China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 22, 2016
Executive Summary: Does President Tsai want to avoid Chen Shui-bian's old mistakes? If she does, she must make a genuine effort to improve cross-Strait relations. Trust between the CCP and the DPP is in short supply. Endless pro forma lip service will not reassure the Mainland. In fact, the Tsai government no longer even bothers with that. The Tsai government has restrained only internal de-Sinicization. Externally, it is using the US and Japan to counter the Mainland. Just what is the nature of cross-Strait relations? The Tsai government must respond to Mainland concerns in a clearer manner. Only then can she narrow the distance between the two sides and enable the resumption of official cross-Strait interaction.
Full Text Below:
President Tsai recently reiterated her intention to maintain the status quo and to conduct cross-Strait relations based on the existing constitutional framework. She volunteered the opinion that both sides share responsibility for cross-Strait dialogue and exchanges. She appeared to be challenging the Mainland's claim that Taiwan alone was responsible for the breakdown in cross-Strait communication. But when a reporter asked her whether there was a 1992 Consensus, President Tsai invoked her 5/20 speech, and implied that she had done everything in her power to bring the two sides closer.
This is the heart of the problem. The Mainland has never stopped working toward cross-Strait peace. It considers President Tsai's inaugural address an improvement, because it made reference to "on the basis of the Constitution's Regulations Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the People of the Mainland China Area”. But the Mainland also noted that President Tsai equivocated on the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus. Therefore her response to the Mainland was incomplete. It hoped that President Tsai would continue to move forward, until both sides met in the middle.
The Mainland refrained from taking tough measures immediately following Tsai's 5/20 address. Feeling responsible, it was reluctant to set back bilateral goodwill. Anyone who pays attention to public opinion on the Mainland, will find more and more people advocating reunification by means of military force. Mainland netizens are increasingly hostile toward Taiwan. They are increasingly filled with resentment. This was not the case a few years ago. Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties, as well as the general public, must pay attention. In spite of this negative atmosphere, the Mainland government has yet to take hostile action against Taiwan in the name of "public opinion". The Mainland response has been restrained, even to the Hsiung Feng III missile launch fiasco and the tour bus fire tragedy. It has done everything in its power to minimize public hostility toward Taiwan. The Tsai government ought to acknowledge this, and respond with goodwill.
Alas, it clearly has not. President Tsai's actions since taking office have provoked deep concern. The Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Education have taken giant steps backwards. They have "de-Sinicized" Taiwan repeatedly. The new government has used "transitional justice" as a pretext to liquidate Kuomintang Party assets. The public has witnessed DPP hatred for the KMT in action. Even more, it has seen the DPP's underlying motive – de-Sinicization. Everything the KMT did in the past to promote cross-Strait peace, is now being stigmatized as “pandering to China [sic], and selling out Taiwan”. The peace dividend the KMT painstakingly created for Taiwan, has been obliterated by the new government. Internationally, the Tsai government has cozied up to United States and Japan. It even prosecuted Taiwan fishermen who sailed to Taiping Island to reaffirm our sovereignty, then claimed it was “merely enforcing the law”. In fact, it has been struggling to prove to the United States and Japan that it is not working with the Mainland to defend Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea. This has sent a chill through patriots within Taiwan. Mainland compatriates consider this as an even more hostile act.
Former SEF Vice Chairman Ma Shao-chang referred to this approach in his new book. He characterized Chen era cross-Strait policy as a two pronged strategy of "stabilization plus differentiation". The stabilization part proved Chen's ability to manage cross-Strait relations. The differentiation part included a wide range of policies. Initial stabilization enabled the creation of increasingly prominent differentiations. The important point was that the stabilization part was mere show. Only the differentiation part was real. The guise of stabilization provided cover for actual differentiation. President Tsai's approach is similar. She uses misleading appearances to hide her true intent. Her show of sensitivity toward Mainland concerns is merely a delaying tactic. Meanwhile, her real world actions move Taiwan farther and farther away from the Mainland. Hung Chi-chang recently expressed concern about President Tsai going down Chen Shui-bian's old path. People who follow cross-Strait relations are clearly concerned about this problem.
President Tsai said both sides share responsibility for cross-Strait communication and interaction. In fact, only the Mainland has acted in a responsible manner. President Tsai has evaded all responsibility. She has not as she alleges, done everything within her ability. The fact is cross-Strait problems cannot be postponed indefinitely. Public opinion on the Mainland is boiling over. It could easily affect Mainland government decision-making. The Mainland's current restraint could yield to public sentiment. That would not be a blessing for cross-Strait relations. President Tsai has been deliberately equivocal and ambiguous. But she may be painting herself into a corner. Refusal to make clear her cross-Strait policy intentions, enables Taiwan independence extremists to force her to openly adopt a Taiwan independence path. The Taiwan Solidarity Union or New Power Party may oppose her merely out of sheer spite. Pressure groups may renew pressure to “Join the United Nations under the name of Taiwan”. If President Tsai fails to make a decision, she will face greater pressures from within, and lose any room to maneuver.
