Seven Years of Diplomatic Humiliation
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 13, 2007
While in Singapore, Frank Hsieh referred to the status quo that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is purportedly maintaining, as a state of independence. Chen Shui-bian meanwhile embarked on his last state visit of his second and final term. Before departure he described his visit as "humiliation in the national interest." This contrasts with Frank Hsieh's decidedly pragmatic stance regarding relations with close Asian neighbors and with Beijing. Some analysts interpret Chen Shui-bian's visit as an attempt to establish an "historical legacy" for his eight years on office.
Nobody can predict how future historians will evaluate Chen Shui-bian. But if his place in history is to be evaluated on the basis of his seven years of foreign diplomacy, we need not wait until historians pass judgement. We can give him a failing grade right now.
During his term of office President Chen has conducted a total of ten state visits, including this one. Each visit was given a long-winded, saccharine title, such as "Journey of Democracy, Diplomacy and Friendship" or "Journey of Democracy and Goodwill" or "Journey to Create Mutual Benefit and Embrace the World" or "Journey to Enhance Popularity." But no matter what names they were given, the destination of these state visits was never the point. The point was always which US cities one was transiting, both coming and going. Eventually Washington caught on to the DPP's real agenda and began playing this game too. As a result it became a barometer of the state of Washington-Taipei relations. It became an index of how much clout Chen Shui-bian had in Washington.
Let's take "Transit Diplomacy" as the measure of Chen's alleged legacy. During ten visits, Chen Shui-bian transited New York twice. Once in 2001, and once in 2003. In 2006, during his "Journey to Enhance Popularity," he was forced to detour through places such as Holland and Libya. The media labeled this fiasco the "Journey to Nowhere." After ten visits, Washington, DC, the actual destination of Chen Shui-bian's "Transit Diplomacy," has gotten farther and farther instead of closer and closer. The current visit is being touted as his "Farewell Visit," yet he is allowed to stop only briefly for refueling in Alaska, well outside the continental United States. He is not even allowed to spend the night. The level of treatment is the lowest in seven years. After seven years of diplomatic games, and ten state visits, what does Chen have to show for it except what he himself acknowledges as a "humiliation?" What other way is there to put it?
Let's take the issue of firming up relations with allied nations for example. Eight of these ten visits were to Central and South America. Obviously the region is of strategic importance to ROC diplomacy. President Chen must be present at the inaugurations of Central and South American presidents. Nor can he afford to be absent from Central American summit meetings. Yet despite all these efforts, all one hears is that "diplomatic relations with Nicaragua are in danger," or "diplomatic relations with Panama are on the verge of collapse." This forces the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to up the ante to shore up relations with these two countries behind the scenes. To everyones' surprise, Costa Rica, with which the ROC maintained friendly relations for half a century, broke off relations. Even more embarrassing was that it chose to announce the break during June this year, almost exactly one year after President Chen attended the Costa Rican president's inauguration ceremony. During Chen's "Journey of Friendship to Central and South American Allies," Saint Lucia cancelled at the last minute. Nicaragua, which was forced to receive President Chen twice in the same year, also appeared reluctant. After eight presidential visits, this last bastion of official ROC diplomacy appears ready to fall.
Regarding participation in international organizations, Not only have years of ruling DPP efforts to gain entry to the United Nations been exercises in futility, so have attempts to rejoin the WHO. Most importantly, in the past we had international support. Over the past two years, these voices of support have not been heard. The result of this year's "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" has been to push Washington even farther from Taipei. This year's treatment of Chen during his transit through the US is one indicator. Chen Shui-bian wrote to the United Nations asking to join under the name of "Taiwan," only to have it summarily rejected by trhe UN Secretary General and returned, unread. On top of which the growing global consensus in recent years has been, "Taiwan is the troublemaker." Few feel any sympathy for the international isolation of the Taiwan authorities. Is this the payoff for all those years of diplomatic game playing?
Many commentators invariably bring up Chinese Communist Party pressure. This accusation is not without basis. But when formulating ROC diplomatic strategy, any "Chinese Communist Party pressure" must be considered a constant, not a variable. Since the 70s, the cross Straits diplomatic tug of war has usually resulted in stalemate. Beijing has never once relented in its diplomatic pressure on Taipei. It made no difference whether the ruling party was Blue or Green. Therefore any responsible administration must seek maximum advantage in the face of this diplomatic pressure. It can hardly point to this pressure as an excuse to wallow in self pity and demand sympathy. Still less can it use it as a excuse to shirk responsibility.
Frank Hsieh made a point of stressing his cross Straits policy while in Singapore. He demonstrated his understanding of the dynamic relationship between the ROC's foreign policy and cross Straits policy. Chen Shui-bian only has a short time left in office. We don't know how long his diplomatic strategy can continue to tie down Frank Hsieh hand and foot. We don't know whether Frank Hsieh will regard Chen Shui-bian's diplomatic legacy as an asset or a liability. But as a voice of public opinion, we earnestly urge the ruling DPP to let professional diplomats engage in diplomacy. The ROC's diplomatic strategy can no longer be "dollar diplomacy" with no upper limit. It can no longer be "transit diplomacy" to enhance the prestige of the head of state. It can no longer be "scorched earth diplomacy" that plays on populist mob sentiment. It can no longer be "victim diplomacy" that deliberately invites humiliation in order to elicit sympathy. The purpose of diplomacy is to maximize the national interest. It must not become a public relations tool by which the head of state can enhance his personal image. It cannot become the ruling party's election tool. The ROC's diplomatic plight is difficult enough as it is. Its diplomatic resources are rapidly diminishing. We truly cannot afford to squander them in an ad libbed and spendthrift manner.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.08.13
七年多的外交操作只化作一句「忍辱負重」？
中時社論
當謝長廷在新加坡指稱民進黨的「維持現狀」就是獨立之際，陳水扁也展開了他任內最後一次的元首出訪，行前他自己形容此行是為國家利益「忍辱負重」。相較於謝長廷積極向亞洲近鄰傳達他在兩岸立場上的「務實」，陳水扁的出訪則被部分論者詮釋為是在尋求他八年任期的「歷史定位」。
沒人能準確預測未來的史家會怎麼為陳水扁「定位」，但如果只是論斷這七年多來他為台灣所拚出怎樣的外交成績單，大概等不到史家的審判，現在就是個不及格的成績了。
細數陳總統任內的出訪，連這次總共十次，每回出訪都有一套辭藻華麗的稱呼，什麼「合作共榮、睦誼之旅」、「攜手同慶、欣榮之旅」、「共創雙贏、胸懷世界之旅」、「興揚之旅」…等等，而不論名稱被叫得有多好聽，出訪目的地從來就不是重點，去回程能過境美國那個城市才是重點，玩多了以後，華府也開始認真相應操作，竟使它真的成為美台關係的晴雨計，更成為陳水扁在華府究竟有多少分量的具體指標。
好吧，就拿「過境外交」的帳面成績當指標論斷吧，這十次出訪，陳水扁曾在二○○一年與○三年兩度風光地過境紐約，也曾在二○○六年的「興揚之旅」中狼狽到在空中且戰且走，繞行到荷蘭、利比亞等地，被媒體形容成是「迷航之旅」。十次出訪下來，陳水扁過境外交的定點，卻是距離華府愈來愈遠，這次號稱為畢業旅行，但只能停留美國境外的阿拉斯加，同時不准過夜，堪稱是史無前例的最低規格。七年多的經營，十次出訪經驗的積累，換來就是這般「忍辱負重」的自評，還能怎麼說呢？
再以鞏固邦誼來說吧，這十次出訪有八次是去中南美，可見這個區域是台灣外交的重鎮。陳總統不僅總統就職典禮一定參加、中美洲高峰會更是從不缺席，這般辛勤的經營，結果卻是經常聽聞「尼加拉瓜的邦交岌岌可危」、「巴拿馬的邦交搖搖欲墜」，逼得外交單位不斷幕後加碼，好不容易暫時穩住了這兩國，意外斷交的竟是與我國邦誼長達半世紀的哥斯大黎加，而更難堪的是該國選在今年六月宣布斷交，距離陳總統去年參加哥國總統的就職典禮，剛好滿一年。而這趟的「中南美友邦之旅」，不僅預定受訪的聖露西亞臨陣取消，尼加拉瓜也為了同一年要接待陳總統兩次而顯得不太情願，這塊台灣正式外交的最後堡壘，經總統八次出訪鞏固的結果，情勢竟是緊繃到令人越來越不安。
在國際組織的參與方面，這幾年在執政黨操作下的結果，不僅加入聯合國徒勞無功，重返ＷＨＯ也一樣挫折連連，重點是前幾年還有國際聲援，這兩年則幾乎已未曾再聽聞，今年操作「公投入聯」的結果，讓華府與台北的心理距離更遠，這次的過境待遇就是指標之一；而陳水扁致函聯合國要求「以台灣名義加入」，結果卻是被秘書處以極其無理的程序蠻橫退件。加之近年國際輿論多針對台灣是否為「麻煩製造者」加以著墨，鮮少對台灣的孤立處境給予同情聲援，這麼多年的經營，該是換得這樣的成果嗎？
許多論者經常提到中共的封鎖與打壓，這個指控確實道出了大部分的事實，但思考台灣外交的戰略時，「中共的打壓」本來就該視為常數，而不是變數。畢竟從一九七○年代以來，兩岸的外交攻防從來就是零和的，北京對台北外交空間的打壓從來沒手軟過，更不會看你執政者是藍是綠而有所不同，因而任何負責任的執政者，該是怎麼在這種外交封鎖與打壓中步步為營，尋求台灣最大的實質利益，而不是將這種打壓轉化到國內去生產悲情，更不能視之為卸責的藉口。
謝長廷刻意選在新加坡談他的兩岸政策，顯示他已意識到當下台灣外交政策與兩岸政策之間的動態連結性，我們不知道陳水扁的外交戰略，在他剩下的任期還能綁住謝長廷多久，我們也不知道謝長廷將陳水扁這筆外交遺產，視為是資產還是負債。站在民間輿論的立場，我們倒是很想誠懇地呼籲：讓外交回歸專業吧！讓台灣的外交經營，從彰顯元首聲望的過境外交、烽火衝撞的民粹外交、無窮加碼的金錢外交，乃至自取其辱的悲情外交中解脫出來吧！外交永遠是在追求最大的國家利益，不該是元首操作個人形象公關的工具，更不該是內部選舉動員的槓桿，台灣的外交處境已經夠艱困，外交資源更是日漸匱乏，真的禁不起一而再、再而三即興式的揮霍了！
Monday, August 13, 2007
Friday, August 10, 2007
Taiwan Independence turns Anti-American
Taiwan Independence turns Anti-American
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
August 9, 2007
Chen Shui-bian has exploited Taiwan independence ideology so shamelessly, it has undergone a total metamorphosis. Not only is the Taiwan independence movement moving farther and farther away from its original goals, it is actually working against itself.
One: One of the Taiwan independence movement's proclaimed goals was to tranform the Taiwan region of China into an "symbiotic ecological niche." But in recent years the Taiwan independence movement's Nazi rhetoric, such as who "loves Taiwan" and who "doesn't love Taiwan," or who "raped Taiwanese women" and who were their "Taiwanese rape victims" has torn Taiwan apart. Two: Another of the Taiwan independence movement's proclaimed goals was that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait would become "Brother Nations." But the Taiwan independence movement's endless provocations of "China," and its virulent hatred of "Chinese," have turned that ideal into a chimera.
In other words, within the confines of the island, Taiwan independence cannot unite people. All it can do is tear the island apart. Across the Taiwan Strait meanwhile, Taiwan independence can neither solve nor diminish any threats the mainland might pose. All it can do is provoke the mainland into passing its "Anti-Secession Law," making the plight of the Chinese people on Taiwan even worse. Chen Shui-bian's aggressive manipulation of Taiwan independence has unexpectly transformed the Taiwan independence movement into the highest-profile anti-America movement in 60 years.
Last May Chen Shui-bian embarked on his "Journey to Nowhere." Foreign Minister Huang Chih-fang said: "Taiwan refuses to be America's bastard son!" Chen Shui-bian was visiting Costa Rica at the time. Costa Rica and the Republic of China have since broken off diplomatic relations. At that time, Chen Shui-bian refused to transit through the US. Now however, he has applied once more for permission to transit the US. Presumably he wants to see who will yield first in a game of "Chicken." But if Chen Shui-bian reenacts last year's "Journey to Nowhere," he will merely be offering us a boring sequel no one wants to watch.
Even Frank Hsieh admits that the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" is nothing but an election ploy. Chen Shui-bian wants to provoke the mainland into lashing back. But so far the mainland hasn't made any major moves. Chen Shui-bian also wants to provoke Ma Ying-jeou into a counter-attack. But the Kuomintang (KMT) is singing along with Chen's tune. The Chinese Communist Party has not been fooled. Ma Ying-jeou is not doing what Chen hoped. Suddenly and unexpectedly, Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have found themselves in sharp opposition with the US. The US sees the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" as a Taiwan independence provocation "intended to change the status quo." Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party have ignored US carrots and US sticks. They have adopted the defiant posture: "Taiwan is not America's bastard son!" They have turned the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" into an naked anti-America political struggle.
As matters stand, Taiwan independence has morphed into anti-Americanism. Taiwan independence leaders should stop to ask themselves: "What am I fighting for? Whom am I fighting for?" Does the Taiwan independence movement really want its most important foreign backer as an enemy? Has Uncle Sam suddenly become an effigy to be hanged and burned as part of the Taiwan independence movement's Jihad? Has anti-Americanism suddenly become the Taiwan independence movement's final article of faith?
The status quo in the Taiwan Straits depends largely on US support. Chen Shui-bian knows this perfectly well. Yet he rails against this fact. Needless to say he has angered the US. If the Taiwan independence movement loses American support, the ruling DPP's international security framework will completely collapse. Aren't Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party, with their newfound anti-Americanism, shooting themselves in the foot? Taking a step back, anti-Americanism is absolutely not in the interest of the Taiwan independence movement. Taiwan independence is not possible even if the Taiwan independence movement embraces the US. But will Taiwan independence become possible because the Taiwan independence movement opposes the US? Chen Shui-bian intially hoped that the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" would provoke the mainland and Ma Ying-jeou. Instead, the only result of the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" so far has been anti-Americanism. So the question is: What exactly are you fighting for? And for whom?
The "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" has become an anti-American farce. It has also put Taiwan independence leaders at loggerheads with the international community. The European Union, Japan, and Russia have all opposed the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite." The United Nations not only returned Chen Shui-bian's petition, unread, it reiterated its "UN Resolution 2758." These results did not benefit Taiwan, and were positively harmful to the Taiwan independence movement.
The "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" is not the only cause of discord between Chen Shui-bian and the US. The leaked text of the DPP's "Resolution to make Taiwan a Normal Country" also provoked opposition between the Democratic Progressive Party and the US. It even embarrassed Frank Hsieh during his trip to the US. Mutual trust between the Democratic Progressive Party and the US is now non-existent. This has harmed both the Democratic Progressive Party and the Taiwan independence movement. Because no matter what, if the Taiwan independence movement turns into an anti-American movement, it will be in defiance of all political logic.
