Tsai Ing-wen Eager to Talk to Beijing: But Why Not Talk to the Voters First?

Tsai Ing-wen Eager to Talk to Beijing:
But Why Not Talk to the Voters First?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 22, 2011

During her recent trip to the Philippines, Tsai Ing-wen said that the DPP is willing to sit down with Beijing and discuss a "sustainable" framework for cross-Strait interaction. But the presidential election is only six months away. Why doesn't Tsai Ing-wen share her "sustainable" framework for cross-Strait interaction with her fellow citizens of the ROC? Or does Beijing rank higher in her political hierarchy than qualified voters of the ROC?

Tsai Ing-wen said she has been totally clear about her cross-Strait principles. She said some people have accused her of being deliberately ambiguous. She said her accusers are deliberately choosing not to understand.

Just what is Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy? She has voiced her opinion on a number of issues. One. She rejects the 1992 Consensus. Two. She is considering demanding a referendum on ECFA, or demanding that ECFA be sent back to the legislature for review. Third. She once said that "If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will continue the former administration's cross-Strait policy." Four. She proposes "Peace with differences. Peace while seeking common ground." Five. She has denied saying that the Macao model could replace the existing consultation mechanism. Six. She would replace a growth and export oriented economy with a "locally based economy."

Can these mutually contradictory statements really be considered "totally clear?" Can listeners really be accused of "deliberately choosing not to understand?" One. Tsai rejects the 1992 Consensus, purportedly because it "forfeits sovereignty and humiliates the nation." But where is her alternative? Two. Tsai insists that ECFA "panders to [Mainland] China and sells out Taiwan." But what does she plan to do about it? Does she intend to demand a referendum? Does she intend to send it back to the Legislative Yuan for review? Third, She says she intends to continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy. if so, why not continue the previous administration's "One China, Different Interpretations" policy as well? Why not continue its policy of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force?" If Tsai does not continue these policies, how can she continue the 15 agreements predicated upon these policies? Four. What exactly is "Peace with differences. Peace while seeking common ground?" What are the "differences?" What is "seeking common ground?" How exactly does she intend to go about "seeking common ground?" If she rejects the 1992 Consensus, can there be any peace to speak of? Five. She apparently realizes the Macao model is not feasible. Does she intend to preserve the existing consultation mechanism? Will Chen Yunlin be allowed to visit? When the time comes, will "President Tsai" once again climb onto a sound truck, to bait this visitor from the Mainland? Six. Does Tsai really believe that a "locally based economy" can do away with cross-Strait exchanges? If so, she should take a gander at the waves of Mainland tourists ascending to the top of the Taipei 101 Building and crowding the night markets.

Leave her ambiguous rhetoric aside for the moment. Tsai Ing-wen also says that "The ROC is a government in exile." But she has yet to explain herself. She remains totally unclear on whether she even recognizes the ROC. In which case, how can she possibly be clear on her cross-Strait policy? Also, what has become of Tsai Ing-wen's "Political Platform for the Coming Decade, Cross-Strait Edition" which she trumpeted for the past three years? It is not merely unclear. It has evaporated into thin air. Nothing more has been heard about it.

Tsai Ing-wen says she thinks the two sides need a "sustainable" mechanism for cross-Strait interaction. Is Tsai a rational and responsible presidential candidate? If so, then shouldn't she present her "sustainable" mechanism for cross-Strait interaction to the people? Only that would be consistent with the principles of "democracy, transparency, oversight" that Tsai purports to uphold. How can she seek to "sit down and talk" with the authorities in Beijing, when the general election is looming, and she continues to bob and weave and evade the issue?

Consider the cross-Strait views that Tsai Ing-wen have voiced lately. She has commented on the 1992 Consensus, on One China, Different Interpretations, on no [immeidate] reunification, no independence, no use of force, on ECFA and the 15 agreements, on direct flights and the influx of Mainland tourists, on the diplomatic truce, on ARATS and the SEF, and on the cross-Strait economic cooperation committee. To her, none of these are "sustainable" mechanisms for cross-Strait interaction. Even the Republic of China, in her eyes, is a "government in exile." It too, fails to qualify as a "sustainable" mechanism for cross-Strait interaction. What exactly does Tsai Ing-wen consider a "sustainable" cross-Strait solution? Before she talks to Beijing shouldn't she report to the people first?

Tsai Ing-wen is directing her rhetorical barrage at Beijing, She is attempting to force Beijing to respond to a "different sort of DPP." But Tsai Ing-wen has joined herself at the hip with Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, Koo Kwan-min and the Taiwan independence movement. Her campaign workers are either Chen supporters or Hsieh supporters. They are either Koo supporters or Taiwan independence activists. That being the case, how exactly is the DPP any different? Tsai Ing-wen stopped Chen Shui-bian from recognizing the 1992 Consensus in 2000. Even today she continues to reject it. How exactly is she any different?

