A "Taiwan Consensus" Absent a DPP Consensus?

A "Taiwan Consensus" Absent a DPP Consensus?
Editorial contributed by a noted Technology Manager
United Daily News (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 10, 2014

Summary: The DPP's "China Affairs Committee" convened this month and resolved to "consolidate a consensus within Taiwan" as its basis for cross-strait dialogue. Alas, the DPP spin on "consensus" does not constitute a consensus within its own party, let alone a consensus among the people at large. The DPP's interpretation of a Taiwan consensus is miles apart from mainstream public opinion.

Full text below:

The DPP's "China Affairs Committee" convened this month and aproved the "2014 China Policy Review Minutes." The proposal to freeze the Taiwan independence party platform did not pass. The committee then resolved to "consolidate a consensus within Taiwan" as its basis for cross-strait dialogue.

The DPP is proficient at word games. Once again it has demonstrated this proficiency in spades. Anyone can see at a glance that this was merely old wine in new bottles. It was the product of a compromise among the DPP's various factions. The content is nothing new. It is essentially the "Taiwan consensus" that Tsai Ing-wen trotted out during the 2012 election campaign. It has merely been poured into a new bottle labeled "Taiwan's internal consensus." DPP elites and pro-Green academics convened for days on end to discuss the DPP's "China policy." But what reaction is possible, other than "Where's the beef?" It truly was a let-down.

Tsai Ing-wen lost her presidential bid in 2012. The main reason was her failure to rid herself of the Taiwan independence albatross around her neck. Her vague and ambiguous "Taiwan consensus" and "Peace with differences" slogans left voters scratching their heads, and made them wonder whether she was selling them a pig in a poke.

The Democratic Progressive Party had been out of power for six years. But who knew factional disputes within would prevent it from arriving at a cross-strait policy consensus? Would the consensus be "one China" or "different constitutional interpretations?" Would the Taiwan independence party platform be frozen or not? No consensus could be achieved. And yet they expect to consolidate a "Taiwan consensus?" This is what is referred to in Chinese as "searching for fish in a tree."

The DPP's "Taiwan consensus" is subject to hundreds of different interpretations. This is the most perverse aspect of the DPP's "Taiwan consensus" or renamed "Taiwan's internal consensus." What is it really? How does anyone know whether a consensus has been reached? Who is qualified to determine whether a consensus has been reached? How much support must it have before it can be referred to as a consensus?

One argument is that a consensus can be determined through opinion polls.

Frank Hsieh has his own take on this. As he told reporters, the DPP's cross-strait policy has a 27% public approval rating. The KMT policy's rating is 35%. The DPP must seek to achieve a 60% approval rating. According to Hsieh, a consensus requires a greater than 60% approval rating. On this, both the ruling and opposition parties have falled short.

Another argument is that a consensus can be discerned by means of a public referendum.

This has been a goal of the DPP for years. The DPP has longed to use a referendum to show "respect for the Taiwanese peoples' right to self-determination." But if the DPP includes "declaring Taiwan independence and founding a new nation" within the referendum, it becomes a double-edged sword. If such a referendum were to succeed, it would prove that the DPP's Taiwan independence advocacy has traction. But if it were to fail, the DPP would not merely lose popular support. It would leave the Taiwan independence movement prostrate for years to come.

A third argument is that a consensus can be achieved by means of political party negotiations.

MAC Chairman Wang Yu-chi will soon visit the Mainland. The ruling and opposition parties in the Legislative Yuan have reached a consensus. When Wang Yu-chi visits the Mainland, they want him to reject or ignore proposals regarding the "one China framework" or "opposition to Taiwan independence." Otherwise he will be held politically accountable. According to this argument, the result of "interparty consultation" within the Legislative Yuan amounts to a consensus. It represents majority opinion. But consider the evils perpetrated by the Legislature in the past. Such "interparty consultation" is merely a minority overriding a majority. It is utterly contrary to the principle of majority rule within a democracy. How can it possibly represent mainstream public opinion?

A fourth argument is that a DPP victory would in itself amount to a popular consensus.

If by some fluke the DPP emerges victorious in local and central elections, it will argue that its victory was the result of a majority of people agreeing with their political ideas and cross-strait policy. Therefore their proposal naturally represents a Taiwan consensus. But consider the paradox. The KMT clung to the 1992 consensus, and emerged victorious during the previous election. Yet the DPP refuses to accept the 1992 consensus. It refuses to concede that the KMT's proposals represent mainstream public opinion, and constitute a Taiwan consensus.

Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric was baffling. During the 2012 election, she argued that "Taiwan is the ROC, and the ROC is Taiwan." She argued that this premise would provide Taiwan with the greatest degree of internal cohesion. It would amount to a Taiwan consensus. It would clearly distinguish the DPP from the Kuomintang. But this makes no sense whatsoever. The KMT also argues that "Taiwan is the ROC, and the ROC is Taiwan." Therefore how does this provide market segmentation? Was Tsai once again merely playing with words? Is this really what she thinks the national consensus is? If she does, why do the DPP and the Deep Greens disagree? Why are they unwilling to accept even the ROC Constitution, the ROC National Flag, and the ROC National Anthem?

In other words , the DPP spin on "consensus," does not constitute a consensus within its own party, let alone a consensus among the people at large. The DPP's interpretation of a Taiwan consensus is miles apart from mainstream public opinion.

名家專論－黨內都沒共識 哪來「台灣共識」
稍後再讀
中國時報 洛杉基 2014年01月13日 04:10

民進黨本月召開中國事務委會並通過《2014對中政策檢討紀要》，「凍結台獨黨綱」提議未過關，將以「積極凝聚台灣內部的共識」作為兩岸對話基礎。

善於玩弄文字遊戲的民進黨，這次再度發揮到極致。明眼人一看就知，這根本是新瓶裝舊酒，是各派系妥協下的產物。內容本質其實就是蔡英文在2012大選年所提出的「台灣共識」，這次換了個新瓶子叫「台灣內部共識」，實在是了無新意。民進黨的菁英與挺綠學者齊聚一堂，討論了好幾天的「對中政策」，竟然端不出一盤新鮮的牛肉，實在讓人失望！

蔡英文女士在2012年敗選，主要的原因，就是拋不開「台獨」這個沉重包袱。外加她提出的「台灣共識」、「和而不同」等模稜兩可的空泛口號，讓選民聽不懂她葫蘆裡到底賣的是什麼藥。

沒想到，在野6年的民進黨，由於內部派系意見分歧，依然無法凝聚黨內兩岸政策的「共識」，到底是憲法一中還是憲政各表，是凍結台獨黨綱還是無需多此一舉等等，莫衷一是，他們卻期待台灣內部能夠凝聚「台灣共識」，可謂是緣木求魚。

如果認真分析民進黨所謂的「台灣共識」意涵，我們會發現，這句話能有上百種的不同解讀。這就是「台灣共識」或「台灣內部共識」最弔詭的地方。到底什麼是共識？如何知道已經達成共識？誰有資格決定共識已形成？得到多少支持度，才叫做共識？

第一種說法：共識靠民調。

對此謝長廷有他的看法。他向媒體表示，民進黨兩岸政策民意滿意度為2成7，國民黨則有3成5。民進黨應尋求6成以上共識。依照他的解釋，所謂的「共識」，必須得到6成以上的民調支持。這點朝野兩黨都不及格。

第二種說法：共識靠公投。

這是民進黨多年來追求的目標，用公投來彰顯「尊重台灣人民自決的主張」。但是如果把「獨立建國」列入公投，可是一把兩面刃；成功了固然讓民進黨的台獨主張有了著力點，但是如果不幸失敗，不但讓民進黨失去民心，還讓台獨主張多年無法翻身。

第三種說法：共識靠政黨協商。

陸委會主委王郁琦近期將登陸，立院朝野達成「共識」，要求王郁琦赴陸訪問期間，不得接受或呼應「一中框架」、「反台獨」等主張，否則自負政治責任。也就是說，立法院的「朝野協商」結果就是「共識」，就可以代表多數民意。不過從過去立法院的斑斑劣跡來看，這個「朝野協商」根本就是個少數凌駕多數、完全違背民主多數決的畸形產物，哪能代表真正主流民意？

第四種說法：民進黨勝選就足以代表人民共識。

如果民進黨僥倖能在地方及中央選舉勝選，他們自然會振振有詞地說，他們勝選正由於多數民眾認同他們的政治主張與兩岸政策。他們的主張自然就是台灣人民的「共識」。不過弔詭的是，即令堅持「九二共識」的國民黨在大選獲勝，依然無法讓民進黨接受「九二共識」，依然無法讓民進黨認為國民黨代表了主流民意、代表了台灣共識。

蔡英文說得很玄。她說：2012年大選時，她提出「台灣是中華民國，中華民國是台灣」；若能以此為基礎，凝聚台灣內部最大共識，就是台灣共識，可和國民黨明確區隔。這點我們又更看不懂了，難道「台灣是中華民國，中華民國是台灣」不也正是國民黨的主張，如何做市場區隔？還是又在玩弄文字遊戲？如果這就是她認為的全民共識，為何民進黨及深綠的民眾無法認同？為何他們連中華民國憲法、國旗國歌都不願意承認？

換句話說，民進黨對共識的解釋，不但黨內無法形成共識，也無法與全民形成共識。而民進黨內部對台灣共識的解讀，與真正的主流民意，兩者相距十萬八千里。（作者為科技業經理人）