On September 15, the Taiwan independence movement will hold a "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" protest march. In response to anti-mainland provocations, the mainland has maintained its composure. In response to anti-Ma provocations, Ma Ying-jeou has chosen to sing the same tune. This being the case, the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" million man protest march will probably turn into the largest scale "pro Taiwan independence, anti-America" protest in recorded history. One really doesn't know whether to laugh or to cry.
「台獨」變成「反美」
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.09 03:24 am
台獨被陳水扁操弄到今日地步，已經全盤變質走調，非但與台獨的原始憧憬漸行漸遠，甚至根本已是背道而馳。
一、台獨的憧憬之一是將台灣打造成一個「生命共同體」。但是，近年來「愛台灣／不愛台灣」、「強姦者／被姦者」之類的台灣納粹論述，已將台灣徹底分割撕裂。二、台獨原本楬櫫的兩岸憧憬是與中國成為「兄弟之邦」，但在不斷挑激敵意下，這當然也成了泡影。
也就是說，對內，台獨不能團結國人，而只是一逕撕裂國家；對外，台獨亦對解決或緩和中國的威脅毫無作用，反而因此逼出了《反分裂國家法》等等，致使台灣的處境更形窘迫。現在，變本加厲的是，在陳水扁的操弄下，如今台獨竟然變質成六十年來台灣層級最高及傷害極深的反美運動。
去年五月陳水扁出人意表地演出「謎航之旅」，外交部長黃志芳說：「台灣不做美國的龜兒子！」當時，陳水扁是赴哥斯大黎加訪問，如今台哥已經斷交；當時，陳水扁峻拒過境美國，如今卻再次向美申請過境，看誰會在「懦夫賽局（Chicken Game）」示弱。只是，陳水扁若再演出「謎航之旅」，其實已是一部了無新意的餿劇本了！
入聯公投，連謝長廷都承認這只是選舉操作而已。陳水扁想惹中國發飆，但至少迄今中國尚無大動作；陳水扁也想激馬英九反撲，但國民黨「拿香跟拜」。中共不上當，馬英九不捧場；一時之間，居然演成了陳水扁及民進黨逕與美國當局針鋒相對的尖銳對抗。美國將「入聯公投」視為「意圖改變現狀」的台獨節目，陳水扁及民進黨則罔顧美國的柔勸強阻，仍擺出一副「不做美國龜兒子」的姿態，遂使「入聯公投」變質走調成一場赤裸裸的「反美」鬥爭。
事態至此，「台獨」變成「反美」，台獨運動者似應停下腳步想一想：究竟為何而戰，為誰而戰？台獨難道要與台灣最重要的國際支柱美國為敵？難道美國竟然成了台獨聖戰的最後一個稻草人？難道反美竟然成了台獨聖戰的最後歸趨？
台灣海峽能夠「維持現狀」，主要是靠美國扶住這一把梯子；陳水扁明知如此，卻偏在梯子上猛搖亂晃，自然惹惱了在下邊扶梯子的美國。失去美國的支持，台灣的國際安全架構將完全解構；陳水扁及民進黨反美，豈不是自毀長城？退一步言，反美亦絕對不符台獨的利益，台獨擁美尚不可能實現台獨，則台獨反美豈有推進台獨的可能？陳水扁原想藉「入聯公投」惹怒中國、挑激馬英九；但如今反美竟成「入聯公投」的唯一效應，反美亦成「入聯公投」的唯一目標。試問：究竟是為何而戰？為誰而戰？
入聯公投不但演成反美鬧劇，而且儼然已經演成了台灣與主流國際全面對立的情景。歐盟、日本、俄國相繼反對「入聯公投」，聯合國則非但逕自退回陳水扁的入聯申請書，更重申《二七五八號決議文》的效力；這些效應，對台灣無益，更對台獨大不利。
尤應注意的是：「入聯公投」發展至今，不僅是陳水扁個人與美國當局的齟齬，更因《正常國家決議文》的文字洩漏而演成了整個民進黨與美國台海政策的對立，亦使得謝長廷在台美關係中失去主體性；可謂是民進黨與美國當局互信的大解構。這些重大的傷害，害了台灣，害了民進黨，其實也害了台獨。因為，無論如何，「台獨」變成「反美」，這已完全違反了一切的政治理性。
九月十五日，台獨將發動「入聯公投」大遊行。反中，中國不動聲色；反馬，馬英九「拿香跟拜」。倘係如此，這場「入聯公投」的百萬人遊行，恐將變質成一場歷來規模最大的「台獨反美」大遊行，豈不令人啼笑皆非？
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
August 9, 2007
Chen Shui-bian has exploited Taiwan independence ideology so shamelessly, it has undergone a total metamorphosis. Not only is the Taiwan independence movement moving farther and farther away from its original goals, it is actually working against itself.
One: One of the Taiwan independence movement's proclaimed goals was to tranform the Taiwan region of China into an "symbiotic ecological niche." But in recent years the Taiwan independence movement's Nazi rhetoric, such as who "loves Taiwan" and who "doesn't love Taiwan," or who "raped Taiwanese women" and who were their "Taiwanese rape victims" has torn Taiwan apart. Two: Another of the Taiwan independence movement's proclaimed goals was that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait would become "Brother Nations." But the Taiwan independence movement's endless provocations of "China," and its virulent hatred of "Chinese," have turned that ideal into a chimera.
In other words, within the confines of the island, Taiwan independence cannot unite people. All it can do is tear the island apart. Across the Taiwan Strait meanwhile, Taiwan independence can neither solve nor diminish any threats the mainland might pose. All it can do is provoke the mainland into passing its "Anti-Secession Law," making the plight of the Chinese people on Taiwan even worse. Chen Shui-bian's aggressive manipulation of Taiwan independence has unexpectly transformed the Taiwan independence movement into the highest-profile anti-America movement in 60 years.
Last May Chen Shui-bian embarked on his "Journey to Nowhere." Foreign Minister Huang Chih-fang said: "Taiwan refuses to be America's bastard son!" Chen Shui-bian was visiting Costa Rica at the time. Costa Rica and the Republic of China have since broken off diplomatic relations. At that time, Chen Shui-bian refused to transit through the US. Now however, he has applied once more for permission to transit the US. Presumably he wants to see who will yield first in a game of "Chicken." But if Chen Shui-bian reenacts last year's "Journey to Nowhere," he will merely be offering us a boring sequel no one wants to watch.
Even Frank Hsieh admits that the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" is nothing but an election ploy. Chen Shui-bian wants to provoke the mainland into lashing back. But so far the mainland hasn't made any major moves. Chen Shui-bian also wants to provoke Ma Ying-jeou into a counter-attack. But the Kuomintang (KMT) is singing along with Chen's tune. The Chinese Communist Party has not been fooled. Ma Ying-jeou is not doing what Chen hoped. Suddenly and unexpectedly, Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have found themselves in sharp opposition with the US. The US sees the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" as a Taiwan independence provocation "intended to change the status quo." Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party have ignored US carrots and US sticks. They have adopted the defiant posture: "Taiwan is not America's bastard son!" They have turned the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" into an naked anti-America political struggle.
As matters stand, Taiwan independence has morphed into anti-Americanism. Taiwan independence leaders should stop to ask themselves: "What am I fighting for? Whom am I fighting for?" Does the Taiwan independence movement really want its most important foreign backer as an enemy? Has Uncle Sam suddenly become an effigy to be hanged and burned as part of the Taiwan independence movement's Jihad? Has anti-Americanism suddenly become the Taiwan independence movement's final article of faith?
The status quo in the Taiwan Straits depends largely on US support. Chen Shui-bian knows this perfectly well. Yet he rails against this fact. Needless to say he has angered the US. If the Taiwan independence movement loses American support, the ruling DPP's international security framework will completely collapse. Aren't Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party, with their newfound anti-Americanism, shooting themselves in the foot? Taking a step back, anti-Americanism is absolutely not in the interest of the Taiwan independence movement. Taiwan independence is not possible even if the Taiwan independence movement embraces the US. But will Taiwan independence become possible because the Taiwan independence movement opposes the US? Chen Shui-bian intially hoped that the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" would provoke the mainland and Ma Ying-jeou. Instead, the only result of the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" so far has been anti-Americanism. So the question is: What exactly are you fighting for? And for whom?
The "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" has become an anti-American farce. It has also put Taiwan independence leaders at loggerheads with the international community. The European Union, Japan, and Russia have all opposed the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite." The United Nations not only returned Chen Shui-bian's petition, unread, it reiterated its "UN Resolution 2758." These results did not benefit Taiwan, and were positively harmful to the Taiwan independence movement.
The "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" is not the only cause of discord between Chen Shui-bian and the US. The leaked text of the DPP's "Resolution to make Taiwan a Normal Country" also provoked opposition between the Democratic Progressive Party and the US. It even embarrassed Frank Hsieh during his trip to the US. Mutual trust between the Democratic Progressive Party and the US is now non-existent. This has harmed both the Democratic Progressive Party and the Taiwan independence movement. Because no matter what, if the Taiwan independence movement turns into an anti-American movement, it will be in defiance of all political logic.
On September 15, the Taiwan independence movement will hold a "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" protest march. In response to anti-mainland provocations, the mainland has maintained its composure. In response to anti-Ma provocations, Ma Ying-jeou has chosen to sing the same tune. This being the case, the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite" million man protest march will probably turn into the largest scale "pro Taiwan independence, anti-America" protest in recorded history. One really doesn't know whether to laugh or to cry.
「台獨」變成「反美」
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.09 03:24 am
台獨被陳水扁操弄到今日地步，已經全盤變質走調，非但與台獨的原始憧憬漸行漸遠，甚至根本已是背道而馳。
一、台獨的憧憬之一是將台灣打造成一個「生命共同體」。但是，近年來「愛台灣／不愛台灣」、「強姦者／被姦者」之類的台灣納粹論述，已將台灣徹底分割撕裂。二、台獨原本楬櫫的兩岸憧憬是與中國成為「兄弟之邦」，但在不斷挑激敵意下，這當然也成了泡影。
也就是說，對內，台獨不能團結國人，而只是一逕撕裂國家；對外，台獨亦對解決或緩和中國的威脅毫無作用，反而因此逼出了《反分裂國家法》等等，致使台灣的處境更形窘迫。現在，變本加厲的是，在陳水扁的操弄下，如今台獨竟然變質成六十年來台灣層級最高及傷害極深的反美運動。
去年五月陳水扁出人意表地演出「謎航之旅」，外交部長黃志芳說：「台灣不做美國的龜兒子！」當時，陳水扁是赴哥斯大黎加訪問，如今台哥已經斷交；當時，陳水扁峻拒過境美國，如今卻再次向美申請過境，看誰會在「懦夫賽局（Chicken Game）」示弱。只是，陳水扁若再演出「謎航之旅」，其實已是一部了無新意的餿劇本了！
入聯公投，連謝長廷都承認這只是選舉操作而已。陳水扁想惹中國發飆，但至少迄今中國尚無大動作；陳水扁也想激馬英九反撲，但國民黨「拿香跟拜」。中共不上當，馬英九不捧場；一時之間，居然演成了陳水扁及民進黨逕與美國當局針鋒相對的尖銳對抗。美國將「入聯公投」視為「意圖改變現狀」的台獨節目，陳水扁及民進黨則罔顧美國的柔勸強阻，仍擺出一副「不做美國龜兒子」的姿態，遂使「入聯公投」變質走調成一場赤裸裸的「反美」鬥爭。
事態至此，「台獨」變成「反美」，台獨運動者似應停下腳步想一想：究竟為何而戰，為誰而戰？台獨難道要與台灣最重要的國際支柱美國為敵？難道美國竟然成了台獨聖戰的最後一個稻草人？難道反美竟然成了台獨聖戰的最後歸趨？
台灣海峽能夠「維持現狀」，主要是靠美國扶住這一把梯子；陳水扁明知如此，卻偏在梯子上猛搖亂晃，自然惹惱了在下邊扶梯子的美國。失去美國的支持，台灣的國際安全架構將完全解構；陳水扁及民進黨反美，豈不是自毀長城？退一步言，反美亦絕對不符台獨的利益，台獨擁美尚不可能實現台獨，則台獨反美豈有推進台獨的可能？陳水扁原想藉「入聯公投」惹怒中國、挑激馬英九；但如今反美竟成「入聯公投」的唯一效應，反美亦成「入聯公投」的唯一目標。試問：究竟是為何而戰？為誰而戰？
入聯公投不但演成反美鬧劇，而且儼然已經演成了台灣與主流國際全面對立的情景。歐盟、日本、俄國相繼反對「入聯公投」，聯合國則非但逕自退回陳水扁的入聯申請書，更重申《二七五八號決議文》的效力；這些效應，對台灣無益，更對台獨大不利。
尤應注意的是：「入聯公投」發展至今，不僅是陳水扁個人與美國當局的齟齬，更因《正常國家決議文》的文字洩漏而演成了整個民進黨與美國台海政策的對立，亦使得謝長廷在台美關係中失去主體性；可謂是民進黨與美國當局互信的大解構。這些重大的傷害，害了台灣，害了民進黨，其實也害了台獨。因為，無論如何，「台獨」變成「反美」，這已完全違反了一切的政治理性。
九月十五日，台獨將發動「入聯公投」大遊行。反中，中國不動聲色；反馬，馬英九「拿香跟拜」。倘係如此，這場「入聯公投」的百萬人遊行，恐將變質成一場歷來規模最大的「台獨反美」大遊行，豈不令人啼笑皆非？
The DPP's Myopic Foreign Policy
The DPP's Myopic Foreign Policy
Is Killing the Taiwan Independence Movement's Own Diplomatic Space
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
August 7, 2007
For years the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been practicing what might be termed "scorched earth diplomacy." The problem for the pro independence DPP is that the fires it has set, far from creating any "international breathing space for Taiwan," have merely boxed the Republic of China (ROC) government into a corner.
The ruling DPP's diplomatic maneuvers have several major characteristics. Characteristic One is these maneuvers help drum up personal support for the president. As a result President Chen Shui-bian repeatedly embarks on such state visits, basking in the red carpet treatment and the media exposure. He takes full advantage of his transits through the US to tout his personal achievements. As usual, whenever higher ups say "Jump!" lower downs ask "How high?" Other high ranking officials also take full advantage of foreign junkets. Characteristic Two is these maneuvers help the ruling DPP in domestic elections. Whenever an election is closely contested, the ruling DPP invariably engages in brinksmanship, pandering to Taiwan independence fundamentalists in both words and deeds. This ploy has become a political cure-all for consolidating the "ben tu" (nativist) vote. Because the ruling DPP has no political achievements to speak of, and the economy is in recession; their election prospects have become increasingly grim, and their diplomatic strategy has become increasingly provocative.
