Su Tseng-chang says No to the Vice-presidency

Su Tseng-chang says No to the Vice-presidency
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
April 14, 2007

Comment: According to the rhetoric of democratic universalism, ambitious politicians within democracies and other monopolistic states seek political office because "they wish to dedicate themselves to public service,"

If you are too old for bedtime stories, you are old enough to realize this assertion is a fairy tale.

The unseemly narcissism displayed by the ambitious politicians mentioned in the following United Daily News editorial reveals the real reason why politicians within democracies and other monopolistic states seek elective office.

They want to "be somebody." And once they have "become somebody" by winning elective office, they want to remake the world in their own image, and they want to do it using our hard-earned tax money.

Let's face it. Why should any of us give a damn which ambitious demagogue insists on being president, and which is willing to "settle" for being vice-president?

Why should any of us meekly accept the premise that these ambitious demagogues have a right to live off our tax money?

If anyone knows a better reason for rejecting democracy and opting for market anarchism than this, speak up.


Premier Su Tseng-chang (DPP)


Speaker of the Legislature Wang Jin-Pyng (KMT) A Pan Green Wolf in Pan Blue Sheep's Clothing?

Su Tseng-chang says No to the Vice-presidency
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
April 14, 2007

The road to the presidency is riddled with obstacles. On the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) side, Su Tseng-chang has declared that if he loses the party primaries, he will turn down the vice-presidential slot. On the Kuomintang (KMT) side, Wang Jin-pyng refuses to commit to a "Ma Wang ticket."

Su Tseng-chang's declaration shows that the issue of who will be the DPP's presidential candidate may cause trouble. On the KMT side, Wang Jin-pyng's moves have made it hard for him to accept a "Ma Wang ticket" for fear of becoming a laughingstock. Not only are the identities of the candidates uncertain, so are the methods by which they will be chosen.

Su Tseng-chang's declaration that "he won't accept the vice-presidency" reveals his determination to burn his bridges, to do or die, in order to consolidate his voter base. Another consideration is the divisive effects of the primaries. Whether the result is a "Su Hsieh ticket" or a "Hsieh Su ticket," bad blood may make any shotgun marriage impossible. Su Tseng-chang has declared that "he won't accept the vice-presidency." On the one hand he is attempting to turn calls for a "Hsieh Su ticket" around, hoping to bring back swing voters. On the other hand he is rejecting the idea of a "Su Hsieh ticket." The question is if Su declares that "he won't accept the vice-presidency," can we really expect Hsieh to declare "No problem, the vice-presidency is okay with me?"

Su and Hsieh are two candidates evenly matched in popularity, but with clear differences in direction and style. Whether Su or Hsieh emerges as the DPP's presidential candidate will have a dramatically different impact on the future of the DPP and Taiwan. Therefore whether Su or Hsieh emerges as the frontrunner really does make a difference. The DPP party primaries have not allowed the differences in the two candidates to come to the fore. Su Tseng-chang's declaration that "he won't accept the vice-presidency" may be an attempt to underscore the differences between the two candidates, to prevent the party primaries from becoming focused exclusively on the issue of "who will be president and who will be vice-president." If that is the case, the election has changed from a "non zero sum" game into a "zero sum" game.

Meanwhile, inside the KMT, Wang Jin-pying has taken Ma Ying-jeou hostage. That is why Ma has reiterated that he "would give priority to Legislative Speaker Wang as his vice-presidential running mate." Wang Jin-pyng has questioned Ma Ying-jeou's status as frontrunner in no uncertain terms. He refuses to say whether he would accept the vice-presidential spot on a Ma Wang ticket. When confronted, Wang Jin-pyng will only say "Thank you," and "I will continue listening to the public." In fact, Wang Jin-pyng is merely attempting to keep Ma Ying-jeou hostage. By refusing to indicate whether he would accept the vice-presidency, he is preventing Ma Ying-jeou from settling on a campaign strategy. As long as Wang Jin-pyng refuses to clarify his position, Ma Ying-jeou cannot plan ahead. Wang Jin-pyng is giving himself maneuvering room while imprisoning Ma Ying-jeou in a box.

Su Tseng-chang has declared that "he won't accept the vice-presidency." Wang Jin-pyng, even more than Su Tseng-chang, ought to do the same. Wang Jin-pyng's outrageous remark that "elite elements from an ethnic minority have no right to govern an ethnic majority," directed against Ma Ying-jeou, amounts to an open accusation that the KMT party primaries lack legitimacy. But if Ma Ying-jeou becomes the party's presidential candidate through a process that Wang Jin-pying has declared lacks legitimacy, how will Wang Jin-pyng justify becoming his running mate? Wang Jin-pyng has said that when he met with Lien Chan two days ago, Lien did not ask him to sign a pledge not to abandon the party and declare an independent candidacy. Wang Jin-pyng wants the right to abandon the party and declare an independent candidacy. At the same time he wants to lean on Lien Chan. So why not come right out and declare forthrightly that "he won't accept the vice-presidency?"

Based on political calculations, Wang Jin-pyng has refused to take a stand on a potential "Ma Wang ticket." Wang's calculating behavior harms Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT without benefitting himself. If Wang Jin-pyng were to commit to a "Ma Wang ticket," and Ma Ying-jeou was indicted, Wang could still be the KMT's presidential candidate, and could serve more effectively in Ma's stead. If Wang Jin-pyng wants us to believe that committing to a "Ma Wang ticket" today would make it harder for him to stand in for Ma tomorrow, he is not being truthful. By stalling for time, Wang Jin-pyng is engaging in wishful thinking. He wants to be certain that abandoning the party and declaring an independent candidacy is no longer an option before he accepts a "Ma Wang ticket." His political calculations are a little too devious. Wang Jin-pyng will have to decide whether to accept a "Ma Wang ticket." The KMT should give Wang Jin-pyng a deadline by which he must respond. If Wang Jin-pyng drags his feet and refuses to commit, he is not only holding Ma Ying-jeou hostage, he is holding the entire KMT hostage.

Su Tseng-chang has declared that "he won't accept the vice-presidency." But if circumstances force him to change his position, Su Tseng-chang would not rule out the DPP's vice-presidential nomination. This is what makes the DPP unique, its flexibility and willingness to see the bigger picture. So far Wang Jin-pyng has not declared whether he would accept the vice-presidency. His failure to do so will undermine his legitimacy in the event he belatedly does. It will also endanger the KMT's election prospects. Damaging the party without benefitting himself. Is this the strategy Wang Jin-pyng has chosen?

For the KMT and DPP, the election has focused on the question of who is or is not willing to accept the vice-presidency. Su Tseng-chang has decided to participate in DPP party primaries and has declared that "he won't accept the vice-presidency." Wang Jin-pyng on the other hand, has denounced the KMT party primaries and refused to state whether he would accept the vice-presidency. The reactions of the two parties to similar circumstances underscore their very real differences.

Original Chinese below:

從蘇貞昌宣示不當副手談起
聯合報／社論
2007/04/14

總統大選變幻詭譎。在民進黨方面，蘇貞昌揚言「初選落敗，不當副手」；在國民黨方面，王金平迄不願對「馬王配」表態。

蘇貞昌此話，顯示民進黨「初選前二名正副搭檔」的主張可能生變；另在國民黨方面，則王金平將情勢操弄至今日地步，他若接受「馬王配」，亦恐成鬧劇與笑柄。換句話說，現在非但總統候選人皆未定，而且如何搭檔的變數亦驟增。

蘇貞昌「不當副手」的放話，主要是展現破釜沉舟、背水一戰的決心，以鞏固初選票源。他的另一層考慮，則可能是因初選的撕裂效應日見嚴重，未來無論「蘇謝配」或「謝蘇配」，氣味皆已不對，恐怕不能強配。蘇貞昌如今宣示「不當副手」，一方面是在試圖轉化「謝蘇配」希望他退而求其次的游離選票，另一方面亦不無同時否定「蘇謝配」的意味。試問：蘇宣示「不當副手」，難道謝能說「無魚蝦也好，副手也可以」？

蘇謝二人的民氣旗鼓相當，但在路線及風格上卻有明顯差異；二者何人出線競選總統，或當選總統，對民進黨未來的走向及台灣的前景亦將有相當不同的影響。因而，對民進黨而言，及對台灣而言，蘇謝二者何人出線確有差別；但是，民進黨內「初選前二名正副搭檔」的期待，卻使蘇謝二人的差異無以凸顯。如今，蘇貞昌「不當副手」的宣示，無非是欲凸顯二人的差異，使選情不再陷於「初選前二名正副搭檔」的泥淖中。倘係如此，選局已從「非零和」（非正即副），變成了「零和」（不當副手）。

再看國民黨的馬王之爭。馬英九被王金平挾持，因此反覆宣示「優先徵詢王院長為副手」；但王金平一方面厲言否定了馬英九出線的正當性，另一方面卻對是否接受「馬王配」為副總統候選人遲不表態。面對追問，王金平只有「謝謝」和「繼續傾聽基層聲音」兩句話。其實，王金平的此種手段，只是更權謀地、更具殺傷力地挾持了馬英九；他既不明確承諾當副手，讓馬英九早日拿定走向；亦不明確拒任副手，放馬英九自由。結果是，王金平進退自如，馬英九進退失據。

