Squaring the Circle: Su Tseng-chang Reverts to Taiwan Independence

Squaring the Circle: Su Tseng-chang Reverts to Taiwan Independence
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
January 15, 2014

Summary: The DPP cannot overthrow the "one China framework." In particular, it cannot successfully maintain that "one China is the People's Republic of China." This is a suicidal position. It must fight for the dignity and interests of the Republic of China under the "one China constitutional framework."

Full text below:

On May 29 last year, Su Tseng-chang said, "The DPP will not turn the clock back and promote Taiwan independence."

On Thursday however, the DPP issued its "Minutes of the 2014 China Policy Review." Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office read it, and concluded that it "obdurately clings to the one country on each side Taiwan independence stance," and that its "so-called core values are incitement of hostility and confrontation."

Has Su Tseng-chang "reverted to promoting Taiwan independence?" If he has not, and the Taiwan Affairs Office has misunderstood, then Su Tseng-chang ought to come forward and declare "I have not reverted to promoting Taiwan independence." Conversely, if the Taiwan Affairs Office is correct in its reading of the minutes, Su should come forward and explain why he reverted to promoting Taiwan independence .

In response to the Taiwan Affairs Office allegations, a DPP spokesman said, "The DPP's basic values and positions remain unchanged. However its policies must be modified for changing times." The DPP spokesman added, "It is firmer where it must be firm, and more flexible where it must be flexible." The DPP was responding to an earlier Beijing statement that "we will be firmer where we must be firm, and softer where we must be soft." This, however, precisely underscored the fundamental contradictions within the minutes. The minutes basically said "Our Taiwan independence stance must be firmer, our willingness to engage in exchanges must be more flexible." In other words, the DPP would continue its rejection of the one China constitution. it would cling to its hardcore Taiwan independence stance even while advocating broader exchanges with the Mainland.

But this is squaring the circle. It is impossible, logically as well as practically. Just as there can be no such thing as "white colored black" or "living corpses," so there can be no "flexible cross-strait exchanges under hardcore Taiwan independence." This fundamental contradiction is precisely what the minutes illustrates so clearly.

The TAO said the minutes promoted Taiwan independence. The DPP issued no denial. By default, it conceded that the minutes were essentially "Taiwan independence minutes." Ker Chien-ming proposed "freezing the Taiwan independence party platform." But the DPP rejected his proposal. This also proves that the DPP clings to Taiwan independence. Frank Hsieh advocated a "constitutional consensus." The DPP rejected that as well. One aspect was especially absurd. The DPP worked on its "China Policy" for six months. It published it on Thursday. Su Tseng-chang then announced that the DPP might consider holding a "China Policy Debate." If so, what were the five committee meetings and nine Huashan meetings all about? Game playing? Now the question is, until such a "great debate" is held and its conclusions made public, what are we to make of the DPP's "China Policy?" The DPP's "China Policy" asserts that "Our Taiwan independence stance must be firmer, our willingness to engage in exchanges must be more flexible?" Does that still count for anything at all?

The underlying premise of the minutes is that "One China is the People's Republic of China." The rest of the minutes refer to "China vs. Taiwan," to "Chinese vs. Taiwanese," and invoke "one nation on each side" political reasoning. It advocates strengthening national defense, rejecting diplomatic truce, and emphasizing Taiwan's role in the "first island chain." It even refers to cross-strait economic exchange "verbiage," to use Frank Hsieh's term. It argues that cross-strait trade "helps reinstate the KMT's old authoritarian state capitalism." (Do Taiwan companies such as Foxconn and 85 Degrees Celsius doing business on the Mainland really amount to the reinstatement of KMT authoritarian state capitalism?) it argues that cross-strait trade has widened the class gap in society. (Is cross-strait trade really the sole reason or even the main reason for the widening of the class gap?) The minutes also calls for Taiwan to join the TPP and RCEP. It underscores the DPP's irrational opposition to the trade in services agreement. (If Taiwan participates in the TPP or RCEP, how can it possibly avoid the "China factor?" The DPP wants to shut out the "China factor" by obstructing the trade in services agreement issue. But if Taiwan joins the TPP or RCEP, the "China factor" will be overwhelming.)

The "China Policy Review Minutes" brims over with Cultural Revolution era rhetoric. It is tough on the outside, but soft on the inside. It contains faulty reasoning masquerading as fierce determination. The Taiwan Affairs Office characterized it as a declaration of war on Mainland China by "hardcore Taiwan independence" elements. Needless to say, it is also a DPP declaration of war on "China Policy" within Taiwan. In practical terms, the minutes backs down. It states that "Taiwan must aggressively consolidate an internal consensus as the basis for cross-strait dialogue." This inadvertently acknowledges that a "Taiwan consensus" is nowhere to be found, and has yet to be "consolidated." The DPP inadvertently acknowledges that "to date there is no consensus, therefore we must await its consolidation." So just what is the DPP's "China Policy?" Is it self-deception, or self-amusement?

There is no such thing a "circular square." It is impossible to "square the circle." It is impossible to have "flexible cross-strait exchanges under hardcore Taiwan independence." The DPP advocates "flexible exchanges," but its rhetoric rings false. The DPP clings to Taiwan independence, but it is clearly unable to rid itself of this albatross around its neck. The minutes attempt to square the circle. The result is neither circular nor square. The square is Taiwan independence being shot. The circle is DPP exchanges being mocked.