As a result, Chen Shui-bian, who won in 2000, largely on the basis of his "Five Noes Policy," and in whom the US and the international community placed their trust, began engaging in reckless brinksmanship. One after another, he played his "One Country, Each Side" card, his "Defensive Referendum [Plebiscite]" card, his "New Constitution" card, his "Terminate Reunification" card, his "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution" card, and even his "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" card. Long term mutual confidence and mutual tolerance between Taipei and Washington have already been seriously undermined by this succession of "mishaps." The ruling DPP puts its partisan self-interest above the national interest. It cares nothing about US concerns. Instead it gambles that the US, constrained by regional strategic considerations, has no choice but to back Taiwan. As a result the US government no longer believes the Chen regime will conduct itself in a responsible manner vis a vis foreign policy affecting the destiny of the ROC and the Asian Pacific region.
Characteristic Three is that the ruling DPP has turned "Taiwan's participation in international organizations" into an ideology. For years, the focus of the ruling DPP was "Taiwan's participation in the United Nations and the World Health Organization." Every year the ruling DPP sponsors a massive propaganda campaign to drum up support for UN participation. But it gradually transfers its demands for the participation of "Taiwan's people" in international affairs, to demands to redefine Taiwan's political status, provoking a Chinese Communist Party backlash and increasing international tensions. The US considers demands by Chen Shui-bian to join the United Nations in the name of "Taiwan" to be violations of the Oath of Office Chen took when he swore not to change the name of the country.
Seen in perspective, these all are wasted efforts. Not only have they not helped "Taiwan" out of a difficult situation, they have caused significant damage. First, diplomatic relations require a long term investment of resources. That alone makes state visits difficult. But hosts and guests can easily swap roles. The Chen regime loves to treat state visits as political theater, plundering resources that might have been invested in substantive relations. It squanders them on myopic, short term political theater, leaving the work of diplomatic foundation building undone. As a result, despite Chen Shui-bian's frequent trips to Central and South America, decades of diplomatic relations with nations such as Costa Rica have flown right out the window.
Next, the international community is nothing if not pragmatic. Given Chinese Communist Party pressure, any attempts by the ruling DPP to demand "Taiwan's rights, interests, dignity, and breathing space," depend on other forces, acting as a counterbalance. But for the past few years, the ruling DPP has been asleep at the wheel. The economy is in recession. The Chinese Communist Party holds all the cards. The ruling DPP panders to Deep Green demands for a Close Door Policy. It is unwilling to face the fact of the mainland's rise. When we demand participation in international activities, what can we use to convince the nations of the world to turn their backs on Beijing and side with Taipei?
Worst of all, a long string of irresponsible diplomatic gambits that gave no thought to the consequences, may have helped the DPP win local elections. But it has steadily diminished Taipei's diplomatic breathing space, and has undermined the sovereignty and status of the Republic of China.
The ROC's international plight is that it requires ambiguity to increase its maneuvering room. It needs to infiltrate the citadel when the Chinese Communist Party isn't looking, thereby affirming its own international standing. The Chen regime's approach is just the opposite. Even before it has set foot outside the door, it raises a huge ruckus. It makes a major political issue of what it is about to do, reminding the Chinese Communist Party to take preemptive measures. Washington worries the situation will spin out of control. It does not trust Taipei's brinksmanship, which has become increasingly reckless. The ruling DPP is now in the comical situation of locking the door from the inside, even as Beijing locks the door from the outside. All the ruling DPP wants to do is boast about its "victories" to Deep Green mobs. Besides engaging in self deception, it offers no countermeasures whatsoever. Besides, the international community already feels that Taiwan's repeated provocations are ruling regime election ploys. They are intended purely to rally domestic political support. They have endangered public safety and Asian Pacific regional stability. This being the case, no one should tolerate this kind of reckless behavior. It could bring disaster to the entire world. Therefore they must join hands to keep a lid on it.
This scenario allows the international community and the Chinese Communist Party to stand together. As a result, both the European Union and the US are uniformly opposed to the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite." Their declarations amount to precedents with tremendous binding force, creating even more barriers to Taiwan's entry into the UN. When United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon returns Chen Shui-bian's petition, unread; when he refers to the United Nations draft resolution that acknowledges the Chinese Communist Party's sovereignty over Taiwan, the major nations express no objection. This increases international community acceptance of the Chinese Communist Party's position. ROC sovereignty is setback even further than before Chen Shui-bian sent his petition.
If it weren't for such undue haste, which has subjected the ROC's sovereignty to attacks, the ROC would not have suffered such injuries. The ruling DPP has relentlessly exploited diplomacy as a tool for self-preservation. Chen Shui-bian's brinksmanship provokes antipathy and anxiety within the international community, leading to an inevitable backlash. The result is harm to the ROC's dignity, rights, and interests. Pressure from Beijing is unquestionably one reason for the ROC's diplomatic plight, but it is hardly the only reason.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.08.07
短線的外交操作正在扼殺台灣的外交空間
中時社論
說台灣這些年搞「烽火外交」，倒也是事實，不過是在自家周圍放火，沒燒出國際空間，反而把自己愈來愈逼進了牆角。
執政當局的外交操作向來都有幾大重點，一是替元首個人造勢。於是陳水扁總統頻頻出訪，享受風光禮遇和媒體曝光，藉著過境美國的待遇為自己的成就大肆吹噓；上行下效，其他高層首長也積極出國。二是替國內選舉助陣。民進黨政府每到選情吃緊時，向台獨邊緣踩紅線的激烈言行，就成了凝聚本土票源的萬靈丹。而且因為政績乏善可陳，經濟有氣無力，民進黨的選情愈來愈困難，外交策略只好愈來愈「重鹹」。
於是乎，二千年曾靠著「四不一沒有」博得美國與國際社會信任的陳水扁，開始在邊線跳探戈。先後大玩「一邊一國」、「防禦性公投」、「新憲」、「終統」、「正名制憲」乃至如今的以台灣名義入聯及入聯公投。台美長期培養出來的互信互諒，已經因為這一連串的「意外」而嚴重侵蝕崩潰。民進黨政府將自我利益置於國家利益之上，不在乎盟友美國的立場，卻豪賭於美國基於區域利益非挺台灣不可，也讓美國政府不再相信扁政府在考量及執行外交政策時，會對台灣命運及亞太局勢採取負責任的態度。
第三重點則是把台灣參與國際組織意識形態化。這些年來，政府把國際參與聚焦於聯合國及世衛組織，每年都進行大量的文宣和動員造勢。但訴求重點從爭取台灣人民參與國際事務的權利，逐漸轉為凸顯台灣國家定位，並因此引發中共反彈及國際社會的疑慮。像這次陳水扁推動以「台灣」名義加入聯合國，便被美方認為違反了就職時「不更改國號」的承諾。
綜觀起來，這些都是虛功，對台灣的外交處境不但沒幫助，還造成了不少重大傷害：首先，外交關係需要投入資源長期耕耘，才能實現元首出訪這種高難度的成果。但主客易位，扁政府熱中出訪作秀，把原本可以投入實質關係的資源給掠奪走，短視近利的操作手法，導致外交基礎工作荒廢。結果陳水扁走中南美洲像在「行灶腳」，數十年的邦交國哥斯大黎加還是飛了。
其次，國際社會是很現實的，在中共打壓之下，台灣要爭取權益尊嚴與活動空間，必須靠其他力量來平衡政治劣勢。可是這些年來，台灣不勵精不圖治，經濟陷入低迷，口袋裡的籌碼比不過經濟起飛的中共，又迎合深綠路線採取鎖國政策，不肯正視大陸的崛起浪潮。當我們要求國際參與時，究竟能拿什麼說服世界各國捨中就台？
更糟糕的是，台灣一連串不顧後果也不負責任的外交操作，儘管完成了助選使命，卻不斷削減台灣的外交操作空間，對台灣的主權地位反而有害無益。
以台灣的國際處境，對外發展關係時應該盡量擴大模糊與迴旋空間，趁著中共沒注意時悄悄攻城掠地，讓自己的國際地位愈站愈穩。結果，扁政府的操作完全相反，腳一步都還沒邁出去，就先敲鑼打鼓大作政治文章，提醒了中共趕快封殺。美國擔心局勢失控，又不信任台灣當局，紅線於是愈畫愈近。如今台灣連門都出不了，卻還關起門來，只顧著向深綠群眾吹噓戰績。除了自欺欺人，拿不出什麼對策來。此外，國際社會已經覺得，台灣一再採取激進挑釁的動作，是執政當局為了內政考量的造勢策略，以致置人民安危於險境，更無視於亞太安定。既然如此，大家就不應縱容這種會為全球帶來災難的冒進行為，必須聯手壓制住台灣這個變數。
情勢讓國際社會選擇與中共站在一起，因此，台灣的入聯公投，連歐盟、美國也齊聲反對，而這樣的表態會對之後的政府形成具有約束力的慣例，也為台灣入聯設下了更多障礙。當聯合國秘書長潘基文退回陳水扁信函，指稱聯合國決議案已認定中共擁有台灣主權時，大國對此並無異議。這使得中共的主張獲得國際社會進一步接受，台灣主權地位因此再遭重挫，比陳水扁致函前還倒退了許多。
如果不是如此躁進，拿台灣的主權國家地位去給人家打，台灣也不會遭到這樣的傷害。執政黨不斷把外交當自保工具，國際社會在反感及疑慮下對陳水扁的操作加以反制，結果是台灣尊嚴與權益連帶無辜受害。台灣如今的外交困境，說實話，絕對有北京打壓與圍堵的因素，但不能說自己全無責任。
Is Killing the Taiwan Independence Movement's Own Diplomatic Space
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
August 7, 2007
For years the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been practicing what might be termed "scorched earth diplomacy." The problem for the pro independence DPP is that the fires it has set, far from creating any "international breathing space for Taiwan," have merely boxed the Republic of China (ROC) government into a corner.
The ruling DPP's diplomatic maneuvers have several major characteristics. Characteristic One is these maneuvers help drum up personal support for the president. As a result President Chen Shui-bian repeatedly embarks on such state visits, basking in the red carpet treatment and the media exposure. He takes full advantage of his transits through the US to tout his personal achievements. As usual, whenever higher ups say "Jump!" lower downs ask "How high?" Other high ranking officials also take full advantage of foreign junkets. Characteristic Two is these maneuvers help the ruling DPP in domestic elections. Whenever an election is closely contested, the ruling DPP invariably engages in brinksmanship, pandering to Taiwan independence fundamentalists in both words and deeds. This ploy has become a political cure-all for consolidating the "ben tu" (nativist) vote. Because the ruling DPP has no political achievements to speak of, and the economy is in recession; their election prospects have become increasingly grim, and their diplomatic strategy has become increasingly provocative.
As a result, Chen Shui-bian, who won in 2000, largely on the basis of his "Five Noes Policy," and in whom the US and the international community placed their trust, began engaging in reckless brinksmanship. One after another, he played his "One Country, Each Side" card, his "Defensive Referendum [Plebiscite]" card, his "New Constitution" card, his "Terminate Reunification" card, his "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution" card, and even his "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan" card. Long term mutual confidence and mutual tolerance between Taipei and Washington have already been seriously undermined by this succession of "mishaps." The ruling DPP puts its partisan self-interest above the national interest. It cares nothing about US concerns. Instead it gambles that the US, constrained by regional strategic considerations, has no choice but to back Taiwan. As a result the US government no longer believes the Chen regime will conduct itself in a responsible manner vis a vis foreign policy affecting the destiny of the ROC and the Asian Pacific region.
Characteristic Three is that the ruling DPP has turned "Taiwan's participation in international organizations" into an ideology. For years, the focus of the ruling DPP was "Taiwan's participation in the United Nations and the World Health Organization." Every year the ruling DPP sponsors a massive propaganda campaign to drum up support for UN participation. But it gradually transfers its demands for the participation of "Taiwan's people" in international affairs, to demands to redefine Taiwan's political status, provoking a Chinese Communist Party backlash and increasing international tensions. The US considers demands by Chen Shui-bian to join the United Nations in the name of "Taiwan" to be violations of the Oath of Office Chen took when he swore not to change the name of the country.
Seen in perspective, these all are wasted efforts. Not only have they not helped "Taiwan" out of a difficult situation, they have caused significant damage. First, diplomatic relations require a long term investment of resources. That alone makes state visits difficult. But hosts and guests can easily swap roles. The Chen regime loves to treat state visits as political theater, plundering resources that might have been invested in substantive relations. It squanders them on myopic, short term political theater, leaving the work of diplomatic foundation building undone. As a result, despite Chen Shui-bian's frequent trips to Central and South America, decades of diplomatic relations with nations such as Costa Rica have flown right out the window.
Next, the international community is nothing if not pragmatic. Given Chinese Communist Party pressure, any attempts by the ruling DPP to demand "Taiwan's rights, interests, dignity, and breathing space," depend on other forces, acting as a counterbalance. But for the past few years, the ruling DPP has been asleep at the wheel. The economy is in recession. The Chinese Communist Party holds all the cards. The ruling DPP panders to Deep Green demands for a Close Door Policy. It is unwilling to face the fact of the mainland's rise. When we demand participation in international activities, what can we use to convince the nations of the world to turn their backs on Beijing and side with Taipei?
Worst of all, a long string of irresponsible diplomatic gambits that gave no thought to the consequences, may have helped the DPP win local elections. But it has steadily diminished Taipei's diplomatic breathing space, and has undermined the sovereignty and status of the Republic of China.
The ROC's international plight is that it requires ambiguity to increase its maneuvering room. It needs to infiltrate the citadel when the Chinese Communist Party isn't looking, thereby affirming its own international standing. The Chen regime's approach is just the opposite. Even before it has set foot outside the door, it raises a huge ruckus. It makes a major political issue of what it is about to do, reminding the Chinese Communist Party to take preemptive measures. Washington worries the situation will spin out of control. It does not trust Taipei's brinksmanship, which has become increasingly reckless. The ruling DPP is now in the comical situation of locking the door from the inside, even as Beijing locks the door from the outside. All the ruling DPP wants to do is boast about its "victories" to Deep Green mobs. Besides engaging in self deception, it offers no countermeasures whatsoever. Besides, the international community already feels that Taiwan's repeated provocations are ruling regime election ploys. They are intended purely to rally domestic political support. They have endangered public safety and Asian Pacific regional stability. This being the case, no one should tolerate this kind of reckless behavior. It could bring disaster to the entire world. Therefore they must join hands to keep a lid on it.
This scenario allows the international community and the Chinese Communist Party to stand together. As a result, both the European Union and the US are uniformly opposed to the "Join the UN under the Name of Taiwan Plebiscite." Their declarations amount to precedents with tremendous binding force, creating even more barriers to Taiwan's entry into the UN. When United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon returns Chen Shui-bian's petition, unread; when he refers to the United Nations draft resolution that acknowledges the Chinese Communist Party's sovereignty over Taiwan, the major nations express no objection. This increases international community acceptance of the Chinese Communist Party's position. ROC sovereignty is setback even further than before Chen Shui-bian sent his petition.