蘇貞昌宣示「不任副手」，王金平其實更應如此。王金平對「少數族群菁英」馬英九之不以為然溢於言表，對國民黨初選之不具正當性亦公開抨擊；則倘若馬英九是透過如此不具正當性的黨內初選程序出線，而王金平若竟接納為搭檔副手，豈能自圓其說？何況，直至最近兩天，王金平尚稱，他與連戰見面，連戰並未要他簽下「不脫黨參選」的協議承諾；然則，王金平既仍要擺出未承諾「不脫黨參選」的架式，又一切僅以「連戰說」為憑靠，何不亦直接表明「不任副手」以明心志？

王金平迄今未對「馬王配」表態，充滿權謀計算；可謂損馬英九不利己，亦損國民黨不利己。其實，萬一馬英九若因案不能參選，王金平即使已承諾「馬王配」，亦仍可代表國民黨參選總統，且可能更有利於代馬出征；但王金平方面如今放話，謂接受「馬王配」將不利未來代馬出征，其實似是而非。王金平的如意算盤，似欲將情勢拖延至他「脫黨參選」的可能性完全破滅之時，才開口接受「馬王配」，這種政治算盤就未免太過機巧了。王金平應當早日對是否接受「馬王配」表態，國民黨亦應要求王金平給一個回答的最後期限。因為，王金平遲不表態，不僅是挾持了馬英九，亦不啻挾持了整個國民黨。

蘇貞昌雖宣示「不當副手」，但若未來情勢變化至他必須改口的階段，蘇貞昌亦不無屈居副手的可能性。這正是民進黨的特質，維持彈性，顧全大局。但王金平迄今未對是否「不當副手」表態，只會使他未來承諾出任副手的正當性愈來愈低，亦必使國民黨的選情更趨險惡。損黨不利己，這難道就是王金平的心志所向？

選情變化至今，對國民黨及民進黨而言，似乎皆將以宣示「當不當副手」來澄清情勢。但是，蘇貞昌參加初選而宣示不當副手，與王金平否定初選卻不對是否出任副手表態，兩黨在相似的情勢中，其實仍有不可以道里計的差異存在！

Putting Taiwan to the Torch

Putting Taiwan to the Torch
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
April 13, 2007

Comment: What is the significance of the incident discussed in the following China Times editorial?

Simply that the fundamentally fascistic nature of the Taiwan independence movement is becoming clearer with each passing day. My characterization of Taiwan independence as a fascist political movement motivated by self-hating anti-Chinese racism is being borne out by developments such as the Grass Mountain arson incident.

The Grass Mountain arson incident can be considered a watershed moment, a turning point, for the worse. With the Grass Mountain arson incident, Taiwan independence movement thuggery has transitioned from verbal expressions of self-hating anti-Chinese racism, to physical expressions of self-hating anti-Chinese racism.

Will the Grass Mountain arson incident be remembered as the precursor to a "ben tu" Taiwanese version of Kristallnacht, the infamous pogrom against Jews in Germany and Austria in 1938?

I fear that it will, but hope that it won't.

Does the Grass Mountain arson incident foreshadow a repeat of the tragic 228 Incident of 1947?

I fear that it does, but hope that it doesn't.


TTV News: Accident? Arson?


Arrows point to Evidence of Arson

Putting Taiwan to the Torch
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
April 13, 2007

Forensic analysis has confirmed that the Yangmingshan Grass Mountain Chateau fire was the result of arson. But so far investigators have no clues as to the identity of the arsonist or his motive, nor do they believe his identity or motive will necessarily come to light in the future. It would seem however, that to ruling and opposition party political figures hoping to make political hay out of the fire, the truth is irrelevant.

Prosecuting a case requires evidence. Because surveillance equipment inside the Grass Mountain Chateau suffered fire damage, this case will not be easy to solve. Facilities dedicated to Chiang Kai-shek in Taoyuan and Ta Hsi have also been the targets of graffiti artists. The recent succession of "Purge Chiang" campaigns, statue-toppling incidents, and other political acts, give one even more reason to suspect that the Grass Mountain Chateau arson was politically motivated. On the other hand, how much we can say is limited by how much evidence we have. Without concrete evidence, speculation is useless, even counterproductive.

But ruling and opposition politicians don't seem to care whether the police investigate or not. They have already arrived at their own conclusions, and are already engaged in verbal warfare. They make either subtle insinuations or engage in broad satire. The Blues accuse the Greens. The Greens lash back at the Blues. Even the fact that Taipei mayor Hao Lung-ping and his father Hao Pei-tsung dined at the Grass Mountain Chateau ten hours before the incident has been cited as reason for suspicion. Never mind the lack of any logical connection.

A fiery conflagration has supplied the ruling and opposition parties with additional ammunition to use against one another. It has allowed them to project their ethnic prejudices onto one another and for them to offer one-sided, arbitrary interpretations. It has allowed them to exploit an arson case about which the truth remains unclear, spinning the incident for maximum political advantage during an intensely fought election, with utter disregard for the lasting suspicion and hostility their behavior will generate.

What is the truth? Perhaps it was politically motivated venting of anger. Perhaps it was some arsonist's momentary impulse. We still don't know, but few people on the island are suprised. Because recently a succession of crude, high-profile political gestures, intended to overthrow past symbols of autocratic rule, have increased social unrest and widened Taiwan's internal divisions.

Following a succession of such acts of "political arson" by the ruling regime, one cannot rule out the possibility that some individuals may have been stirred up enough to resort to extreme measures. With enough agitation, enough manipulation, enough provocation, conflicts will always get out of control. Even the cleverest arsonist cannot guarantee that the fire he sets will not get out of control. Often, for his own gratification, he will ignore the potential disaster he might precipitate. Likewise, when political figures provoke mutual hostility and encourage ethnic divisions, ignoring the consequences of their "political arson," when all sorts of "purge Chiang" campaigns are already proceeding at full speed, when a stray spark becomes a raging firestorm, can they really pretend to be surprised? If one deliberately provokes conflict, conflict is what one will get. Who can guarantee that he will be able to limit the scope of the conflict? The consequences will be borne collectively by 23 million people. Repeated acts of "political arson" have already left Taiwan scarred and on the verge of suffocation.

In the wake of democratic reform, one must of course demand justice. But "transitional justice" ought to be defined as rectifying the mistakes of the past through self-introspection, in order to establish a more civilized, more perfect social order. When we condemn the White Terror and compensate its victims, we need to identify those behaviors which were unjust. But more importantly, we need to ensure that such injustices will not be recur in the future. Let us ensure that such dictatorial behavior never recurs in this land we love, and that posterity is never subjected to such humiliation and fear again.

Taiwan's "transitional justice" is merely willful retaliation that substitutes one tyranny with another, merely "victor's justice" that turns black into white, merely an instrument in the service of political campaigns and power struggles that stop at nothing and ignore all costs. Resorting to the same crude methods as past authoritarians to tear down the symbols of past authoritarian rule not only fails to consider the feelings of other ethnic groups, it provokes ethnic hatred and reaps political benefits from that collective hatred. This kind of "transitional justice" involves no justice, only a transition. The result is a society that has banished rational thought, sanctioned mob rule, and enthroned the arrested logic of "us" vs. "them."

Taiwan's politicians compete to see who can inflict the most grievous wounds on the body politic. No one seems either willing or able to heal those wounds. The ruling regime plays upon the ethnic majority's historical grievances. The opposition exaggerates ethnic minority insecurities. Neither side seems willing to dissuade their comrades from engaging in inappropriate statements or behavior for the sake of Taiwan's long term welfare.

In such a society, no one engages in dialogue, everyone engages in diatribes. No one hears anyone else, everyone hears only himself. No one tolerates dissent, or empathizes with anyone with a different background. We have been incarcerated by those who insist on reopening historical wounds, poisoned by those who prevent the wounds from healing. We look on helplessly as blood gushes from these deliberately inflicted wounds, and as the nation's lifeblood drains away.

The flames from the Grass Mountain Chateau fire, regardless of what the arsonist's motives may have been, have cast a flickering light on the sad state of Taiwan society.

