Two Questions Tsai Ing-wen Must Answer Before the Election
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 8, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen must answer two questions before the election. The first is, if elected, will she pardon Chen Shui-bian? The second is, if elected, will she recognize the 1992 Consensus?
These are major questions affecting the nation. Tsai Ing-wen must confront these questions in the event she is elected. If she refuses to answer these questions frankly, with simple yes or no answers before the election, her election bid will lack legitimacy. If elected, her refusal to answer these questions would lead to an unimaginable crisis of governance. Therefore she must provide voters with answers before the election.
Tsai Ing-wen has thrown her weight behind Chen supporters and Taiwan independence hardliners. The public is wondering whether she will return the favor by granting Chen Shui-bian a pardon, in the event she is elected. This is a question she can not evade. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, the Green Camp will surely demand a pardon for Chen Shui-bian. It will demand "transitional justice." It may even take to the streets in protest. How will "President Tsai" respond to such "expressions of public opinion?" The Green Camp is not about to let this matter go. They will give her no peace. On the other hand, if she grants Chen Shui-bian a pardon, she will provoke anger among those who disagree, leading to political instability. This question will affect on the legitimacy of "President Tsai's" rule. Therefore Tsai Ing-wen must provide voters with clear yes or no answers before the election. She cannot evade these questions by promising merely that she will give them "serious consideration."
The 1992 Consensus is the premise and foundation for cross-Strait peace and development. If "President Tsai" accepts the 1992 Consensus, she can talk of "continuing the previous administration's cross-Strait policy" if elected. If "President Tsai" refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, the current cross-Strait peace and development framework will be deprived of its foundation. When that happens, how will "President Tsai" deal with cross-Strait relations? She must answer these questions. We cannot wait until the election is over before they are answered. They must be answered before the election.
Tsai Ing-wen has clear positions on several national policy issues. For example, she proposes a nuclear-free homeland by 2025. She opposes the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant project. She opposes "growth oriented" economic policies, This shows that she does not duck every issue. She only bobs and weaves when confronted with certain issues, such as whether she would pardon Chen Shui-bian, and whether she would accept the 1992 Consensus. But these are the two most important issues facing the candidates. If she persists in prevaricating, how can she persuade voters that her election bid is rational and legitimate?
Tsai Ying-wen can not duck these questions. For example, she originally repudiated the 1992 Consensus. She said that "You cannot expect me to acknowledge something that does not exist." Now however, she has changed her tune. She now refers to the 1992 Consensus an "historical framework," and as a "political premise." She no longer says that the 1992 Consensus "simply does not exist." As for pardoning Chen Shui-bian, she said only that she would give it "serious consideration." She refused to assume responsibility by providing a clear answer.
During the upcoming presidential election, these two issues will be the most divisive. They will have the greatest impact on public sentiment. Tsai Ing-wen is a candidate for president. She cannot refuse to state her position on these questions. Tsai Ing-wen is often reluctant to say whether she would demand the "rectification of names" and the authoring of a new constitution. She ducks such questions by saying they should be "turned over to the democratic process for discussion." But the presidential election is precisely when these questions should be "turned over to the democratic process for discussion." Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen must clearly state their positions on these two questions. The electorate can then express its feelings during the election. If Tsai Ing-wen refuses to provide answers before the election, she is in effect refusing to take part in the election.
Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to appeal to both the Green Camp and to swing voters. Does she intend to pardon Chen Shui-bian and accept the 1992 Consensus? Those are the most divisive issues for Green Camp and swing voters. Tsai Ing-wen hopes to win over both groups by refusing to answer. But in the event she is elected, she will have to. No matter how "President Tsai" answers, one of the two groups will feel betrayed and disappointed. She will no longer be able to stonewall. For example, if she pardons Chen Shui-bian, will swing voters find it intolerable? If she refuses to pardon Chen Shui-bian, will the Green Camp forgive her? And if Chen Shui-bian, who advocates "one nation on each side," is released from prison, will he permit "President Tsai" a single moment's peace? The 1992 Consensus has far reaching consequences. Therefore, she must state her position before the election.
Tsai Ing-wen must answer both these questions in the event she is elected. Therefore she must answer both these questions prior to the election. If voters agree with her positions, her rule will acquire some degree of legitimacy. If she evades these questions, she will not receive public endorsement during the election. If she attempts to flip-flop following the election, based on which way the wind is blowing, her rule will lack legitimacy. The nation will be torn apart. Relations with the Mainland will weakened. The consequences will be disastrous.
