United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 3, 2016
Executive Summary: Zhou Zhihuai is the Director of the Taiwan Institute of Social Sciences of the Mainland based Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhou publicly declared that "What I want to stress, is that substitutes can be found for the 1992 Consensus. We do not oppose the creation of creative alternatives to the 1992 Consensus. We can form new commonly agreed upon expressions as the political basis for the development of cross-Strait relations."
Full Text Below:
Zhou Zhihuai is the Director of the Taiwan Institute of Social Sciences of the Mainland based Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhou publicly declared that "What I want to stress, is that substitutes can be found for the 1992 Consensus. We do not oppose the creation of creative alternatives to the 1992 Consensus. We can form new commonly agreed upon expressions as the political basis for the development of cross-Strait relations."
Zhou said "The Mainland's willingness to establish a new consensus on cross-Strait policy is every bit as strong as its determination to safeguard the consensus reached in 1992."
This is the first time that the Mainland has made clear that the 1992 Consensus can be replaced, and that it has no objection to the creation of an "alternative consensus", a "new shared interpretation", or "new cross-Strait consensus". Zhou Zhaihuai is considered the Mainland's chief Taiwan policy expert. His declaration is undoubtedly a policy statement, and should be treated seriously. Consider the following points.
One. What did Zhou mean when he said substitutes for the wording of the 1992 Consensus are acceptable? He meant that substitutes for the two words “1992 Consensus” are acceptable. Zhou reiterated that "the affirmation that the Mainland and Taiwan both belong to one country" is a key element that cannot be replaced. He said the new cross-Strait consensus must reaffirm the One China Principle, oppose Taiwan independence, and oppose de-Sinicization. This being the case, why not continue using the term “1992 Consensus”? After all, any new consensus would have to make these conditions regarding the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus even more explicit.
Two. Zhou's declaration included “One China Principle”, "two sides, one nation", "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one country", and "(Taiwan) may as well learn to get along with the Mainland under a One China framework”. But he did not explicitly define "one country". He left room for compromise.
The Ma government championed the 1992 Consensus, and refrained from contradicting Beijing. It qualified its position by stipulating that it championed "one China, different interpretations". Does the Tsai government intend to repudiate the "one China / one country" concept? If not, then what is its alternative? The Tsai government need not use the term "one China, different interpretations". But what alternative does it have? If it forfeits the 1992 Consensus, what will happen to “one China, different interpretations”?
3. Zhou said the Mainland's bottom line in its Taiwan policy is opposition to Taiwan independence. His new cross-Strait terminology merely stipulates that "the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one country". But will the Mainland follow up by adding the clause "opposition to Taiwan independence"?
Ma Ying-jeou advocated "no reunification, no independence, no use of force". This is an affirmation plus a repudiation. Only by saying "no independence", was it able to say "no reunification". If Tsai accepts the idea that "the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one country", she must address the problem of “one China, different interpretations”. The contradictions in Taiwan independence will then resurface.
Four. Zhou advocates the establishment of a "new cross-Strait framework” or “cross-Strait consensus". He recommends that think tanks from both sides of the Strait "strive to reach a tacit understanding". He said "This understanding need not be a written agreement, or even a verbal agreement. But it is essential". He said “Cross-Strait exchanges and controllable contacts can be conducted only under specified conditions”.
Outsiders may not immediately understand the gap between “a consensus that does not require even a verbal agreement”, and "a new understanding of cross-Strait talks and a new cross-Strait consensus". Do "contacts through buffers” and “controllable contacts" mean that the two sides should arrange for secret exchanges outside the two cross-Strait agencies? If so, how can the Tsai government gain the trust of the general public, or allay suspicions within the Green Camp?
Five. Zhou Zhihuai said "The KMT occupies a special place in the history of cross-Strait peace, and cannot be replaced". The Mainland considers the KMT just as irreplaceable as “both sides of the Strait are part of one country". This and other remarks by Zhou Zhihuai were probably meant for the ears of the Tsai government, which is intent on exterminating the KMT. If the KMT is weakened too much, the cross-Strait framework created by the KMT-CCP civil war will also evaporate. Beijing may consider the DPP vendetta against the KMT an attempt to sever a historical connection between the two sides. Therefore as the DPP attempts to exterminate the KMT, it should not ignore the possible consequences.
