Two DPP Suns with a Difference

Two DPP Suns with a Difference
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 21, 2014

Summary: The Mainland economy is about to undergo transformation. The internationalization and liberalization of the renminbi is the key to successful transformation. Taiwan is promoting the liberalization of the NTD and financial liberalization. The results have been mixed. Lin Chuan and Hu Sheng-cheng are educated and have a wealth of practical experience. Beijing is very interested in meeting them. Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen and the delegates held a press conference. The newness of official DPP contacts with the Mainland was palpable. Those in attendance could not disguise the excitement in their faces. This sun is rising. The Kuomintang should beware.

Full text below:

On the 9th of this month the DPP China Affairs Committee issued its "2014 China Policy Review Minutes." Criticism was widespread. Critics felt the DPP failed to honestly confront the final obstacle standing in the way of a DPP return to power. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office criticized it as well. It said "it takes the same old Taiwan independence path," and "a dead end is still a dead end." During the conference Tsai Ing-wen repeatedly asked "Then what?" Afterwards, she quietly dispatched a group of aides on a secret visit to Beijing. Su Tseng-chang embarked on a European trip, and said he would deliver a DPP China Policy speech while in the United Kingdom. The two began a wrestling match over the party chairmanship election. They laid the groundwork for the 2016 presidential nomination. As the two camps' visits show, Tsai and Su are fighting over the final obstacle standing in the way of a DPP return to power. Each has made a different choice. Who made the right choice is obvious.

Su announced the "Review Minutes," then went on a radio talk show. He presented his "seagulls on the beach" and "China plus one" arguments. His so-called "seagulls on the beach" argument compares cross-strait relations to seagulls on the beach. Each goes his own way. Each is independent of the other. At most, they appreciate each other. His "China plus one" argument borrows from the "ASEAN plus 3" international convention. His cross-strait relations metaphors show that in his heart of hearts, Su thinks in terms of "one nation on each side." Given such attitudes, exchanges with the Mainland are impossible.

Frank Hsieh thinks Su Tseng-chang's "seagulls on a beach" argument is inappropriate. Does the Mainland want to "capture" Taiwan? Does the DPP want to communicate with the Mainland? Either way, contact cannot be avoided. Since it is impossible to avoid contacts, how can one argue that each will go his own way? Hsieh said he was puzzled by the "China plus one" argument. Instead of talking about "China plus one," why not talk about "Taiwan plus one?" Tsai Ing-wen expressed no objection to Su's argument. She said Su merely meant that "If Taiwan and China can respect each other, they can live in peace."

The Taiwan independence coloration in Su Tseng-chang's speech was unmistakable. Tsai Ing-wen was more ambiguous. On the one hand, she did not want to offend Taiwan independence fundamentalists. On the other hand, she wanted to remain pragmatic and flexible. Her statements regarding China policy are more of the same. She says cross-strait relations are complicated. If one wishes to debate them, one must first make comprehensive and precise advance plans. Some things are suitable for debate. Some things are not. Such is Tsai Ing-wen's style. Unclear statements and vague generalities. The two politicians exemplify the DPP's cross-strait policy dilemma.

We do more than listen to what they say. We also look at what they do. Su Tseng-chang has embarked on his European tour. Tsai Ing-wen has dispatched aides to Mainland China. Each has chosen a different path. Su Tseng-chang's visit to Europe is shrouded in mystery. Before his departure he disclosed nothing. The only part of his itinerary made public was his speech in the UK, at the Centre of Taiwan Studies at SOAS, University of London. He was accompanied by DPP Representative to the US Joseph Wu and Director of International Affaris Liu Shi-chung. Sure enough, he said the DPP would continue to "join the international community before approaching China" He said the DPP would continue its "democratic alliance" strategy. In other words, it would ally with Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and other Asian democracies to contain Mainland China. But this conflicts with cross-strait peaceful development. This is inconsistent with the bigger strategic picture between Beijing, Washington and the major powers. Instead it echoes Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Cold War mentality.

Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric remains vague. It maintains flexibility. Her actions meanwhile, reflect changed thinking. She has begun communicating directly with the Mainland. The experience of the last election taught her a lesson, that "joining the international community before approaching the Mainland" is not feasible. In 2012 Tsai Ing-wen aggressively distanced herself from Ma Ying-jeou's "joiningg iwth Mainland before joining the world" strategy. She visited Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines. She fired her opening shot at the very spot where Philippines President Corazon Aquino was inaugurated. But in the end, the final obstacle standing in the way of the DPP's return to power, remained cross-strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen remembers the lesson. This time her path has changed.

The roster of Tsai Ing-wen aides is long. They include Thinking Taiwan Foundation leader Lin Chuan, former National Security Council Deputy Secretary-General Chiang Chun-nan, former CEPD Hu Sheng-cheng, Vice Chairman Chang Ching-sen, former FSC chairman Shi Chun-chi, former MAC Vice Chairman Chiu Tai-san, former Comptroller Hsu Chang-yao, DPP legislator Hsiao Bi-khim, and Chai Chi-chang. It has all the earmarks of a shadow cabinet. It contrasts sharply with Su Tseng-chang's lineup. It reveals the increasing gap between the strength of the "two DPP suns." The pragmatists within the party now constitute the mainstream.

The main purpose of Lin Chuan's visit was to understand the Mainland economy. Lin visited think tanks, the National Bureau of Statistics, and other official institutions and private enterprises. Lin Chuan said the visit was the result of bilateral discussions. He said he looked forward to more exchanges. Tsai Ing-wen expressed hope that the trip would help Taiwan society.

