to association" and "industry to industry" negotiations. He suggested using these associations and industries as buffers. Joseph Wu attempts to be realistic. One cannot say that when the time comes one will actually break off cross-Strait negotiations. One must always have a viable alternative. Wu believes that viable alternative is the Macau model. But falling back on the Macau model would be akin to plucking cross-Strait negotiations out of the Internet era, from the level of cloud computing, and dropping it back into the era of the Semaphore and Morse code.

Sure enough, Joseph Wu's explicit Macau model made its many problems equally explicit. The most serious problem made explicit, is that the DPP lacks a proposal of its own. It has no solutions to offer. Besides, how can Tsai Ing-wen admit that when the DPP was in power, its coping mechanism was the Macau model? Would Beijing accept the Macau model? Tsai Ing-wen knows that is wishful thinking. Beijing would accuse her of bad faith, and disown responsibility for the consequences.

Therefore Tsai Ing-wen must come forward and attack Joseph Wu. She must declare that Wu did not take part in DPP deliberations over [Mainland] China policy. She must declare that his remarks did not represent the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen essentially admitted that alternatives to the Macau model are infeasible. Joseph Wu's prophecy, quoted in the first paragraph of this article, has already been fulfilled. The only surprise was that those who stepped forward to attack Joseph Wu's too explicit rhetoric, were DPP leaders and Tsai Ing-wen herself.

In sum, Tsai Ing-wen must concede that Joseph Wu is right on two points. The first is that if elected president, she will not accept the 1992 Consensus. The second is that if she refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, she will provoke major changes in the political and economic situation. Therefore, Tsai and Wu differ on only one point. Wu proposes the Macau model as a response. Tsai Ing-wen however, disagrees. The next question should be obvious. If Tsai Ing-wen believes that the Macau model is infeasible, what tricks does she have up her sleeve?

Tsai Ing-wen must offer a more explicit cross-Strait policy. Joseph Wu's little interlude has made that clear. Tsai Ing-wen can no longer bob and weave. She can no longer refuse to accept the 1992 Consensus. She can no longer refuse to face the consequences of a change in the cross-Strait political and economic situation. She can no longer refuse to offer a response. Refusal to offer a response is not the action of a rational and responsible presidential candidate.

The cross-Strait peace and development framework of the past three years is predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. The DPP argues that this is merely the KMT and CCP's one-sided perception. Tsai Ing-wen says that if she wins next year's presidential election, she will maintain an open and pragmatic attitude toward cross-Strait exchanges. But she will not accept the 1992 Consensus, and she disdains the Macau model. Furthermore, she has joined Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui's Taiwan independence chorus. What is this, other than "President Tsai's" own one-sided [Mainland] China policy?

吳釗燮「具體逼問」蔡英文
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.10

在民進黨總統初選階段，吳釗燮說：「蔡英文的兩岸論述不能太具體，若太具體，很多問題就會暴露，必有人跳出來攻擊說不可行，容易失焦。」

不料，吳釗燮訪美，自己竟然將民進黨的兩岸論述說得如此「具體」；他的談話所引致的「攻擊」，則包括來自民進黨中央及蔡英文本人。

吳釗燮在華府說：蔡英文若當選總統，不會接受九二共識，倘因此使海基、海協兩會協商中斷，可用「澳門模式」補救。對於吳釗燮如此「具體」的說法，蔡英文稱他不能代表民進黨的主張。

其實，吳釗燮至少有一個觀點，與蔡英文完全相同，可以代表蔡英文的立場。那就是吳釗燮說，蔡英文若執政不會接受「九二共識」，這一點無疑是蔡英文迄今始終一貫的主張。

至於吳釗燮說，蔡若執政而不接受九二共識，北京可能中斷兩會協商；蔡英文對這一點恐亦必須同意，難持異議。實則蔡若執政而不接受九二共識，非但兩會可能中斷協商機制，ECFA亦可能擱淺，兩岸外交烽火再起，陸客不來，司法互助停擺，直航停飛，這些皆是不無可能之事。因而，蔡英文若不能否定吳釗燮對「兩會中斷」的預言，亦即不能否認若執政而不接受「九二共識」所必將引發的政經後果，則所謂吳釗燮不能代表她云云，應只是遁詞而已。也就是說，其實吳釗燮在「不接受九二共識」，及「因此可能引爆兩岸重大變局」這兩點看法上，應與蔡英文無異，不可謂「不能代表民進黨」。

蔡吳二人的唯一可能差異，是在吳釗燮舉「澳門模式」為替代方案；亦即主張在否棄九二共識後，改以「協會對協會／行業對行業」的「雙層白手套」來建立兩岸協商。吳釗燮的說法，毋寧是實事求是，總不能說屆時真的就關閉一切兩岸協商機制，總需有個對策，他認為那就是「澳門模式」。但此一主張，好比要將兩岸協商從雲端網路時代，倒退到旗語或摩斯電碼的時代。

至此，吳釗燮「具體」的「澳門模式」，果然使「很多問題就會暴露」，最嚴重的是在「暴露」了民進黨其實根本無計可施、無路可走；然而，蔡英文如何能承認民進黨屆時的因應對策竟是難登大雅的「澳門模式」？當然，蔡英文心裡更明白，等到北京以「是妳無情，莫怪我無義」與她翻臉之日，欲求「澳門模式」恐亦不可得。

於是，蔡英文就必須出面「攻擊」吳釗燮，謂吳未參與此際民進黨中國政策的研議，不能代表民進黨；究其根本，蔡英文不啻就是「跳出來說澳門模式不可行」。如此一來，本文首段所引吳釗燮的「預言」，已告完整實現；只是未料「跳出來攻擊」吳釗燮的「具體」論述者，竟是民進黨中央及蔡英文自己。

總括前論，蔡英文必須承認吳釗燮的兩點看法：一、她若當選總統，不會接受「九二共識」；二、她若不接受九二共識，屆時必將引爆兩岸重大政經變局。因此，蔡吳二人唯一的異見只是在於：吳主張屆時可用「澳門模式」因應變局，但蔡英文似乎不以為然。接下來的問題則是：蔡英文若認為「澳門模式」端不上檯面，她的錦囊妙計又將是什麼？

吳釗燮演出的這一段插曲，更加顯得蔡英文必須端出一套「具體」的兩岸政策，不能再閃躲迴避。她不能一方面不接受九二共識，另一方面又不願面對必將引爆的兩岸政經變局，再一方面更完全不提出（提不出？）屆時因應變局的對策。這豈是一個「理性」的總統候選人的負責態度？

三年來的兩岸「和平發展框架」，是以「九二共識」為前提及基礎；但民進黨稱，這只是國共兩黨所作「片面詮釋」。蔡英文說，她在明年贏得總統大選後，將仍持開放務實的態度進行兩岸交流；但她不接受九二共識，又不屑澳門模式，更與扁李等人唱和台獨論述，且看「蔡總統」將如何「片面詮釋」她的「中國政策」？