Zhou has released a political trial balloon, a deliberate attempt to resolve the cross-Strait impasse. Meanwhile, the premise that "both sides of the Strait are part of one China" remains irreplaceable, and is a way to force the Tsai government to negotiate, or else.
If the Tsai government refuses to respond, if no response is forthcoming, how can it answer to the public? If it decides to respond, what will its bottom line be? Now that the gauntlet has been thrown down, the government can no longer afford to ignore it.
民共另建兩岸新共識的可能性
2016-12-03 聯合報
大陸社科院台研所所長周志懷公開表示：「我想強調的是『九二共識』文字表述的可替代性，我們並不反對在九二共識之外，建立具有創造性的替代性共識，在兩岸關係發展的政治基礎問題上形成新的共同表述。」
他說：「大陸建構兩岸新共識的政策創新動能，並不弱於維護九二共識的決心。」
這是大陸方面首次明確表示「九二共識」文字表述的可替代性，並明言不反對在「九二共識」之外，另建「替代性共識」、「新的共同表述」或「兩岸新共識」。由於周志懷的職位被視為首席涉台智囊，他的喊話無疑具有政策釋放意味，宜慎重看待。茲略述幾點看法：
一、揆其語意，所謂九二共識文字表述的可替代性，應是指九二函電的相關表述以及「九二共識」這四個字的可替代性。但周亦反覆指出，「大陸與台灣同屬一個國家的內涵」，則是不可替代的核心要素。他所謂的兩岸新共識，已定性為體現一中原則、反對台獨、反對去中國化的兩岸新共識。倘是如此，則何不繼續使用九二共識即可？而新共識要如何文字堆砌始能完整表述這些核心內涵？
二、在周的談話中，雖有「一中原則」、「兩岸一國」、「大陸與台灣同屬一個國家」、「（台灣）不如在一個中國框架下學會如何與大陸相處」等用語，但他並未明示「一國」的定義，這應是存留的空間。
馬政府主張「九二共識」，且未反駁北京的那類用語，但以「一中各表」加以平衡。蔡政府要不要反駁「一中／一國」的概念？如果不反駁，又要以什麼來平衡？蔡政府或許可以不用「一中各表」四字，但其「替代性」的表述是什麼？失去九二共識之皮，一中各表毛將焉附？
三、周說，大陸對台政策的底線思維是反對台獨。但他提出的兩岸新論述，只見正面表述「大陸與台灣同屬一個國家」等等，但會不會後續再增添「反對台獨」的負面表述？
馬英九主張「不統／不獨／不武」，這是正負俱陳的表述。因為說了「不獨」，才能說「不統」；倘只說「不統」，而不說「不獨」，在兩岸就擺不平。蔡政府若接受了「大陸與台灣同屬一個國家」，一方面有如何伸展「一中各表」的難題，且後續台獨黨綱的矛盾勢將浮現。
四、周志懷主張建立「兩岸新論述／兩岸新共識」，又倡議兩岸智庫對話「力爭達成默契」，並說「這一默契並非一紙協議，甚至連口頭協議都不是，但它至關重要」。他又說，「在一定條件下，兩岸可進行傳話性接觸與可控性接觸」。
外界一時不易理解，從「連口頭協議都不是的默契」到「兩岸新論述／兩岸新共識」之間，其中的缺口存有何種過程及意義？而所謂「傳話性接觸／可控性接觸」，是否意指兩岸兩辦兩會之外的「密使」往來。倘是如此，蔡政府如何取得台灣人民的信任，又如何處理綠營內部的猜疑，會不會橫生枝節？
五、周志懷說，「國民黨在兩岸關係和平發展中的歷史與特殊作用不可替代」，其高度竟與「兩岸一國」的「不可替代」居於同一階位。若與周志懷其他部分談話合併解讀，應是針對蔡政府如今意圖滅絕國民黨的動作而發。國民黨如果過度弱化，國共內戰的兩岸架構亦告解構；北京可能視此為民進黨欲切斷兩岸的歷史臍帶。因而，民進黨追殺國民黨，應勿忘唇亡齒寒的效應。
周志懷在此時釋出這個政治氣球，一方面可視為有意化解兩岸僵局，但另一方面由於「兩岸一中」的前提仍是不可替代，也可視為促迫蔡政府進行談判及攤牌的動作。
蔡政府若不回應，事態當會有不回應的演化，然則該當如何肆應？若是回應，則最高目標是什麼？最低底線又是什麼？如今已聞轅門叫陣，恐怕也不能相應不理了。
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