Cross-Strait Negotiations: Easy Things First, Hard Things Later

Cross-Strait Negotiations: Easy Things First, Hard Things Later
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2011

ARATS Vice Chairman Zheng Lizhong is coming to Taiwan. He will discuss the Free and Independent Travel Policy and direct cross-Strait airline flights. He will also meet with SEF Vice Chairman Kao Koong-lian, to review the effectiveness of past cross-Strait agreements.

The Ma administration took office in 2008. Since then, the two sides have signed a total of 16 agreements or memoranda of understanding. The medical and health cooperation agreement has been signed, but is not yet in force. Not counting this year, the two sides have signed an average of 5.3 protocols a year. But this year is already half over, and the two sides have yet to sign a single agreement. It would appear that the easy things have already been done, and that cross-Strait consultations have entered the "hard things stage." When the two sides review the effectiveness of existing agreements, they must consider obstacles to future negotiations, and seek constructive solutions.

Cross-Strait exchanges were once non-existent. The Ma administration institutionalized cross-Strait agreements within an economic cooperation framework. It liberalized and expanded long term trade and economic relations. It brought about systemic changes. Even more significantly, it reduced personnel costs, capital costs, and transaction costs. It reaped real economic benefits. Early harvest provisions for goods, finance, transport, tourism, and medicine yielded "cross-Strait dividends" and business opportunities. These were the immediate benefits of the agreements. But food safety, agricultural product inspection and quarantine, product inspection and safety, and intellectual property protection require closer cooperation on technical matters. Obvious results are not as easy to achieve. Efforts to seek common ground and establish mutual trust must continue. Consider cross-Strait cooperation on consumer product safety, implemented last year. Since then Taipei has issued reports on hundreds of defective products. Beijing has also conducted investigations, and achieved real results.

Late last year, the sixth Chiang/Chen meeting was convened. Cross-strait economic and trade agreements reached a nadir. The momentum from highly effective past consultations seemed to have petered out. ECFA included agreements over goods, services, investment protection, and dispute settlement, none of which saw real progress. The direction and structure of economic cooperation remained indeterminate. Consider the investment protection negotiations held during the second half of last year, Consultations went on for nearly a year. But they stalled over investment liberalization, personal safety, dispute resolution, and arbitration. Many of these had implications for the legal system, legal standards, and technical issues. Many had cross-Strait repercussions. They are understandably time-consuming. But ten months have passed, and no solution are in sight, The problem is probably not technical or legal in nature. After all, if one is flexible and determined to reach an accord, one can break any deadlock. In other words, the current predicament may involve sensitive political issues. Absent a clear political mandate, cross-Strait negotiations may remain stalled over technicalities.

It is better to get cross-Strait agreements right, than to arrive at cross-Strait agreements quickly. But wheel-spinning is a bad sign. The solution to our current plight is not difficult. As far as Taipei is concerned, we must forsake our "demand more, give less" attitude. Negotiations must strike a balance. It is true that the two sides are unequal in size. Political problems persist. Taipei's demand for full equality and reciprocity in negotiations ignores political reality. Blindly delaying normalization, and demanding concessions in return, represents unrealistic thinking. The key is lifting restrictions on the import and export of Mainland capital, in order to create favorable condidtions for consultation. As far as Beijing is concerned, it must look at the Big Picture. It must not be so politically sensitive. It must avoid interpreting everything in a political light. It must adopt a more pragmatic approach when dealing with simple technical issues. It must establish a more favorable basis for future consultations. More importantly, the two sides must solemnly confront the current deadlock. They need a push from those at the top of the political ladder. They must resolve problems relating to investment protection and disputes settlement. They must find solutions applicable to all subsequent negotiations. Apparently officials charged with cross-Strait negotiations have yet to receive such instructions and authorizations.

The two sides have reached an impasse. Are they deliberately slowing their footsteps in anticipation of political changes that may occur within the coming year? Will slowed progress in cross-Strait trade be a political blessing or a political curse? No one can say for sure. If slowed progress is the result of underestimating the problem's importance, then the two sides must allow more time for adjustment and reform. The two sides will convene their second regular meeting in September. Authorities on both sides look forward to breaking the deadlock. They are using the occasion of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Council to break the deadlock.

