Let Su Tseng-chang Suffer the Consequences
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 28, 2014
Summary: The future of cross-strait relations affects the welfare of the people. Do not force the people live in fear. Do not make cross-strait relations grind to a halt. Do not encourage the DPP to remain mired in quicksand. Frank Hsieh said, "Let Su Tseng-chang suffer the consequences." We may have no other choice.
Full text below:
It is now 2014. The atmosphere of the Seven in One Elections is gradually enveloping Taiwan. Election season has arrived. We initially assumed that cross-strait relations would develop along a preordained track. The Ma administration's priorities must be security, stability, and election victory. At the very least, it must not give its opponents any pretext to attack it. If it loses power it will not matter how grand its ambitions were. All it will be able to do is rage at its fate. The big picture however, is not what most people imagine it to be.
Consider cross-strait relations. Exchanges have continued all year. Cross-strait representative offices have been established. The trade in services and trade in goods agreements have been signed. These are bright spots. Mainland Affairs Council Chief Wang Yu-chi and Zhang Zhijun, Director of Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office, met following the Spring Festival. They attempted to pave the way for a Ma Xi Meeting at APEC. But that may be difficult to arrange. Authorities on both sides may want it. But election pressures may limit what they can do. There might not be any major breakthrough.
Meanwhile, observers have watched the DPP undergo policy transformation and power change. Frank Hsieh visited the Mainland and advocated a "constitutional consensus." The impact is still being felt. DPP legislative whip Ker Chien-ming advocated freezing the Taiwan independence party platform. His proposal has faded into obscurity. But it too made waves. On January 15, key members of the Thinking Taiwan Foundation visited the mainland for a "professional exchange" on economics. Such activities provoke curiosity about Beijing's rapid response capabilities. We hope to make an accurate assessment. But we doubt this was a "DPP to CCP exchange." The DPP has not forsaken its separatist stance, At most this was an exchange between CCP agencies or research institutions and DPP individuals or foundations. We need not read too much into it.
The CCP has long been adept at "United Front" tactics. It has long been adept at noting and exploiting its enemy's internal squabbles, at uniting with the left, at appealing to the center, in order to attack the right. It has long been skilled at distinguishing between its primary enemies and its secondary enemies, and between its leaders and followers. It has long been skilled at distinguishing between those who can be won over, and those who must be fought. They use tomorrow's enemies to fight today's enemies. They have waged both wars of words and wars with weapons. A war of words values reason. It requires propaganda. A war with weapons values power. It requires strength. The KMT is no match for the CCP. The DPP has learned many of the tricks that the CCP used against the KMT. These include using the countryside to lay seige to the cities. The DPP is adept at using propaganda and organizing mass movements. Many DPP politicians have even stood on the podium with the CCP and sung the "Internationale." But is the DPP a match for the CCP? That is highly debatable.
Consider the downside. Some have concluded that the Mainland authorities are attempting to divide and conquer the DPP, to win them over and change them, to exploit factional rivalries within the DPP, the standoff between the "two suns," and differences between many of its elders. Some have concluded that the Mainland authorities are attempting to use quantitative change to effect qualitative change, starting small but growing large, to force the DPP to abandon its secessionist ideology. Others have concluded that Beijing feels it already has a handle on the strategic picture, that it stands on right side of history, and that time is on its side. They have concluded that Beijing feels it commands nationalist sentiment, that its strategy reflects current global realities, and that its current conduct reflects its contempt for its enemies. Strategically, it adheres to its principles. Tactically, it does not underestimate its enemies. Methodologically, it retains its flexibility.
CCP strategic principles or struggle methods are worth noting. But Taiwan's own positions and practices are more important. We feel compelled to make some veiled criticisms of President Ma's "no reunification, no Taiwan independence, no use of force" stance. We have no objections to "no Taiwan independence" and "no use of force." But our nation is the Republic of China. It goes without saying that we insist on national unity and national revival. The difference between us and the CCP is the manner by which, and conditions under which national reunification and national revival are achieved. We understand the DPP's views regarding "Taiwan consciousness." But it must not become a fig leaf for separatism. It must not become a basis for Taiwan independence. A future in which Taiwan is not part of China, incarcerates us within the limits of Taiwan for temporary safety. This "hiding out in a remote corner" mindset is unworthy of us. The Republic of China deserves better. Our sons and grandsons deserve better. This mindset deprives them of the opportunity to be part of China's future.
Therefore the DPP must undergo reform, the sooner the better. It must adopt new principles. It must undergo fundamental change. Su Tseng-chang visited the UK SOAS on the 24th, and declared that the DPP would not amend its Taiwan independence party platform. We strongly condemn his statement. We endorse former Premier Frank Hsieh's view. Hsieh said "The DPP is large. It cannot be governed by a single individual. Su Tseng-chang's leadership of the DPP falls far short of public expectations." We agree with those DPP elected representatives who said, "Su Tseng-chang has no sense of direction and no point of view."