Original Chinese below:

中時電子報
中國時報 　2007.04.13
草山行館這把火 燒出台灣多少迷惘與悲哀
中時社論

經過鑑識，陽明山草山行館的火災確定是人為縱火，但縱火者及其犯案動機至今仍毫無線索，將來未必能夠水落石出。但對企圖藉機炒作的朝野政治人物來說，真相似乎並不重要。

辦案要講證據，由於草山行館裡的監視錄影設備受到大火損毀，此案看來追查不易。儘管桃園大溪也同時傳出前蔣公行館遭到噴漆事件，在近來一連串「去蔣」、「拆銅像」等政治爭議下，令人更加有理由懷疑草山行館是一起出於政治動機的縱火案，但畢竟有一分證據說一分話，沒有具體證據，現在怎麼揣測都是白搭，也無助於廓清事實。

可是朝野政治人物似乎不需要警方偵辦，自己就已對案情推演出各種論述，並且再次大打口水戰。或含沙射影，或明嘲暗諷，藍的指控綠的，綠的反擊藍的，連事發前十幾個小時台北市長郝龍斌和父親郝柏村曾去草山行館吃飯都被影射，也不管其中有什麼邏輯可言。

一場無名火，提供了更多朝野相互指責的火力，大家在其中焦躁地投射出各自的族群情結，以完全片面獨斷的解讀，把一件真相未明的縱火案作對自己最有利的詮釋，以求在戰況激烈的選舉中勝出，卻無視於族群間的猜忌仇視繼續加劇。

真相到底是什麼？可能是有政治動機的縱火洩恨，也可能只是某個縱火犯的臨時起意，我們還不知道，可是，對於這種事，很多人倒也並不全然意外。因為，在近來一連串蓄意以粗暴手法高調打倒昔日威權的象徵動作後，社會不安與族群對立已經增溫，台灣內部的分裂敵視益加擴大。

在執政當局一連串的「政治縱火」之後，不能排除某些人的情緒被煽動到逕行採取激烈動作。有煽動、有操弄、有挑撥，就可能發生失控衝突。再高明的縱火者，也很難保證火勢一定能控制在某個範圍內，但卻往往只為了自己爽，而無視於可能造成的災難。同樣的，政治人物長期以來不斷擴大仇視、挑撥族群對立，無視後果地進行「政治縱火」，之前種種「去蔣」動作已經如火如荼了，如果真的擦槍走火出現失控事件，也不會在意料之外。蓄意挑動衝突，當然會引發衝突，誰能保證一定可以控制衝突的規模？而後果，當然是二千三百萬人共同承擔。一再的「政治縱火」，早已把台灣燒得傷痕累累、奄奄一息了。

在民主改革之後，當然應該尋求「轉型正義」。但「轉型正義」的意義，應該是在反省與矯正昔日過錯的同時，努力重建一套更文明美好的價值體系。我們譴責白色恐怖、彌補受害者時，不只要指明那些行為是不公不義的，更要確定公義是非將從此得到信仰與捍衛，讓那些踐踏人權、粗暴獨裁的行為不再重演於這塊我們深愛的土地，讓子孫後代永遠不必體驗那種屈辱與恐懼。

但是，台灣最近執行的「轉型正義」，卻是以暴易暴式的恣意報復，是勝者為王式的顛倒黑白，更是為了選舉造勢或權力鬥爭，而不擇手段也不計後果的廝殺工具。用和昔日威權者同樣粗暴的手段拆解威權象徵，非但不顧及不同族群者的歷史情感，甚至是刻意刺激不安全感以挑撥族群仇恨，然後在族群仇恨中收割政治利益。這種只有「轉型」沒有「正義」的政治煽動，結果很容易導致整個社會完全失去理性思考空間，任由近乎暴民政治的狂暴、片面、非友即敵的弱智邏輯宰制。

看看台灣，政治人物似乎人手一把刀，都在忙著割裂戳刺，然後用自己刺出的傷口進行血淋淋的政治炒作，再也沒有人有空間或有能力進行彌合癒療了。執政者挑動多數族群的歷史悲情，在野者誇大少數族群的不安全感，沒有一方能為台灣長遠福祉考量而強力約束黨內不當言行。

這樣的社會，只有對罵，不再對話；只選擇自己喜歡聽的話，不再包容及傾聽不同的聲音，也不再體諒關懷不同的族群。我們被執著於歷史創傷的人捆綁，被不允許創傷癒合的人下毒，在蓄意製造的嶄新裂痕中傷痛流血，眼睜睜看著台灣的生機一點一點流失，但是無力自救。

草山行館那把火，不管動機為何，至少照出了當前台灣社會的創痛與悲哀。

Party State Withdrawal from the Media has become a Rumor on the Wind

Party State Withdrawal from the Media has become a Rumor on the Wind
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
April 12, 2007


Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV) homepage

Yesterday shareholders of Taiwan Television Enterprises (TTV) waged a proxy battle. Despite influence brought to bear by Cheng Wen-tsang and Steve Chen, the Hung Pang Construction Co, which has close relations with the Liberty Times, did not prevail. Instead, an alliance between Lai Kuo-chou and the Unique Group won the bid. From the public's perspective, the result is a case of "evading a tiger only to encounter a wolf." TTV remains at the mercy of political influence.

The proxy battle was fierce. Outwardly several financial groups were jockeying for control. In reality, only two political powers were engaged in a behind the scenes struggle. One was the Democratic Progressive Party, represented by Cheng Wen-tsang. The other was Lee Teng-hui, represented by Lai Kuo-chou. This is what is so absurd about the entire affair. The reason for the public offering of TTV shares was to implement the policy of "party, state, and military withdrawal from the media." Instead, the public offering merely provided an opportunity for behind-the-scenes manipulators to acquire control over the media. The public offering opened a gate through which the ruling party and the ruling regime could launch an assault on the media.

At a banquet for Japan's Fuji Television Network, Cheng Wen-tsang attempted to pressure Fuji to sell its shares of TTV to the DPP-friendly Liberty Times. Because of this, he lost his job as Government Information Office (GIO) Chief. The truth remains hidden. Minister of Economic Affairs Steve Chen both participated in and hosted the banquet. Whom did he represent? What was his purpose for being there? About these questions the Executive Yuan's investigation report remains evasive. The Su cabinet claimed that "The Liberty Times did not participate in either the bidding or the voting," hoping to let Cheng Wen-tsang off the hook. But when the Hung Pang Construction Company crossed the line during the proxy battle, that directly refuted Su Tseng-chang's lie.

Even after the Fuji Banquet Scandal was exposed, the Democratic Progressive Party government continued helping the Liberty Times and the Hung Pang Construction Company gain control of TTV. Shortly afterwards, via "shuttle diplomacy" by certain political figures, Huachun (Shinkong) Industrial Yarn Chairman Eric Wu sold his 1/10 interest in TTV to the Hung Pang Construction Company. This transaction opened another channel for Hung Pang in its bid to acquire private shares. Even though Hung Pang failed in its bid for a controlling interest in TTV, it has nevertheless been handed a backdoor pass. The government's effort to negotiate a sweetheart deal may have "failed." But as far as the Hung Pang Construction Company is concerned, it succeeded. Think about it. What sort of political pressure or quid pro quo could make former Taiwan Solidarity Union legislator at large Eric Wu betray Lee Teng-hui and sell his shares to a hostile group?

The ruling regime does not hesitate to demean itself by intervening in the proxy battle over media shares. In addition to the usual motives for collusion between government and business, it is motivated by the desire to infiltrate the media. By influencing the management, it can control the manner in which the media reports the news. This kind of manipulation not only flouts the principle of "party, state, and military withdrawal from the media," it runs counter to and infringes the right of media organizations to manage their business affairs. After such an intense proxy battle between shareholder factions, during which new enmities have added to old hatreds, how will TTV operations ever get back on track?

In fact, TTV is already a company with over half its shares in private hands. But the government does not respect the the wishes of private shareholders. It continually treats upper management positions as political rewards for services rendered. It even uses the shares it controls to stir up trouble, to conduct political struggles, indifferent to its duty to manage the company responsibly. Lai Kuo-chou was originally made chairman of the board on the basis of public shares, ignoring the requirement that public interests must be kept separate from private interests. Not only only did he conduct private negotiations with a Japanese shareholder, he discussed the matter of how to consolidate shares, inflicting serious harm upon the company. Despite losing money year after year, Lai Kuo-chou continues to occupy the throne, successfully acquiring control over huge numbers of public and private shares. How does the ruling regime intend to explain its initially humble but eventually arrogant attitude? And how can Lai Kuo-chou sell shares to the public yet still squat in the TTV chairman's seat, refusing to relinquish control?

The TTV public offering continues to make waves. The confusing shadows of political figures and the flagrant manipulation of public and private shares, show that the goal of "party, state, and military withdrawal from the media" has become nothing more than a wraith, shadowy and insubstantial. Even more demanding of our vigilance is the fact that after we remove the phony "party, state, and military withdrawal from the media" talismans and amulets, and examine "freedom of the press" on Taiwan, all we see are stigmata and scars. A single error in reporting the news by TVBS was enough for Democratic Progressive Party lawmakers to organize a political action group demanding that the station be closed down forever. The Taiwan Advertisers' Association, needless to say, chimed right in. Even the National Communications Commission (NCC), the independent agency charged with communications industry oversight, had only to deviate ever so slightly from the ruling regime's orthodoxy for the ruling DPP to demand both the replacement of individual officials and the dissolution of the commission as a whole. From this we can see that external threats to media independence are a thousand times more serious than any internal defects. The most appalling of these external threats is a ruling regime wielding absolute power over others, that does not know when enough is enough.

Overnight Lai Kuo-chou went from being the manager of a public company to the manager of a private company. Whether or not this is beneficial for TTV is hard to say. The key is whether another loophole will allow the Hung Pang Construction Company, which has now acquired control of TTV, to fulfill the role of Democratic Progressive Party proxy. If both sides approach each other with hostility, the result will be partisan bickering within the company, and all private shares will suffer the same fate. The plight of TTV reflects Taiwan's dirty politics, and is a tragedy for Taiwan's media. The bloody struggle between former directors Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian tells the whole story.