If it weren't for such undue haste, which has subjected the ROC's sovereignty to attacks, the ROC would not have suffered such injuries. The ruling DPP has relentlessly exploited diplomacy as a tool for self-preservation. Chen Shui-bian's brinksmanship provokes antipathy and anxiety within the international community, leading to an inevitable backlash. The result is harm to the ROC's dignity, rights, and interests. Pressure from Beijing is unquestionably one reason for the ROC's diplomatic plight, but it is hardly the only reason.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.08.07
短線的外交操作正在扼殺台灣的外交空間
中時社論
說台灣這些年搞「烽火外交」，倒也是事實，不過是在自家周圍放火，沒燒出國際空間，反而把自己愈來愈逼進了牆角。
執政當局的外交操作向來都有幾大重點，一是替元首個人造勢。於是陳水扁總統頻頻出訪，享受風光禮遇和媒體曝光，藉著過境美國的待遇為自己的成就大肆吹噓；上行下效，其他高層首長也積極出國。二是替國內選舉助陣。民進黨政府每到選情吃緊時，向台獨邊緣踩紅線的激烈言行，就成了凝聚本土票源的萬靈丹。而且因為政績乏善可陳，經濟有氣無力，民進黨的選情愈來愈困難，外交策略只好愈來愈「重鹹」。
於是乎，二千年曾靠著「四不一沒有」博得美國與國際社會信任的陳水扁，開始在邊線跳探戈。先後大玩「一邊一國」、「防禦性公投」、「新憲」、「終統」、「正名制憲」乃至如今的以台灣名義入聯及入聯公投。台美長期培養出來的互信互諒，已經因為這一連串的「意外」而嚴重侵蝕崩潰。民進黨政府將自我利益置於國家利益之上，不在乎盟友美國的立場，卻豪賭於美國基於區域利益非挺台灣不可，也讓美國政府不再相信扁政府在考量及執行外交政策時，會對台灣命運及亞太局勢採取負責任的態度。
第三重點則是把台灣參與國際組織意識形態化。這些年來，政府把國際參與聚焦於聯合國及世衛組織，每年都進行大量的文宣和動員造勢。但訴求重點從爭取台灣人民參與國際事務的權利，逐漸轉為凸顯台灣國家定位，並因此引發中共反彈及國際社會的疑慮。像這次陳水扁推動以「台灣」名義加入聯合國，便被美方認為違反了就職時「不更改國號」的承諾。
綜觀起來，這些都是虛功，對台灣的外交處境不但沒幫助，還造成了不少重大傷害：首先，外交關係需要投入資源長期耕耘，才能實現元首出訪這種高難度的成果。但主客易位，扁政府熱中出訪作秀，把原本可以投入實質關係的資源給掠奪走，短視近利的操作手法，導致外交基礎工作荒廢。結果陳水扁走中南美洲像在「行灶腳」，數十年的邦交國哥斯大黎加還是飛了。
其次，國際社會是很現實的，在中共打壓之下，台灣要爭取權益尊嚴與活動空間，必須靠其他力量來平衡政治劣勢。可是這些年來，台灣不勵精不圖治，經濟陷入低迷，口袋裡的籌碼比不過經濟起飛的中共，又迎合深綠路線採取鎖國政策，不肯正視大陸的崛起浪潮。當我們要求國際參與時，究竟能拿什麼說服世界各國捨中就台？
更糟糕的是，台灣一連串不顧後果也不負責任的外交操作，儘管完成了助選使命，卻不斷削減台灣的外交操作空間，對台灣的主權地位反而有害無益。
以台灣的國際處境，對外發展關係時應該盡量擴大模糊與迴旋空間，趁著中共沒注意時悄悄攻城掠地，讓自己的國際地位愈站愈穩。結果，扁政府的操作完全相反，腳一步都還沒邁出去，就先敲鑼打鼓大作政治文章，提醒了中共趕快封殺。美國擔心局勢失控，又不信任台灣當局，紅線於是愈畫愈近。如今台灣連門都出不了，卻還關起門來，只顧著向深綠群眾吹噓戰績。除了自欺欺人，拿不出什麼對策來。此外，國際社會已經覺得，台灣一再採取激進挑釁的動作，是執政當局為了內政考量的造勢策略，以致置人民安危於險境，更無視於亞太安定。既然如此，大家就不應縱容這種會為全球帶來災難的冒進行為，必須聯手壓制住台灣這個變數。
情勢讓國際社會選擇與中共站在一起，因此，台灣的入聯公投，連歐盟、美國也齊聲反對，而這樣的表態會對之後的政府形成具有約束力的慣例，也為台灣入聯設下了更多障礙。當聯合國秘書長潘基文退回陳水扁信函，指稱聯合國決議案已認定中共擁有台灣主權時，大國對此並無異議。這使得中共的主張獲得國際社會進一步接受，台灣主權地位因此再遭重挫，比陳水扁致函前還倒退了許多。
如果不是如此躁進，拿台灣的主權國家地位去給人家打，台灣也不會遭到這樣的傷害。執政黨不斷把外交當自保工具，國際社會在反感及疑慮下對陳水扁的操作加以反制，結果是台灣尊嚴與權益連帶無辜受害。台灣如今的外交困境，說實話，絕對有北京打壓與圍堵的因素，但不能說自己全無責任。
Thursday, August 9, 2007
How Long can Chen Shui-bian seek Short Term Advantage?
How Long can Chen Shui-bian seek Short Term Advantage?
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
August 8, 2007
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been in power for seven years. But it still hasn't learned the basics of government administration. During the last year of its second term, it suddenly announces that it intends to promote "A Benefit a Week" policy that will rapidly transform Taiwan into a prosperous "New Island Paradise." This proves one thing: The Taiwan region of China really and truly is not a "normal nation."
The Chang Chun-hsiung cabinet treats the ROC central government as if it were the DPP's election committee. It assiduously administers injections of adrenalin into its political heart. This may give the DPP's election campaign a boost, but what about the rest of the nation? Can our society really endure the disruptive effects of such a reckless and short-sighted policy process? Can the economy really withstand such huge deficits?
In two and a half months, the Executive Yuan spent nearly 440 billion NT on its so-called "Benefits for All" policy. This rivals predecessor Chang Chun-hsiung's "8100, Taiwan Starts Moving Economic Stimulus Plan" seven years ago. The ruling DPP squandered 800 billion on that fiasco, for which it got long-term recession and high unemployment. Now that Premier Chang has staged a comeback, his "Benefits for All" fantasy is more than a little unsettling.
Recent market fluctuations have left many individual investors in a bind. The government's heavy handed intervention and release of flawed data are inexcusable. The stock market rebound was something people were originally happy to see. But the ruling regime was determined to trumpet its own political accomplishments. It pushed the market index up to 10,000 points by manipulating government funds. It artificially created a speculative climate. It also increased the market's opacity. The government's intervention seduced many younger investors into buying high. But can a government determined to manipulate the stocket market outmaneuver highly nimble foreign investors? Besides, the global market is full of surprises. Can Taiwan stocks really rise to the sky through to government intervention? When the global market is subjected to repeated shocks, when anxious political hacks eager to claim credit are wondering what to do next, foreign investors and major investors will already have taken their profits and walked away. Those left holding the bag will be ordinary members of the public, individual investors who made the mistake of swallowing the government's lies about "Benefits for All." What is this, if not politically inflicted harm?
Let's look at the housing market. Behind its bullish facade lie pitfalls akin to the stock market's. Look at the big picture, and we see the same policy mistakes and biases. Mistake One was to abuse tax cuts and low interest loans to artificially stimulate demand in the housing market. Mistake Two was to reclassify farm land as commercial land, and to auction off state owned urban land, enabling large syndicates to engage in real estate speculation. Housing prices surged upward, but the overall economy didn't. Supply did not match demand. Vested interests made huge profits, while ordinary citizens were left holding the bag. One might say these are economic shackles by which the DPP has fettered an entire generation.
If we examine each of the Chang cabinet's "Benefits for All," we find they are full of obsolete interventionist thinking. For example, manipulation of the stock market, and intervention in the housing market. They also resort to such outmoded approaches as subsidies. For example, minimum wage subsidies and taxi gasoline price subsidies. These reveal a blinkered, short sighted mindset that precipitately commutes the sentences of violent felons without regard for the consequences. Taipei County's elevation to the status of a Directly Administered Municipality was nothing but "drawing a biscuit to appease one's hunger." So was the half-baked Rural Reconstruction Plan. The "Benefits for All" have benefitted only the wealthy. For ordinary citizens they have been a disaster. The burden of these failed policies must now be borne by society as a whole.
The Chang cabinet is devoting its attention to concocting these "rapidly recycled" Benefits for All. This is distracting it from the routine conduct of government affairs. Even more frightening is how such a politicized atmosphere undermines respect for professionalism. The president issues an order, and the formula for oil pricing is immediately rewritten. The cost of living skyrockets, but the government has no remedy, proving once again its sheer incompetence. Professionals of consciences have been silenced. When the Executive Yuan promotes its "Benefits for All," it boasts of the amount invested. But when asked where the funds came from, it pretends not to hear. What are its policies, if not sheer speculation? Does the state treasury contain enough silver to pay for them? Or will these debts need to be repaid by future generations?
Actually, many of the the so-called "Benefits of the Week" are already disintegrating. Some have vanished altogether. For example, housing sales and volume are weak. Rental rates for commercial real estate have risen sharply. The impact of changes in the urban landscape and stock market lasted only two months. Momentum has died, and the outlook remains uncertain. Taipei County's elevation to the status of "Directly Administered Municipality" was mere lip service without basis in fact. The ill considered commutation of the sentences of convicted felons and their early release from prison has resulted in suicides, murders, and drug related deaths, courtesy our "enlightened regime." These "Benefits for All" are purely for the sake of votes. But the election is eight months away. These "benefits" may change or vanish unexpectedly. They are mere illusions.
To deal with problems caused by the weather during next year's Olympic Games, Beijing has established a "Weather Modification Office" that has received much attention. The Chang cabinet's "Benefits for All" group is attempting to modify the political climate. It too is a "Weather Modification Office." Its decisions will not only affect the political climate during the coming election season. Its calamitous decisions will destroy the future of an entire generation.
利多變泡沫：偏鋒短線豈能持久？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.08 02:51 am
執政七年，連怎麼維持基本行政運作都沒學會的主政者，突然在最後一年宣稱要周周放送大利多，快速打造「寶島新樂園」的好景。這個現象只印證了一件事：台灣果然不是一個正常的國家。
張內閣把整個政府當成民進黨的輔選機器，一味猛打政治強心針，對民進黨選情或許確有一定程度的拉抬效果；但對國家而言，我們的社經體質真禁得起這種專走偏鋒、炒短線政策的翻攪折騰嗎？台灣的未來又承擔得起這麼龐大的透支嗎？
僅僅兩個半月，行政院已大手筆釋出總額逾四千四百多億的所謂政策「利多」；這比起張俊雄七年前任閣揆時推出的「八一○○，台灣啟動」，已不遑多讓。當年狂擲八千多億的率爾操刀，結果卻讓台灣陷入長期蕭條及高失業的窘境；如今捲土重來，張內閣製造的利多夢幻，不免讓人餘悸猶存。
以最近股市的暴起暴跌為例，許多散戶慘遭套牢，政府的過度介入與釋放錯誤訊息，實難辭其咎。股市回春，本來當然是人們樂見之事；但主政者亟欲美化政績，強力運用基金哄抬「萬點行情」，不僅升高了台股的投機氣氛，也添加了市場研判的濁度。正因為政府介入作多，誘使許多小投資人追高買進；問題是，一心作多的政府操盤手，哪裡鬥得過刁鑽靈活的外資？何況，國際股市瞬息萬變，台股豈能因政府支撐即可一柱擎天？也因此，當國際股市連鎖震盪，貪功躁進的政治炒手仍驚魂未定，外資及大戶早已獲利了結揚長而去，卻留下眾多誤食政府「利多」誘餌的套牢散戶；這豈不是政策害人？
再看最近房市的景象，表面風光背後也埋藏著和股市相若的陷阱，究其原委，同樣可歸咎政府政策的錯誤及偏斜。錯誤之一，是濫用賦稅減免及低利貸款，催化市場對房屋的假性需求；錯誤之二，是濫用農地釋出及率爾拍賣都心國有地，助長財團對土地房價的炒作。亦即，房價雖然高漲，但社會經濟並未表現出相應的榮景；在供需不對稱的情況下，房地既得利益者愈形暴富，而基層民眾卻愈無力擺脫無殼蝸牛的處境。這甚至可說是民進黨留給整個新生世代的枷鎖。
檢視張內閣釋放的各項「利多」，不僅充滿老舊的「干預」思維（例如對股市的操作及對房市的介入）；且動輒訴諸落伍的「補貼」手法（例如對基本時薪和計程車油價的補貼）；更一再暴露瞻前不顧後的短視近利心態（諸如減刑條例的草率推動，北縣升格直轄市的畫餅充飢，及粗糙的農村改建方案）。財團的利多，卻是平民的災難，種種政策偏失的代價，均轉嫁給社會大眾承擔。
更可怕的是，當張內閣將全副精力用於發想這些「快速回收」的利多時，不僅影響到常態的政務推動；在政治掛帥的氛圍下，更影響到行政體系的專業判斷。總統一聲令下，浮動油價公式即宣告改弦易轍；但民生物價飛漲，政府卻束手無策，在在證明行政失能、專業喑啞已到極點。尤其，行政院動輒推出利多，且屢屢誇稱投入可觀經費，但對資金從何而來，卻一概避而不談。這些政策如果不是買空賣空的勾當，請問：國庫中有足夠的銀兩支付嗎？或者這些均將留待下一世代來償還？
其實，所謂一周一利多，其中多項已現破綻甚至已告幻滅。例如，曾幾何時，房價已見盤弱，價量背離，更出現店租暴漲、街市變貌等效應；股市只飆了兩個月，後繼無力，前景莫測；北縣升格，口惠實不至；減刑者出獄，自殺、殺人，吸毒而死，「德政」變色……。這些「利多」，皆是為了選舉而放送；但如今距選舉尚有八個月，這些利多竟已變形或幻滅，可見其虛浮不實。
北京為因應明年奧運的天候問題，特成立了「人工影響天氣辦公室」，簡稱「人影辦」，備受矚目。若要比擬，張內閣的「利多」小組，利用人工影響選舉氣候，稱其為超級「人影辦」也當之無愧；因為，他們的決策何止影響一次選舉，更將貽禍往後一整個世代的未來。
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
August 8, 2007
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been in power for seven years. But it still hasn't learned the basics of government administration. During the last year of its second term, it suddenly announces that it intends to promote "A Benefit a Week" policy that will rapidly transform Taiwan into a prosperous "New Island Paradise." This proves one thing: The Taiwan region of China really and truly is not a "normal nation."
The Chang Chun-hsiung cabinet treats the ROC central government as if it were the DPP's election committee. It assiduously administers injections of adrenalin into its political heart. This may give the DPP's election campaign a boost, but what about the rest of the nation? Can our society really endure the disruptive effects of such a reckless and short-sighted policy process? Can the economy really withstand such huge deficits?
