The DPP Cannot Cross the Chasm with Two Small Jumps

The DPP Cannot Cross the Chasm with Two Small Jumps
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 24, 2014

Summary: "Don't be afraid to take a big step if one is indicated. You can't cross a chasm in two small jumps." If the DPP refuses to reaffirm the "one China Constitution," it will not matter what rhetoric it spouts. In Beijing's eyes it will remain the same old Taiwan independence path with different street signs. The DPP must take a big step. It must affirm the "one China constitution." It cannot cross the chasm with two small jumps.

Full text below:

"Don't be afraid to take a big step if one is indicated. You can't cross a chasm in two small jumps."

Several DPP Taoyuan County elected officials recently held a press conference. They said "Su Tseng-chang is a man with no sense of direction and no point of view." They begged Su Tseng-chang not to run for a second term as party chairman. Their focus was the DPP nomination process. But they directed their attention at Su Tseng-chang's leadership style. Their first observation sums up Su Tseng-chang's cross-strait policy.

"Don't be afraid to take a big step if one is indicated. You can't cross a chasm in two small jumps." So said former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, in his now famous quote. Su Tseng-chang's cross-strait policy howeer, is just that. It is a futile effort to cross a chasm in two small jumps. Actually Su has no policy, only ploys. One. He wants to take two small jumps chronologically. He wants to avoid cross-strait issues during the run up to the Seven in One Elections. He wants to wait until 2016 before tackling them. Two. He wants to take two small jumps thematically. He wants to use the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" to stall for time. He wants to hold the " constitutional consensus," "freezing the Taiwan independence party platform," and the "Resolution on the Republic of China" in reserve.

But Su Tseng-chang's attempts to stall for time will not work. The more he evades, the more he shines a spotlight on the DPP's unresolved cross-strait policy. Take timing. This is what happened with the recent "cross-strait policy debate" proposal. This is what happened with the "three in one debate" proposal floated during the party chairmanship election. Take themes. Beijing openly criticized the "China Policy Review Minutes" as a "one country on each side Taiwan independence stance." It added that "Taiwan independence is a dead end. No matter what street signs one posts along the road, a dead end remains a dead end."

Clearly Su Tseng-chang's "two small jumps strategy" is "no sale," either inside the party, or with Beijing. During an interview with Radio Taiwan International,  Su tried to hide his embarrassment by presenting three views. Ironically, they provoked even more controversy. One. He said "The Taiwan independence party platform is history. It is past tense." This implied he was has not "turned back the clock, and is not promoting Taiwan independence." But if so, why was such language not found in the "China Policy Review Minutes?" Two. His "seagulls on a beach" metaphor for cross-strait relations equated humans with seagulls. It implied "one country on each side, you go your way, I go mine" thinking. Seaguls can avoid humans by flying away. Can Taiwan increase the 130 kilometer wide Taiwan Strait by hundreds of kilometers? Three. He said, "China plus one" would be even more potent [than one China]. It implied good will toward Beijing. But "China plus one" left people with the impression that Taiwan would be nothing more than an accessory to Mainland China.

Su Tseng-chang's three views made his "two small jumps strategy" even less convincing. His waffling mollified neither camp within the party. His abortive goodwill gesture is unlikely to ingratiate him with Beijing.

DPP officials have floated several trial balloons. They include "freezing the Taiwan independence party plaform," a "constitution consensus," and a "Resolution on the the Republic of China." They do not appear in the "China Policy Review Minutes." But they have inadvertently revealed the DPP's bottom line. Public pressure inside Taiwan, and moves by Beijing, will force the DPP to put its cards on the table, sooner or later. The only difference is whether it will show its hand voluntarily, or wait until it has been painted into a corner.

The DPP will be forced to play its "freezing Taiwan independence party platform" card. The next step will naturally be "annulling its Taiwan independence party platform." The DPP will be forced to play its "constitutional consensus" card. The next step will naturally be "different constitutional interpretations" and "a constitutional one China." In fact the DPP knows that without the big step of "annulling the Taiwan independence party platform" and "constitutional one China" cards, the chasm of cross-strait policy is unbridgeable.

Nevertheless Su Tseng-chang and DPP conservatives cling to a "two small jumps strategy." They are only willing to take one small jump. They are only willing to engage in "back door listing" via the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." They refuse to accept the "one China framework." The China Policy Review Minutes excluded terms such as "freezing," "annulling," "constitutional consensus" "constitutional one China," and "Resolution on the Republic of China." But what is the Republic of China, if it is detached from a "constitutional one China?" If the DPP insists on taking this small jump, how can it take a big step across the abyss?

The DPP insists that "one China is the Peoples Republic of China," Therefore it "refuses to be locked into the one China framework." But repudiating the "one China framework" is an admission that one is engaged in "backdoor listing." It is an admission that one is repudiating the Republic of China's "one China Constitution." Of course Beijing is going to denounce that as "one nation on each side." Therefore the DPP may tell itself that "backdoor listing" is a small jump. But in fact it is a small jump straight into the chasm.

The "One China framework" has two aspects. The first is "one China, different interpretations." This means that the ROC and PRC "do not recognize each other's sovereignty." The second aspect is the "big roof concept of China." ROC and PRC sovereignty together equal the "big roof concept of one China."