The Mainland economy is about to undergo transformation. The internationalization and liberalization of the renminbi is the key to successful transformation. Taiwan is promoting the liberalization of the NTD and financial liberalization. The results have been mixed. Lin Chuan and Hu Sheng-cheng are educated and have a wealth of practical experience. Beijing is very interested in meeting them. Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen and the delegates held a press conference. The newness of official DPP contacts with the Mainland was palpable. Those in attendance could not disguise the excitement in their faces .

This sun is rising. The Kuomintang should beware.

社論－民進黨兩顆太陽 格局大不同
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年01月21日 04:09

民進黨中國事務委員會9日做出《2014對中政策檢討紀要》後，各界批評不斷，認為並沒有誠實面對執政最後一哩路問題，大陸國台辦也批評為「走台獨老路，死胡同就是死胡同」。蔡英文在會中提出連珠炮式的「然後呢」質疑，隨後悄悄派出核心幕僚群密訪北京，蘇貞昌同時展開歐洲行，預定在英國發表民進黨對中政策演說。兩個人揭開了黨主席選舉角力的帷幕，也為2016總統大選精心布局。從兩個陣營的出訪安排可以看出，蘇蔡拚民進黨最後一哩路，已經做出不同選擇，而且高下立判。

蘇貞昌《檢討紀要》發布後，曾經接受電台訪問，提出所謂「海灘之鷗」和「中國加1」的論述，所謂「海灘之鷗」，比喻兩岸關係如同人和海灘的鷗，各走各的，互不相干，頂多是彼此欣賞。而「中國加1」的說法就是借用「東協加3」的國際慣例，這樣的比喻充分說明蘇貞昌內心中的兩岸關係是「一邊一國」，在這樣的心態下想要和大陸打交道，基本上不存在可能性。

針對蘇貞昌的說法，謝長廷就認為「海灘之鷗」說不恰當，如果說大陸要「抓」台灣，或是民進黨想要與大陸交流，就不可能不接觸，既然要接觸就不可能兩不相干；而「中國加1」說，謝長廷表示不解，既要講「中國加1」，為何不講「台灣加1」？但是蔡英文沒有對蘇貞昌的說法表示反對，他認為蘇貞昌的意思就是「台灣跟中國如果能夠互相尊重，一定可以和平相處。」

在言語上，蘇貞昌台獨本質鮮明，蔡英文則表現得較為含糊，一方面不得罪基本教義派，另一方面也預留了較為務實彈性空間，就如同她對於中國政策辯論的表態一樣，她認為兩岸關係很複雜，如果要辦辯論必須作完整而精密的規畫，有些事適合辯論，有些事不適合。不清楚表態，含糊籠統，展現了蔡氏風格，也說明民進黨處理兩岸關係的兩難。

我們不僅察其言，更要觀其行。蘇貞昌展開歐洲之行，蔡英文派出核心幕僚訪大陸，兩人選擇了不同的道路。蘇貞昌訪歐行程非常神祕，出發前並未多所透露，唯一公開行程是在英國亞非學院台灣研究中心演講，隨行的有民進黨駐美代表吳釗燮和國際事務部主任劉世忠。無可避免的，他將繼續強調民進黨「結合國際走向中國」的「民主同盟」策略，也就是和美、日、韓等亞洲民主國家結盟，對中國進行圍堵，不過這根本不符合兩岸當前和平發展的大勢，也不符合美中倡議的新型大國關係的大局，不過是呼應日本安倍的冷戰思維。

蔡英文在言語上保持模糊、保留彈性，行動上卻已經改變了過去的思維，開始和大陸進行直接的溝通，畢竟上次大選的經驗告訴她，從「全球走向大陸」的路徑是行不通的。2012年蔡英文積極和馬英九「從大陸走向全球」的策略做區隔，她從歐洲德國到英國再到菲律賓，在菲律賓女總統柯拉蓉宣示就職的地方鳴槍起跑，但是最後證明，民進黨的最後一哩路還是差在兩岸關係。蔡英文記取了教訓，這次改變路徑了。

蔡英文幕僚團陣容龐大，以小英基金會執行長林全領軍，包括前國安會副祕書長江春男、前經建會主委胡勝正、副主委張景森、前金管會主委施俊吉、前陸委會副主委邱太三、前主計長許璋瑤、立委蕭美琴、蔡其昌等人，呈現了影子內閣的氣勢，和蘇貞昌出訪陣容形成了強烈的對比，不但說明了民進黨「兩個太陽」強弱態勢逐漸明朗，黨內務實派也已占據主流地位。

林全一行主要目的是了解中國經濟，除了與智庫交流外，也參訪了國家統計局等官方機構及民間企業。林全表示，行程是雙方討論出來的，期待未來能有更多的交流。蔡英文也表示希望這次的旅程對台灣社會有幫助。

中國經濟正要轉型，人民幣的國際化與自由化是轉型成敗的關鍵，台灣在推動新台幣自由化與金融開放過程中，留下許多正面與負面經驗，林全、胡勝正等人學養與實務經驗都很豐富，是大陸非常有興趣接觸的人。從昨天蔡英文和出訪人員的記者會中，可以感受到民進黨正式接觸大陸之後的新鮮感，也不掩他們臉上的興奮之情。

這顆上升的太陽，國民黨該警惕了。