Original Chinese below:

黨政勢力退出媒體已成風中傳說
聯合報／社論
2007/04/12

台視釋股案昨天決標。結果，鄭文燦及陳瑞隆介入的自由時報關係企業鴻邦建設未能得逞，卻由與賴國洲結盟的非凡國際得標。對廣大民眾而言，這個結果無非是「未陷虎口，卻膏狼吻」，台視仍難逃政治勢力的魔掌。

這 次釋股大戰廝殺激烈，表面上是多家財團競標，實際上卻是兩股政治力量在幕後纏鬥：一是鄭文燦所代表的民進黨勢力，一則賴國洲為代表的李登輝勢力。這也正是 整起事件最荒謬之處：台視之所以必須出售公股，是因為要落實「黨政軍退出媒體」的政策承諾；孰料，政治力量卻伺機將黑手伸進媒體，釋股政策反而為「黨政進 攻媒體」開了「巧門」。

鄭文燦在「富士宴」上為特定媒體說項，因而丟了新聞局長職位，其幕後真相其實尚未解開。陳瑞隆以經濟部長之尊同時 參與邀宴，他奉誰之命，目的何在，行政院的調查報告始終支吾其詞。而當蘇揆以「自由時報並未參與投標」的說辭，意圖為鄭文燦開脫時，鴻邦建設在投標賽的出 線，其實已等於直接駁斥了蘇貞昌的謊言。

即使在「富士宴」醜聞曝光後，民進黨政府意圖為自由時報／鴻邦建設護航的運作，仍然沒有絲毫停 歇。在短短時間內，透過特定政治力量的運作穿梭，新光化纖董事長吳東昇將手中持有的一成許台視股票賣給鴻邦建設。這項交易，等於幫鴻邦在民股管道另闢渠 道，即使昨天鴻邦在公股決標中失利，它其實已從巧門拿到台視經營權的入場券。政府護航「未遂」，但鴻邦卻可以說是「已遂」。試想，吳東昇身為前台聯不分區 立委，要逼他背叛李登輝而將手中股票賣給敵對集團，那得多大的政治壓力或交換誘因，才能成交？

執政者之所以如此不惜身段介入媒體的釋股 戰，除了政商關係的苟合，無非企圖藉此使自己的影響力滲進媒體，透過影響經營階層來掌控媒體的報導取向。這種操作，不僅與它標榜的「黨政軍退出媒體」完全 背道而馳，甚至已達到妨害媒體事業自由經營的地步。而經過這次釋股的激烈火併，股東間新仇加上舊恨，台視經營豈不愈發難上軌道？

事實上， 台視早已是一家民股過半的公司，政府卻不尊重民股意願，一直將高層人事權當成酬庸，甚至利用手中公股興風作浪，遂行政治鬥爭，將公司治理置之度外。且看， 賴國洲原是以公股董事身分出任台視董事長，卻未恪守公私分際，不僅伺機與日商股東進行私下交易，更與國內財團洽談吃股，都嚴重損害公股代表的立場。但試 問：台視連年虧損，賴國洲始終高坐董事長寶座，最後還成功吃下大量公私股權；對此，執政者要如何解釋自己的前恭後倨？而賴國洲又何以在如今釋出公股仍霸著 台視不放？

台視釋股案高潮迭起，政治人物的錯亂身影，公股和民股的橫遭操弄，在在顯示「黨政軍退出媒體」已退化為虛構的幻象。更值得警惕 的是，揭開「黨政退出」的假符咒之後，我們檢視台灣的新聞自由，看到的只是傷痕累累。Ｔ台一則錯失報導，民進黨立委即發起「關台行動聯盟」，廣告主協會也 起而呼應；即連獨立的通訊傳播監督機構ＮＣＣ行事不合主政者之意，立即陷入個別撤換、整體瓦解的險境。如此看來，媒體外部干預的威脅，恐怕比內部結構的扭 曲嚴重千百倍；而其中最霸道的，就是生殺予奪不知適可而止的主政者。

賴國洲一夕之間從公股代表「變身」為民股，對台視是福是禍，殊難預 料；關鍵端在，經另一扇「巧門」取得台視股權的鴻邦，將如何扮演民進黨的代理角色。雙方若挾怨以對，恐怕只會在公司內部複製政黨惡鬥的結果，所有民股將同 遭其殃。台視的命運，反映的是台灣政治的汙濁，亦是反映台灣媒體的悲情；前後兩任主政者李登輝與陳水扁的這一場肉搏戰，說明了一切。

Can Su Tseng-chang recognize himself in the Mirror?

Can Su Tseng-chang recognize himself in the Mirror?
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
April 11, 2007


"Premier" Su Tseng-chang -- Can he still recognize himself in the mirror?


Mirror, mirror, one the wall, who's the ugliest of them all?

Comment: The following United Daily News editorial informs us that Su Tseng-chang was once a stand-up guy.

I'm skeptical as hell. But the UDN is the most trustworthy newspaper on Taiwan, so despite my skepticism, I'm inclined to take them at their word.

The only Su Tseng-chang I know about is the current version, the one the UDN editorial describes as a kleptocrat and a dictator, the one whom the UDN editors believe may have become a kleptocrat and a dictator due to the electoral demands of democratic politics.

The late, great Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek noted that in democratic politics "the worst get on top."

Taking Hayek's logic to its logical conclusion, we can safely conclude that "in order to get on top in democratic politics, one must become one of the worst."

If indeed that is the case, what more damning indictment of the corrupting influence of democracy could one ask for?

Can Su Tseng-chang recognize himself in the Mirror?
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
April 11, 2007

When Su Tseng-chang rose from bed this morning and looked in the mirror, did he recognize himself? Recently Su Tseng-chang has been behaving like a different person. He suddenly began promoting the "Rectification of Names," joking about moving the capital to southern Taiwan, talking about legalizing gambling and horse racing, and interfering with the neutral and independent National Communications Commission (NCC) and Central Election Committee. The simple, straightforward "Old Chang" has vanished. What everyone sees today is a scheming and dictatorial premier for whom the ends justifies the means. Is Su Tseng-chang pleased with what he sees in the mirror?

As a presidential candidate who hasn't resigned his current position as he should, Su Tseng-chang enjoys a distinct advantage. With abundant resources at his disposal, he could easily establish a record of achievements for his administration. But this is also a major test of Su Tseng-chang's character and powers of discrimination. It is precisely at such moments that an individual who possesses power can demonstrate his ability to practice moderation, eschew favoritism, reject opportunism, and display empathy. This is when we get to see what a man is made of.

Unfortunately, Su Tseng-chang has not made wise use of the authority and the resources at his disposal to do what a national leader ought to. Instead, he has abused his authority and misused his resources for short-term electoral advantage. If he continues down this path, will Su Tseng-chang transform his clearcut advantages into fatal liabilities?

Take his handling of the NCC for example. Su Tseng-chang not only revealed his dark side, he exceeded his legal authority. When an NCC committee member hired a relative as his chauffeur, that was clearly improper. The shameful conduct of a tiny minority of committee members has defiled the image of the NCC. However, the Su cabinet's handling of this matter was hardly in accordance with either the letter or spirit of the law. Instead, it was motivated from beginning to end by a desire to do away with the NCC altogether. Because its political agenda was so obvious, the Su cabinet has completely lost the right to claim that it is "merely governing in accordance with the law."

Premier Su is the nation's chief executive. And yet he feels nothing but hostility toward a governmental body entrusted with a special duty, and wants nothing more than to destroy that body. This is something truly difficult to imagine. A nation's chief executive ought to show respect for all its officials, even lowly local leaders. Besides, the NCC is a specially established, wholly independent agency. The Executive Yuan has supervisory authority over the NCC. But when Su Tseng-chang rashly ordered an NCC Committee Member suspended on the basis of a single administrator without portfolio's one-sided report, he is guilty not only of usurping authority, he is guilty of overstepping the principle of "nulla poena sine lege" (no penalty without a law). Su Tseng-chang is guilty not only of violating the law, he is guilty of violating the constitution.

"Governing in accordance with the law" is a constitutional principle that any chief executive should observe. But based on the way Su Tseng-chang has taken a scalpel to the NCC, what the people are actually seeing is the face of a dictator without the slightest regard for the Rule of Law. Besides, even as the Su cabinet brandishes a club against the NCC, it is simultaneously "mediating" the Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV) proxy battle. If an NCC Committee Member who hires a relative as his chauffeur deserves to be severely punished, then what punishment does the Su cabinet deserve for selling a publicly-operated television station to its political cronies? Isn't the Su cabinet's crime far more egregious than the NCC Committee Member's?

Furthermore, even as the struggle between the ruling and opposition parties over the Central Election Committee (CEC) rages, word that the Executive Yuan intends to bulldoze its way through any opposition has spread, that it intends to nominate the committee members for the new session on its own, ignoring legislative procedure, and displaying an attitude of shocking barbarism. If this is indeed the case, then on the one hand the Democratic Progressive Party is ignoring the legislature. On the other hand the Su cabinet is illegally forming a Central Election Committee. Can this still be considered a democratic nation? Can the chief executive of a democratic nation be allowed to get away with behavior as lawless as this? If the Executive Yuan persists in manipulating the CEC in this manner, is this not tantamount to pulling democracy out by the roots? Does a Su Tseng-chang who behaves in such a manner, have the effrontery to announce that he is a candidate for president?