The DPP's cross-strait policy debate has entered the "deep end of the pool." The DPP must return to one China as defined by the Republic of China Constitution. It must cease "backdoor listing" via the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." Its first step should be to reaffirm the Republic of China by endorsing "different constitutional interpretations" or "one China, different interpretations." This is the first level of the "one China framework." Its second step should be to embrace a "generic concept of China" such as the "big roof concept of China." It should seek to co-exist side by side with the People's Republic of China. This is the second level of the "one China framework."

The DPP cannot overthrow the "one China framework." In particular, it cannot successfully maintain that "one China is the People's Republic of China." This is a suicidal position. It must fight for the dignity and interests of the Republic of China under the "one China constitutional framework."

圓形的方塊：蘇貞昌回頭搞台獨
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.01.15 04:43 am

蘇貞昌在去年五月二十九日說：「民進黨不會回過頭去搞台獨。」

上周四，民進黨發布《二○一四對中政策檢討紀要》，被北京國台辦指為「依然頑固堅持一邊一國的台獨立場」，「以所謂核心價值煽動敵意和對抗」。

蘇貞昌是不是又「回過頭去搞台獨」了？如果不是，而是國台辦的誤讀誤解，蘇貞昌即應出面聲明「我沒有搞台獨」；反之，倘若國台辦的判讀正確，蘇貞昌也當出面解釋自己為何出爾反爾，又回頭搞台獨。

回應國台辦的指控，民進黨發言人說：「民進黨的基本價值與立場不變，但政策與時調整。」並稱：「堅定的更堅定，靈活的更靈活。」（這是針對北京的「硬的更硬，軟的更軟」）然而，這卻正是通篇《紀要》的根本矛盾所在，因為《紀要》的基本架構即是：「台獨更堅定，交流更靈活。」也就是：「否定憲法一中，站在鐵桿台獨的立場上，主張與中國擴大和平交流」。

這正如要畫一個「圓形的方塊」，在邏輯及現實上皆無可能。正如天下沒有「白的黑色」與「活的死人」，因此亦不會有「堅持台獨的兩岸靈活交流」。這個根本矛盾，正是《檢討紀要》呈現的自我矛盾。

國台辦指《紀要》是台獨，民進黨不作辯解，即是默認《紀要》本是「台獨紀要」。柯建銘主張「凍獨」，民進黨加以否定，亦反證民進黨仍是台獨。謝長廷主張「憲法共識」被排除，也反證民進黨拒絕「憲法一中」。尤其荒謬的是，經營半年的《對中政策》在上周四發布後，蘇貞昌居然又說可在黨內舉行「中國政策大辯論」，那麼，半年來這五場委員會與九場華山會議，豈不皆成兒戲？請問：在「大辯論」得出結論之前，這一套「台獨更堅定，交流更靈活」的「對中政策」究竟還算不算數？

《紀要》潛在的主軸命題是：「一個中國就是中華人民共和國。」然後通篇皆以「中國／台灣」、「中國人／台灣人」的「一邊一國」邏輯思維來進行政治推理，因而主張加強國防軍力、反對「外交休兵」，強調台灣在「第一島鏈」的角色；甚至在論及兩岸經濟交流的「堆砌文字」中（謝長廷語），也不忘回過頭來提醒兩岸經貿將促成「國民黨舊有的威權國家資本主義的復辟」（難道登陸的台商富士康與八十五度Ｃ是國民黨的威權國家資本主義復辟？），及兩岸經貿對擴大社會階級化的影響（難道兩岸經貿是階級深化的唯一原因或主要原因？）。再者，《紀要》又主張加入ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ，亦更彰顯民進黨反對《服貿協議》的無理取鬧（台灣若欲參加ＴＰＰ或ＲＣＥＰ，哪一個躲得過「中國因素」？民進黨想在《服貿協議》堵住的「中國因素」，若到了ＴＰＰ或ＲＣＥＰ，恐怕更加擋不住）。

此篇《對中政策檢討紀要》，文字充滿「文革風情」，色厲內荏，理不直而假裝氣壯。這是一篇被國台辦指為「頑固台獨」的對中國宣戰檄文，當然也是一篇觸發民進黨「對中政策內戰」的開戰公告。而在實務上，《紀要》又倒退至「應該積極凝聚台灣內部的共識做為兩岸對話基礎」，正可顯示，「台灣共識」迄今仍是不知所云，而尚待「凝聚」。然則，民進黨居然堂皇隆重推出一部「迄無共識／尚待凝聚」的「對中政策」，這是自欺欺人，或自娛娛人？

世無「圓形的方塊」，亦無「方形的圓圈」，也不可能有「堅持台獨的兩岸靈活交流」。民進黨主張「靈活交流」，可見氣虛；卻又「堅持台獨」，則可見已是不能自拔。《檢討紀要》想畫出一個「圓形的方塊」，卻不是圓又不是方；方的台獨被打槍，圓的交流被譏嘲。

民進黨內部的兩岸政策辯論已經進入「深水區」。於今之計，必須回到「一中憲法的中華民國」，不要再搞《台灣前途決議文》那一套「借殼上市」。第一步，經「憲法各表」或「一中各表」先進入中華民國的門檻（這是第一層次的「一中架構」）；然後第二步，再設法在「上位概念」的「大屋頂中國」下，尋求中華民國與中華人民共和國並立並存之道（此為第二層次的「一中架構」）。

民進黨無可能推翻「一中架構」，尤不可持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」的自殺立場，而必須在「一中憲法架構」下，爭取中華民國的尊嚴與利益。