The President's Brain Trust Cannot Consist of Only of "Friends of Ma."
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 17, 2014
Summary: Who comprises the President's brain trust? That is a serious question. One must consider the nation's framework. Individuals of talent must engage in long-term thinking. If one relies solely on the "Friends of Ma," the risks to the nation are simply too great.
Full text below:
King Pu-tsung was recently called home by the Legislative Yuan Foreign Policy and Defense Policy Committee. He was ordered to report and answer questions. The legislators' questions included questions about the Huang Shi-ming case. They asked King Pu-tsung whether he would consider becoming Secretary General of the National Security Committee or Deputy Premier. They assumed he knew the answers to all sorts of questions. This brought to the fore two anomalies. One. The ROC Representative to the US was ordered to return home and answer questions on utterly irrelevant matters. Legislators clearly exceeded their authority. They interfered with the nation's diplomacy. Two. King Pu-tsung continues to be perceived as President Ma's "closest crony." Everything must go through him. The administration continues to have blind spots and remains unable to make full use of talented individuals.
One month ago rumors flew. US EPA Chief Gina McCarthy would visit Taiwan. It would be the first time a US cabinet member visited Taiwan in over a decade, and would be highly significant. It would also be a feather in King Pu-tsung's cap. But the visit was aborted as soon as it became public knowledge. There is no evidence to suggest that Beijing protested or blocked the visit. The visit can now be recorded in the "Chronicle of Events that Never Happened." Why? Because someone leaked the information prematurely, and Washington was unhappy. When U.S. officials visit Taiwan, this is something the media is likely to uncover. Sudden developments such as this underscore the lack of trust between Washington and Taipei. This is a matter of concern. This is also a sign that our national security strategy is in trouble.
When President Ma took office, he made a special effort to ease cross-strait relations. He reversed Taiwan's "troublemaker" image -- an image created by Chen Shui-bian during his administration. He is proud of these achievements. But in recent years, the regional situation has changed. The Mainland has begun to stress the "Chinese Dream." Cross-strait interactions are now at the deep end of the pool. New tensions have arisen, and a new relationship between Washington and Tokyo has formed. Washington and Tokyo are demanding that Taipei fulfill its regional security obligations. Their demands are getting louder. President Ma clings to his "East China Sea Peace Initiative." If he thinks it constitutes an ace in the hole, he has misjudged the situation. Current Secretary-General Yuan Chien-sheng cites it, just as Su Chi did when Ma first took office. Representative to the United States King Pu-tsung cites it also. President Ma has long been pro-Washington. It has become his only card he knows how to play.
National security should not reflect the president's individual whims alone. Ma no longer has the full support of his brain trust. In advanced nations such responsibilities are assigned to its most experienced strategists. The ROC clearly lacks such talent. Its national security system lacks the brain power. This is also true for cross-strait relations. When Kao Koong-lian stepped down, continuity problems appeared. When veteran cross-strait negotiator Kao Koong-lian resigned, the SEF was left with Lin Chung-sheng. Lin was elderly and inexperienced in cross-strait affairs. The MAC was left with Wang Yu-chi, who was required to meet immediately with Zhang Zhijun from the Mainland side. Wang Yu-chi was a former presidential spokesman. That was his sole qualification. At most he could precisely execute Ma Ying-jeou's cross-strait policies. He could contribute little in the way of original thinking.
In other words, the administration lacked individuals of talent, in everything from national security to cross-strait relations. Their thinking was limited. The best they could do was carry out President Ma's wishes. But decisions such as these are complex and have far-reaching repercussions. Knowing this, how can any of us feel at ease?
President Ma's brain trust is miniscule. It has been mocked as "Yo-Yo Ma," a pun on the famed cellist's name, meaning "Friends of Ma." Ma's personal preferences often determine the shape and manner of his decision-making. He often chases his own tail and cannot come up with anything new. For example, on New Years Day, the president proclaimed that Vice President Vincent Siew would return to head up economic revitalization. It was a surprise, but it was not terribly convincing. When Vincent Siew was Vice President, he was seldom consulted about anything. When Ma ran for a second term, Siew was replaced with Wu Den-yih. Wu Den-yih is running for president in 2016. Time is not on his side. Instead, Vincent Siew has suddenly resurfaced. Is "economic revitalization" his sole mission? Even Sean Chen, lauded as "the best economic cabinet member in two decades," was unceremoniously forced out of office. Who today can fill the role of economic advisor to the President? What kind of person will he or she be? That is a major question. Vincent Siew has made a comeback. He is a respected official. But his return merely underscores the Ma government's lack of talent.
According to Wikipedia, a United States Presidential Advisor's role is clear, and his or her resources are abundant. The advisor's role may be either administraive or merely advisory. A senior advisor my have others under his or her command. There are many kinds of advisors. They may grow into an army. The ROC Constitution provides for senior policy advisors and national policy advisors. But does the president seek out their opinions? Or are they merely decoration? Were they merely being paid off?
President Ma has been in office nearly six years. His performance has been poor. Is he hoping to turn things around? If he looks around, all he sess are King Pu-tsung, Vincent Siew, and a handful of others. If this is not a crisis, what is a crisis? If his policies are wrong, and his first rank officials are blasted, can second rank officials remedy the situation, or provide it with warnings? The president cannot stand on the front lines and fight every battle by himself. Besides, if national security depends entirely on a president's personal whims, that is hazardous to the nation.