All sorts of controversial Su cabinet measures have not only given the public no time to react, they have even dumbfounded comrades within his own party. These measures include the transfer of central government agencies to Xinzhuang and the legalization of gambling and horse racing, all in an attempt to abuse his authority delivering pork in order to win votes. These measures have never been submitted for discussion, and their feasibility remains questionable. Su Tseng-chang used to be on the straight and level. Suddenly however, he has changed into someone prone to empty boasts, dictatorial attitudes, and lawless behavior. Have election concerns cast an evil spell upon him? Or has Su Tseng-chang made a conscious decision to debase himself?

When Su Tseng-chang looks in the mirror in the morning, he would do well to ask himself whether he likes what he sees. If Su Tseng-chang hopes to be elected president in 2008, he cannot allow himself to become a kleptocrat who misuses national resources, and must not turn himself into a dictator who abuses government authority. He must mold himself into a leader who can be trusted, and not turn himself into a monster who will stop at nothing to get elected.

In fact, the people have already noticed the change in Su Tseng-chang. The effect is already reflected in Premier Su's downward slide in opinion polls. When Su Tseng-chang looks at himself in the mirror in the morning, does he see his own image and the perversion of his own spirit?

Original Chinese below:

攬鏡自照：蘇貞昌還認得自己嗎？
聯合報／社論
2007/04/11

今 晨起來，蘇貞昌面對鏡子，不知道會不會覺得自己有點陌生？蘇貞昌最近的表現，忽而狂推正名，忽而戲言遷都，忽而心血來潮開放賭博賽馬，忽而蠻橫介入獨立機 構ＮＣＣ及中選會；原本那個素樸平實的「昌仔」不見了，大家看到的是一個不擇手段的既權謀又獨裁的閣揆。蘇貞昌可滿意自己現在的面貌？

帶職角逐總統，原是蘇貞昌得天獨厚的優勢；手中握有豐厚的行政資源，可為自己營造政績。但這也是蘇貞昌人品與器識的絕大考驗，正是在這樣的關鍵時刻，一個擁有權力的人能不能自持、會不會徇私、是否不擇手段、懂不懂民心，全都一覽無遺。

可惜，蘇貞昌沒有運用手中的權力和資源來為自己創造做為國家領導人的深度與高度，卻拿來為自己進行選舉短線的炒作。這樣玩下去，蘇貞昌會不會把自己的資產玩成了負債，讓自己的優勢變成了別人的箭靶？

以 處理ＮＣＣ開鍘事件為例，蘇貞昌不僅暴露了其陰晦的一面，更踰越了法治界線。ＮＣＣ委員聘用親屬擔任司機，誠屬不當；少數委員的醜行，更使ＮＣＣ形象蒙 羞。然而，蘇內閣處理此事，並非就法論法，亦非就事論事，而是自始即以瓦解ＮＣＣ為目的。正由於其政治用心強烈，蘇內閣也就完全失卻了「依法行政」的立 場。

蘇揆身居全國行政首長，對於負有特殊任務的機構竟然充滿敵意，必欲摧毀而後已，這是多麼難以想像的事。即使對一個地方三級機構，行政 院長也須尊重分權的精神；更何況，ＮＣＣ還是依專法成立的獨立機構。行政院雖對ＮＣＣ擁有監督權，但只憑一名政務委員的片面報告，蘇揆即輕率對ＮＣＣ委員 下達停職令，這不僅是擅權，且已踰越了「罪刑法定主義」的規範，是違法又違憲之舉。

「依法行政」是任何行政首長皆應遵守的憲政準則，但從 這次對ＮＣＣ開鍘，人們卻看到了蘇貞昌目無法律的獨裁者面貌。何況，蘇內閣一手揮舞亂棒痛擊ＮＣＣ，一手卻又介入「喬」台視股權之爭；如果說ＮＣＣ委員將 司機的職缺授予親屬應受重懲，則蘇內閣欲將公營電視台賣給自己的政治轎夫更是該當何罪？蘇內閣的罪行難道不比ＮＣＣ兩名委員更醜惡？

再 如，朝野爭議多時的中選會組織法之爭，最近傳出行政院擬議強渡關山，逕自啟動委員換屆提名作業，置立法程序於不顧，亦是駭人聽聞的蠻幹作風。果真如此，則 一方面民進黨抵制國會表決立法於前，另一方面蘇內閣又逕自違法設置中選會於後；這難道還算是個民主國家嗎？行政院長難道可以無法無天嗎？行政院倘是如此操 弄中選會，豈不等於要將民主根基從台灣連根拔起！蘇貞昌若真敢如此胡作非為，他還有顏面參選總統嗎？

蘇內閣最近的種種爭議措施，不僅讓輿 論來不及反應，連他的黨內同志也感瞠目結舌。包括中央部會遷移新莊副都心，包括賭場賽馬的開放，都是企圖利用行政分贓來爭取選票，且幾乎未見討論即逕拋 出，可行性備受質疑。原本風格平實的蘇貞昌，突然變得浮誇，變得獨裁，變得胡作非為；這究竟是選舉的魔咒，還是蘇貞昌的自甘沉淪？

是的， 當蘇貞昌在早晨端詳著鏡中的自己時，不妨問問自己喜不喜歡現在的面目。蘇貞昌如果想爭取二○○八的總統職位，他現在就不可使自己變成一個濫用國家資源的分 贓者，更不可使自己變成一個濫用政府權力的獨裁者。他應當努力塑造自己成為一個可以期待信靠的領導者形象，而不是將自己變成一個不擇手段的選舉妖怪。

其實，民眾似已發現蘇貞昌的變化，效應已經清楚地反映在蘇揆下滑的民調上。早上面對鏡子，蘇貞昌是否看出了自己形象與心靈的畸變？

Central Election Committee Reform must not be Undermined

Central Election Committee Reform must not be Undermined
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
April 10, 2007

Comment: The following China Times editorial makes a desperate appeal to the better angels of our nature. It pleads with the ruling DPP to honor the Rule of Law and to "play nice."

A few years ago I might have echoed their heartfelt appeal.

But not today.

The Chinese have an expression: 緣木求魚 yuan mu qiu yu. It means: "climbing a tree in search of fish." As you can probably guess, the expression refers to the fruitless act of looking for something where it will never be found.


Yuan Mu Qiu Yu, i.e., "Climbing a Tree in Search of Fish"

Anyone who expects democracy to protect the life, liberty, and property of the sovereign individual, or in the language of democracy's champions "uphold freedom and human rights," is "climbing a tree in search of fish."

That's because protecting the life, liberty, and property of the sovereign individual is not the raison d'etre for democracy.

Democracy exists so that ambitious politicians can exercise limitless power and remake the world in their own image.

Democracy is the ideal arrangement for achieving this end, because the vast majority of people alive today are under the spell of the democratic myth.

They don't realize that the superficial trappings of democracy, such as "the right to vote," are merely toy steering wheels attached to infant car seats, giving them the illusion that they are actually driving the car.

They don't realize that the only real "right" they enjoy is the right to pay taxes until the day they die, and to have their "democratically-elected representatives" spend their hard-earned money any way they wish.

Once one understands the purpose of democracy and other monopolistic states, one will never again make the mistake of "climbing a tree in search of fish." One will never again labor under the delusion that one's "democratically-elected leaders" have any interest whatsoever in deferring to the Rule of Law and playing by the rules of the game.

Central Election Committee Reform must not be Undermined
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
April 10, 2007

A stalemate between the ruling and opposition parties in the Legislative Yuan over the Draft Law for the Central Election Committee (CEC) has, believe it or not, made it impossible to pass the annual budget. Despite the stalemate, the Executive Yuan, according to reports, will officially begin nominating new committee members according to current CEC rules and procedures. But according to the Blue Camp's understanding, the ruling and opposition parties are in the middle of consultations over the Draft Law for the CEC, therefore the Executive Yuan should not bulldoze its way through political opposition. Otherwise the legislature will not be able to give its approval to this item. It would seem that the composition of the CEC is destined to become a major bone of contention between the ruling and opposition parties, and even the administration.

According to central government laws and regulations, the organization and empowerment of government entities that directly impact the people's political rights, such as the CEC, must be determined by means of legislation rather than regulations. In other words, existing CEC procedures have the status of administrative orders. By their very nature they can only be "black box operations." On this point at least, the ruling and opposition parties are in basic agreement, and should pass such provisions as soon as possible.

The question is how the CEC is to be organized and how its members are to be chosen. The Green Camp, with its lock on administrative resources, wants to retain the current system. It has reluctantly agreed that no more than 2/5 of all committee members can belong to any one political party. It insists however, that the actual candidates be nominated by the premier and appointed by the president. But if candidates are nominated in such a fashion, the ruling regime will exercise complete control over the CEC. During the 2004 Presidential Election, the CEC provided the incumbent Chen regime with "full cooperation." It went so far as to become the willing tool of Green Camp electioneering activity, by rubber stamping the unconstitutional linkage of the controversial 2004 Arms Purchase Referendum with the Presidential Election. From a Blue Camp perspective, the painful experience of the unconstitutional linkage of the referendum with the election is precisely why it insists that the composition of the CEC must be determined by means of proportional representation according to party affiliation. At the very least, it wants to ensure that no more than 2/3 of the committee members are controlled by the ruling regime.