In two and a half months, the Executive Yuan spent nearly 440 billion NT on its so-called "Benefits for All" policy. This rivals predecessor Chang Chun-hsiung's "8100, Taiwan Starts Moving Economic Stimulus Plan" seven years ago. The ruling DPP squandered 800 billion on that fiasco, for which it got long-term recession and high unemployment. Now that Premier Chang has staged a comeback, his "Benefits for All" fantasy is more than a little unsettling.
Recent market fluctuations have left many individual investors in a bind. The government's heavy handed intervention and release of flawed data are inexcusable. The stock market rebound was something people were originally happy to see. But the ruling regime was determined to trumpet its own political accomplishments. It pushed the market index up to 10,000 points by manipulating government funds. It artificially created a speculative climate. It also increased the market's opacity. The government's intervention seduced many younger investors into buying high. But can a government determined to manipulate the stocket market outmaneuver highly nimble foreign investors? Besides, the global market is full of surprises. Can Taiwan stocks really rise to the sky through to government intervention? When the global market is subjected to repeated shocks, when anxious political hacks eager to claim credit are wondering what to do next, foreign investors and major investors will already have taken their profits and walked away. Those left holding the bag will be ordinary members of the public, individual investors who made the mistake of swallowing the government's lies about "Benefits for All." What is this, if not politically inflicted harm?
Let's look at the housing market. Behind its bullish facade lie pitfalls akin to the stock market's. Look at the big picture, and we see the same policy mistakes and biases. Mistake One was to abuse tax cuts and low interest loans to artificially stimulate demand in the housing market. Mistake Two was to reclassify farm land as commercial land, and to auction off state owned urban land, enabling large syndicates to engage in real estate speculation. Housing prices surged upward, but the overall economy didn't. Supply did not match demand. Vested interests made huge profits, while ordinary citizens were left holding the bag. One might say these are economic shackles by which the DPP has fettered an entire generation.
If we examine each of the Chang cabinet's "Benefits for All," we find they are full of obsolete interventionist thinking. For example, manipulation of the stock market, and intervention in the housing market. They also resort to such outmoded approaches as subsidies. For example, minimum wage subsidies and taxi gasoline price subsidies. These reveal a blinkered, short sighted mindset that precipitately commutes the sentences of violent felons without regard for the consequences. Taipei County's elevation to the status of a Directly Administered Municipality was nothing but "drawing a biscuit to appease one's hunger." So was the half-baked Rural Reconstruction Plan. The "Benefits for All" have benefitted only the wealthy. For ordinary citizens they have been a disaster. The burden of these failed policies must now be borne by society as a whole.
The Chang cabinet is devoting its attention to concocting these "rapidly recycled" Benefits for All. This is distracting it from the routine conduct of government affairs. Even more frightening is how such a politicized atmosphere undermines respect for professionalism. The president issues an order, and the formula for oil pricing is immediately rewritten. The cost of living skyrockets, but the government has no remedy, proving once again its sheer incompetence. Professionals of consciences have been silenced. When the Executive Yuan promotes its "Benefits for All," it boasts of the amount invested. But when asked where the funds came from, it pretends not to hear. What are its policies, if not sheer speculation? Does the state treasury contain enough silver to pay for them? Or will these debts need to be repaid by future generations?
Actually, many of the the so-called "Benefits of the Week" are already disintegrating. Some have vanished altogether. For example, housing sales and volume are weak. Rental rates for commercial real estate have risen sharply. The impact of changes in the urban landscape and stock market lasted only two months. Momentum has died, and the outlook remains uncertain. Taipei County's elevation to the status of "Directly Administered Municipality" was mere lip service without basis in fact. The ill considered commutation of the sentences of convicted felons and their early release from prison has resulted in suicides, murders, and drug related deaths, courtesy our "enlightened regime." These "Benefits for All" are purely for the sake of votes. But the election is eight months away. These "benefits" may change or vanish unexpectedly. They are mere illusions.
To deal with problems caused by the weather during next year's Olympic Games, Beijing has established a "Weather Modification Office" that has received much attention. The Chang cabinet's "Benefits for All" group is attempting to modify the political climate. It too is a "Weather Modification Office." Its decisions will not only affect the political climate during the coming election season. Its calamitous decisions will destroy the future of an entire generation.
利多變泡沫：偏鋒短線豈能持久？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.08 02:51 am
執政七年，連怎麼維持基本行政運作都沒學會的主政者，突然在最後一年宣稱要周周放送大利多，快速打造「寶島新樂園」的好景。這個現象只印證了一件事：台灣果然不是一個正常的國家。
張內閣把整個政府當成民進黨的輔選機器，一味猛打政治強心針，對民進黨選情或許確有一定程度的拉抬效果；但對國家而言，我們的社經體質真禁得起這種專走偏鋒、炒短線政策的翻攪折騰嗎？台灣的未來又承擔得起這麼龐大的透支嗎？
僅僅兩個半月，行政院已大手筆釋出總額逾四千四百多億的所謂政策「利多」；這比起張俊雄七年前任閣揆時推出的「八一○○，台灣啟動」，已不遑多讓。當年狂擲八千多億的率爾操刀，結果卻讓台灣陷入長期蕭條及高失業的窘境；如今捲土重來，張內閣製造的利多夢幻，不免讓人餘悸猶存。
以最近股市的暴起暴跌為例，許多散戶慘遭套牢，政府的過度介入與釋放錯誤訊息，實難辭其咎。股市回春，本來當然是人們樂見之事；但主政者亟欲美化政績，強力運用基金哄抬「萬點行情」，不僅升高了台股的投機氣氛，也添加了市場研判的濁度。正因為政府介入作多，誘使許多小投資人追高買進；問題是，一心作多的政府操盤手，哪裡鬥得過刁鑽靈活的外資？何況，國際股市瞬息萬變，台股豈能因政府支撐即可一柱擎天？也因此，當國際股市連鎖震盪，貪功躁進的政治炒手仍驚魂未定，外資及大戶早已獲利了結揚長而去，卻留下眾多誤食政府「利多」誘餌的套牢散戶；這豈不是政策害人？
再看最近房市的景象，表面風光背後也埋藏著和股市相若的陷阱，究其原委，同樣可歸咎政府政策的錯誤及偏斜。錯誤之一，是濫用賦稅減免及低利貸款，催化市場對房屋的假性需求；錯誤之二，是濫用農地釋出及率爾拍賣都心國有地，助長財團對土地房價的炒作。亦即，房價雖然高漲，但社會經濟並未表現出相應的榮景；在供需不對稱的情況下，房地既得利益者愈形暴富，而基層民眾卻愈無力擺脫無殼蝸牛的處境。這甚至可說是民進黨留給整個新生世代的枷鎖。
檢視張內閣釋放的各項「利多」，不僅充滿老舊的「干預」思維（例如對股市的操作及對房市的介入）；且動輒訴諸落伍的「補貼」手法（例如對基本時薪和計程車油價的補貼）；更一再暴露瞻前不顧後的短視近利心態（諸如減刑條例的草率推動，北縣升格直轄市的畫餅充飢，及粗糙的農村改建方案）。財團的利多，卻是平民的災難，種種政策偏失的代價，均轉嫁給社會大眾承擔。
更可怕的是，當張內閣將全副精力用於發想這些「快速回收」的利多時，不僅影響到常態的政務推動；在政治掛帥的氛圍下，更影響到行政體系的專業判斷。總統一聲令下，浮動油價公式即宣告改弦易轍；但民生物價飛漲，政府卻束手無策，在在證明行政失能、專業喑啞已到極點。尤其，行政院動輒推出利多，且屢屢誇稱投入可觀經費，但對資金從何而來，卻一概避而不談。這些政策如果不是買空賣空的勾當，請問：國庫中有足夠的銀兩支付嗎？或者這些均將留待下一世代來償還？
其實，所謂一周一利多，其中多項已現破綻甚至已告幻滅。例如，曾幾何時，房價已見盤弱，價量背離，更出現店租暴漲、街市變貌等效應；股市只飆了兩個月，後繼無力，前景莫測；北縣升格，口惠實不至；減刑者出獄，自殺、殺人，吸毒而死，「德政」變色……。這些「利多」，皆是為了選舉而放送；但如今距選舉尚有八個月，這些利多竟已變形或幻滅，可見其虛浮不實。
北京為因應明年奧運的天候問題，特成立了「人工影響天氣辦公室」，簡稱「人影辦」，備受矚目。若要比擬，張內閣的「利多」小組，利用人工影響選舉氣候，稱其為超級「人影辦」也當之無愧；因為，他們的決策何止影響一次選舉，更將貽禍往後一整個世代的未來。
Monday, August 6, 2007
Four Hundred Billion Evaporates, but Nobody is Responsible
Four Hundred Billion Evaporates, but Nobody is Responsible
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
August 4, 2007
A recent news report escaped the notice of most people. We however, were quite taken aback. According to this report, Taipower's Fourth Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 was scheduled to begin operations in July two years from now. But because contractors have declared bankruptcy, construction will have to be delayed at least eight months. In other words, the ruling DPP's halt on construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant will set the project back four years. According to estimates by Academia Sinica economic experts, delays caused by the suspension of work on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant will increase the cost of construction alone by 160 billion NT. According to Legislative Yuan research figures, changes in contractual terms, price increases in the reserve fund, additional annual fuel costs due to the substitution of fossil fuel fired electrical generation plants following the Executive Yuan's announced halts on construction, have already cost an additional 234.5 billion NT. Using the simplest arithmetic, the ruling DPP's stopping and restarting of construction on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant has already cost Republic of China taxpayers over 400 billion NT (approximately 12 billion US).
How much is 400 billion, really? For the ordinary citizen, it is an inconceivable, astronomical sum. Why not take the most common central government budget figures for comparison? Consider the 2006 central government budget, approved by the Legislative Yuan, amounting to over 1.37 trillion NT (approximately 42 billion US). Four hundred billion is nearly 1/3 of the Republic of China's annual budget. By contrast, corruption and fraud are a drop in the bucket. Policy decisions made for the sake of ideological conformity, allowed 400 billion to simply evaporate.
Try thinking about it. How much good could have been done with this 400 billion, had it not been wasted? Taipei County has been elevated to the status of a Directly Administered Municipality. Recently, it has been fighting with Taipei City and Kaohsiung City over central government funding. Arguing over 10 or 20 billion in budget allocations, officials have gotten flushed in the face with anger, and almost become sworn enemies! The Executive Yuan only has so much money. If Taipei County wants a little more, then Taipei City and Kaohsiung City must receive that much less. The central government is not about to give the three one dollar more. This shows that Taipei County's elevation to the status of Directly Administered Municipality was purely an election ploy by which Su Tseng-chang hoped to drum up party support during the presidential primary race. Not even the most rudimentary financial preparations were made. In other words, even if Taichung is eventually elevated to the status of Directly Administered Municipality, it will probably have to share from the same pie. The Executive Yuan may be able to elevate the status of counties and municipalities with the wave of a wand, but it can't increase their budget allocations with the wave of a wand. Watching helplessly as new and old municipalities lose their temper bickering over 10 or 20 billion, while the Executive Yuan feigns innocence, as if the problem had nothing to do with them. We really want to say is, if you have the power to make 400 billion evaporate, just like that, yet can't manage to raise a measly 20 billion, just how incompetent are you?
Note that the losses repeatedly mentioned here are official government losses. We don't even know how to begin to calculate private sector losses! Forget everthing else. Just remember the impact of the ruling DPP's October 2000 announcement that it was halting construction on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. Within 18 days the TAIEX fell below 6000. By the end of the year it had fallen to 4600. By 2001, Taiwan's economy was in serious decline. According to Mastercard International's Consumer Confidence Index, that year consumer confidence on Taiwan fell to a ten year low, Anyone with a memory on Taiwan remembers it well. How much their net worth shrank. But from whom can we demand an accounting?
Even more interesting is the fact that not one representative of a government that has allowed 400 billion NT to evaporate, has stepped forward to take responsibility for this debacle. Not one individual has come forth to say to the people "We're sorry." Not one individual has even come forth to offer say "We regret what happened." If the corporate management of a corporation in the private sector, or the CEO of a multinational corporation, loses tens of millions of dollars a year, or even several million dollars a year, in all probability he will be ashamed to face the board of directors and the shareholders. Yet a government which has wasted over 400 billion dollars has the chutzpah to assume an air of self-righteous indignation. Perhaps it's merely coincidence, but the same year that it announced that it was suspending work on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, the premier was also Chang Chun-hsiung. And Chang maintains even today, that the economic recession of that year, was the result of a global recession, and had nothing to do with the halted construction on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. As for the 400 billion which simply evaporated from sight, no responsible explanation has been offered. Out of sight, out of mind. Isn't that the way it works?
Now because global warming and the impact of the Kyoto Protocol have become serious, major nations are limiting the growth of fossil fuel fired power plants, . and aggressively building nuclear power plants, last year even Lee Yuan-tse and Annette Lu began publicly advocating reconsidering the development of nuclear power generation. How ironic considering the change in political climate from a few years ago? Not ony is our Fourth Nuclear Power Plant is far from ready to begin official operation. Nobody dares to guess how much more taxpayer money will have to evaporate before it is. It looks like we will just have to wait and see.
Most disturbing of all is that a government which has allowed 400 billion vanish into thin air, has no need to shoulder any responsibility whatsoever. Instead, it can assume an air of self-righteous indignation. If it commits an even more serious blunder in the future, resulting in an even monumental debacle, and wastes even more ROC taxpayer dollars, or place ROC citizens in even greater danger, one will probably never be able to find anyone willing to assume responsibility.