Tsai Ing-wen must provide clear answers to both these questions, before the presidential election, That alone is rational and responsible. The public must not permit her to continue obfuscating.
蔡英文在選前必須回答兩個問題
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.05.08
蔡英文在選前必須回答兩個問題:一、若當選是否特赦陳水扁?二、若當選是否接受九二共識?
這兩個攸關國家治理的重大問題,蔡英文若當選,必將面對。她倘在選前不能對此作出「是」或「否」的回答,即不易建立她參選的正當性,且若當選亦將釀成不堪設想的治理危機。所以,她應在選前作出答案。
蔡英文獲扁系及獨派的力挺,民眾皆在猜測蔡英文若當選會否以特赦陳水扁作為回報,這已是她不能迴避的問題。想像中,蔡英文若當選,綠營必會出現特赦陳水扁的呼聲,要求實現「轉型正義」,甚至上街示威遊行;「蔡總統」若不順應這樣的「民意」,綠營必不會善罷甘休,使她難安其位;反之,她若就此特赦陳水扁,恐亦將引爆持異議者的憤怒,導致政局動盪。由於這個問題將與「蔡總統」的統治正當性密切相關,因此蔡英文必須在選前即作出「是/否」的答覆,而不能僅以「嚴肅考慮」四字敷衍過去。
至於「九二共識」,已是兩岸「和平發展框架」的前提與基礎。「蔡總統」若接納「九二共識」,始可言「若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」;但「蔡總統」若不接受「九二共識」,則兩岸現今的「和平發展框架」即失依托,「蔡總統」屆時將以何種替代方策來處理兩岸關係,即應作出交代。這個問題也不能待若選上再回答,應在選前給國人答案。
蔡英文在許多國政上皆有鮮明主張,例如倡議二○二五非核家園、反國光石化、反對「成長掛帥」的經濟政策等,顯示其並不迴避表現其政策立場;然她在是否特赦陳水扁及接受九二共識這兩個問題上,卻顯得閃爍迴避。但這兩個問題卻可謂是她此次參選所面對的最重要的兩個問題,若始終支吾其詞,如何建立其參選的合理性與正當性?
其實,蔡英文亦知不能迴避這兩個問題。例如,她原來根本否認有「九二共識」,而謂「不能教我承認根本不存在的東西」;如今她已改口稱「九二共識」是「歷史框架」、「政治前提」,亦即不再說「九二共識」是「根本不存在」。至於特赦陳水扁,她也只說「嚴肅考慮」,並未說她沒有必須作出答案的責任。
在此次統總大選中,這兩個議題是社會歧見最大、且對國情民心影響最深的議題;蔡英文作為總統職位的競逐者,不能不對此作出明確表態。蔡英文常將她不願作答的題目(如,是否正名制憲),諉稱可交付民主討論;唯總統大選的過程,正是民主討論的過程,只要馬英九及蔡英文均對這兩個問題表態,即可經由大選得到民意的答案。蔡英文若在選前不給回答,即是對大選民意見證機制的否定。
蔡英文經營的選票架構是「綠營」加「中間選民」。而是否特赦陳水扁及是否接受九二共識,卻可能是在綠營與中間選民之間歧見最大的議題;蔡英文想以拒絕回答來維持平衡,但她若當選,即不再可能模稜兩可,而「蔡總統」屆時所作的任何決定,必將使她一部分的支持者感到失落與受騙。例如,她若特赦陳水扁,中間選民能接受嗎?反之,她若不特赦陳水扁,綠營又能饒過她嗎?且「一邊一國」的陳水扁出獄後,會讓「蔡總統」清靜嗎?九二共識的牽動亦類乎此。因此,她必須在選前說清楚。
這兩個問題,既是蔡英文若當選必將面對的問題,因而她應當在選前即作出答案。如果選票贊同她的主張,她至少可藉民意建立她若當選後的治理正當性;但若她迴避這兩個問題,不在大選中徵得民意背書,而欲在若當選後再見風轉舵,那不但將難以維持其統治正當性,也可預見整個國家及兩岸皆將面臨一場撕裂、震盪的浩劫。
蔡英文必須在這兩個問題上有了清楚的答案才進入總統大選,這始是理性及負責的態度,且國人亦不容許她繼續不清不楚下去。
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