Blue Camp and Green Camp strategic calculations have led to gridlock over the Draft Law for the CEC. Legislation, the central government budget, and arms purchases have all become victims. Externally, this deadlock has undermined trust between the ROC and the US. Internally, it has hindered the government's plans for the coming year.

The short term beneficiary of the continuing deadlock over the Constitutive Law for the CEC is of course the Green Camp. For example the ruling regime can claim that CEC rules and regulations have not yet been systematized, then use this as a pretext to pack the incoming CEC with members of its own choosing. After which it won't matter whether we're looking at the year end legislative election, or next year's presidential election, or even a combined legislative and presidential election. The 2004 precedent will prevail. The CEC will continue to concoct all kinds of public referenda advantageous to the Green Camp, causing a mechanism originally intended to facilitate direct democracy to degenerate into an electioneering tool by which a designated political party can drum up support. In the long run however, if the CEC cannot be integrated into a system predicated on the Rule of Law, the failure will constitute a major setback for democratic government, and a further indicator of legislative impotence. Under such circumstances, if the ruling authorities concern themselves only with retaining control over the CEC, or go so far as to transform the CEC into a tool in the service of a designated political party, then not only will they defile the CEC by destroying its role as an impartial intermediary, they will call public trust in the CEC into further question.

Furthermore, if the ruling regime, motivated exclusively by the desire to retain control of the CEC, deliberately hinders the legitimization of the CEC, or does not hesitate to create gridlock in the legislature, sacrificing arms purchases and the annual budget, then the price is too high, and the behavior not something a ruling government should be engaged in. The ruling regime clearly has no intention of legitimizing the CEC via consultation. Instead, acting willfully and on its own, it intends to pack the CEC with its own nominees. The result will be a flagrantly biased situation, leading inevitably to an intense Blue Camp backlash, and even a "scorched earth" policy of resistance.

Although the official business of the Legislative Yuan would not come to a complete standstill, social divisions and turmoil would surely intensify. The ruling and opposition parties would both suffer injuries, but the primary victims would be the public welfare, the functioning of government machinery, and the potential for national development.

Based on the above analysis, and in view of legislation related to the Constitutive Law for the CEC, we feel obligated to make the following appeals:

First, we hope that the legislature will recognize its proper role. Passage of legislation is the lawmaker's primary duty. Ruling and opposition party lawmakers may have different views concerning the content of legislation, but ensuring its passage is their common duty. A legislature which spins its wheels is subject to questioning and to challenge.

Next, the ruling regime must cooperate fully in the legitimization of the CEC. If it is unable to complete this process before the end of the current session, it should complete this process during the transition period. If it attempts to exploit the weaknesses in the system to its own advantage, and precipitates the destruction of the system, it will become the executioner of public trust in the CEC.

Finally, in regards the ruling and opposition parties, we realize this dispute has a direct impact on the question of who will be the winners and who will be the losers in the upcoming legislative and presidential elections. But election victories and losses are temporary. To destroy the Rule of Law for the sake of selfish partisan advantage is to incur a debt that can only be settled in history books.

Original Chinese below:

中選會的法制化與公正性不容破壞
中時社論
2007.04.10

立 法院朝野陣營上會期為了中選會組織法草案的爭議相持不下，破天荒使得年度總預算案迄今未完成立法程序。在這種相持不下的情況下，據報導行政院將於下周一 （四月十六日）依現行的中選會組織規程正式啟動中選會委員的換屆提名作業。而藍營則認為目前朝野正在為中選會組織法草案進行協商，行政院不應強度關山，否 則立院將對此項任命的備查案不予認可。看來，有關新一屆中選會委員的組成、任命，將成為朝野乃至行政、立法之間角力對抗的最新題材。

依中央法規標準法，類似中選會這種直接攸關人民政治權利行使的機關，其組織及職權行使本就應以法律定之。也就是說，現有中選會組織規程，在法律位階上只是行政命令，從而性質上也只能算是黑機關。就這一點而言，立法院朝野倒是有起碼共識，同意應盡速予以法制化。

然 而，問題就出於中選會的組成與委員的產生方式。掌握行政資源的綠營希望維持現制，只消極規定同一黨籍的委員不得超過總額的五分之二，但具體人選還是由行政 院長提名報請總統任命。依照這樣的提名任命模式，執政團隊可以有效掌握中選會的議事走向。以過去的經驗而言，二○○四年具爭議性的軍售公投綁總統大選事 件，當時的中選會就是扮演充分配合，甚至甘為綠營選舉造勢工具的角色。就藍營而言，正因為曾有公投綁大選的慘痛經驗，因此針對中選會的組成，堅持應採取政 黨比例的方式產生，至不濟要確保執政團隊所掌控影響的中選會委員不能超過三分之二多數決的門檻。

在藍綠陣營各有盤算而又兵家必爭的情況下，遂導致中選會組織法草案在立法院遲遲未能完成立法，甚至使年度中央政府總預算案乃至軍購特別預算案等都遭到池魚之殃，對外影響與美國之間的互信基礎，對內造成政府機器年度計畫推動的阻延。

有 關中選會組織法立法僵局的持續，短期看來受益者當然是綠營。譬如執政團隊大可以尚未法制化為由，堂而皇之地繼續沿用中選會組織規程，逕行提名產生新一屆中 選會委員，然後不論是在年底的立委改選，或明年三月的總統大選，甚或是將立委與總統選舉二合一，仍依二○○四年的前例，繼續炮製對綠營選舉情勢有利的各種 公投，從而使得原本為體現直接民權的公投機制，徹底淪為特定政黨選舉造勢的工具。

然而從長遠看，中選會如果一直未能完成法制化，既是民主 法治的重大缺憾，也將進一步凸顯國會的失能。而在這種有缺憾的情況下，行政當局對於中選會委員的換屆作業，如果還是只著眼於操控掌握，甚至不惜使之淪為為 個別政黨服務的工具，則不只汙衊了中選會獨立超然公正的中介角色，也將使中選會的公信力受到進一步的質疑。

除此之外，執政團隊如果只為了便於掌握中選會而刻意阻延中選會的法制化，甚至不惜癱瘓議事，使包括軍購預算案和年度總預算案成為陪葬品，這樣的代價未免太過沉重，而且更非執政當局推動政務所應為。

同 時，完全可預見的，如果行政當局既無意透過協商實現中選會的法制化，又在委員換屆的提名作業過程一意孤行，出現嚴重傾斜現象，則勢必引發藍營的強烈反彈， 甚至可能激化為焦土對抗。想像在那種情況下，立法院議事固然可能完全停擺，社會上的分裂動盪也一定會加劇，到時候朝野兩敗俱傷，但賠上的卻將是全民的福 祉、政府機器的運作以及國家發展的契機。

根據這樣的分析，我們針對有關中選會組織立法所引發的相關紛爭，不得不提出以下的呼籲：

首先，仍寄望立院認清自己的角色。立法本來就是立委的主要職責，朝野立委盡可對法案內容有不同看法，但剋期完成立法卻是分內工作，陷於空轉本身就應受質疑、抵制。

其次，對於行政當局，除應全力配合推動中選會的法制化之外，萬一無法在換屆前完成，則過渡時期的提名作業更應審慎從事，尤忌藉機鑽空子，搞傾斜，成為破壞體制，毀損中選會公信力的劊子手。

最後，對於朝野政黨，我們深知此一紛爭直接關係在立委及總統選舉的輸贏。但是選舉的輸贏畢竟只是一時，為了政黨之私而破壞法制，這筆帳在歷史上終歸是要清算的。

The Chief Prosecutor's Conference must offer a Unified Opinion on the Discretionary Fund Case

The Chief Prosecutor's Conference must offer a Unified Opinion on the Discretionary Fund Case
United Daily News editorial
Translated by Bevin Chu
April 04, 2007

Ma Ying-jeou's Discretionary Fund trial has been just been convened. Because the Tainan Public Prosecutor and the High Court's Anti-corruption Center have submitted legal opinions on the case as different as night and day, and because Ma Ying-jeou and his defense attorneys will be citing these opinions, they will become major bones of contention. In order to ensure a fair trial, the prosecution must quickly resolve these radical differences.

Hou Kuan-jen of the High Court's Anti-corruption Center has indicted Ma Ying-jeou for embezzlement, citing "the abuse of official authority to obtain wealth through deception." The Tainan Public Prosecutor's office meanwhile, has indicated that in the Hsu Yang-min and Hsu Tien-tsai cases, years of administrative precedent make it impossible to find the accused guilty of "the abuse of official authority to obtain wealth through deception." Nor is it possible to find the accused guilty of "criminal intent." Therefore, given the disparity in the legal opinions offered by the two prosecutors' offices, a unified opinion is essential.

Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming has said that he will convene a Public Prosecutor's conference in order to arrive at a unified opinion. At the same time however, word has spread of a sudden and massive reshuffling of chief prosecutors. The timing of the reshuffling is suspicious. The reasons offered are unpersuasive. The reshuffling dispenses with due process. The public is aware that the ruling regime is displeased with the Tainan Public Prosecutors' legal opinion on the Discretionary Fund case. Can it be that the ruling regime intends to manipulate the results of the upcoming Chief Prosecutor's conference?

Once the ruling regime succeeds in seizing control, the Chief Prosecutor's conference will endorse the "guilty" finding of the High Court Public Prosecutor's Office Anti-corruption Center. Whether the court will accept such a finding remains unknown. But the inevitable result will be that the case prosecutor will receive a shot in the arm, while Ma Ying-jeou's political road will become increasingly arduous. Public prosecutors at the grass roots have yet to rally against the Ministry of Justice, and the reshuffling of chief prosecutors has yet to be implemented. Future developments are hard to predict. But for court cases to be subject to such flagrant political interference, has already put the nation to shame.

On the other hand, if the upcoming Chief Prosecutor's conference endorses the Tainan Public Prosecutor's "not guilty" finding, this may amount to a severe test of the prosecutor's moral courage. As this newspaper's editorials have concluded, if the conference endorses the "not guilty" finding, the fairest way of handling the matter would be for the Taipei Public Prosecutor's Office to withdraw its indictment against Ma Ying-jeou. But this will surely lead to political unrest and political protests. Whether the case prosecutor will resist orders from above we cannot know. The pressure to submit will surely be great. However, if the case prosecutor adopts a unified "not guilty" opinion, yet persists in indicting Ma Ying-jeou for embezzlement, and burdens him with the stigma of criminal prosecution, it will amount to a travesty of justice.

What's more, the ruling and opposition parties are currently holding their presidential primaries. Yet Eric Chen of the High Court Public Prosecutor's Anti-corruption Center informed the media that the reason he did not simultaneously investigate the Discretionary Funds of the "Four Princes of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)" was to avoid influencing the DPP's presidential primaries. Ma Ying-jeou is not necessarily the Kuomintang's presidential candidate. He must first undergo the party's primary nomination procedure. In order to avoid influencing the DPP's presidential primaries, Eric Chen sat on the Discretionary Fund indictments of the "Four Princes of the DPP" and refused to prosecute. Yet together with Hou Kuan-jen, Chen rejected the Tainan Public Prosecutor's request that the two cases be prosecuted simultaneously. Chen insisted instead on indicting Ma Ying-jeou in advance. Could it be that Chen intended to influence the KMT's presidential primaries? Today, Ma Ying-jeou stands accused of embezzlement. Rivals within the KMT can use the fact that a candidate may be ineligible due to a criminal conviction as an excuse to boycott the primaries, sending the KMT into confusion. This, without a doubt, is the result of public prosecutors' contempt for due process.

Furthermore, the Special Investigative Unit has already been established. The Anti-corruption Center has been disbanded. Their cases have been turned over to the Special Investigative Unit, and Hou Kuan-jen and Chu Tsao-liang of the Tainan Public Prosecutor's Office have been made members. Some feel that once the cases of the "Four Princes of the DPP" are turned over to the Special Investigative Unit, Hou Kuan-jen should continue his investigation for the sake of consistency. If Hou Kuan-jen does continue investigating the "Four Princes of the DPP," he probably won't dare to apply double standards in order to avoid outside attacks. But if we consider the case on its own merits, if the Discretionary Fund case was never actionable to begin with, the case prosecutor should admit his mistake and withdraw the charges against Ma Ying-jeou, instead of dragging in other political figures to be buried along with him. Therefore, the prosecutor must, as quickly as possible, offer a unified legal opinion and arrive at a consistent conclusion. Only then will their handing of this case conform to the demands of justice and safeguard human rights.

The Ma Ying-jeou case is already in progress. This manner in which this case is tried, the manner in which public prosecutors are reshuffled, the conclusions the Chief Prosecutors' conference reach, the manner in which the Special Investigative Unit investigates other Discretionary Fund cases, and even the manner in which the ruling and opposition party primaries play out, will each affect one another, resulting in a complex interaction between law enforcement and politics. A perfect solution will be hard to come by. One can only hope that judges and prosecutors will appreciate the heavy price the nation and society have already paid, and handle this case in the fairest possible manner, in order that fairness and justice may prevail.

Original Chinese below:

聯合報社論
2007.04.07
檢察首長會議應儘速對特別費統一見解

馬英九特別費案首度開庭，由於南檢和高檢查黑中心對特別費的法律見解南轅北轍，且為馬英九以及辯護律師所引用，恐將成為本案的攻防重點。基於執法公平，檢方實應早日解決這種分歧現象。

高 檢查黑中心侯寬仁起訴馬英九貪汙治罪條例「利用職務詐取財物罪」，南檢則在許陽明和許添財的特別費案中，表明依特別費多年來的申領行政慣例，既不能認定有 「利用職務詐取財物罪」中的「詐取財物」構成要件，亦無法指稱相關首長有犯罪故意。在南檢的見解下，甚至「不需單據」的一半特別費是否花完，也不構成有無 犯罪的區別。因此，在南北歧見中，統一見解極為必要。

檢察總長陳聰明已表示將召開 檢察首長會議，討論統一見解。然而，就在此際，卻又傳出法務部突兀且強硬地大幅調動檢察首長；時機如此敏感，調動理由又不具說服力，且連程序正義都棄置不 顧，而社會上則盛傳執政者對南檢的特別費見解極為不滿，難道是執政者有意操控未來檢察首長會議對特別費案的結論嗎？

倘 若如此，一旦執政者操控成功，檢察首長會議採高檢查黑中心的「有罪說」，法院是否接受固仍屬未知數；但公訴檢方的氣勢必高漲，而馬英九的從政之路更為艱 辛，則是必然的結果。如今，因基層檢察官群起抗拒法務部，檢察長的調動尚未實現，未來的發展難以逆料；但司法案件受到如此嚴重的政治干擾，已足令國家蒙 羞。

反之，倘若未來檢察首長會議結論採南檢的「無罪說」，則檢方有無貫徹執行的道 德勇氣，就是嚴格的考驗。本報社論曾探討過，一旦採無罪說，最公平的處置就是台北地檢署撤回對馬英九的起訴，但這必將引起政治風潮抗爭，公訴檢察官是否從 命亦不可知，難度誠然不低。然而，檢方統一見解後若採無罪說，卻仍然讓馬英九陷於貪汙的指控，受到審判的牽累，無論如何都是司法正義的矛盾。

更 有甚者，朝野主要政黨均正進行黨內總統初選相關活動。而高檢查黑中心陳瑞仁檢察官竟向媒體表示：民進黨參與競爭的「四大天王」特別費案未同步偵結，是避免 影響民進黨總統初選云云。然則，馬英九亦非國民黨必然的總統候選人，其亦須完成黨內初選提名程序；陳瑞仁為考慮不影響民進黨初選，而壓著「四大天王」特別 費案不辦，卻與侯寬仁力斥南檢協調意見的要求，堅不同意同步偵結，必欲早日起訴馬英九，難道是有意介入國民黨的黨內初選嗎？如今，馬英九受審，國民黨內競 爭對手以可能判有罪使國民黨失去候選人為由，拒絕初選，致國民黨亂成一團。這無疑是檢察官辦案不顧程序公平的政治後果。

再 者，特偵組已經成立，查黑中心解散，案件移交特偵組，而侯寬仁與南檢的朱朝亮均是特偵組成員。有人認為，民進黨四大天王案移交特偵組之後，應由侯寬仁繼續 偵辦，以求標準一致。按理，若侯寬仁真的續辦民進黨四大天王案，為避免外界抨擊，當不致出現不同標準；但就事論事，若特別費案根本不應處以刑責，檢方就應 坦然認錯而撤回對馬英九的起訴，而非拉其他政治人物陪葬。因此，檢方應當儘速統一法律見解，並落實結論，始能符合公平正義並保障人權。

馬 案已經開始審理，而本案的審理過程與檢方人事調動、檢察首長會議的結論，特偵組對其他特別費案的偵辦，乃至朝野政黨的初選時程等等，皆將相互影響，形成司 法與政治錯綜複雜的關係。欲求萬全恐怕已很困難，唯願法官和檢察官能體察國家社會已付出和將付出的重大代價，以最公正的態度處理本案，使公平正義得以體 現。

Who can save Hsieh Wen-ting?

Who can save Hsieh Wen-ting?
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
March 30, 2007


High Court Chief Prosecutor Hsieh Wen-ting, purged for refusing to cover up rampant Chen Shui-bian regime corruption

Comment: In "The Myth of Checks and Balances" I wrote:

In theory, a democratically elected president is merely the highest ranking official in one of three or more coequal branches of government, the executive branch.

In reality, in any monopolistic state with a presidential system, the president is an elective dictator, the legislature is a debating society, and the judiciary is a rubber stamp. Real world experience has demonstrated that over time, the executive invariably co-opts the judiciary and marginalizes the legislature.

In theory, the coequal branches of government provide "checks and balances" upon each other, preventing them from ganging up upon the individual citizens they have sworn to protect and serve.

In reality, because the executive is the branch that has been delegated the power to "execute" policy (pun intended), it invariably usurps any and all powers delegated to the other branches of a monopolistic state. Real world experience has shown that "limited government" inevitably morphs into unlimited government, and that the executive is always the branch that winds up monopolizing that limitless power. It makes no difference whether the executive was popularly elected, self-appointed, or hereditary.

When this happens, "champions of democracy" assure us that what is needed is "reform."

I disagree.

Democracies do not need to be reformed. They need to be replaced. Democracies and other monopolistic states degenerate into dictatorships because they are structurally defective therefore impervious to reform from their very inception.

