Thursday, December 8, 2016

Strategic Implications of PLA Air Force Circumnavigation of Taiwan

Strategic Implications of PLA Air Force Circumnavigation of Taiwan 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 9, 2016

Executive Summary: Since taking office, the Tsai government has made an effort to develop the military hardware and shipbuilding industries. It has made gains in military procurements from the United States. But this is a declaration of military strength. It is of no help whatsoever to the real goal of national defense, peace and prosperity. Since time immemorial, the highest ideal in warfare, has been "to win without fighting”. For Taiwan, it is the only option.

Full Text Below:

PLA Air Force military aircraft flew through the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel across the first island chain, and eventually rendezvoused off the eastern coast of Taiwan. Japanese military aircraft rushed to intercept them. The ROC Air Force maintained long-range monitoring but did not intercept them. This raised many questions.

First of all, consider the significance of the Mainland military aircraft circumnavigation of Taiwan. Was this a paramilitary operation, or was it a political statement? If it was the former, then the ROC Air Force should have taken decisive military action to ensure our national security. Failure to act would have been a dereliction of duty. Military dereliction of duty is a serious matter.

In this case, Mainland military aircraft did not enter the ROC air defense identification zone. Nor did they cross the midline of the Taiwan Strait. The flight was clearly a political statement rather than a military action. This Mainland military show of force directed at Taiwan, the United States and Japan, was unprecedented. Over the past eight years, cross-Strait relations have greatly improved, Military confrontations have greatly eased. But that does not mean the Mainland has reduced its military build up or deployment against Taiwan. On the contrary, the Mainland's economic strength has grown by leaps and bounds. Its military strength has kept pace. The cross-Strait military balance has been lopsided for quite some time. More importantly, Mainland military preparations are no longer verbal declarations and responses to isolated political events. They are no longer emergency responses, but part of normal readiness.

The two missile crises in 1995 and 1996, which the public on Taiwan still remembers clearly, were the Mainland's response to Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States and the presidential election. Events have shown that such military actions failed to produce results. Instead, they increased public resentment against the Mainland. The Mainland has made timely adjustments, and is less inclined to resort to military action. During the Hu Jintao era, it stressed its commitment to peaceful cross-Strait relations. The Mainland position is that "We have made no commitment to abandon the use of force". But this has gradually faded from its official discourse.

During the missile crises, the United States dispatched aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait. This thorn in the Mainland's side accelerated the Mainland's commitment to military reform and weapons and equipment updates. The Mainland now has an aircraft carrier group and a space force. This time PLA military aircraft circumnavigated Taiwan from north to south, on both sides of the island. It was the most intensive military exercise in nearly 20 years. It revealed the extent of Mainland military preparations. Similar incidents will happen more often in the future. Taiwan must awaken to this reality.

Of course, we have also noted the Japanese response to this incident. ROC and Japanese air defense identification zones abut each other. Mainland military aircraft flew outside the eastern edge of the ROC air defense identification zone. This meant it flew inside Japan's air defense identification zone. The Japanese Air Force immediately intercepted. This showed that the Japanese are closely monitoring Mainland military actions. It means that once the People's Liberation Army takes military action on the eastern coast of Taiwan, it faces a threat from the rear by US and Japanese forces. From this perspective, the cross-Strait military balance of power has not drastically changed the overall regional strategic military balance. Taiwan is not actually under that great a military threat.

Mainland military strength has grown by leaps and bounds. The Japanese military is exhausted. The Mainland passed through the Tsugaru Strait and Miyako Strait. It passed through Diaoyutai Island waters, as a matter of routine. Japan pays close attention to this, but no longer responds. US forces in Japan also refrain from confronting the Mainland military head on. From this perspective, even if the strategic balance in the western Pacific does not change in the short term, United States and Japanese influence on cross-Strait relations will gradually decline. Ultimately Taiwan will be forced to focus on the Mainland, as the US and Japan lose their determination to lend their strategic support to Taiwan.

Many people dream that the United States and Japan will rush to Taiwan's aid. But this will not happen.  Many Taiwan independence advocates are unafraid of cross-Strait military conflict. They remember the previous Taiwan Strait missile crises. They remember the US aircraft carrier support. These people are convinced that in the event of a cross-Strait war, the United States and Japan will immediately rush to defend Taiwan. They are convinced that even though Taiwan's military strength has deteriorated, that will not affect Taiwan's security. But current reality clearly contradicts their assumptions. As recent events have shown, the United States and Japan will find it increasingly difficult to remain as involved as they were in the past. They will be reduced to passivity. If people on Taiwan are pinning their hopes on unrealistic expectations of foreign support, they are merely revealing defects in their strategic thinking.

Therefore one must consider the actual situation in cross-Strait military strength. Even if one factors the US and Japan into the strategic picture, the result does not favor Taiwan. Mainland military aircraft circumnavigating the island is sufficient to demonstrate the pressure it can exert on Taiwan. Mainland military aircraft refrained from entering the ROC air defense identification zone. They also refrained from crossing the center line of the Strait. This shows the flight was merely a political statement. PLA Air Force restraint was a show of rationality.