中國時報 A2/焦點新聞 2007/08/04
《社論》四千億憑空蒸發 找不到人負責
【時報】
最近有一則新聞，並未引起各界太多的注意，但我們卻對這則新聞感慨良多！這則新聞是說原本預計在後年七月商業運轉的核四第一號機，因為包商開立倒閉，工程至少要再多延滯八個月以上，換言之，因為核四停工所造成的工程落後，總計已長達四年以上。根據中研院的一位經濟學者估算，核四因為停工所造成工期延後，光是工程支出就要增加一六○○億。而再根據立法院的調查數據，從行政院宣布停建核四後所衍生出的契約變更、漲價準備金、改以火力電廠替代發電每年多支出的燃料成本等，所耗費的成本已高達二三四五億元。用最簡單的算術說，台灣人這幾年為了核四停工又復工，已經整整付出了四千多億的代價！
四千多億究竟是多少？對升斗小民而言，這是個遙不可及的天文數字，想都不敢去想！我們何妨就拿最通俗的中央政府總預算來對比吧，以九十五年度立法院審議通過的中央政府總預算論，大約是一兆三千七百多億元，而四千多億大約已經接近台灣一個年度總預算的三分之一了，驚人吧！那些貪汙舞弊所Ａ掉的錢算什麼，連零頭都不到。為一個配合意識形態需要所作的政策決定，讓四千多億元就這麼簡單的從人間蒸發了！
嘗試想想，就算模擬一下好了！這四千多億如果沒浪費掉，可以做多少事？台北縣升格為直轄市之後，這幾天為了與北高兩市爭奪統籌分配款，為了一百億兩百億的預算分配爭得臉紅脖子粗，幾近乎翻臉！行政院擺明了錢就只有這麼多，台北縣多要一點，北高兩市就得要砍多少，中央那邊再多一塊也不給！這證明當初台北縣的升格，純粹只是配合當時蘇貞昌黨內總統初選的造勢，連最起碼的財政準備都沒有！換言之，未來就算台中市盼到了升格，怕也是會在同一塊大餅裡分，行政院有本事讓縣市說升格就升格，卻沒本事擴編統籌分配款的規模，眼睜睜看著新舊直轄市為了一兩百億不惜翻臉，行政院還一副無辜狀，好像完全不干他們的事！我們真想說：有本事讓四千億從人間蒸發，卻連個一兩百億的統籌分配款都挪不出來，這種治理能耐讓人該怎麼說呢？
請注意，這裡一再提及的四千億還是官方所付出的代價，民間部門的損失還不知道該怎麼算呢！別的不提了，還記得二○○○年十月執政當局宣布停建核四的時所造成的衝擊嗎？當時十八天內國內股價跌破六千點，年底更跌到四千六百點，到了二○○一年台灣總體經濟即面臨嚴重衰退，根據萬事達卡國際組織的消費信心指數，那一年台灣人的消費信心跌至十年的最低，有點記憶力的台灣人當清楚記得，自己的財產在那一時段縮水了多少！但能找誰去算帳呢？
更有趣的是，一個讓四千多億平白從人間蒸發的政府，到現在為止都不曾有人出面表示過要負責，當然也沒有人出面向人民道過一聲歉，連聲「遺憾」的表達都不曾聽聞過；一個民間上市公司的經理部門，或是跨國公司的ＣＥＯ，年度業績甭說虧上千萬，就算虧損個幾百萬大概都無顏見董事會與股東吧！而面對一個浪費掉四千多億的政府，我們所領教的還經常是副「理直氣壯」的嘴臉！或許還真是湊巧，當年宣布讓核四停工的，正是現任的行政院長張俊雄，而他到現在都還堅持，當年的經濟衰退，是全球性的不景氣所致，與核四停建完全無關，至於這筆從人間蒸發的四千億，卻是到現在也沒給個負責任的說法，好像沒了就是沒了，要不還能怎樣？
如今由於全球暖化問題嚴重，加上京都議定書的效應，主要國家都在抑制火力發電廠的成長，相對的還在積極搶建核電廠，連李遠哲與呂秀蓮都在去年公開主張應重新考慮發展核電，這種時代氛圍的改變相對於幾年前，是多麼的反諷？可咱們的核四不僅距離正式運轉還早得很，未來還會再蒸發掉多少納稅人的稅金，誰也不敢估計，看來我們也只能等著瞧了！
更令人不安的是，一個讓四千億憑空消失的政府，可以不必有人擔負起任何責任，還可理直氣壯的繼續揮霍，未來若是犯了更大的錯，捅了更大的樓子，浪費台灣人更多的稅金，甚至將全體台灣人都推到更大險境，怕也永遠都找不到任何人肯負責了！
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
August 4, 2007
A recent news report escaped the notice of most people. We however, were quite taken aback. According to this report, Taipower's Fourth Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 was scheduled to begin operations in July two years from now. But because contractors have declared bankruptcy, construction will have to be delayed at least eight months. In other words, the ruling DPP's halt on construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant will set the project back four years. According to estimates by Academia Sinica economic experts, delays caused by the suspension of work on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant will increase the cost of construction alone by 160 billion NT. According to Legislative Yuan research figures, changes in contractual terms, price increases in the reserve fund, additional annual fuel costs due to the substitution of fossil fuel fired electrical generation plants following the Executive Yuan's announced halts on construction, have already cost an additional 234.5 billion NT. Using the simplest arithmetic, the ruling DPP's stopping and restarting of construction on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant has already cost Republic of China taxpayers over 400 billion NT (approximately 12 billion US).
How much is 400 billion, really? For the ordinary citizen, it is an inconceivable, astronomical sum. Why not take the most common central government budget figures for comparison? Consider the 2006 central government budget, approved by the Legislative Yuan, amounting to over 1.37 trillion NT (approximately 42 billion US). Four hundred billion is nearly 1/3 of the Republic of China's annual budget. By contrast, corruption and fraud are a drop in the bucket. Policy decisions made for the sake of ideological conformity, allowed 400 billion to simply evaporate.
Try thinking about it. How much good could have been done with this 400 billion, had it not been wasted? Taipei County has been elevated to the status of a Directly Administered Municipality. Recently, it has been fighting with Taipei City and Kaohsiung City over central government funding. Arguing over 10 or 20 billion in budget allocations, officials have gotten flushed in the face with anger, and almost become sworn enemies! The Executive Yuan only has so much money. If Taipei County wants a little more, then Taipei City and Kaohsiung City must receive that much less. The central government is not about to give the three one dollar more. This shows that Taipei County's elevation to the status of Directly Administered Municipality was purely an election ploy by which Su Tseng-chang hoped to drum up party support during the presidential primary race. Not even the most rudimentary financial preparations were made. In other words, even if Taichung is eventually elevated to the status of Directly Administered Municipality, it will probably have to share from the same pie. The Executive Yuan may be able to elevate the status of counties and municipalities with the wave of a wand, but it can't increase their budget allocations with the wave of a wand. Watching helplessly as new and old municipalities lose their temper bickering over 10 or 20 billion, while the Executive Yuan feigns innocence, as if the problem had nothing to do with them. We really want to say is, if you have the power to make 400 billion evaporate, just like that, yet can't manage to raise a measly 20 billion, just how incompetent are you?
Note that the losses repeatedly mentioned here are official government losses. We don't even know how to begin to calculate private sector losses! Forget everthing else. Just remember the impact of the ruling DPP's October 2000 announcement that it was halting construction on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. Within 18 days the TAIEX fell below 6000. By the end of the year it had fallen to 4600. By 2001, Taiwan's economy was in serious decline. According to Mastercard International's Consumer Confidence Index, that year consumer confidence on Taiwan fell to a ten year low, Anyone with a memory on Taiwan remembers it well. How much their net worth shrank. But from whom can we demand an accounting?
Even more interesting is the fact that not one representative of a government that has allowed 400 billion NT to evaporate, has stepped forward to take responsibility for this debacle. Not one individual has come forth to say to the people "We're sorry." Not one individual has even come forth to offer say "We regret what happened." If the corporate management of a corporation in the private sector, or the CEO of a multinational corporation, loses tens of millions of dollars a year, or even several million dollars a year, in all probability he will be ashamed to face the board of directors and the shareholders. Yet a government which has wasted over 400 billion dollars has the chutzpah to assume an air of self-righteous indignation. Perhaps it's merely coincidence, but the same year that it announced that it was suspending work on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, the premier was also Chang Chun-hsiung. And Chang maintains even today, that the economic recession of that year, was the result of a global recession, and had nothing to do with the halted construction on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. As for the 400 billion which simply evaporated from sight, no responsible explanation has been offered. Out of sight, out of mind. Isn't that the way it works?
Now because global warming and the impact of the Kyoto Protocol have become serious, major nations are limiting the growth of fossil fuel fired power plants, . and aggressively building nuclear power plants, last year even Lee Yuan-tse and Annette Lu began publicly advocating reconsidering the development of nuclear power generation. How ironic considering the change in political climate from a few years ago? Not ony is our Fourth Nuclear Power Plant is far from ready to begin official operation. Nobody dares to guess how much more taxpayer money will have to evaporate before it is. It looks like we will just have to wait and see.
Most disturbing of all is that a government which has allowed 400 billion vanish into thin air, has no need to shoulder any responsibility whatsoever. Instead, it can assume an air of self-righteous indignation. If it commits an even more serious blunder in the future, resulting in an even monumental debacle, and wastes even more ROC taxpayer dollars, or place ROC citizens in even greater danger, one will probably never be able to find anyone willing to assume responsibility.
中國時報 A2/焦點新聞 2007/08/04
《社論》四千億憑空蒸發 找不到人負責
【時報】
最近有一則新聞，並未引起各界太多的注意，但我們卻對這則新聞感慨良多！這則新聞是說原本預計在後年七月商業運轉的核四第一號機，因為包商開立倒閉，工程至少要再多延滯八個月以上，換言之，因為核四停工所造成的工程落後，總計已長達四年以上。根據中研院的一位經濟學者估算，核四因為停工所造成工期延後，光是工程支出就要增加一六○○億。而再根據立法院的調查數據，從行政院宣布停建核四後所衍生出的契約變更、漲價準備金、改以火力電廠替代發電每年多支出的燃料成本等，所耗費的成本已高達二三四五億元。用最簡單的算術說，台灣人這幾年為了核四停工又復工，已經整整付出了四千多億的代價！
四千多億究竟是多少？對升斗小民而言，這是個遙不可及的天文數字，想都不敢去想！我們何妨就拿最通俗的中央政府總預算來對比吧，以九十五年度立法院審議通過的中央政府總預算論，大約是一兆三千七百多億元，而四千多億大約已經接近台灣一個年度總預算的三分之一了，驚人吧！那些貪汙舞弊所Ａ掉的錢算什麼，連零頭都不到。為一個配合意識形態需要所作的政策決定，讓四千多億元就這麼簡單的從人間蒸發了！
嘗試想想，就算模擬一下好了！這四千多億如果沒浪費掉，可以做多少事？台北縣升格為直轄市之後，這幾天為了與北高兩市爭奪統籌分配款，為了一百億兩百億的預算分配爭得臉紅脖子粗，幾近乎翻臉！行政院擺明了錢就只有這麼多，台北縣多要一點，北高兩市就得要砍多少，中央那邊再多一塊也不給！這證明當初台北縣的升格，純粹只是配合當時蘇貞昌黨內總統初選的造勢，連最起碼的財政準備都沒有！換言之，未來就算台中市盼到了升格，怕也是會在同一塊大餅裡分，行政院有本事讓縣市說升格就升格，卻沒本事擴編統籌分配款的規模，眼睜睜看著新舊直轄市為了一兩百億不惜翻臉，行政院還一副無辜狀，好像完全不干他們的事！我們真想說：有本事讓四千億從人間蒸發，卻連個一兩百億的統籌分配款都挪不出來，這種治理能耐讓人該怎麼說呢？
請注意，這裡一再提及的四千億還是官方所付出的代價，民間部門的損失還不知道該怎麼算呢！別的不提了，還記得二○○○年十月執政當局宣布停建核四的時所造成的衝擊嗎？當時十八天內國內股價跌破六千點，年底更跌到四千六百點，到了二○○一年台灣總體經濟即面臨嚴重衰退，根據萬事達卡國際組織的消費信心指數，那一年台灣人的消費信心跌至十年的最低，有點記憶力的台灣人當清楚記得，自己的財產在那一時段縮水了多少！但能找誰去算帳呢？
更有趣的是，一個讓四千多億平白從人間蒸發的政府，到現在為止都不曾有人出面表示過要負責，當然也沒有人出面向人民道過一聲歉，連聲「遺憾」的表達都不曾聽聞過；一個民間上市公司的經理部門，或是跨國公司的ＣＥＯ，年度業績甭說虧上千萬，就算虧損個幾百萬大概都無顏見董事會與股東吧！而面對一個浪費掉四千多億的政府，我們所領教的還經常是副「理直氣壯」的嘴臉！或許還真是湊巧，當年宣布讓核四停工的，正是現任的行政院長張俊雄，而他到現在都還堅持，當年的經濟衰退，是全球性的不景氣所致，與核四停建完全無關，至於這筆從人間蒸發的四千億，卻是到現在也沒給個負責任的說法，好像沒了就是沒了，要不還能怎樣？
如今由於全球暖化問題嚴重，加上京都議定書的效應，主要國家都在抑制火力發電廠的成長，相對的還在積極搶建核電廠，連李遠哲與呂秀蓮都在去年公開主張應重新考慮發展核電，這種時代氛圍的改變相對於幾年前，是多麼的反諷？可咱們的核四不僅距離正式運轉還早得很，未來還會再蒸發掉多少納稅人的稅金，誰也不敢估計，看來我們也只能等著瞧了！
更令人不安的是，一個讓四千億憑空消失的政府，可以不必有人擔負起任何責任，還可理直氣壯的繼續揮霍，未來若是犯了更大的錯，捅了更大的樓子，浪費台灣人更多的稅金，甚至將全體台灣人都推到更大險境，怕也永遠都找不到任何人肯負責了！
Friday, August 3, 2007
The Hsieh/Su Ticket and the Provisions against Corruption
The Hsieh/Su Ticket and the Provisions against Corruption
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
August 2, 2007
The Frank Hsieh lawsuit issue and the Frank Hsieh vice presidential running mate issue have become thoroughly entangled.
On the one hand, Chen Shui-bian is aggressively promoting a "Hsieh/Su ticket." On the other hand, the Hsieh faction's attempt to amend the Democratic Progressive Party's "Provisions against Corruption" was unceremoniously killed by DPP party insiders. On the one hand, Su Tseng-chang pulled an "Escape from Taipei." Before departing for the US, he maintained that he "backed the ticket fully, and was not seeking office himself." He went on to emphasize that "Everyone should believe what I say." On the other hand, word has spread that "Frank Hsieh now wants a Hsieh/Su ticket."
The Hsieh faction had hoped to pass its "Provisions against Judicial Chicanery" amendment, which would have removed the phrase, "immediate suspension from duties upon indictment" from the "Provisions against Corruption." But as soon as word got out, they immediately encountered intense opposition from party insiders. Yu Hsi-kuen and Annette Lu's comments were straight and to the point. The Su faction warned the Hsieh faction against making the DPP lose face. Hsieh was forced to declare that he opposed amending the law. Chen Shui-bian said that "Frank Hsieh is not corrupt, therefore the DPP doesn't need to amend its Provisions against Corruption." However, Chen Shui-bian added: "If Hsieh is smeared, the entire party must demand justice!" and threatened the judiciary, saying "Judicial personnel must not intervene in the presidential election!"
This shows that anti-Hsieh forces within the DPP are waiting for an opportunity to move against him. Frank Hsieh's "Ten Major Scandals" are a Sword of Damocles hanging over his head. Yet Su, Lu, and Yu are openly and vehemently opposed to Hsieh amending the "Provisions against Corruption." Su Tseng-chang chose to simply walk away before Hsieh returned to Taiwan. For Frank Hsieh, this chess game is full of surprises. Frank Hsieh's corruption cases may or may not blow up in his face. But as long as he is indicted, the provision for "immediate suspension upon indictment" will kick in. The allegation that "Su is in, Hsieh is out" will immediately spread, and Hsieh will be in trouble.