Democracies and other monopolistic states must be replaced with non-monopolistic political arrangements that refrain from granting any single political entity an exclusive franchise on the use of force within any given jurisdiction.

Unless by some miracle the Chinese people on Taiwan forsake "democracy" and adopt market anarchism, the answer to the question "Who can save Hsieh Wen-ting" will remain: "Nobody."

Who can save Hsieh Wen-ting?
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
March 30, 2007

The Ministry of Justice, confronted with a boycott by all nine elected members of the Personnel Review Committee, has rammed through the reassignment of 26 chief prosecutors, the most controversial of which is the Hsieh Wen-ting case.

The elected members of the Personnel Review Committee issued a powerful statement to the effect that "Public prosecutors categorically must not retreat before such flagrant manipulation of the justice system by political forces. Otherwise the authority of the Public Prosecutor's Office will become subordinate to the authority of the Executive branch, and public prosecutors will become political goons. The justice system categorically must not bow to political power." The outrage they felt was clear from their language.

What we are witnessing is a war of annihilation and extermination, waged by malevolent political forces against the spirit of an independent judiciary. If Hsieh Wen-ting is forced out of office in this manner by a malevolent political authority, what will become of our legal system? How will administrators of justice enforce the law?

Over the past year, the fate of Chief Prosecutor Hsieh Wen-ting opf the High Court Prosecutor's Office has hinged on the outcome of a savage struggle between politics and law enforcement. Last April, the legislature vetoed Hsieh Wen-ting's appointment as Prosecutor General. The reason was the opposition parties lacked confidence in Hsieh Wen-ting's managerial style. One year later, it turns out that because Hsieh Wen-ting resisted pressure to sweep Chen Shui-bian's State Affairs Confidential Expense scandal under the rug, he was summarily replaced.

According to reports, during the State Affairs Confidential Expense scandal, political figures at the highest levels attempted through a variety of channels to discover from Hsieh Wen-ting's own statements, the direction and progress of his investigation, but received no response. Word also spread that following the indictment in this case, political figures at the highest levels hoped that Hsieh Wen-ting would order public prosecutors to withdraw the charges, but Hsieh Wen-ting "resisted the will of those above him." Case prosecutor Eric Chen confirmed that Hsieh Wen-ting said that "The pressure stops here." Hsieh wanted them to be free from political considerations and to handle matters according to the letter and spirit of the law.

After all is said and done, one must admit that Hsieh Wen-ting has upheld his role as an administrator of justice. Meanwhile, looking back at the tumultuous changes over the past year, Chen Tsung-ming's ascent to the throne of Prosecutor General due to People First Party collusion, represents shameful self-abasement. Scandals erupted again and again, and the Ministry of Justice covered them up again and again. Hsieh Wen-ting on the other hand, just missed becoming Prosecutor General because he "resisted the will of those above him." His appointment to Prosecutor General was unexpectedly rejected. Is this not a political and judicial farce that leaves one unsure whether to laugh or to cry?

Hsieh Wen-ting's replacement, at such a time and under such circumstances, cannot help but arouse suspicions. No wonder an atmosphere of indignation permeates prosecutorial circles. If the rumor that Hsieh Wen-ting was replaced because he "resisted the will of those above him" is true, then this is nothing less than the undisguised purging of political dissent from judicial circles.
Those in power have openly declared war upon the judicial world. "Obey me and live, Defy me and die!" "Refuse to cover up my corruption, and I will have your job!" Is this not a war of annihilation and extermination against justice?

Yesterday before the Examining Committee, elected committee members suggested that as long as the facts of the case remained in doubt, meetings should be suspended. But the Ministry of Justice ignored Examining Committee rules requiring a 2/3 quorum and held an illegal meeting which all nine elected committee members refused to attend.

In a single breath, the Ministry of Justice transferred 26 chief prosecutors, inspiring Committee Member Chen Chih-ming to question the urgent need to transfer personnel who were just now learning their jobs. On the Prosecutorial Reform Committee's offical website, Chen Chih-ming pointed out that Minister of Justice Shih Mao-ling's "abnormal behavior" might have been motivated by either selfish concerns or year end election concerns, in order to manipulate the vote-buying investigation process. Chen Chih-ming said that the situation was worse than imagined. If that is indeed the case, it amounts to a political purge of individuals of integrity within the justice system.

Chen Chih-ming considered this highly unethical. He pointed out that the motive for making such major reassignments was entirely selfish. If such selfish behavior set a negative precedent, it would undermine chief prosecutors who respected the law.

This is a ruling regime utterly devoid of moral virtue, which now hopes by means of its hold on political power to purge prosecutorial circles of any last vestiges of integrity, in order to advance its private interests. Can the nation and the justice system do nothing but look on as a ruling regime devoid of moral virtue practices a policy of "Obey me and live, defy me and die," and creates a justice system utterly devoid of moral virtue?

Perhaps due to strong protests from elected committee members, yesterday's roster contained hints of compromise. But Chen Tsung-ming sits securely on his throne. Hsieh Wen-ting meanwhile, leaves office on a bittersweet note. This reflects perfectly the current state of the justice system. The laws of god, the laws of man, public sentiment. Who can demand that Chen Tsung-ming step down? And who can save Hsieh Wen-ting?

Original Chinese below:

誰能救得了謝文定？
聯合報社論
2007/03/30

在全體九名「票選委員」拒絕出席人事審查會的情勢下，法務部橫柴入灶，強渡關山通過了二十六名檢察長的調動案，其中又以謝文定遭撤換最滋爭議。

「票選委員」發表強烈聲明：「政治力這般赤裸裸操弄司法，檢察體系絕不能退縮，否則檢察權就淪為行政權的附庸，檢察官以後就成為政治打手，司法在政治力面前絕不低頭。」痛心疾首，溢於言表。

目前的情勢，儼然是政治惡勢力對司法獨立精神的殲滅戰與掃蕩戰。謝文定若就這樣被政權暴力逼下了台，司法的正義如何維持？司法人的風骨何以為繼？

一年之間，高檢署檢察長謝文定的人生際遇，橫逆乖舛，不啻正是一部政治與司法爛纏惡鬥的荒謬劇。去年四月，謝文定的檢察總長人事案在朝野猜忌中被立院否決，原因是在野黨對謝文定的操持不具信心；詎料，一年後的今天，竟傳出謝文定因抗拒當局對國務機要費案之「關心」，而遭撤換的惡運。

據報導，政治高層在國務機要費案偵辦期間，透過各種管道欲從謝文定口中探知偵辦進度及方向，未獲謝的回應；甚且傳出至該案起訴後，又欲透過謝文定命檢方撤回起訴，謝文定亦「抗拒上意」。承辦檢察官陳瑞仁則證實，謝文定曾告以「各種壓力到我這裡為止」，要他們不要有任何政治思考，一切依法辦理。

謝文定畢竟維持了他的司法人風範。然而，回顧這一年來的翻騰變化，陳聰明因親民黨放水而坐上檢察總長的寶座，失格失態，醜聞頻傳，但法務部再三加以包庇迴護；與檢察總長失之交臂的謝文定，卻傳出因堅持原則，「抗拒上意」，其檢察長的職位竟將被罷黜。這豈不是一齣令人啼笑皆非的政治與司法交纏的荒謬劇？

謝文定在此時此際遭撤換，不能不令人疑竇叢生；也難怪在檢察官之間，一股不平之氣已是沸沸揚揚。倘若謝文定因「抗拒上意」而遭撤換的傳言屬實，則這不啻是當權者以赤裸裸的政權暴力在司法界誅除異己的行動。當權者不啻公然向司法界宣戰：「順我者生，逆我者死！」「你不包庇我的貪腐，我就叫你在司法界無以立足！」這難道不是對司法清流的殲滅戰與掃蕩戰？

昨日審查會前，「票選委員」主張在真相未明下應暫停開會；但法務部竟違反審查會必須有三分之二出席始能開會的規範，強行開會，九名「票選委員」遂全體拒絕出席。

法務部這次一口氣調動二十六名檢察長，被檢審委員陳誌銘公開質疑，在那些檢察長工作進入純熟之際豈有換人的急迫性？陳誌銘在檢改會網站上直率指出，法務部長施茂林「此舉很不尋常」，可能是廣植親私，亦可能是為年底選戰布樁，以操縱查賄動作。陳誌銘稱，事態比想像的還要「兇惡」；倘係如此，這豈不形同是執政當局對司法清流的一場政治整肅？

陳誌銘甚至認為：「這是一件很缺德的事！」他指出，大調動的動機很「自私」，若因這些自私的動機開了惡例，將使具司法屬性的檢察長地位變得更不穩定，所以「是一件很缺德的事」！

這是一個缺德的統治集團，現在又欲憑其政權暴力，在檢察界誅除清流，廣布親私；難道全體國人，及全體司法人、全體檢察官，真的只能眼睜睜地看著這個缺德的統治集團，欲用「順我生、逆我死」的殘暴手段，來炮製一個「缺德」的司法體系嗎？

或許是由於「票選委員」的強烈抗議，昨日通過的名單已有折衷意味。但是，陳聰明穩居大位，謝文定反而悲壯去職；這正是當前司法境況的寫照。天理、國法、民心，誰能叫陳聰明下台？又誰能救得了謝文定？