DPP Gambling that Hu Jintao Will Not Shred Cross-Strait Agreements

DPP Gambling that Hu Jintao Will Not Shred Cross-Strait Agreements
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 11, 2011

Joseph Wu was Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council during the Chen Shui-bian administration. Wu has issued yet another shocking statement. A while back he said that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power and existing cross-Strait communications channels are terminated, the government can simply resort to the "Macao model." More recently he said that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, Mainland China cannot afford to shred the agreements reached by the two sides. Doing so would be an admission that Hu Jintao's Taiwan policy was a complete and utter failure. "They (the Beijing authorities) are not prepared accept this characterization of President Hu Jintao's historical legacy."

Joseph Wu advanced this perspective while answering reporters' questions. "Suppose the Democratic Progressive Party returned to power but refused to accept the 1992 Consensus?" a reporter asked him. "Would cross-Strait agreements have to start over from the beginning?" Joseph Wu replied that for the time being, the question cannot be answered. He then offered the opinion previously mentioned, saying that it was "based on a shared vision of how to handle cross-Strait relations."

Joseph Wu is clearly still evading the question of whether, in the event it returned to power, the Democratic Progressive Party would accept the 1992 Consensus. That is why Wu said that for the time being, the question cannot be answered. But Joseph Wu thn implied that even if the DPP refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, the Hu Jintao regime would not dare terminate existing agreements.

In January, ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin said, "The Mainland's economic policy toward Taiwan has political preconditions. If one day opposition to Taiwan independence vanishes, if the 1992 Consensus vanishes, then everything may be up for reconsideration." Since then, the Beijing authorities have reiterated their view that the "1992 Consensus is the prerequisite and the basis for peaceful development." Recently when Zheng Lizhong, Vice President of ARATS visited Taiwan, he said "Cross-Strait exchanges are based entirely upon the 1992 Consensus."

Joseph Wu however, said that if the DPP returns to power, it can refuse to accept the 1992 Consensus. Hu Jintao will not tear up the fifteen agreements currently in force, including ECFA. Wu said his conclusion was based "a shared vision of how to handle cross-Strait relations." This may come as a surprise to many, including leaders in Beijing.

Another surprising "shared vision" is Wu's assumption that in the event the Democratic Progressive Party refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, threatening to terminate existing agreements are the only strategic and tactical options for Beijing. First of all, Beijing has repeatedly linked the 1992 Consensus to "peaceful development." When the time comes, Beijing cannot fail to take action. Otherwise President Hu Jintao's "historical legacy" would be called in question. A repudiation of the 1992 Consensus by the DPP would never pass a hawks vs. doves reality test. Beijing would conclude that it must take tough action to bring the DPP back in line. If Beijing and the DPP government break off talks over the 1992 Consensus, Beijing can say, "You betrayed my trust. I can't be blamed for reacting harshly." Beijing could halt the flow of Mainland tourists to Taiwan, or discontinue direct cross-Strait flights. As the public on Taiwan bickers over who is to blame -- the DPP government or the Beijing authorities -- the DPP will not emerge unscathed. If the DPP returns to power, it many not even honor existing agreements such as ECFA. Tsai Ing-wen initially declared that the government would first hold a referendum. More recently, the Democratic Progressive Party said it would have to re-evaluate any such agreements. We don't even know whether the DPP will honor existing agreements. So why worry about Hu Jintao?

Suppose the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, but refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. It will present Beijing with an ideal opportunity to take Taipei hostage. Beijing may gain a double advantage. It may be able to create political and economic chaos on Taiwan, and force the DPP government to yield ground. This is probably the real balance Hu Jintao will strike between a "reality test" and an "historical legacy." That is why Mainland analysts have long said that if the Democratic Progressive Party refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, it will present Beijing with a "new opportunity," strategically and tactically. Question: If the DPP positions its own head on Beijing's chopping block, will Beijing pass up the opportunity?

What is the 1992 Consensus? Basically it is a promise by the leadership of the Republic of China to defend the Republic of China and uphold its "One China Constitution." It is a promise not to adopt "de jure Taiwan independence." As for the definition of "China," authorities on both sides agreed to disagree. They agree to seek common ground while allowing for differences. The DPP refuses to accept this position. In cross-Strait relations, it refuses to fight for "One China, Different Intepretations." Therefore what right does it have to seek the Presidency of the Republic of China?

Joseph Wu's remarks reveal that DPP repudiation of the 1992 Consensus is based on the belief that Hu Jintao would be reluctant to shred existing agreements. When Tsai Ing-wen visited the UK, she said "Taiwan can make good use of [Mainland] China." But clearly Joseph Wu is talking about "playing with [Mainland] China." Such irrational behavior could have devastating consequences. Presumably that is a "shared vision" among anyone with a shred of common sense.

