China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 16, 2016
Executive Summary: If the government's “national defense autonomy” proposal can be implemented smoothly, it will undoubtedly reduce Taiwan's need for US arms purchases, and reduce pressure on the defense budget. But this is not what the US side wants to see. Trump in particular, is committed to arms sales to Taiwan. In such a case, the Tsai government must choose between supporting domestic manufacture and US arms purchases.
Full Text Below:
US president-elect Donald Trump has touched a sensitive nerve by calling attention to cross-Strait issues. One cannot assume that this will be his policy upon taking office. But Trump himself and his appointments of key White House staff members and national security advisors do not bode well. The three way interaction among Washington, Beijing, Taipei may be troubled.
After speaking with President Tsai, Trump Tweeted that the US sells billions of dollars in arms to Taiwan every year. This explains why he picked up the phone, and raised speculation that he would increase arms sales to Taiwan upon taking office. Trump even questioned the need for the United States to adhere to the One China Policy. His main purpose however, was to adopt a hard bargaining position, in the hope of linking the One China Policy to Sino-US trade negotiations. Trump is aware of the importance of the One China Policy. But he intends to use it as a bargaining chip in exchange for other concessions. He simultaneously used the opportunity to increase US strategic commitment to Mainland China, allowing for greater latitude in US policy toward Taiwan.
In fact, the US government has long adhered to the One China Policy. But it has also had its own counter-strategies. The United States government is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act and will resist any resort to force or other high-handed means to endanger the safety and socio-economic system of the public on Taiwan. This is a commonly held perception on Taiwan. The United States will help in the event of cross-Strait crisis. But this does not mean that the United States will send troops to confront the Mainland directly. The main idea is to enhance Taiwan's independent defense capability. The most important means of achieving this, is arms sales to Taiwan. But pressure from the Mainland and the international situation, limits the quality and quantity of US arms sold to Taiwan. They do not fully meet Taiwan's needs, and are often delayed for various reasons.
The government's budget is limited, and the funds earmarked for national defense have been inadequate. Since democratization, the defense budget has declined relative to GDP. It has remained close to 2% in recent years, far below US expectations. The United States has long urged Taiwan to increase the percentage of defense budget to 3%. US Department of Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asian Affairs Abraham Denmark recently took part in a think tank forum. He made clear that the Mainland has undergone military modernization and is determined to reunify China. Taiwan must make preparations and invest in order to contain aggression. Taiwan's defense budget has not kept pace with the threat, and therefore must be increased.
President Tsai declared her commitment to this goal during her election campaign. At this moment, the Tsai government's defense policy and the United States government's policy for Taiwan are aligned. Trump's words and deeds have not broken out of this US government framework. They actively promote it. Increasing tensions in US-China relations will make arms sales to Taiwan easier. Either that, or they may enable the US to extract concessions from the Mainland in other areas. In any event this strategy is favorable to the US.
The problem is mainly on the Taiwan side. President Tsai declared her desire for "national defense autonomy". She wants “domestic manufacture of warplanes” and “domestic manufacture of warships”. She wants a win-win situation whereby she can upgrade Taiwan's armaments, while developing the defense industry. But Taiwan is limited in its R & D capability and experience. It can implement localization only in limited areas. It may be able to realize small-scale projects such as the Hsiung Feng II and Hsiung Feng III Mobile Launch Vehicles. Important projects include the Air Force next-generation military trainer. The Han Hsiang Company would make replacements for the AT-3 trainer and F-5E/F fighters. But R&D time and capacity constraints, and the transition period required, mean that foreign arms purchases would still be needed to fill the gap. The design and construction of submarines still presents many difficulties for Taiwan, which must rely on the US for technical support. Taiwan remains dependent upon the US for missiles, helicopters, and other weapons and equipment. In the short term, these must be purchased from the United States. They cannot change our dependence on the United States. Taiwan also finds itself in at a disadvantage when bargaining over high-priced weapons from the United States.
If the government's proposal can be implemented smoothly, it will undoubtedly reduce Taiwan's need for US arms purchases, and reduce pressure on the defense budget. But this is not what the US side wants to see. Trump in particular, is committed to arms sales to Taiwan. Also, weapons projects would be based on R&D progress on Taiwan. Promoting the domestic manufacture of weapons systems would enable Taiwan to produce competitive weapons, as it has in the past. In such a case, the Tsai government must choose between supporting domestic manufacture and US arms purchases.
President Tsai wants national defense autonomy to develop the relevant industries. She faces constraints from internal R&D technical capacity. More importantly, she faces constraints from the United States. If Taiwan is subject to US policy needs, any efforts toward national defense autonomy will be in vain. More importantly, Taiwan's budget is limited. Many needs must be met. Social welfare, national pensions, health care reform, and other needs, all require funding. Adequate funding is also needed to cope with the temporary turmoil caused by reform. Clearly the government lacks the capacity to increase the defense budget. Still less can it afford to flip-flop between the localization of the arms industry and US arms purchases.