Who comprises the President's brain trust? That is a serious question. One must consider the nation's framework. Individuals of talent must engage in long-term thinking. If one relies solely on the "Friends of Ma," the risks to the nation are simply too great.
總統智囊團不能只有「馬友友」
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.17 02:35 am
金溥聰最近被立院外交國防委員會「召回」,進行業務報告及備詢。立委的質詢,從黃世銘案到他金溥聰是否將接任國安會秘書長或副閣揆等要職無所不包,彷彿任何重要議題均可從他身上找到答案。這反映了兩個不正常現象:第一,駐美代表若動輒被要求返國備詢,議題卻又風馬牛不相及,這是立委撈過界,外交工作也受干擾。第二,這凸顯金溥聰至今仍未脫離馬總統「第一親信」的形象,任何職務皆非他不可的態勢,反映了當局用人的貧乏與盲點。
月前政壇盛傳美國環保署長吉娜麥卡錫將來台訪問,如果成行,將是十數年來首位美國閣員訪台,意義重大,也將是金溥聰任內重要政績。但此事「見光死」,雖未聞中共抗議阻撓,只能計入「未發生事件簿」,歸因於我方事前曝光引起美方不滿。但美國政要來訪之事,本來就有高機率遭媒體探知;臨時生變顯示美台關係信任基礎薄弱,是值得警惕之處,也是國安戰略生鏽的警訊。
馬總統上任後,格外致力於緩和兩岸關係,也扭轉了陳水扁任內造成台灣是「麻煩製造者」的形象,是他頗引為自得的成就。但近年區域情勢丕變,大陸進入張揚「中國夢」的時代,兩岸互動漸入深水區;而美日中出現新的緊張關係和新的合縱連橫態勢,美日要求台灣善盡區域間安全義務,呼聲日緊。馬總統此時若仍以乏人附議的「東海和平倡議」為王牌,顯然錯估情勢。而現任國安會秘書長袁健生和馬初上任時啟用的蘇起一樣,乃至金溥聰的駐美,反映的都是馬總統一向的親美路線,卻也變成唯一的路線。
國家安全其實最不應該是「以總統個人意志為意志」的一個領域,近年來卻見不到瞻矚更全面的幕僚群作為支撐。這在先進國家屬於「最高戰略大腦」的角色,台灣卻顯得人才單薄。和國安體系同樣「大腦」薄弱的,還包括兩岸領域,在高孔廉去職後,出現了老幹新枝銜接不上的問題。兩岸談判身經百戰的高孔廉去職後,海基會僅留下年紀不輕、但兩岸事務資歷甚淺的林中森;陸委會則馬上要由王郁琦會見對岸張志軍,而王郁琦先前只有總統府發言人等淺薄資歷,充其量只是「精準執行」馬英九的兩岸思維,談不上「大腦」功能。
換言之,從國安到兩岸,有人才斷層的問題,有思維局限的限制,只剩馬總統一人以意志貫徹;這在如此影響重大而內容龐雜的決策範疇,豈能讓人安心?
馬總統因用人圈狹小,被譏受包圍於「馬友友」。而他的個人好惡,往往決定了決策圈的形態與模式,似乎已到了不斷自我循環而難以產生新意的狀態。例如,近日總統元旦文告宣布前副總統蕭萬長「復出」統領拚經濟的重任,讓人意外。並非老驥伏櫪不堪重用,而是蕭萬長在副總統任內少有用武之地,在馬競選連任時旋遭吳敦義取代;如今吳敦義在競逐二○一六大位之路已被預言時不我予,反而再由蕭萬長出山重膺要職。若純粹論「拚經濟」的任務,連曾被稱為「二十年來最佳財經內閣」的陳?都已被「後浪推前浪」而去,則如今擔當總統財經顧問角色的到底還有何等樣人,令人疑惑。蕭萬長之復出,展現國之重臣的分量,卻更反襯馬政府人才不繼的窘況。
一般民眾上維基百科查一下「美國總統顧問」(United States Presidential Advisors),不但功能性分類清晰,編制龐大,且具有行政職的、諮詢頭銜的、資深幕僚之下再統領次級幕僚群的……,分門別類,堪稱「軍容壯大」。中華民國在憲政設計上,亦有資政、國策顧問等濟濟之士;但總統究竟何時徵詢過他們的高見?或只是把他們擺在那裡裝飾、酬庸之用?
馬總統執政快六年了,如果政績欠佳,想要振衰起敝,左顧右盼卻只有金溥聰、蕭萬長等區區幾人可供調度,這不是危機,什麼才是危機?如果政策出錯,以致第一線的決策官員受到批評時,有沒有第二軌的資深顧問可以發揮匡正或諫言功能?總不能凡事由總統親上火線,更別說國安議題全由總統發揮個人意志,潛藏多少國家危險。
「誰是總統智囊」是個嚴肅的話題,必須從國家的制度面、人才面作長遠思考擘畫。若只靠一群「馬友友」治國,那就太危險了!
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