Since taking office, the Tsai government has made an effort to develop the military hardware and shipbuilding industries. It has made gains in military procurements from the United States. But this is a declaration of military strength. It is of no help whatsoever to the real goal of national defense, peace and prosperity. Since time immemorial, the highest ideal in warfare, has been "to win without fighting”. For Taiwan, it is the only option.

從國家戰略高度看共機繞島事件
2016/12/9 中國時報

大陸解放軍軍機分別由宮古海峽和巴士海峽穿越第一島鏈,最後在台灣東部會合,日本軍機緊急起飛攔截伴飛,我空軍則維持遠距監控並未伴飛,引發許多質疑。

首先應探究大陸軍機繞島飛行事件的意義,究竟是準軍事行動,或政治宣示行為,如果是前者,我空軍理應果斷採取相對應的軍事行為,以確保國家安全。應行動未行動是失職,軍人失職是非常嚴重的行為。

不過,這次事件,大陸軍機未進入我防空識別區,亦未穿越海峽中線,可以研判,此舉政治宣示性質大於軍事行為,目的在向台灣及美、日兩國宣示大陸軍事能量今非昔比。過去8年兩岸關係大幅推進,軍事對峙氛圍也有所緩解,但這並不意味著大陸放鬆了軍事建設及對台軍事部署,恰恰相反,隨著大陸經濟實力的大幅躍升,其軍事實力也在突飛猛進,兩岸軍事對比早已失衡。更重要的是,大陸的軍事準備不再停留在口頭宣示和針對個別政治事件的緊急應對,而是進入常態化備戰階段。

台灣民眾記憶猶新的1995年和1996年兩次飛彈危機,是大陸針對李登輝訪美和總統大選的應對作法,事實證明軍事動作不僅沒有發揮效果,反而助長了台灣民眾對大陸的反感。對此大陸及時做出調整,此後即較少公開訴諸軍事動作。到胡錦濤時代,進一步宣告要致力於兩岸關係和平發展,「不承諾放棄使用武力」的說法雖未被摒棄,但也逐漸淡出官方論述。

飛彈危機期間美國派出航母進入台灣海峽,也讓大陸深感芒刺在背,因而加速軍事革新,致力於武器裝備更新,現在又組建航母編隊及外太空武力,對台軍事力量今非昔比。這次軍機繞飛行動,解放軍完成從台灣南北兩側的閉環,正是大陸近20年軍事實力提升的集中表現,也展現大陸的常態化軍事準備。相信今後類似事件還會經常發生,台灣對此必須清醒認識。

當然,我們也注意到日軍對此事件的應對作為。台日防空識別區相鄰,大陸軍機沿我東部海岸防空識別區線外飛行,意味進入日本防空識別區,日空軍乃緊急升空伴飛,顯示日軍對大陸軍事行為滴水不漏的嚴密監控。這也意味一旦解放軍有意在台灣東部海岸採取軍事動作,要面對來自後方美、日軍隊的威脅。如此觀之,縱使海峽兩岸軍事實力對比失衡,從整體的區域戰略格局來看,這種戰略平衡的狀態並未發生劇變,台灣也不至於實質進入軍事威脅的困境之中。

大陸軍事實力突飛猛進,讓日本軍隊疲於奔命,大陸接連穿過津輕海峽、宮古海峽,更在釣魚台水域常態巡航,日本除了密切關注以外也無更多應對作為,駐日美軍也基本採取克制態度,未與大陸軍隊正面對峙。從這個角度看,即便西太平洋戰略平衡短期內不會改變,但美、日對台海兩岸的影響能力也逐漸下降,最終將不得不將主要精力放在與大陸的博弈,失去戰略支援台灣的決心。

這意味許多人幻想美、日馳援台灣的局面不可能再度發生,很多台獨主張者不怕兩岸軍事衝突,基本上都是來自上次海峽飛彈危機的經驗,看到美國航母的支援,讓這些人更加深信,一旦兩岸開戰,美、日會立即協防台灣,即便台灣軍事實力每況愈下,也不影響台灣的安全。但如今的局面顯然與他們的想像背道而馳,從近年來的幾次事件來看,美、日很難再如過去那樣直接介入,反而都只能採取被動因應的作法。台獨若將自己的希望寄託在不切實際的外來支援上,只會凸顯他們戰略思維的脆弱。

因此考量兩岸軍事對比的實際狀況,即便加入美、日因素後的整體戰略格局,也同樣不利於台灣,大陸軍機繞島飛行足以證明其軍事能量對台灣軍事壓力的實質存在。但大陸軍機並未進入我防空識別區,也未穿過海峽中線,只是單純政治宣示性質,空軍的克制動作顯得理性。

蔡政府上台以來致力於推動國機國造和國艦國造,對美軍事採購也有新的進展,但這更多是提升軍力的宣示,對改變兩岸軍事失衡格局沒有任何助益,根本之道仍在於以和平發展為目標的國防建設,「不戰而屈人之兵」自古以來都是戰爭的最高境界,對台灣來說,更是唯一選擇。

No comments: