A Peace Agreement: An Interim Solution

A Peace Agreement: An Interim Solution
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 23, 2011

The whistleblower website WikiLeaks has published a message sent by the US Department of State. The message said that Mainland Chinese President Hu Jintao established a research group in 2006, in the hope of making a major breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. It said he hoped to find a cross-Strait framework acceptable to both sides, midway between the "one country, two systems" model and the "two states" model.

Based on what we know of Hu Jintao's actions on cross-Strait relations over the years, the report seems credible. On March 22, 2008, Ma Ying-jeou was elected president of the ROC. Four days later, on March 26, President Hu Jintao spoke on the hotline with US President George W. Bush. Hu said that "The Chinese mainland and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, The parties acknowledge that there is only one China, but agree to define the term in their own way." Nine months later, on New Year's Eve, Hu announced his "Hu Six Points." Hu said that "The nation faces special political circumstances. It is not yet reunified. Nevertheless the two sides can begin pragmatic discussions." Hu Jintao's two statements represent some of the most innovative thinking on cross-Strait policy in a long time.

During the March Bush/Hu hotline conversation, Hu referred to "one China, different interpretations." On New Year's Eve, when Hu announced his Hu Six Points, he conceded that the nation was not yet reunified, and that it faces special political circumstances, but that pragmatic discussions could nonetheless begin. His remarks had two implications. One. He conceded that the nation is not yet reunified. He implied that the special political circumstances were acceptable, and must be accepted. Hu formally reaffirmed his previous statement, "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they nevertheless remain part of one China." In the past, this was unacceptable, because "not yet reunified" was considered acquiescence to divided rule. Two. Hu went so far as to speak of special political circumstances and pragmatic discussions. In effect, he conceded that there were options in cross-Strait political relations other than reunification. One could imagine political relations under special circumstances in which the nation is not yet reunified.

Consider Hu Jintao's policy from this newspaper's long-held perspective on cross-strait relations. We would say that Hu has moved from "goal orientation" to "process orientation." He has moved from "reunification" to "reconnection." His is contemplating a "third concept of China" that transcends both the ROC and the PRC. He understands the "glass theory," which states that the ROC is the glass, and Taiwan is the water. As long is the glass remains intact, the water is contained within the glass. Once the glass is broken, the water runs off.

According to WikiLeaks, Hu Jintao is seeking a solution midway between the "one country, two systems" model, and the "two states" model. Hong Kong's "one country, two systems" model cannot be applied to the ROC, It is hard to imagine the Republic of China not holding presidential elections, and instead electing a Special Executive. If the "two states theory" means "one nation on each side," that is unacceptable to both the government and the opposition on the Chinese mainland. The model midway between the "one country, two systems" model and the "two states" model is midway between "total reunification" and a "permanent split." It is a means of establishing political relations between the two sides under circumstances in which the nation is not yet reunified. It is a way to ensure that "although the two sides are not yet reunified, they are still part of one China." It is a way to ensure "different interpretations."

In fact, the phrase "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they nevertheless remain part of one China" is the same as "one China, different interpretations." This however, is confined to the level of thinking and language. It has yet to be legalized and institutionalized. Hu Jintao is probably referring to this when he speaks of pragmatic discussions.

The first thought that comes to mind is a "quasi-confederation." This newspaper proposes a new three part statement of principles. "There is only one China in the world. The ROC and the PRC are both part of that one China. China's territory and sovereignty are indivisible." Scholars speak of "one China, three constitutions." All of these can be considered a "quasi-confederation." This however, may be aiming too high. This may be hard to achieve. What is needed is an "interim solution" to serve as a turning point.

A peace agreement would be just such an interim solution. A quasi-confederation would require a "third constitution" and a joint-confederation hierarchy. That would be no simple task. But the two sides could sign a peace agreement, in their capacity as warring parties in a civil war. They could do so on the basis of "one China, different interpretations," as expressed in both sides' constitutions. They could commit to a long term cease-fire and peace. They could establish a long term, bilateral, cabinet level "cross-strait peace and development conference." This might allow the two sides to legalize and institutionalize the concepts expressed in such phrases as "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they nevertheless remain part of one China," "special circumstances," and "one China, different interpretations."

If we wish to sign a peace agreement, we must first agree on its central premise. For example, it may not be possible for the two sides to reach an accord as "Republic of China President Ma Ying-jeou" and as "Peoples Republic of China President Hu Jintao." But it may be possible for them to reach an accord as "the Taiwan authorities' President Ma Ying-jeou" and as "the Mainland authorities' President Hu Jintao." Absent agreement on this most basic of conditions, no peace agreement is possible.

If the authorities on the two sides are willing to pursue the matter, we hope they start soon. The two sides should refer to each other as "the Taipei authorities" and as "the Beijing authorities." For example, as "the Taipei authorities' Department of Health," "the Taiwan authorities' Economic Minister," "the Beijing authorities' Ministry of Culture" and "the Beijing authorities' State Council." They could even refer to each other as "the Taiwan authorities' President Ma" and "the Mainland authorities' President Hu." Hopefully the two sides will make good use of the opportunities afforded them in the next four to five years. If so, they can move toward signing a cross-Strait peace agreement. If by then they have not achieved a quasi-confederation, the two sides can still refer to each other as "the Taiwan authorities' President" and "the Mainland authorities' President" in their capacity as "warring parties in a civil war."

Consider the big picture. The two sides are engaged in coopetition. They have now reached a take profit point and a stop-loss point. A peace agreement is an interim solution that could consolidate the "special circumstances." It could uphold "a third concept of a China under divided rule, but undivided sovereignty."