Tsai Ing-wen remains unclear on cross-Strait policy. She is attempting to run for president on a deliberately ambiguous campaign platform. She may be trying to deceive Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, Koo Kwan-min and the Taiwan independence movement. She may be trying to deceive the authorities in Beijing. She is definitely trying to deceive ROC voters. Voters who support Tsai Ing-wen, especially advocates of Taiwan independence, are willing to support her merely so they can win the election and hustle her into the office of the president. Their strategy is to first win the election by deceiving the public. The details can be hashed out later. If that is the case, then Tsai Ing-wen's election bid is nothing more than a giant scam. If it is not exposed for what it is before the election, it will be exposed for what it is after she is elected.

Tsai Ing-wen says Beijing is willing to listen to the Democratic Progressive Party. But Beijing has already stated that "Cross-Strait exchanges are based entirely on the 1992 Consensus." Therefore, Tsai Ing-wen must first explain her "sustainable" cross-Strait policy to the voters. Today she disingenuously harangues Beijing with her rhetoric. What is she doing, but revealing her hidden insecurities?

蔡英文欲與北京談，何不先對選民說？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.22

蔡英文在訪菲律賓期間說：民進黨願與中國坐下來，談論「可長可久」的互動架構。然而，距今只有六個多月就要總統大選了，蔡英文何不先將她腹笥中「可長可久」的兩岸互動架構向國人公告？難道在她的政治階序中，中國當局的地位要高於選民？

蔡英文還說，她對兩岸問題的處理原則一直很清楚，有人認為不清楚，是因為他們故意不看清楚它。

蔡英文的兩岸政策是什麼？其已經發布者是：一、反對九二共識；二、ＥＣＦＡ公投是一個選項，或交付立法院重審；三、曾稱「民進黨若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」；四、宣示「和而不同，和而求同」；五、否定可用澳門模式取代兩岸現行協商架構；六、以「在地經濟」，取代成長掛帥與出口導向。

這些矛盾百出的說法難道可稱是「一直很清楚」？或是有人「故意不去看清楚」？試問：一、反對「喪權辱國」的「九二共識」，其替代方案是什麼？二、「傾中賣台」的ＥＣＦＡ究竟存廢如何？還要不要公投？或是丟給立法院重審？三、若延續前朝兩岸政策，為何不延續「一中各表」、「不統，不獨，不武」這些前提政策？而若不延續這些前提，又豈能延續在此基礎上建立的十五項協議？四、什麼叫做「和而不同，和而求同」？「不同」何在？「求同」者何？又如何「求同」？倘否定九二共識，還有「和」可言麼？五、若認為澳門模式不可行，是否延續現行協商架構？陳雲林能否來訪？屆時「蔡總統」仍將站在戰車上以滿街狼藉相迎？六、「在地經濟」難道就不必以兩岸交流支持？看一看一○一大樓及六合夜市的陸客潮吧。

這些「不清不楚」的說詞暫且不論，蔡英文又說「中華民國是一個流亡政府」，迄今亦未見其本人作出解釋；但倘若連對「中華民國」的認同亦不清不楚，遑論能有什麼清楚的兩岸政策？還有，蔡英文喊了三年的「十年政綱兩岸篇」爾今進度如何？則非但不清不楚，簡直是憑空蒸發，全無下文了。

蔡英文認為兩岸應有一「可長可久」的互動架構。然則，若要作一個理性的負責任的總統參選人，自然應先將此一「可長可久」的互動架構報告國人，這才符合蔡英文始終標榜的「民主／透明／監督」原則；豈能先向中國當局放話要「坐下來談」，卻迄今仍在大選政見中閃爍其詞、避重就輕？

以蔡英文迄今發布的兩岸主張來看，「九二共識，一中各表」、「不統，不獨，不武」、ＥＣＦＡ等十五項協議、直航與陸客來台、外交休兵、兩會架構，及兩岸經濟合作委員會等，似皆非「可長可久」的互動架構，亦非有益於「可長可久」的先行架構，甚至連「中華民國」這個「流亡政府」，亦非兩岸「可長可久」的互動體制；那麼，蔡英文所謂的「可長可久」的兩岸方案究竟是什麼？在她與中國談以前，竟難道不應先向國人報告？

蔡英文向中國喊話，提示北京要面對一個「不一樣的民進黨」。但是，蔡英文如今非但與「扁李謝辜獨」合體，連工作層次的人馬也非扁即謝，非辜即獨；然則，民進黨究竟有什麼「不一樣」？而蔡英文自二○○○年阻擋陳水扁承認「九二共識」以來，迄今亦仍然否定「九二共識」，又有何「不一樣」？

蔡英文不把兩岸政策說清楚，欲以這種不清不楚的手法投入總統大選；她不是想騙「扁李謝辜獨」，就是想騙北京當局，更不啻是在騙全體選民；而在支持蔡英文的選民之中，尤其是獨派，亦不乏支持她先把大選騙過去再說，先把大選騙到手再說。倘係如此，蔡英文的這場選戰即是一個擺明了的大騙局，若不在選舉投票前被拆穿，也必會在她若當選後被拆穿。

蔡英文說，民進黨願傾聽北京的聲音，但北京已經公開說「兩岸一切交流成效皆以九二共識為基礎」。因此，蔡英文應先就其「可長可久」的兩岸政策向選民說清楚，爾今竟裝聾賣傻地兀自向北京喊話，豈不徒顯其色厲內荏？