In 2005, DPP elder Lin Yi-hsiung criticized the Chen regime's Mainland policy. He said that "When small states interact with large states, the prerequisite is good faith. If political leaders imagine they can engage in deceit and political intrigue while Interacting with large states, in the end they will be caught in the large state's web. They will effectively commit suicide."

The Democratic Progressive Party refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen is currently in the UK, proclaiming a desire to bolster cross-Strait economic and trade ties. Is this "making good use of [Mainland] China?" Or is it "playing with [Mainland] China?"

民進黨賭胡錦濤不敢停斷兩岸協議
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.11

扁政府的陸委會主委吳釗燮又語出驚人。日前他說，民進黨若再執政而現行兩岸協商機制停斷，可代以「澳門模式」；如今他又說，中國大陸若在民進黨重新執政後，撕毀兩岸各項已達成之協議，等於承認胡錦濤對台政策完全失敗，「他們（北京政權）還沒有準備好這樣子對胡錦濤歷史定位」。

吳釗燮是在答記者問時，提出此一觀點。當時，記者問他，假設民進黨若再執政而不接受九二共識，兩岸目前既有的協議是否可能歸零？吳釗燮答稱，這樣的問題目前沒有結論；接著，他就發表了前段所述見解，並稱這是「根據處理兩岸關係者的共同看法」。

顯然，吳釗燮仍迴避了民進黨若再執政是否接受九二共識的問題，而謂「這樣的問題目前沒有結論」；但吳釗燮接下來的推論似認為，即使民進黨不接受九二共識，胡錦濤政權亦不會停斷現行協議。

一月間，海協會會長陳雲林說：「大陸對台灣的經濟政策有一個政治前提，如果有一天反台獨沒有了，九二共識沒有了，可能一切都要重新考慮。」此後，北京涉台當局即反覆申論「九二共識是和平發展的前提與基礎」。日前海協會副會長鄭立中來台，又稱「兩岸交流的一切成效都是以九二共識為基礎」。

然而，吳釗燮的判斷卻是：民進黨若再執政，可以不接受九二共識，但胡錦濤不會撕毀現行十五項協議（包括ＥＣＦＡ在內）。這若竟是「處理兩岸關係者的共同看法」，確實令人嘖嘖稱奇。

另一種迥然不同的「共同看法」卻是：民進黨若再執政而不接受「九二共識」，北京當局斷然以停廢現行協議相要脅，將是其唯一的戰略及戰術選擇。首先，北京既反覆強調「九二共識」與「和平發展」的連結，如果屆時沒有大動作，莫說胡錦濤的「歷史定位」堪虞，他將根本撐不過大陸鷹鴿互啄的「現實考驗」。屆時，北京會認為，強硬的動作將是挾持及逼迫民進黨政府就範的有效手段；何況，倘若到時候北京與民進黨政府因「九二共識」而決裂，北京可以說，「你無情，莫怪我無義」，而停斷了陸客來台或直航，則台灣民意在北京當局及民進黨政府之間的歸責歸咎，恐怕亦未必有利民進黨。更何況，民進黨若再執政，是否延續包括ＥＣＦＡ在內的各項協議，目前亦尚無定論；蔡英文先說應交付公投，近日民進黨又稱將重新檢視；是則民進黨自己亦猶未決定是否延續現行協議，何必擔心胡錦濤會不會撕毀？

民進黨若再執政而不接受九二共識，將提供北京當局採取挾持戰術的最佳時機，且最後極可能獲得台灣內部政經情勢大亂及民進黨政府最終仍將讓步的雙重戰略利益。這恐才是胡錦濤屆時在「現實考驗」及「歷史定位」兼籌並顧之計。因而，早有大陸方面的評論者稱，民進黨若再執政而不接受九二共識，應可視為北京在兩岸戰略及戰術上的「新機遇」。試問：民進黨自己把頭放在北京的砧板上，誰會錯過這個「機遇」？

什麼是九二共識，說到最根底，就是中華民國的執政者宣示堅守中華民國及中華民國「憲法一中」的立場，不採「法理台獨」；至於對「中國」的涵義，兩岸當局皆同意可有不同認知，此即「求同存異」。而民進黨竟不接受此一立場，莫說不能與對岸爭取「一中各表」，對內又豈有參選中華民國總統的正當性？

吳釗燮的說詞顯示，民進黨堅持否認九二共識的立場，是押在「胡錦濤不敢撕毀協議」的賭博之上。蔡英文在英國訪問時說，台灣有能力「善用中國」；但吳釗燮的說法，卻儼然是在「玩弄中國」，其不理性及可能導致的毀滅性後果應是略具常識者的「共同看法」。

二○○五年，民進黨大老林義雄評扁政府的大陸政策稱：「小國與大國良好互動的前提是真誠，如果政治領袖自作聰明，與大國互動時爾虞我詐，最後逃不出大國的掌心，等於是自尋死路。」

民進黨不接受九二共識，蔡英文此刻竟兀自在英國主張強化兩岸經貿交流；這是「善用中國」，還是「玩弄中國」？