The two sides enjoy a four or five year window of opportunity. They can begin by referring to each other as "the Taiwan authorities" and "the Mainland authorities." They can expedite an interim solution. They can establish a framework for peaceful development "under divided administration, but undivided sovereignty." They can establish mutual goodwill, change people's hearts and minds, and trade time for space. They can transform cross-Strait negotiations into a rational process. They can clarify their goals. We do not know whether the two sides in fact enjoy a four or five year window of opportunity. But if they do, this is it.

和平協議就是中程方案
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.23

爆料網站「維基解密」公布美國外交電文稱：大陸國家主席胡錦濤，為在兩岸問題取得重大突破，於二○○六年成立研究小組，期望在「一國兩制」與「兩國論」之間找到一個兩岸都能接受的模式。

從這些年來胡錦濤的兩岸施為來看，此說應當可信。二○○八年三月二十二日，馬英九當選中華民國總統，四天後，三月二十六日，胡錦濤主席在熱線電話中對美國總統布希說：「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識基礎上恢復談判，雙方承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義各自表述。」九個月後，十二月三十一日除夕，胡錦濤在「胡六點」指出；「兩岸可以就在國家尚未統一前的特殊情況下的政治關係展開務實探討。」胡錦濤的這兩次談話，應可視為其兩岸政策的主要創新思維。

三月的布胡熱線談話，就是「一中各表」；而上引除夕「胡六點」所述，則是胡錦濤再次確認了「在國家尚未統一前的特殊情況」之存在，並謂可「務實探討」此一「特殊情況」下的「政治關係」。此意是說：一、承認「國家尚未統一」是可以接受及必須接受的「特殊情況」，亦即正式確定胡錦濤此前所主張的「儘管尚未統一，仍是一個中國」；這在過去是不行的，因為「尚未統一」是不容接受的「分裂分治」。二、至於進一步主張可就此一「特殊情況」的「政治關係」務實探討，即是表明，兩岸的「政治關係」未必只有「統一」一個念想，而是可以想像建立一個「在國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係」。

若以本報對兩岸議題的一貫看法對胡錦濤的政策思維進行解讀，我們認為：胡錦濤應是從「目的論」轉向了「過程論」，從「統一論」轉到了「連結論」，且腦中存有一個超越中華民國與中華人民共和國的「第三概念的中國」，亦深知「杯子理論」的道理：中華民國是杯，台灣是水；杯在水在，杯破水覆。

「維基解密」說，胡錦濤想在「一國兩制」與「兩國論」之間找到方案。香港的「一國兩制」不可行，因為不易想像要中華民國不選總統，而改選特首；至於「兩國論」如果是指「一邊一國」，亦非大陸朝野所能接受。而所謂「在一國兩制與兩國論之間」的方案，應就是「在完全統一及永遠分裂之間」的方案，也就是欲設法建立一個「在國家尚未統一前特殊情況下的政治關係」，以確保「儘管尚未統一，仍是一個中國」，亦即確保「一中各表」。

其實，「儘管尚未統一，仍是一個中國」，就是「一中各表」。只是，這些皆迄仍停留在思維及語言層次，沒有法制化及機構化。胡錦濤意欲「務實探討」者，應即指此。

第一個進入人們腦際者，應是「泛邦聯模式」。本報主張的新新三句「世界上只有一個中國，中華民國與中華人民共和國都是一部分的中國，中國的領土與主權不容分割」，及學者鼓吹的「一中三憲」，可謂皆是「泛邦聯模式」。然而，此恐懸鵠過高，不易企及；須有一個「中程方案」作為轉折。

這個「中程方案」就是「和平協議」。因為「泛邦聯模式」須有「第三憲」及合組邦聯機構，皆非易事；但兩岸若在「內戰交戰政府」的對等地位上簽署「和平協議」，載明以雙方憲法的「一中各表」為連結與基礎，達成永遠停戰及共維和平的信諾，而在雙邊內閣層次建立常設的「兩岸和平發展會議」，或許就能使「儘管尚未統一，仍是一個中國」及「一中各表」的「特殊情況」得以法制化及機構化。

若欲簽署「和平協議」，首須確立「議和主體」。譬如說，若不能以「中華民國總統馬英九」及「中華人民共和國主席胡錦濤」的地位簽署，至少應以「台灣當局：總統馬英九」及「大陸當局：國家主席胡錦濤」落款。倘若沒有這個最基本的條件，和平協議絕無可能簽得成。

如果這是兩岸當局認為可以追求的方案，我們希望從最近的將來開始，兩岸雙方應以台北當局及北京當局互稱，例如稱「台北當局的衛生署」或「台灣當局的經濟部長」等，及「北京當局的文化部」或「大陸當局的國務院」等，甚至相對稱呼「台灣當局馬總統」與「大陸當局胡主席」。進一步言，倘若未來兩岸還能維持四、五年的機遇期，則可朝簽定兩岸「和平協議」的方向努力，屆時若未達成邦聯一類的架構，簽署雙方在「內戰交戰政府」的框架下，即可考慮以「台灣當局：總統／大陸當局：主席」互稱。

就大局大勢言，兩岸在雙邊競合關係上，目前可謂皆已面臨了最佳的「停利點」及「停損點」。「和平協議」即是可將此一「特殊情況」穩固化的「中程方案」，以確保「一個分治而不分裂的第三概念的中國。」

再重複一次：如果兩岸尚有四、五年的機遇期，可從互稱台灣當局、大陸當局起步，及早建立一個「中程方案」，確立「分治而不分裂」的和平發展框架；雙方皆可藉以累積善意，感化人心，「以時間換取空間」，將兩岸關係導向「合理的過程」，以通往「改善之目的」。我們不知還有沒有這四、五年的時機，但這必定是最後一個機會。