The Tsai government faces a dilemma. It must extricate itself from this whirlpool. The best way to do this, is to institutionalize peaceful cross-Strait relations and end cross-Strait military confrontation.
和平是王道 警惕對美軍購漩渦
2016/12/16 中國時報
美國總統當選人川普接連挑起兩岸問題的敏感神經，雖然不能就此論斷他就任以後的對中政策，但從川普本人及他任命白宮重要幕僚與國安團隊要角的言談，可以清楚嗅出令人不安的氣息，美中台三角互動關係將進入多事之秋。
川普在與蔡總統通電話之後，就在推特上以美國每年對台軍售數十億美元作為理由，說明他為什麼該接這通電話，引發外界對他強化對台軍售動機的猜測。後續川普進一步質疑美國堅持一中政策的必要性，但他主要思路是將其視為一種交易，希望將一中政策納入中美有關貿易的談判之中。川普並非不知道一中政策的重要，而是打算拿來交換其他問題的解決，同時，也可以藉此機會拉高美國對中政策的戰略縱深，讓美國的對台政策可以更為游刃有餘。
事實上，美國政府雖然堅持一中政策，但一直以來都有自己的應對策略。美國政府受到《台灣關係法》的約束，會抵抗任何訴諸武力或使用其他高壓手段，而危及台灣人民安全及社會經濟制度的行動。這也構成台灣社會普遍認知，一旦兩岸出現危機，美國會出手相助，但這並不意味著美國會為此直接派兵與大陸正面對抗。美國的主要思路是提升台灣的自主國防能力，其最重要的實現形式就是對台軍售。只是受限於來自大陸的壓力和國際局勢，美國對台軍事的品質和數量並不完全符合台灣的需求，且常常因為種種原因而延宕。
對台灣來說，政府財政預算有限，投入國防的資金一直難以滿足需求，而自從民主化以來國防預算占GDP的比重更是一直在下降，近年來已經接近2%，遠低於美國對台灣的期許。一直以來，美國都要求台灣將國防預算的比重提高到3%，美國國防部主管亞洲事務的副助理部長鄧志強近日在參與智庫論壇時即明確表示，大陸的軍事現代化和統一決心，使得台灣在準備和投資遏制侵略的能力變得義不容辭，而台灣的國防預算沒有跟上威脅的演進，因此應該增加。
對此，蔡總統在競選期間也曾明確承諾要達到這個目標，現階段蔡政府的國防政策與美國的對台政策在方向上是一致的。而川普的言行，也並未跳脫出美國政府的這一框架，反而是在積極推動。透過升高美中關係的緊張局勢，可以讓對台軍售更為順利地推動，或者藉此換取大陸在別的議題上讓步，無論如何這都是對美方穩贏的策略。
問題主要在台灣這一邊。蔡總統宣告全力推動「國防自主」，並期望通過「國機國造」和「國艦國造」項目來實現提升軍備能力與發展國防工業的雙贏局面。但台灣受限於研發能力和經驗的不足，只能在有限幾個領域實現國產化，目前有實現前景的主要是雄二、雄三機動發射車等小規模項目，重要項目則有空軍下一代高教機，由漢翔公司負責，逐步取代AT-3教練機和F-5E/F戰鬥機，但即便如此，因為研發時程和產能的限制，機型轉換的間隙可能仍需要對外採購來填補。至於潛艦的設計建造，台灣也同樣面臨重重困難，仍須依賴美方的技術支持。至於飛彈、直升機等武器裝備，還是只能仰賴對美採購，短期內不可能改變依賴美國的局面，台灣對美國的高價武器也難有討價還價的能力。
政府的這一構想如果能夠順利實現，無疑會減少台灣對美國軍購的需求，降低國防預算的支出壓力，這一局面並非美方所樂見，尤其是川普致力於推動對台軍售，在相關武器項目上也會根據台灣方面研製的進度採取相應措施，比如推銷台灣有機會取得進展的武器項目以達到競爭目的，這在過去也是所在多有。在這種情況下，蔡政府必須在支持國產與對美軍購兩者之間做出取捨。
蔡總統想要透過國防自主來發展相關產業的構想，不光要受到內部研發技術能力的限制，更重要的是要面對來自美國的阻礙，若台灣要受制於美國的政策需要，相關努力很容易就付諸東流。更重要的是，台灣的財政預算十分有限，又有龐大的社會福利需求，後續國民年金、健保改革等議題都牽涉到財政資金的分配，需要政府給予足夠的資金保障應對改革帶來的暫時動盪。在這種情況下，顯然沒有餘力再進一步提升國防預算的比重，更無法承受在國產化與美國軍備之間搖擺的政策損失。
面臨此種困局，蔡政府必須設法跳出這一漩渦，根本之道還是實現兩岸關係和平發展的制度化，消解兩岸軍事對峙的氛圍，如此才不至於在國防預算上空耗資源。
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