Can Tsai Ing-wen Free Herself from the Macao Model?

Can Tsai Ing-wen Free Herself from the Macao Model?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 13, 2011

Over the past two years, the DPP has failed to offer any new cross-Strait arguments. The DPP has been willing to say only that it does not recognize the 1992 Consensus. Former DPP Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Joseph Wu recently visited the United States. During his visit, he suggested the "Macao model" as a substitute for the 1992 Consensus. By doing so, Wu unwittingly showed the Democratic Progressive Party's hand. He unwittingly showed that if the DPP returns to power, cross-Strait relations may well suffer an across the board setback. He showed that the DPP was desperate, and had nothing to offer.

Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly lambasted the Ma administration for "pandering to [Mainland] China," and "failure to assert sovereignty." But what has the DPP done? What is its position on the status of Taipei and Beijing? Under Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP leadership has done everything possible to dodge the issue. Shortly after Tsai Ing-wen declared her candidacy, she trotted out her mantra, "peace but with differences, peace and the search for common ground." This mantra is extremely vague. It bears no resemblance to practical policy. It also leaves far too much room for interpretation by the two sides.

It was not until the DPP presidential primary, when Hsu Hsing-liang forked out 5 million NT to enter the presidential race and participate in the presidential debates, that the DPP was free to openly discuss cross-Strait policy. Hsu challenged Tsai Ing-wen. He said that ECFA was a bilateral agreement whose tariff conditions benefitted Taiwan one-sidedly. Yet Tsai Ing-wen wanted to appeal ECFA to the WTO. This might invalidate ECFA. More importantly, Hsu Hsin-liang challenged Tsai Ing-wen over bilateral direct links and trade agreements. These were possible only because the Ma administration recognized the 1992 Consensus. If the DPP returns to power and refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges could be completely disrupted. What contingency plans does the DPP have, in the event this happens?

During the primary debates, Tsai Ing-wen never gave Hsu Hsin-liang a direct answer. Instead she waited until the DPP presidential nomination was announced. She then told the media that cross-Strait relations should look to the future. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power in 2012, she promised, it would maintain an open and pragmatic approach to cross-Strait exchanges. Cross-Strait exchanges would be based on a "shared and sustainable basis. "

Her statement was extremely vague. The DPP candidate has already been announced. Yet Tsai Ing-wen remains reluctant to discuss cross-Strait policy. That is why Joseph Wu's mention of the Macau model aroused so much public concern. Joseph Wu said that if the DPP returned to power, ECFA and other cross-Strait agreements would not be overturned, but that the DPP would not accept the 1992 Consensus. Wu said that if Beijing broke off talks between the SEF and ARATS, the two sides would fall back on the Macau model of "industry to industry" and "organization to organization" communications during the Chen era.

The Macao model had its origins in the DPP era. Cross-Strait communications had been disrupted. Therefore in 2005, Spring Festival charter flights for Taiwan businessmen were negotiated by means of private sector consultations. DPP officials were overjoyed with this model. But the Macao model is hardly ideal for cross-Strait exchanges. Negotiations for the Spring Festival charter flights for Taiwan businessmen were conducted on the Mainland side by Civil Aviation Administration officials, and on our side by a representative of the Taipei Airlines Association. Our side was deprived of governmental status. Worse, the relationship between the negotiators became one of "officials addressing citizens." Paradoxically, this demeaned Taipei's status.

An even more serious objection was that the government ostensibly commissioned a non-governmental organization to conduct cross-Strait talks. This blurred the lines between public authority and civil society. As a result, Beijing could readily leapfrog the ROC government, and talk directly to private sector groups. It could grant favors to private sector groups on Taiwan. Lured by profits, these groups fell over each other and made a beeline to Beijing. The government no longer figured in their calculations. Has the DPP forgotten how harshly they criticized Beijing for "using businesses to beseige and isolate the government?" This is the side effect of the Macao model.

Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP insist on repudiating the 1992 Consensus. But direct links and ECFA are not the only victories scored by the Ma administration on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. Victories include cross-Strait "government to government" negotiations on other issues. The DPP insists that the 1992 Consensus stresses the One China Principle, and therefore demeans Taiwan's [sic] sovereignty. (Translator's Note: Taiwan has no sovereignty. Taiwan is an administative region of the Republic of China. The Republic of China has sovereignty, not Taiwan.) But real world practice shows that the Macao model is more likely to demean the Republic of Chna's sovereignty. The Macau model eliminates the role of the government. In the long run, it works to the Republic of China's disadvantage.

Tsai Ing-wen has publicly declared that Joseph Wu never participated in DPP policy discussions regarding Mainland China. She said his statements cannot be regarded as representative of the Democratic Progressive Party. But Tsai Ing-wen has repudiated the Macao model, while faiing to offer any alternatives. In fact, the Macao model is the only alternative left to the Democratic Progressive Party. The DPP has no other alternative. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, cross-Strait exchanges will again be disrupted, When that happens, the DPP will be impotent, unable to do anything. Does the DPP really intend to fall back on the Macau model to deal with complex cross-Strait relations?

One cannot prove that one "Loves Taiwan" merely by foaming at the mouth. Cross-Strait relations require more than rigid ideology. The DPP has dismissed Joseph Wu's remarks about the Macao model. They say he mispoke. But Joseph Wu's remarks were highly significant. Joseph Wu tried to offer an alternative to the 1992 Consensus. His alternative proved detrimental to the Republic of China. This is something the DPP must contemplate.

蔡英文能擺脫澳門模式的困境嗎？
2011-05-13 中國時報

這兩年來，民進黨並沒有提出新的兩岸論述，該黨唯一定調的就是：民進黨不承認九二共識。因此，當民進黨前陸委會主委吳釗燮日前訪美，提出將以「澳門模式」取代九二共識時，不啻是洩露民進黨的底線，也凸顯出民進黨對於執政後兩岸全面關係倒退的可能性、無計可施的困境。

民進黨黨主席蔡英文屢屢批評馬政府「傾中」、「對主權不敢堅持」，但是對於民進黨的兩岸定位，在蔡英文主導下的民進黨中央，則是盡可能的迴避討論。蔡英文個人則在宣布參選總統後，提出「和而不同、和而求同」八字箴言；這八個字高度抽象，不但不具政策的操作性，也留下各說各話的解讀空間。

一直到民進黨總統初選政見發表會時，許信良花了五百萬參賽，才取得在民進黨內公開討論兩岸政策的權利；他詰問蔡英文，兩岸簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，這是在關稅上獨惠台灣，蔡英文卻主張要向ＷＴＯ通報，可能會讓ＥＣＦＡ失效；更重要的是，許信良也直接問蔡英文，兩岸能夠談成三通直航、經貿協定，都是因為馬政府承認九二共識，民進黨上台後如果不接受九二共識，兩岸經貿交流可能全面中斷，民進黨是否已有備案？

在政見發表會中，蔡英文從未正面回應許信良，而在確定獲民進黨總統提名後，日前蔡英文回應媒體時首度強調，兩岸關係應該往前看，若民進黨在二○一二年取得政權，將保持開放、務實的態度進行兩岸交流，會就兩岸交流尋找一個「共同的、可長可久的基礎」。

這個表述還是相當抽象。可以說，即使確定代表民進黨參選，蔡英文對兩岸論述仍然諱莫如深，也因此，吳釗燮的「澳門模式」說，才會引起各界關注。吳釗燮的說法是，民進黨若再執政，不會推翻ＥＣＦＡ等兩岸協議，但也不會接受九二共識，屆時北京若中斷海基會、海協會兩會互動，兩岸溝通可採取扁政府時代的「行業對行業/團體對團體」的「澳門模式」。

「澳門模式」的由來是：民進黨執政期間，兩會交流中斷，因此於二○○五年由兩岸民間行業協商台商春節包機，民進黨官員曾對此一模式津津樂道，但所謂的「澳門模式」，卻不是兩岸交流的最適方式，因為，在當年的台商春節包機會談中，對岸主談人是民航總局官員，我方主談人卻是台北市航空公會派出的代表，不但造成我方「去政府化」，更營造出「以官對民」的高姿態，台灣反而有被矮化的風險。

更嚴重的是，政府表面上以「複委託」的方式，委託民間團體進行兩岸談判，但卻因此也造成公權力與民間團體混淆不清，因為如此一來，北京可以理所當然的跳過中華民國政府、與我方各種民間團體洽談，並且直接對台灣的各種團體施放利多，利字當頭，各團體趨之若鶩，逕自到北京朝聖，眼中那裡還有政府存在，民進黨難道不記得，他們當年如何痛批北京「以商圍政、孤立政府」，這就是「澳門模式」的後遺症。

蔡英文及民進黨堅持不接受九二共識，但是馬政府靠著九二共識達成的，不只是三通直航及ＥＣＦＡ協定而已，還有兩岸「政府對政府」的對等談判模式。民進黨咬定九二共識強調一中原則，矮化台灣主權，但從實際運作的結果檢證，「澳門模式」卻更有矮化台灣的可能，因為，此一模式會讓政府的角色消失不見，長期而言，當然更不利台灣的主體性。

蔡英文雖已公開表示，吳釗燮並未參與民進黨中國政策的討論，他的說法不能代表民進黨，只是，蔡英文否認了「澳門模式」，卻仍然提不出其他方案。事實上，所謂的「澳門模式」，其實就是民進黨執政時期無計可施下的替代方案，如果民進黨再度執政，兩岸交流再度中斷，屆時無計可施的民進黨，難道還要靠「澳門模式」來處理繁複的兩岸關係。

愛台灣不是靠嘴巴喊的，處理兩岸關係更不能只靠僵化的意識形態；民進黨將吳釗燮此次的「澳門模式」說界定為發言失誤，但這是一次很有意義的失誤，因為吳釗燮試圖在九二共識之外提出另一種模式，但這種模式相較之下、反而不利台灣，這值得民進黨深思。