From the Philippines to Korea: Diplomacy Must Be Flexible

From the Philippines to Korea: Diplomacy Must Be Flexible 
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
August 18, 2016

Executive Summary: To appease public outrage, Minister of the Interior Yeh Chun-jung landed on Taiping Island yesterday and reaffirmed out sovereignty. President Tsai has approved her New Southern Strategy. But she did not rule out cooperation with the Mainland. Is this the first of the new government's policy changes? If so, we look forward to more such changes.

Full Text Below:

The Philippines emerged victorious in the South China Sea arbitration dispute. But its victory did not raise tensions in the region. Instead the Philippines stressed its willingness to share South China Sea resources with Mainland China. Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte sent former President Fidel Ramos to Hong Kong to “break the ice” and restart talks with Mainland China. Ramos fulfilled his mission. The Mainland invited the special envoy from the Philippines to Beijing.

President Duterte may be a populist. But when it comes to diplomacy, he is a pragmatist. He has no desire to butt heads with the Mainland in the South China Sea. The 88-year-old Ramos is a capable ambassador. He has used his image, experience, and contacts to defuse diplomatic crises. Three years ago, a Philippines government vessel fired upon the Kuang Ta Hsing, a fishing vessel from Taiwan, and killed one of its crew. Ramos enabled the two sides to investigate the case together. He was neither overbearing nor servile. His performance was impressive. Taiwan does not men of his caliber. But blue vs. green distrust means that ideology trumps all. Therefore the talents of such individuals can seldom be put to use.

Ramos hopes to mend relations with the Mainland over the South China Sea. That will not be easy. The two sides will communicate in two stages. The first will be exploratory contacts in Hong Kong, that will create a climate conducive to reconciliation. According to Ramos, his job in Hong Kong is not to negotiate, but to restore the traditional friendship between the two nations. Therefore Ramos visited a number of old friends in Hong Kong, all high ranking CCP officials, including Wu Sichun, President of the South China Sea Institute. His visit lasted five days. Ramos and Fu Ying, Chairman of the National Peoples Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, announced that the two nations would discuss "maritime conservation" and "avoid tensions while promoting fisheries cooperation". The Mainland then invited the Ramos to visit Beijing.

Leaders of the Philippines did not allow themselves to be carried away by their arbitration victory. Instead, they realized that their national interests lie in smooth foreign relationships. They noted that Aquino, who demanded arbitration, was already out of the picture. Duterte was in charge. The heads of state could now modify Philippines-Mainland relations to meet with the best interests of their respective nations.

Also worth noting is the relationship between the Mainland and South Korea. In May, South Korean President Park Geun-hye agreed to deploy the THAAD missile system. This triggering tensions in Mainland-ROK relations. The Mainland issued “limits on Koreans", forcing Korean entertainers to cancel scheduled performances on the Mainland. The Mainland tightened requirements for Korean entrepreneur visas. It threatened to remove South Korea from its list of approved parts suppliers.

In fact, the Mainland did not actually implement the so-called "limit on Koreans" policy. So far only South Korean entertainers and talent agents have been affected. The impact has yet to extend to the economic and trade levels. The South Korean public has accused the Mainland of lacking the tolerance befitting a great nation. But the South Korean government is cautious. It sent six members of parliament to the Mainland. They stressed that the THAAD missile system was not directed against the Mainland. Cheong Wa Dae will be using the Hangzhou G20 meeting in early September to melt the ice. South Korea's deployment of the THAAD missile system has undermined its relations with the Mainland. Nevertheless the two sides continue to talk, allowing for eventual reconciliation.

Mainland relations with the Philippines, and Mainland relations with South Korea, offer a valuable lesson for cross-Strait relations. The DPP government has been in office three months. Cross-Strait channels of communication have already been severed. STA negotiations have essentially been abandoned. Neither side trusts the other. The number of Mainland tourists and Mainland students arriving on Taiwan has steadly been reduced. The impact on the private sector is increasingly evident. In the absence of channels of communication with the Mainland, Beijing has repeatedly extradited scam artists from Taiwan to the Mainland for trial. The Mainland is gradually reducing Taiwan's international wriggle space. Yet the Tsai government is doing nothing to defuse the situation.

Taiwan's current diplomatic difficulties are the result of the Tsai government's cross-Strait policy. It is overly rigid and has failed to keep up with the times. In the long run, this will leave Taiwan increasingly isolated and incapable of determining its own fate. The DPP has chosen to be part of the United States' Asia rebalancing policy. It seeks to reduce economic dependence on the Mainland with its New Southern Strategy. From a strategic perspective, this seems reasonable. Alas, dependence on the US means forfeiting Taiwan's primacy. To wit, the downgrading of Taiping Island in the South China Sea arbitration case to the status of a “reef”. To wit, the unsustainable nature of the New Southern Strategy. Formosa Plastics steel mills have been repeatedly subjected to extortion by foreign governments. Is the Tsai government really too obstinate to make the necessary changes?