兩岸協商先易後難的困局與解套
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.09

大陸海協會副會長鄭立中來台，除討論陸客自由行與航班之事外，並與海基會副董事長高孔廉共同檢視、總結過去兩岸協議的執行成效。

自二○○八年馬政府上任至今，兩岸已經簽署總計十六個協議或備忘錄（醫藥衛生合作協議已簽尚未生效）；今年不算，平均每年洽簽五點三個協議。但今年至今已過一半，卻尚無將可簽成任何協議的音訊，顯現在「先易後難」的方向下，兩岸協商已經逐漸進入困難階段。雙方當局在回顧既有協議的執行成效之際，更有必要認真檢視未來的協商障礙，並積極構思解決之道。

相較於過去的一片空白，兩岸各項協議除了建立制度化的經濟合作架構，並加深自由化經貿關係等長期性、制度面的機制外，更顯著地降低了人員、貨品及資金互動的交易成本。在實質經濟利益上，早收貨品、金融、運輸、觀光，甚至於醫療等行業所享有的「兩岸紅利」與商機也開始浮現。但不可諱言，除了這些立即見效的協議外，諸如食品安全、農產品檢驗檢疫、商品檢驗與安全及智財權保護等，因為涉及更為深層、隱性的技術性合作議題，其表層效果不易呈現，還有持續化異求同與建立互信的空間。例如，以兩岸消費品安全合作為例，自去年實施以來，台灣方面已經進行了數百件檢驗瑕疵商品的通報，而大陸主管機關也積極的在源頭協查處理，亦達成相當的具體成果。

但是，自從去年底第六次江陳會開始，兩岸經貿協議似乎進入了一個低潮期。過去高效率的協商動能，已經出現疲乏現象，迄今ECF A所列的貨品、服務、投保與爭端解決四大後續協議，都尚未見到實質進展；而經濟合作更是連方向、架構都還沒確定。以去年下半年便展開協商的投資保障協議為例，在經過接近一年的協商後，還環繞在投資開放、人身安全保障、糾紛調解與仲裁等老議題原地打轉。這些議題固然涉及許多法律制度接軌等技術配套問題，還有很多具有兩岸特色的規定，其耗時費神是可以理解的，但十個月過去，難題還是無解，就恐怕不是法律技術問題造成的障礙。畢竟若是立場底線有彈性，完成協商的意志堅定，則總會在山窮水盡之際突破僵局；換言之，目前的困局，可能已經涉及敏感的政治問題，在欠缺明確政治授權的情況下，兩岸技術談判階層只能繼續堅持己見，讓協商空轉。

確實，兩岸協議應該秉持著「簽得快不如簽得好」的原則，但原地空轉絕非健康的發展。解決目前困境的方向其實不難。對台灣來說，必須調整「要的多、給的少」的心態，求取一個更為平衡的協商起點。固然兩岸大小懸殊，政治問題仍存，完全的對等互惠談判，是漠視台灣政治現實的想法；但一味抵拒延滯正常化，及要求更為優惠的回報，也是不切實際的思維。於此同時，加速陸資的開放及進出口限制的解除，也是創造良好協商環境的關鍵。而中國大陸的解答，則在於以大局為視野，調低對政治議題的敏感度，避免凡事政治解釋的取向，以更務實的態度處理可以是很單純看待的技術問題，創造未來更為有利的協商基礎。更重要的是，若是兩岸嚴肅正視目前停滯不前的問題，以政治高度提供動力，則不僅能夠解決投保與爭端解決協議的問題，且能一體適用在所有的後續協商中。遺憾的是，兩岸雙方談判官員，似乎都還沒得到這樣的指示與授權。

目前的僵局，若是起因於一年內兩岸都須面對政治變局下，刻意放慢腳步的結果，則兩岸經貿進展遲緩在政治上是利是弊，恐怕沒人說得準；但若是因為輕視問題的重要性所致，就有需要調整改革的空間。兩岸經合會將在九月召開第二次例會，期待雙方當局能夠重視停滯空轉問題，利用經合例會的機會以突破僵局。