The future of cross-strait relations affects the welfare of the people. Do not force the people live in fear. Do not make cross-strait relations grind to a halt. Do not encourage the DPP to remain mired in quicksand. Frank Hsieh said, "Let Su Tseng-chang suffer the consequences." We may have no other choice.
社論-就讓蘇貞昌痛苦到底吧
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月28日 04:09
2014年才開始,台灣已經逐漸籠罩在年底七合一選舉氛圍中,既然政治旺季即將到來,本來大家以為兩岸關係只會在既定的軌道上發展,因為馬政府須以安全、穩健、勝選為重,或至少不要給對手抓到把柄,做為攻擊的口實,丟了政權就是再有天大的抱負也只能徒呼負負。不過,大勢似乎與一般想像不同。
今年在兩岸關係方面,除了持續的交流活動、設立兩岸兩會辦事機構及服貿、貨貿協議之外,再加上可能的亮點,如陸委會主委王郁琦與國台辦主任張志軍春節過後的會晤,以及還在努力創造條件,但難度甚高的APEC馬習會之外,選舉壓力下,兩岸當局即使主觀上都有意願,但客觀上能做的已然有限,應該不致再有太大突破。
於此同時,外界卻看到民進黨嘗試調整及其權變的一面,謝長廷登陸的效應及其主張的「憲法共識」仍在發酵。民進黨立院黨鞭柯建銘的凍獨主張最後無疾而終,但也攪動一池春水。1月15日,小英基金會重要成員相偕前往大陸進行經濟方面的「專業交流」。這類活動,我們雖對中共的某些明快反應感到好奇,期望能夠正確解讀其中意涵,但並不認為這種互動就是所謂的「民、共交流」,在民進黨沒有放棄台獨分離主義立場之前,充其量而言,這只是中國共產黨的某些單位、個別的機構或研究單位與民進黨個別人士或基金會的交流活動罷了,實不必有過度的解讀。
共產黨一向擅長所謂統一戰線,善於分析矛盾、利用矛盾,習於聯左、拉中、打右,不但能夠區別主要敵人與次要敵人,甚至還會區分主從,查明哪些是可以爭取、哪些是必須打擊的對象,利用明天的敵人打擊今天的敵人。在過去,不管是文鬥或武鬥,文鬥講道理、要宣傳,武鬥憑本事、講實力,國民黨都不是共產黨對手;民進黨雖然學了許多共產黨當年對付國民政府的鬥爭技巧,如以鄉村包圍城市、擅長宣傳及群眾運動,而且許多檯面上政治人物甚至能夠高唱共產國際歌,但民進黨是否真是共產黨對手,恐怕還有不少討論的空間。
若從負面出發,有些人或會認定大陸當前是以分化、利用、爭取、轉化的方式來對付民進黨,嘗試利用並且擴大民進黨內不同派系、兩個太陽,不同大老之間的矛盾,希望由量變的方式逐漸讓民進黨走向質變,由小變轉為大變,迫使或至少是誘使民進黨放棄其分離主義的意識形態、主張、活動和立場,但更持平的看法是,北京可能自認為,它已掌握了戰略的制高點,自己不但站在歷史正確的一邊,時間也站在北京的一方,它不但掌握了民族主義的情緒,也反映了當前世界的現實格局,它目前所展現的不過是在戰略上輕視敵人,把握原則的堅定性之外的一種戰術上重視敵人和策略上的靈活性罷了。
其實,從我們的立場來看,中共的戰略原則或鬥爭策略當然值得關注,但更重要的是台灣自己應有的立場與作法。坦白的說,我們對於馬總統不統、不獨、不武的立場是有微詞的,不獨、不武,勢所當然,但是站在中華民國的立場,我們當然仍然要堅持追求國家統一、民族復興的立場,我們和中共的差別在於究竟是要以何種方式、在什麼條件下實現國家的統一。我們可以理解民進黨有關台灣主體意識的說法,但如果將其變為分離主義的遮羞布,做為台獨的張本則期期以為不可。這種自外於中國的未來,把自己侷限在台灣茍且偷安、偏安江左的心態,不但對中華民國不公,也對後代的子孫不公,剝奪了他們經略中原的大好機會。
準此,我們認為民進黨非改不可,越早改越好,而且是要原則性、更本上的改,我們必須對蘇貞昌24日在英國倫敦大學亞非學院有關民進黨不修台獨黨綱的談話提出嚴正批判,並同意前行政院長謝長廷的觀點「民進黨之大,非一人之所能治,蘇貞昌所領導下的民進黨的表現與人民的期待有很大落差」,更同意其他民進黨民意代表有關「蘇貞昌是個沒有方向感、沒有觀念的人」的說法。
兩岸關係的未來發展方向事涉全民福祉,與其讓全民惶恐不安,與其讓兩岸關係陷於困境,與其讓民進黨陷入進退兩難的處境,謝長廷所謂「讓蘇貞昌痛苦到底」的講法或許是一個不得不然的選擇。
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