To appease public outrage, Minister of the Interior Yeh Chun-jung landed on Taiping Island yesterday and reaffirmed out sovereignty. President Tsai has approved her New Southern Strategy. But she did not rule out cooperation with the Mainland. Is this the first of the new government's policy changes? If so, we look forward to more such changes.

從菲韓作法談外交靈活之必要
2016-08-18 聯合報

菲律賓在南海仲裁案大獲全勝後，非但未乘勝挑起區域的緊張，反而強調願意與中國大陸分享南海資源。菲國總統杜特蒂並派前總統羅慕斯為特使，赴港進行「破冰之旅」，謀求重新開啟中菲兩國對話管道。羅慕斯不辱使命，中方已表示歡迎菲國特使訪問北京。

杜特蒂總統行事雖頗具民粹風格，但面對外交工作，卻充分表現出務實的一面，不願為南海問題與中共鬧僵。八十八歲的羅慕斯則是幹練的親善大使，屢屢運用自己從政時累積的形象、經驗和人脈，為菲國化解外交危機。三年前，他為台灣漁船廣大興遭菲公務船射殺案來台，促成雙方共同調查該案，不卑不亢的態度令人印象深刻。台灣其實並不缺乏這類人才，但因為藍綠政府彼此猜忌，加上意識形態作祟，鮮少被用上。

羅慕斯要修補中菲的南海齟齬，並不是輕鬆的任務；雙方設定為兩階段的溝通，先在香港進行試探性接觸，以營造和解氣氛。羅慕斯的定位是：香港行之任務不在談判，而在幫中菲「恢復歷史的傳統友誼」；也因此，他在港拜訪多位與中共高層有聯繫的老友，包括中國南海研究院院長吳士存。五天的訪問中，他最後與人大外事委員會主委傅瑩發表共同新聞稿，宣布兩國將探討「海洋生態保護」與「避免局勢緊張及促進漁業合作」的可能性；中方同時表示，歡迎菲國特使訪問北京。

由此可見，菲律賓沒有被仲裁的勝利沖昏頭，反而意識到對外關係的平順才是國家利益之所在。而提出仲裁的艾奎諾下台，杜特蒂執政，讓菲國元首有調整中菲關係的機會，以追求最佳的國家利益。

同樣值得注意的，是中韓的關係變化。五月間，韓國總統朴槿惠同意美國在韓國部署薩德飛彈系統，引發中韓關係的緊張。為此，中國大陸最近祭出「限韓令」，首先取消了韓國演藝人員在大陸的一些演出以為施壓，同時縮緊韓國企業家的赴大陸簽證，並揚言考慮將排除韓國某些零件製造商於中國供應商的名單之外。

事實上，中共並未全面推動所謂的「限韓令」，迄今為止，僅對韓國演藝人員及經紀公司造成較大的衝擊，尚未擴大至經貿層面。韓國社會雖有批評中國缺乏大國氣度的聲音，但韓國政府則小心翼翼，派出六名國會議員前往大陸溝通，強調薩德系統並非針對大陸而來。此外，青瓦台也把九月初將在杭州召開的Ｇ20會議，當成兩國融冰對話的機會。亦即，薩德飛彈部署雖影響中韓友善關係，但雙方鬥而不破，為彼此的和解預留空間。

由中菲、中韓的外交作法對應，對我國處理兩岸關係或許可以有一些提示作用。民進黨政府上台三個月，兩岸對話機制處於斷線狀態，服貨貿的簽署談判已形同放棄進度，在彼此猜忌下，來台陸客及陸生人數逐漸減少，對民間的衝擊日益明顯。在欠缺對話管道的情況下，中共屢屢逕將台灣詐欺犯押解到大陸受審，大陸對於台灣國際空間的打壓也日益增強。然而，人們卻看不到蔡政府在這方面作出試圖化解的努力。

當前台灣的外交困境，主要是蔡政府的兩岸政策過於僵化，無法隨形勢的轉變而調整；長此以往，這將使台灣陷入愈發孤立而難以自主的困境。民進黨選擇積極配合美國的亞洲再平衡政策，並推動新南向政策以化解對大陸的經濟依賴，從戰略觀點似無可厚非。問題是，當對美的依附角色損及台灣的主體性（例如太平島在南海仲裁案被貶為礁），當新南向政策缺乏主客觀的支撐（例如台塑越鋼廠頻遭當地政府剝削），我們的政策要不要作出相應的調整？

為撫平民怨，內政部長葉俊榮日昨赴太平島宣示主權，蔡總統拍板「南向政策」綱領，也聲稱不排除與大陸合作。如果這是政府路線調整的第一步，我們希望能看到更具體的作為。