If the DPP wishes to reaffirm the Republic of China, it cannot repudiate the "one China Constitution." When the DPP genuinely reaffirms the "Republic of China stipulated by the one China Constitution," Taiwan's efforts to promote "one China, different interpretations" will be enhanced. This could be the beginning of a united Taiwan. The next step could be wrangling over the "big roof concept of China."

If the DPP refuses to reaffirm the "one China Constitution," it will not matter what rhetoric it spouts. In Beijing's eyes it will remain the same old Taiwan independence path with different street signs. The DPP must take a big step. It must affirm the "one China constitution." It cannot cross the chasm with two small jumps.

民進黨無法用兩小步跨越深淵
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.24 03:44 am

「不要害怕跨一大步，你無法用兩小步跨越深淵。」

桃園縣的幾名民進黨民意代表日前聯名舉行記者會，宣稱「蘇貞昌是沒有方向感、沒有觀念的人」，並「拜託蘇貞昌不要再連任黨主席」；他們的議論焦點雖在批評民進黨的提名問題，卻亦直指蘇貞昌的領導風格，文首那句話即他們所說，也很適用於評量蘇貞昌的兩岸政策。

「你無法用兩小步跨越深淵」，這是英國前首相勞合‧喬治的名言。蘇貞昌的兩岸政策（其實沒有政策，只有謀略），正是「想用兩小步跨越深淵」。一、時間上的兩小步：七合一選舉前不談兩岸，想等到二○一六再談。二、議題上的兩小步：先用《台灣前途決議文》抵擋一陣子，「憲法共識」、「凍獨」、「中華民國決議文」等皆按下不表。

但是，蘇貞昌愈拖延、愈閃躲，愈凸顯了民進黨的兩岸政策未獲解決。就時間上說，近期再舉行「兩岸政策大辯論」之議有之，在黨主席選舉時舉行「三合一辯論」之議亦有之；就議題上說，北京更直指《對中政策檢討紀要》仍為「一邊一國的台獨立場」，更稱「台獨是一條死胡同，無論掛上什麼路牌，死胡同就是死胡同」。

可見，蘇貞昌的「兩小步戰略」，在黨內及在北京皆計不得售。為化解尷尬，他在中央廣播電台的專訪中表達了三個觀點，卻皆引起更多的議論。一、他說：「《台獨黨綱》在歷史進程中已成過去式」，這是在表示他並未「回過頭去搞台獨」；但是，為什麼此語未能見諸《對中政策檢討紀要》？二、他以「沙灘之鷗」來比喻兩岸關係，但人鷗殊途，這卻有「一邊一國，你走你的，我走我的」之意味；然而，海鷗避人可飛去，但台灣難道能將最狹處一三○公里的海峽再推開幾百公里？三、他說「中國加一」更有力量，此語有向北京示好的意味；但「中國加一」的圖像，會使人覺得台灣成了中國的一個附件或零件。

蘇貞昌的這三個觀點，不免使他的「兩小步戰略」愈描愈黑。他的搖擺，不能同時滿足黨內兩條路線的不同人馬；他的示好，也未必能使北京領情。

其實，民進黨中「凍獨」、「憲法共識」、「中華民國決議文」等主張，雖未能在《對中政策檢討紀要》中出現，但皆已經成為民進黨暴露的底牌；在台灣內部民意的壓力之下，及北京的操作之下，這些底牌早晚都會打出來，只有「自己擇時打出」或「被現實所迫打出」的不同而已。

等到民進黨打出「凍獨」，下一張牌自然就是「廢獨」；等到民進黨打出「憲法共識」，下一張牌當然就是「憲法各表」及「憲法一中」。其實，民進黨何嘗不知道，若沒有「廢獨」及「憲法一中」兩張牌跨出的一大步，無法跨越兩岸政策的深淵。

但是，蘇貞昌及民進黨內保守派的「兩小步戰略」，只跨出以《台灣前途決議文》來「借殼上市」的一小步，並停在「拒絕鎖進『一個中國』的框架」（《對中政策檢討紀要》用語）的半空中；而將「凍獨／廢獨」、「憲法共識／憲法一中」、「中華民國決議文」均「排除在議程之外」。問題是：脫離「憲法一中」的中華民國還算是中華民國嗎？這一步踏空了，又如何跨越深淵？

民進黨堅持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，因此「拒絕鎖進一中框架」；但否定「一中架構」，即形同以「借殼上市」面目出現，而否定了中華民國的「一中憲法」，當然會被北京指為「一邊一國」。所以「借殼上市」這一步，對民進黨而言雖看似跨出了一小步，卻是一腳踩空的一步。

「一中架構」有兩個層次。第一個層次是「一中各表」；亦即「主權互不承認」的中華民國與中華人民共和國；第二個層次則是在「大屋頂中國」下「主權相加」的中華民國與中華人民共和國，亦即「大一中架構」。

若欲回到中華民國，民進黨即不能否定「一中憲法」。等到民進黨真正回到「一中憲法的中華民國」，台灣在「一中各表」的力度必可增強，且始有可能以團結的台灣，進一步與北京就「大屋頂中國」之「大一中架構」的營造進行角力。

民進黨如果不回到「一中憲法」，不管提出甚麼說詞，在北京眼裡都只是換一個路牌的台獨。民進黨必須邁出「一中憲法」的一大步，無法用兩小步跨越深淵。