As we noted in our previous analysis, any "Hsieh/Su ticket" presents a dilemma for Frank Hsieh. If he refuses a "Hsieh/Su ticket," Su is free to make his own arrangements. If Hsieh is indicted, if party insiders counterattack, Su could be in, and Hsieh could be out. If, on the other hand, Hsieh agrees to a "Hsieh/Su ticket," there could be two entirely different results. One, a "Hsieh/Su ticket" means that Hsieh has endorsed Su as his stand in. If Hsieh is indicted, Su could replace him as presidential candidate. Two, if Su pledges to be Hsieh's "vice presidential running mate," and Hsieh is indicted, but Chen Shui-bian mobilizes the entire party to support Hsieh, Su may be forced to "demand justice for Hsieh" along with the entire party and support Hsieh to the bitter end. This may be one reason Chen Shui-bian must facilitate a "Hsieh/Su ticket" with all his might. If Su pledges to be Hsieh's vice presidential running mate, that will be a fait accompli. If Hsieh is indicted, a "Su is in, Hsieh is out" scenario may not be possible. Hope of a "Hsieh Yeh ticket" was recently snuffed out. Apparently because Frank Hsieh knew a "Hsieh/Su ticket" may be the best way to keep Su Tseng-chang down. But now it appears that the initiative for any "Hsieh/Su ticket" is in Su Tseng-chang's hands, not in Chen Shui-bian's hands, and even less in Frank Hsieh's hands.
If Frank Hsieh can't control Su Tseng-chang, so be it. But if at the appointed time even Chen Shui-bian can't control Su Tseng-chang or an uprising by party insiders, then things are going to get very messy very fast!
Chen Shui-bian advocates a "Hsieh/Su ticket." One reason is his desire to tie Su Tseng-chang down hand and foot. He wants him to accept a vice presidential role on a "Hsieh/Su ticket," He doesn't want Su to have any thoughts of his own, or to create any new problems for him. He wants to avoid having to "change horses in midstream" as that would lead to a chaotic election scenario. Chen Shui-bian wants the following: To retain the "Provisions against Corruption," in order to abduct Frank Hsieh. To declare a war of resistance against the Judiciary, in order to protect Frank Hsieh. To force Hsieh to accept a "Hsieh/Su ticket," in order to keep Su Tseng-chang down. Su Tseng-chang however has rejected a "Hsieh/Su ticket" by going into exile. If Frank Hsieh is indicted he will be confronted with a "Su is in, Hsieh is out" scenario, and be totally isolated. If Su refuses to play ball, Frank Hsieh's attempt to united party insiders will have failed. Therefore if a "Hsieh/Su ticket" fails to gell, Frank Hsieh will be hurt either way.
On the other hand, the situation has already degenerated. Assuming a "Hsieh/Su ticket" suddenly gelled, would a "self- exiled" Su Tseng-chang who rushed back from the US to accept the position of Frank Hsieh's "vice presidential running mate" be a new Su Tseng-chang, or the original Su Tseng-chang? Would such a "Hsieh/Su ticket" still be the original "Hsieh/Su ticket?"
The Hsieh faction's attempt to amend the "Provisions against Corruption" could be seen as an attempt to gauge party insider political support, and an attempt to defuse a potential power struggle within the party. According to reports, the response from party insiders was so unexpectedly hostile, Hsieh was forced to yield. The only help the Hsieh faction can expect from party insiders now is: "If Hsieh is smeared, the entire party must demand justice!" Therefore Frank Hsieh remains Chen Shui-bian's hostage, and must consider accepting a "Hsieh/Su ticket" in exchange for Chen Shui-bian's support. The problem is, Su Tseng-chang isn't necessarily someone whom Hsieh and Chen can move about like a pawn.
All this is a result of the carelessness and passivity of prosecutorial and investigative agencies. Ten Major Scandals are hanging over Hsieh's head. These cases are at least 150 days old. Some are several years old. As long as Frank Hsieh's cases remained unresolved, the curtain cannot be rung down on the DPP's internal power struggles, and Frank Hsieh's election prospects will remain riddled by crises.
It is now three short months from the official start of the presidential election season. The Judiciary has created a dangerous political deadlock. One can only wonder what he judicial personnel the DPP has accused of "judicial chicanery" are thinking at this moment.
「謝蘇配」與「排黑條款」的連動關係
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.02 03:55 am
謝長廷的官司問題與謝長廷的副手問題，儼然已糾纏在一起。
一方面，陳水扁力主「謝蘇配」；另一方面，謝系刪修「排黑條款」的嘗試遭到黨內閃電封殺；再一方面，蘇貞昌「走避」美國，臨去仍稱「全力輔選，不要位子」，並強調「大家要相信我說的」；另一方面，又傳出「謝長廷轉向謝蘇配」。
謝系欲藉設定「防司法小人條款」，來刪修「起訴就停權」的「排黑條款」；風聲一出，立即遭到黨內強烈反對，游呂說的話都很直接且難聽，蘇系更放話叫謝系勿丟民進黨的臉。終致謝長廷立即表態反對修法，陳水扁亦稱「謝長廷不黑，不必排黑」。但是，陳水扁又補了一句話：「如果謝被『抹黑』，全黨上下要為他討公道！」並出言恫嚇稱：「司法人員勿介入總統大選！」
情勢顯示，民進黨內反謝的勢力似仍在伺機而動。謝長廷「十大弊案」纏身，但蘇呂游反對謝系發動刪修「排黑條款」的聲勢竟是如此之公然與決絕；蘇貞昌甚至乾脆在謝返國前夕「耍大牌」一走了之。對謝長廷來說，這盤棋委實充滿變數。
倘若情勢如此演變下去，謝長廷的官司不出事則罷，一旦有案被起訴，那麼「起訴就停權」及「蘇上謝下」的雜音恐將立即出現，謝的處境就堪虞了。
我們曾經分析，是否「謝蘇配」，謝長廷面臨兩難之境。一方面，倘若拒絕「謝蘇配」，將使蘇有置身局外的自由度；於是，謝若有案起訴，黨內出現反撲，即會發生「蘇上謝下」的壓力。另一方面，倘若同意「謝蘇配」，亦可能發生兩種截然不同的後果：一、既已「謝蘇配」，謝不啻認可了蘇的「備位」；謝若起訴，蘇即可能取代成為總統候選人。二、但是，反過來說，蘇既承諾為「副手」，萬一謝起訴而陳水扁發動全黨挺謝，蘇恐怕也只能「與全黨上下為謝討公道」，挺謝到底；這也許正是陳水扁要全力促成「謝蘇配」的原因之一，蘇若承諾任副手，生米煮成熟飯，則在謝一旦被起訴時，即不便再有「蘇上謝下」的逾格運作。近日「謝葉配」儼然全面熄火，可見謝長廷亦知「謝蘇配」也許才是套住蘇貞昌的辦法。但是，如今看來，是否「謝蘇配」，主動權是操在蘇貞昌手中，而未必操在陳水扁，更非操在謝長廷。
謝長廷若掌控不住蘇貞昌也就罷了，倘若屆時連陳水扁也掌控不住蘇貞昌及黨內反撲勢力，那個場面就不可收拾了！
陳水扁主張「謝蘇配」，原因之一就是欲先把蘇貞昌套牢，要他接受「謝蘇配」的副手角色，勿心存他想，也勿另生枝節。以免萬一「中途換馬」，選局大亂。陳水扁的手法是：一方面，不刪「排黑條款」，以挾制謝長廷；另一方面，宣示將對抗司法、力保謝長廷；再一方面，迫謝接受「謝蘇配」，並藉以套住蘇貞昌。但是，蘇貞昌如今居然以「自我放逐」來展現拒絕「謝蘇配」的決心；就謝長廷而言，其最高風險是，萬一起訴恐將面臨「蘇上謝下」的壓力，四面楚歌；其最低風險則是，蘇不入局，顯示謝長廷的黨內整合工作終告失敗。因而，倘若「謝蘇配」破局，謝長廷橫豎皆將受傷。
但是，反過來說，事態惡化至今日地步，如果「謝蘇配」突然又告成局，屆時「自我放逐」的蘇貞昌，竟自美兼程奔回接受謝長廷給他的「副手」封賜，則那樣的蘇貞昌還是原來的蘇貞昌嗎？那樣的「謝蘇配」還是原來的「謝蘇配」嗎？
謝系發動刪修「排黑條款」，可視為試探黨內支持度的政治動作，並欲藉此先行拆除黨內鬥爭的引信；詎料，黨內的反應竟是如此具有敵意，逼使謝系知難而退，目前只能求「萬一被『抹黑』，全黨一致為謝討公道」了。正因如此，謝長廷亦進一步受到陳水扁的挾持，必須考慮接受「謝蘇配」來換取陳水扁的力挺；問題是，蘇貞昌卻未必受長扁二人擺佈。
這一切皆因檢察單位的顢頇懈怠所致。謝身纏十大弊案，這些案子少說已逾一百五十日，其中亦有糾纏數年的老案；謝長廷的案子一天不偵結，民進黨內的鬥爭態勢即不能塵埃落定，謝長廷的選情也就仍是危機四伏。
距總統大選正式開跑僅剩三個月，司法竟使政局陷於此種高度風險的僵局，不知那些民進黨口中的「司法小人」作何感想？
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
August 2, 2007
The Frank Hsieh lawsuit issue and the Frank Hsieh vice presidential running mate issue have become thoroughly entangled.
On the one hand, Chen Shui-bian is aggressively promoting a "Hsieh/Su ticket." On the other hand, the Hsieh faction's attempt to amend the Democratic Progressive Party's "Provisions against Corruption" was unceremoniously killed by DPP party insiders. On the one hand, Su Tseng-chang pulled an "Escape from Taipei." Before departing for the US, he maintained that he "backed the ticket fully, and was not seeking office himself." He went on to emphasize that "Everyone should believe what I say." On the other hand, word has spread that "Frank Hsieh now wants a Hsieh/Su ticket."
The Hsieh faction had hoped to pass its "Provisions against Judicial Chicanery" amendment, which would have removed the phrase, "immediate suspension from duties upon indictment" from the "Provisions against Corruption." But as soon as word got out, they immediately encountered intense opposition from party insiders. Yu Hsi-kuen and Annette Lu's comments were straight and to the point. The Su faction warned the Hsieh faction against making the DPP lose face. Hsieh was forced to declare that he opposed amending the law. Chen Shui-bian said that "Frank Hsieh is not corrupt, therefore the DPP doesn't need to amend its Provisions against Corruption." However, Chen Shui-bian added: "If Hsieh is smeared, the entire party must demand justice!" and threatened the judiciary, saying "Judicial personnel must not intervene in the presidential election!"
This shows that anti-Hsieh forces within the DPP are waiting for an opportunity to move against him. Frank Hsieh's "Ten Major Scandals" are a Sword of Damocles hanging over his head. Yet Su, Lu, and Yu are openly and vehemently opposed to Hsieh amending the "Provisions against Corruption." Su Tseng-chang chose to simply walk away before Hsieh returned to Taiwan. For Frank Hsieh, this chess game is full of surprises. Frank Hsieh's corruption cases may or may not blow up in his face. But as long as he is indicted, the provision for "immediate suspension upon indictment" will kick in. The allegation that "Su is in, Hsieh is out" will immediately spread, and Hsieh will be in trouble.
As we noted in our previous analysis, any "Hsieh/Su ticket" presents a dilemma for Frank Hsieh. If he refuses a "Hsieh/Su ticket," Su is free to make his own arrangements. If Hsieh is indicted, if party insiders counterattack, Su could be in, and Hsieh could be out. If, on the other hand, Hsieh agrees to a "Hsieh/Su ticket," there could be two entirely different results. One, a "Hsieh/Su ticket" means that Hsieh has endorsed Su as his stand in. If Hsieh is indicted, Su could replace him as presidential candidate. Two, if Su pledges to be Hsieh's "vice presidential running mate," and Hsieh is indicted, but Chen Shui-bian mobilizes the entire party to support Hsieh, Su may be forced to "demand justice for Hsieh" along with the entire party and support Hsieh to the bitter end. This may be one reason Chen Shui-bian must facilitate a "Hsieh/Su ticket" with all his might. If Su pledges to be Hsieh's vice presidential running mate, that will be a fait accompli. If Hsieh is indicted, a "Su is in, Hsieh is out" scenario may not be possible. Hope of a "Hsieh Yeh ticket" was recently snuffed out. Apparently because Frank Hsieh knew a "Hsieh/Su ticket" may be the best way to keep Su Tseng-chang down. But now it appears that the initiative for any "Hsieh/Su ticket" is in Su Tseng-chang's hands, not in Chen Shui-bian's hands, and even less in Frank Hsieh's hands.
If Frank Hsieh can't control Su Tseng-chang, so be it. But if at the appointed time even Chen Shui-bian can't control Su Tseng-chang or an uprising by party insiders, then things are going to get very messy very fast!
Chen Shui-bian advocates a "Hsieh/Su ticket." One reason is his desire to tie Su Tseng-chang down hand and foot. He wants him to accept a vice presidential role on a "Hsieh/Su ticket," He doesn't want Su to have any thoughts of his own, or to create any new problems for him. He wants to avoid having to "change horses in midstream" as that would lead to a chaotic election scenario. Chen Shui-bian wants the following: To retain the "Provisions against Corruption," in order to abduct Frank Hsieh. To declare a war of resistance against the Judiciary, in order to protect Frank Hsieh. To force Hsieh to accept a "Hsieh/Su ticket," in order to keep Su Tseng-chang down. Su Tseng-chang however has rejected a "Hsieh/Su ticket" by going into exile. If Frank Hsieh is indicted he will be confronted with a "Su is in, Hsieh is out" scenario, and be totally isolated. If Su refuses to play ball, Frank Hsieh's attempt to united party insiders will have failed. Therefore if a "Hsieh/Su ticket" fails to gell, Frank Hsieh will be hurt either way.
On the other hand, the situation has already degenerated. Assuming a "Hsieh/Su ticket" suddenly gelled, would a "self- exiled" Su Tseng-chang who rushed back from the US to accept the position of Frank Hsieh's "vice presidential running mate" be a new Su Tseng-chang, or the original Su Tseng-chang? Would such a "Hsieh/Su ticket" still be the original "Hsieh/Su ticket?"
The Hsieh faction's attempt to amend the "Provisions against Corruption" could be seen as an attempt to gauge party insider political support, and an attempt to defuse a potential power struggle within the party. According to reports, the response from party insiders was so unexpectedly hostile, Hsieh was forced to yield. The only help the Hsieh faction can expect from party insiders now is: "If Hsieh is smeared, the entire party must demand justice!" Therefore Frank Hsieh remains Chen Shui-bian's hostage, and must consider accepting a "Hsieh/Su ticket" in exchange for Chen Shui-bian's support. The problem is, Su Tseng-chang isn't necessarily someone whom Hsieh and Chen can move about like a pawn.
All this is a result of the carelessness and passivity of prosecutorial and investigative agencies. Ten Major Scandals are hanging over Hsieh's head. These cases are at least 150 days old. Some are several years old. As long as Frank Hsieh's cases remained unresolved, the curtain cannot be rung down on the DPP's internal power struggles, and Frank Hsieh's election prospects will remain riddled by crises.
It is now three short months from the official start of the presidential election season. The Judiciary has created a dangerous political deadlock. One can only wonder what he judicial personnel the DPP has accused of "judicial chicanery" are thinking at this moment.