Does President Tsai want to avoid Chen Shui-bian's old mistakes? If she does, she must make a genuine effort to improve cross-Strait relations. Trust between the CCP and the DPP is in short supply. Endless pro forma lip service will not reassure the Mainland. In fact, the Tsai government no longer even bothers with that. The Tsai government has restrained only internal de-Sinicization. Externally, it is using the US and Japan to counter the Mainland. Just what is the nature of cross-Strait relations? The Tsai government must respond to Mainland concerns in a clearer manner. Only then can she narrow the distance between the two sides and enable the resumption of official cross-Strait interaction.
解兩岸冷對抗 蔡總統並未盡其所能
2016/8/22 中國時報
蔡總統在記者節茶敘上主動提及兩岸關係，除了重申維持現狀和在當前憲政體制下發展兩岸關係以外，也再度強調推進兩岸對話交流需要兩岸雙方共同努力，是雙方共同的責任，似乎是針對大陸所稱兩岸溝通停擺責任完全在台灣一方的說法。不過當記者問到沒有九二共識怎麼辦時，蔡總統卻又回到520講話，指其已經盡其所能把雙方立場拉近。
問題的癥結就在這裡，大陸從未放棄推動兩岸關係和平發展的努力，也部分認同蔡總統的就職演講，認為增加了「依據憲法和《兩岸人民關係條例》」的用詞是一種進步。但大陸也注意到，蔡總統還是在九二共識的核心意涵問題上採取模糊態度，因此大陸的回應指這是一份未完成的答卷，希望蔡總統可以繼續向前走，讓雙方產生交集。
大陸並沒有在520講話之後立即採取強硬措施，正是不願雙方關係倒退的善意之舉，也是一種負責任的表現。民眾如果關心大陸網路輿論，會發現愈來愈多的武統言論甚囂塵上，而大陸網民對台灣的態度也愈來愈不友善，愈來愈充滿反感，這是幾年前還不存在的現象，台灣朝野及社會大眾應生警惕。但即便在這種輿論氛圍下，大陸官方也沒有藉「民意」之名對台灣採取敵對行動，甚至在發生雄三飛彈誤射及火燒車事件，我方應對荒腔走板，大陸卻選擇克制，盡可能避免輿論朝敵視台灣的方向發展。蔡政府應該正視、接受並回應這份善意。
結果顯然不是如此，蔡總統上任以來的種種作為讓人深感憂慮，文化部和教育部大開歷史倒車，「去中國化」的行動此起彼落，新政府對「轉型正義」和清算國民黨黨產全力以赴，讓人不僅看到民進黨對國民黨的仇視，更讓人注意到背後的去中國化邏輯。事實上，國民黨過去推動兩岸關係和平發展的種種能力，現在都被汙名化為親中賣台，國民黨為台灣創造的和平紅利，也被新政府逐步消滅殆盡。不僅如此，在對外關係上，蔡政府一再向美、日靠攏，甚至連前往太平島宣示主權的漁船都要假行政執法名義處罰之，與其說是依法行政，不如說是向美、日交心，證明自己無意與大陸聯手共同捍衛南海主權，這無疑讓台灣內部的愛國者心寒，看在大陸眼裡，更是十分不友好的舉動。
前海基會副董事長馬紹章在其新著，將扁時代的兩岸策略總結為「穩定」與「區別」兩手策略。「穩定」是為了證明其有處理兩岸關係的能力，「區別」則是創造多數的策略，執政初期以「穩定」為主，隨著時間的推移則愈來愈凸顯「區別」，更重要的是，「穩定」策略是虛是表，表現為不作為，「區別」則是實，表現在作為，是以虛掩實，以表蓋裡。檢視蔡總統現階段的做法，也可發現其有類似的發展趨勢，對大陸的核心關切都在虛與委蛇、以拖待變，實質行動則與大陸漸行漸遠。洪奇昌最近表達其對蔡總統走陳水扁老路的擔心，可見關心兩岸前途的人們都已注意到這個嚴峻問題。
雖然蔡總統言必稱兩岸溝通互動是兩岸共同的責任，但事實上大陸一直在盡責，反而是蔡總統一直在迴避，更未如其所言那般已盡其所能。但兩岸之間的問題終究不可能一直久拖不決，大陸的民意沸騰也很容易傳導至政府決策層，讓暫時的克制不得不退卻，轉而對民意做出回應，這絕非兩岸關係之福。蔡總統的曖昧模糊，也會讓自己陷入進退失據，遲遲不確定兩岸政策意向，其內部的激進派也有心推她一把，讓其走向公開台獨路線，無論是台聯與時代力量為反對而反對，還是民間團體的入聯倡議皆是新一輪的施壓。若蔡總統再不做出決斷，她將面對更大的內部壓力，反而讓自己失去迴旋空間。
蔡總統若想避免重蹈阿扁的老路，就應該採取實際行動為兩岸關係的改善做出努力，民、共互信嚴重不足，不斷的口頭論述不會讓大陸感到放心，更何況現在蔡政府連口頭的善意都鮮少出現。蔡政府只有在內部施政層面克制去中國化的衝動，在對外政策上做好美、日外交和兩岸關係的平衡，在兩岸究竟是什麼關係的問題上，以更清晰的態度回應大陸的關切，才能讓兩岸之間的距離拉近，從而為兩岸官方互動的重啟創造有利條件。
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