Tsai Ing-wen: Outside Official Channels and Inside the Black Box

Tsai Ing-wen: Outside Official Channels and Inside the Black Box
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 21, 2014

Summary: The Thinking Taiwan Foundation sneaked into the Mainland under the radar. Its actions were exposed. Meanwhile, Su Tseng-chang was visiting Europe, to promote his "China Policy." Beijing referred to it as the "same old Taiwan independence." But this was no joke. It is a tragedy for Taiwan, one that could well become a disaster.

Full text below:

The "Thinking Taiwan Foundation" has arrived on the Mainland for a visit. Frank Hsieh is clinging to his "constitutional consensus." Su Tseng-chang is in Europe, ostensibly to promote his "[Mainland] China Policy."

This reveals the three way power struggle inside the DPP, among Su, Tsai, and Hsieh. One. The three are vying for the party chairmanship and the 2016 presidential nomination. Two. The three seek to be the standard bearer for DPP cross-strait policy, because this will improve their prospects for the aforementioned two positions of power. Three. The three seek to be the one who reestablishes relations with Beijing. Beijing has the power to decide which of the three will be the DPP's standard-bearer for cross-strait policy. Beiing has the power to decide which of the three will reform the DPP. Therefore Beijing has the power to influence the two elections. DPP cross-strait policy reform is linked to the party chairmanship and presidential nomination. It is also linked to the restoration of relations with Beijing. It has already precipitated a DPP power struggle and a crisis over the DPP's policy path, and may precipitate a crisis for Taiwan.

Any DPP cross-strait policy reform must receive Beijing's understanding and acceptance. If Beijing casually notes that the DPP is engaged in the "same old Taiwan independence" or "Taiwan independence under a new label," it will "game over" for the DPP. If Beijing refuses to give the DPP's cross-strait policy the nod, Washington will conclude that the DPP is still a " troublemaker." This will undermine the DPP's party chairmanship election and its presidential primaries. This is why when the "China Policy Minutes" ran into a brick wall, Su Tseng-chang quickly added that the "Taiwan independence party platform was part of history, but is now past tense." He also invoked the term "China plus one." This of course was a nod to Beijing. It was a show of peace, a show of goodwill, and a show of weakness. Tsai Ing-wen however, turned out to be a shrewd chess hand. She used her "Thinking Taiwan Foundation" as cover. Foundation head Lin Chuan led a delegation on a five day, four night tour of the Mainland. This revealed that channels of communication between Tsai and Beijing were a fait accompli. The two parties already had a hotline and had exchanged emissaries. That went without saying. Tsai Ing-wen and Beijing were already in communications. This fact could impact Frank Hsieh. Since Tsai already has a direct line to Beijing, therefore she has no need of Hsieh as a go between.

The evolving situation has two implications for cross-strait exchanges. . The first is that they involve exchanges outside official channels. The second is that they involve black box operations. First, consider what takes place outside official channels. The power struggle among Su, Tsai, and Hsieh has made it impossible for the DPP to reform its cross-strait policy inside official channels.

Tsai and Hsieh joined forces at the Huashan Conference. They downgraded the "summary report " to the status of "conference minutes." They changed the "constitutional consensus" to "aggressive consolidation of an internal Taiwan consensus." In other words, they conceded that the DPP had no consensus. One thing is forbidden. These cross-strait policies may not become official policy. Only when official channels fail, are Tsai and Hsieh permitted to become standard bearers for cross-strait policy "outside official channels." During the Huashan Conference Tsai Ing-wen downgraded the "summary report" to the status of "conference minutes." Meanwhile, Lin Chuan was packing his bags to visit Beijing, bring them gifts, and wish them well.

The DPP uses non-official channels to divide official DPP policy. It uses the result, a divided Democratic Progressive Party, to deal with Beijing. Su, Tsai, and Hsieh have each submitted their own cross-strait policies to Beijing for approval. It is akin to an auction, and may create a worrisome "buyer's market" for Beijing.

Now let us return to "black box operations." In October 2012, Frank Hsieh's "exploratory visit" to the Mainland was nominally transparent. Lin Chuan's visit to the Mainland however, was "under the radar." News of it was leaked, probably by Beijing. Otherwise, it might rightly have been characterized as a "secret mission" kept hidden from the public. Two legislators accompanied the delegation and reported to the party. Yet DPP leaders insist they "only learned of it from news reports on the Internet." In other words, the visit was a "black box operation."

Why was the visit hidden? Should it have been hidden? What was being hidden? Tsai Ing-wen's black box operations, conducted outside official channels, have seriously undermined public trust. Annette Lu has already come forward and said, "It should have been transparent. It should have been announced before hand." DPP cross-strait policy has become an election ploy that DPP presidential candidates use to cope with Beijing. Under the circumstances, how can they win the public trust?

This is an extremely dangerous situation. It could lead to the DPP's collapse. It could mire Taiwan in black box operations. Tsai Ing-wen said the trip was merely an "exchange of views on fiscal policy" without political implications. Is such a disclaimer even the least bit credible? The circumstances surrounding the trip were highly political. They proved that Tsai Ing-wen and Beijing have already established a black box operations outside of official channels. Now back up. Suppose the trip was as Tsai Ing-wen insisted, merely about "fiscal matters?" Lest we forget, Tsai Ing-wen originally demanded "globalization that circumvents [Mainland] China." She advocated "connecting with the world before connecting with [Mainland] China." Has she changed her position on this and other economic strategies? How does she view the trade in services agreement, which is currently on life support?

Su, Tsai, and Hsieh should work within official DPP channels. They should work together and call for cross-strait policy reform. They should present a united front to Beijing. In particular, they must not condone individual members engaging in "black box deals" with Beijing "outside of official channels," while depicting themselves as the DPP's cross-strait policy standard bearers.

The Thinking Taiwan Foundation sneaked into the Mainland under the radar. Its actions were exposed. Meanwhile, Su Tseng-chang was visiting Europe, to promote his "China Policy." Beijing referred to it as the "same old Taiwan independence." But this was no joke. It is a tragedy for Taiwan, one that could well become a disaster.

小英登陸的體制外與黑箱內
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.21 02:34 am

小英基金會登陸訪問，謝長廷抱著他的「憲法共識」，蘇貞昌赴歐據稱是為宣傳「對中政策」。

此情此景，暴露了民進黨內蘇蔡謝三人的分裂與爭奪：一、三人爭奪五月黨主席與二○一六總統候選人；二、三人爭奪兩岸政策的掌旗者地位，因為此一地位與上開兩項選舉有關；三、三人爭奪與北京重建關係，因為北京可以決定誰能在民進黨內擔任兩岸政策的轉型旗手，並進而影響那兩項選舉。這些跡象顯示，民進黨兩岸政策的變革已與黨主席及總統候選人選舉掛鉤，又與重建與北京的關係掛鉤。勢若趨此，可謂已然引爆民進黨內權力及路線交纏鬥爭的危機，亦可能引爆台灣的危機。

民進黨兩岸政策的轉型，必須得到北京的理解與認可；因為，北京只要隨口一句「台獨老鞋」或「換了路牌的台獨」，民進黨的戲就唱不下去了。而北京若不點頭，美國就會覺得民進黨是「麻煩製造者」，也就會影響到民進黨兩項選舉的選情。因此，蘇貞昌在《對中政策紀要》碰壁後，補上一句「《台獨黨綱》在歷史進程已成過去式」及「中國加一」，當然是向北京示和、示好、示弱。沒想到，蔡英文棋高一著，居然以小英基金會的正式名義，由林全率團登陸訪問了五天四夜；此行顯示，蔡與北京的管道已經布建完成，雙方已有熱線密使的往來，皆不待言。而蔡英文與北京搭上線，即可能影響了謝長廷的角色；因為，蔡既已有直達車，即未必要再借用謝為白手套。

此一情勢的發展有兩大特徵。一是體制外，二是黑箱內。先談「體制外」，亦即由於蘇蔡謝三人的權力鬥爭，使得民進黨無法在黨的「體制內」完成兩岸政策的轉型；蔡謝二人合力將華山會議的「總結報告」降格為「紀要」，又將「憲法共識」改為「積極凝聚台灣內部的共識」（亦即「沒有共識」），就是不容在「體制內」作成兩岸決策之用意。而唯有當「體制內」不能做出決策時，蔡謝才有可能從「體制外」成為兩岸政策轉型的旗手。當蔡英文將華山的「總結報告」降格為「紀要」之時，正是林全一行盤點進京拜會禮品，準備打包上路之時。

這個情勢，是以「體制外」的民進黨，去分裂「體制內」的民進黨，再進而以分裂的民進黨去應對團結的北京。至此，蘇蔡謝三方，分別提出其兩岸政策，呈交北京評點，這儼然是一競價競標的局面，可能成就北京的買方市場，令人心憂。

再言「黑箱內」。二○一二年十月，謝長廷登陸的「開展之旅」，尚稱公開透明。但林全一行卻是「潛赴」大陸，若非消息走漏（可能是由北京方面漏出？），此團即可能成為一個偷偷摸摸的「密使團」。且非但對公眾不公開，甚至除二名隨行立委曾向黨報備外，黨中央似亦是「看網路新聞才知道」。此即「黑箱化」。

然而，此事為什麼隱瞞？應不應隱瞞？還隱瞞了什麼？蔡英文將此行操作成「體制外／黑箱內」，對其社會信任恐成重傷；呂秀蓮就已出面表示，「應當透明，最好出門前對外宣布」。因為，倘若民進黨的兩岸政策成了總統候選人與北京套招的選舉手法，如何能贏得國人的信任？

這是一個十分危疑凶險的情勢。非但可能造成民進黨體制瓦解的危機，亦且可能造成台灣陷於黑箱內的危機。蔡英文方面稱，此行只是「財經議題交流」，不涉政治議題；這種說詞，孰其能信？因為，此行的整個態勢本即是高度的政治動作，證實了蔡英文與北京已達成「體制外／黑箱內」的交涉管道。退一步言，即使是「財經議題」，蔡英文亦當說明，此行之後，她對她原本所持「繞開中國的全球化」「由世界走向中國」等經濟戰略有否調整？她又對躺在加護病房的《服貿協議》作何看法？

我們認為，蘇蔡謝三人仍應努力在民進黨的體制內，攜手提出一個兩岸政策轉型方案，在團結一致下共同因應北京；尤不可縱容姑息個別黨員，以「體制外／黑箱內」的手法與北京交易，而將自己塑造為民進黨兩岸政策的掌旗人。

正當小英基金會潛赴大陸的消息被揭爆之時，蘇貞昌居然赴歐據稱要宣揚他被北京指為「台獨老鞋」的「對中政策」。這不是笑話，而是悲劇，更可能是台灣的災禍。