「謝蘇配」與「排黑條款」的連動關係
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.08.02 03:55 am
謝長廷的官司問題與謝長廷的副手問題，儼然已糾纏在一起。
一方面，陳水扁力主「謝蘇配」；另一方面，謝系刪修「排黑條款」的嘗試遭到黨內閃電封殺；再一方面，蘇貞昌「走避」美國，臨去仍稱「全力輔選，不要位子」，並強調「大家要相信我說的」；另一方面，又傳出「謝長廷轉向謝蘇配」。
謝系欲藉設定「防司法小人條款」，來刪修「起訴就停權」的「排黑條款」；風聲一出，立即遭到黨內強烈反對，游呂說的話都很直接且難聽，蘇系更放話叫謝系勿丟民進黨的臉。終致謝長廷立即表態反對修法，陳水扁亦稱「謝長廷不黑，不必排黑」。但是，陳水扁又補了一句話：「如果謝被『抹黑』，全黨上下要為他討公道！」並出言恫嚇稱：「司法人員勿介入總統大選！」
情勢顯示，民進黨內反謝的勢力似仍在伺機而動。謝長廷「十大弊案」纏身，但蘇呂游反對謝系發動刪修「排黑條款」的聲勢竟是如此之公然與決絕；蘇貞昌甚至乾脆在謝返國前夕「耍大牌」一走了之。對謝長廷來說，這盤棋委實充滿變數。
倘若情勢如此演變下去，謝長廷的官司不出事則罷，一旦有案被起訴，那麼「起訴就停權」及「蘇上謝下」的雜音恐將立即出現，謝的處境就堪虞了。
我們曾經分析，是否「謝蘇配」，謝長廷面臨兩難之境。一方面，倘若拒絕「謝蘇配」，將使蘇有置身局外的自由度；於是，謝若有案起訴，黨內出現反撲，即會發生「蘇上謝下」的壓力。另一方面，倘若同意「謝蘇配」，亦可能發生兩種截然不同的後果：一、既已「謝蘇配」，謝不啻認可了蘇的「備位」；謝若起訴，蘇即可能取代成為總統候選人。二、但是，反過來說，蘇既承諾為「副手」，萬一謝起訴而陳水扁發動全黨挺謝，蘇恐怕也只能「與全黨上下為謝討公道」，挺謝到底；這也許正是陳水扁要全力促成「謝蘇配」的原因之一，蘇若承諾任副手，生米煮成熟飯，則在謝一旦被起訴時，即不便再有「蘇上謝下」的逾格運作。近日「謝葉配」儼然全面熄火，可見謝長廷亦知「謝蘇配」也許才是套住蘇貞昌的辦法。但是，如今看來，是否「謝蘇配」，主動權是操在蘇貞昌手中，而未必操在陳水扁，更非操在謝長廷。
謝長廷若掌控不住蘇貞昌也就罷了，倘若屆時連陳水扁也掌控不住蘇貞昌及黨內反撲勢力，那個場面就不可收拾了！
陳水扁主張「謝蘇配」，原因之一就是欲先把蘇貞昌套牢，要他接受「謝蘇配」的副手角色，勿心存他想，也勿另生枝節。以免萬一「中途換馬」，選局大亂。陳水扁的手法是：一方面，不刪「排黑條款」，以挾制謝長廷；另一方面，宣示將對抗司法、力保謝長廷；再一方面，迫謝接受「謝蘇配」，並藉以套住蘇貞昌。但是，蘇貞昌如今居然以「自我放逐」來展現拒絕「謝蘇配」的決心；就謝長廷而言，其最高風險是，萬一起訴恐將面臨「蘇上謝下」的壓力，四面楚歌；其最低風險則是，蘇不入局，顯示謝長廷的黨內整合工作終告失敗。因而，倘若「謝蘇配」破局，謝長廷橫豎皆將受傷。
但是，反過來說，事態惡化至今日地步，如果「謝蘇配」突然又告成局，屆時「自我放逐」的蘇貞昌，竟自美兼程奔回接受謝長廷給他的「副手」封賜，則那樣的蘇貞昌還是原來的蘇貞昌嗎？那樣的「謝蘇配」還是原來的「謝蘇配」嗎？
謝系發動刪修「排黑條款」，可視為試探黨內支持度的政治動作，並欲藉此先行拆除黨內鬥爭的引信；詎料，黨內的反應竟是如此具有敵意，逼使謝系知難而退，目前只能求「萬一被『抹黑』，全黨一致為謝討公道」了。正因如此，謝長廷亦進一步受到陳水扁的挾持，必須考慮接受「謝蘇配」來換取陳水扁的力挺；問題是，蘇貞昌卻未必受長扁二人擺佈。
這一切皆因檢察單位的顢頇懈怠所致。謝身纏十大弊案，這些案子少說已逾一百五十日，其中亦有糾纏數年的老案；謝長廷的案子一天不偵結，民進黨內的鬥爭態勢即不能塵埃落定，謝長廷的選情也就仍是危機四伏。
距總統大選正式開跑僅剩三個月，司法竟使政局陷於此種高度風險的僵局，不知那些民進黨口中的「司法小人」作何感想？
Chen Shui-bian's Veiled Threat against the Judiciary
Chen Shui-bian's Veiled Threat against the Judiciary
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
August 1, 2007
"Transitional Justice" has been a hot topic on Taiwan lately. Its main theme is how to confront, process, and correct the negative impact of authoritarianism on a political system or culture. This requires close attention by men of vision, who must not assume that authoritarianism will automatically vanish with regime change, who must not assume that authoritarianism is a defect unique to a specific political party, rather than the abuse of power by any political authority. The implementation of Transitional Justice is often difficult, because those implementing Transitional Justice are often guilty of the same abuses as those they just replaced. They may fly the banner of democratic reform, but they have inherited the same habits, the same manners, and the same propensity to abuse power as those they just replaced. This is what makes the implementation of Transitional Justice so difficult.
President Chen received a foreign visitor the other day. Citing "Transitional Justice" as his reason, he spoke of the problem of judges and public prosecutors who were unfit for office. He cited the example of East Germany, which eliminated over five-tenths of its judges and public prosecutors. By contrast, Taiwan has not undergone the same process. He said it was difficult to avoid intervention by judges, public prosecutors, and criminal investigators, who motivated by political factors or election considerations, engaged in attempts to influence or even manipulate the results of ROC presidential elections. President Chen's words provoked an immediate reaction from the Judicial Yuan, the Prosecutors' Reform Association, and the private sector Judicial Reform Foundation. The consensus was that his remarks were improper. Examination, prosecutorial, and investigative bodies all affirmed that judicial personnel should not and would not abuse their authority to intervene in the presidential election. Some appealed to President Chen to exercise caution, to avoid misspeaking, and to avoid indiscriminately tarring everyone with the same broad brush.
Taken at face value, Chen's speech was a bold call for justice. Taken at actual value, it was a chilling threat against an independent judiciary. According to his logic, the government needs to engage in the wholesale elimination of judges and public prosecutors. The criterion for elimination would be which judges and public prosecutors are having an undesired impact on the presidential election. Those judges and prosecutors currently prosecuting the two presidential candidates, who have the power to influence the candidates' election prospects, are targets for elimination. Who has the authority to decide which judges and prosecutors are "unfit for office," therefore must be eliminated? Who else but Chen? Who is Chen suggesting as potential targets for elimination? Who else but the judges and prosecutors handling the Wu Shu-chen case, the Ma Ying-jeou case, the Frank Hsieh case, and the Chen Chu case? What is Chen telling them, if not that they will be eliminated under the pretext of implementing Transitional Justice in the event their prosecution of these cases or the outcome of these trials meet with his displeasure?
President Chen's improper remarks illustrate a problem with Transitional Justice that cannot be ignored, namely that those implementing Transitional Justice are often guilty of the same authoritarian abuses of power as those they just replaced.
Politically speaking, President Chen Shui-bian may be a lame duck. But because the ruling DPP considers the office of the president an indispensable component of its power, during the upcoming presidential election Chen will remain an influential player. On top of which, President Chen is a key figure, even an indirect litigant, in the ongoing State Affairs Confidential Expenses Case, the Wu Shu-chen case, the Ma Ying-jeou case, the Frank Hsieh case, and the Chen Chu case. Citing Transitional Justice as a pretext to hurl veiled accusations against the judiciary constitutes a serious conflict of interest, from which Chen should have recused himself. But when a head of state openly casts doubt on the impartiality of his own nation's judiciary in front of foreign dignitaries, is that merely a breach of etiquette? Or is it something far more serious -- the abuse of the power of his office in an attempt to influence or even intimidate the judiciary? Isn't a ruling regime's threat to conduct a political purge the nation's judiciary, depending upon whether pending court cases favor the ruling regime in the upcoming presidential election, precisely what "Transitional Justice" is all about?
Prior to regime change, the public had little faith in the judiciary. That lack of faith reflected weakness in the nation's political institutions. Years ago the ruling party boasted that "We own the courts." Those words probably still ring in many peoples' ears. It was the very reason some suspected the judiciary of containing "residual scum" from a bygone era. Prior to regime change, when the ruling party had the temerity to boast that "Our party owns the courts," the problem was not that a specific political party dared to boast that "Our party owns the courts." The problem was that the ruling party dared to boast that "Our party owns the courts." The name of the party was not important. What was important was that it was in power. Only the ruling party has the political wherewithal to own the courts, not the opposition party. That is why what matters is who is in power, not the name of the party in power.
If Transitional Justice is to avoid replicating past authoritarian manipulations of the judiciary, it must address two problems. The first problem is the new regime. The new regime must not be permitted to interfere with the judicial process the way the old regime did. The new regime might not have the chutzpah to openly manipulate the courts. But if the new regime nurses a morbid fear that "If we don't own the courts, then the courts will own us," and cites that as a justification for a political war against the courts, what difference is there between it and the old regime? The other problem is new judicial personnel. New judicial personnel may be unqualified to be part of a modern judicial system. But which judicial personnel should be eliminated must not be decided by the ruling regime, on the basis of partisan political advantage, on the basis of "Those who obey me, prosper. Those who defy me, perish." Such decisions must be made in accordance with human rights safeguards, with due process as a measuring rod. Political interests must make room for social dialogue, and allow deliberative democracy to inspire spontaneous reform from within the judiciary.
If the ruling regime waves the banner of Transitional Justice, while drawing no distinctions between black and white or good and evil; If it accuses the judiciary of being filled with "residual scum" in order to intimidate the judiciary and make electoral gains from specific court decisions, that constitutes a betrayal of Transitional Justice. That constitutes the trampling of judicial independence by yet another abusive political authority.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.08.01
陳總統議論司法是惡劣的權力示威
中時社論
「轉型正義」，是台灣最近常見的討論話題，所探究的主軸是如何面對、處理或矯正過去威權體制在政治社會乃至文化層面的遺緒。這確實需要有識之士嚴肅以對；尤其應該注意避免一項基本的思考盲點，那就是假設威權體制業已隨著政黨輪替而終結，誤認「威權體制」是與特定的政黨而非政治權力的濫用相連結。因為，轉型正義所要處理的一個重大難題，正是在正義轉型期間掌握政權的個人或政治勢力，不僅整套複製既有威權政治文化的遺緒，更在民主業已轉型的表象之下，繼承了濫用權力的習性與風格，使得轉型正義難以實現。
陳總統日前接見外賓，以「轉型正義」為由，說到如何處理不適任的法官與檢察官的問題，以東德淘汰了五成以上的法官與檢察官為例，對照台灣未做相同的處理，以為台灣很難避免法官、檢察官及調查員因政治因素或選舉考量，而介入、影響甚至企圖左右各黨總統候選人未來的競選活動。陳總統的話語，立即引起司法院、檢改會、民間司改會以及司法界人士的反應，普遍皆認為發言不當。審、檢、調機關各自重申，司法人員不該也不會動用手中的權力干預總統大選；有人呼籲陳總統慎言，不要模糊其詞，一竿子打翻一船人。
依我們看來，陳總統的不當發言，恰巧出現了「轉型正義」裡不容忽略的思考盲點：即民主轉型期中的掌權者，也依舊可能延續威權政治中的濫權遺緒。
陳總統的發言，表面上大義凜然，骨子裡卻令人不寒而慄。依照其發言邏輯，台灣似也該淘汰不適任的法官、檢察官，而意在言外的淘汰指標，似乎就是要看哪些法官、檢察官介入影響總統選舉？接下來，正在處理或審判總統大選候選人相關案件，還有足以影響選情、動見政治觀瞻等重大案件的法官、檢察官們，豈不就是淘汰指標所要觀察的對象？問題是，誰有權力運用特定的淘汰指標指認並發動淘汰「不適任」的法官、檢察官？陳總統所暗示的淘汰指標，難道不是在以吳淑珍案、馬英九案、謝長廷案、陳菊選舉案中的法官或檢察官為對象，告訴他們，如果處理或審判的結果不令當權者感到滿意，他們就會是轉型正義旗幟下遭到淘汰的法官與檢察官？
陳水扁總統雖已處於政治跛腳的位置，但是由於執政黨極度看重總統職位的分量，他在未來的總統大選中，顯然仍是舉足輕重的政治影武者。加上尚屬現在進行式的國務機要費刑事案件，陳總統在吳淑珍案、馬英九案、謝長廷案、陳菊案……中，都是不折不扣的政治利害關係人，甚或間接當事人，利用「轉型正義」的題目，從事含沙射影的發言，已經不只是應迴避而不迴避的利害衝突問題，也不能只問國家元首在接見外賓時是否欠缺了對於司法應有的尊重，而是涉及是否利用其身分及權勢地位干預甚至恫嚇司法了。一位執政者，利用總統選舉的案件關連性，對於司法人員提出淘汰說，有沒有威脅司法獨立的顧慮，不也正是轉型正義論述所該關心的話題？
政黨輪替之前的威權時代，司法的信用不彰，原是民主體質孱弱的社會現象指標。當年執政黨自詡是法院的經營者，許多人可能依舊言猶在耳，也就因此以為司法之中尚有昔日的威權餘孽存在。但是，政黨敢於號稱「法院是我黨所開」，原因不在它政黨的名號，而是在它執政的位置。有政治本錢經營法院的只能是執政黨，不會是在野黨，所以重點是誰在執政，不是那個政黨。
轉型正義要避免威權政治再度扭曲司法，必須針對兩種對象，一種是新的執政者，確保他們不會繼續伸手干預司法的前朝文化，他們也許不再明目張膽地經營法院，但是新的執政者如果本著深怕「法院不是本黨的地盤」的心態，以法院不利執政者的判決作為政治上聲討法院的根據，其實也與戕害司法的威權文化餘孽，相去無幾。另一種對象則是司法體系之中與現代司法體質格格不入的不適任人員。但是，如何區別甚或淘汰不適任司法人員，不該由執政者決定，也不該是直觀式的使用政黨的標籤進行順昌逆亡的聲討，而必須要以人權保障的司法正義實現程度，做為觀察標尺，由政治勢力讓出適當的空間，透過審議式民主的社會對話，引發司法體系自覺自發性的體質改良。
執政者若是打著轉型正義的旗號，表面上不分青紅皂白，對司法做出泛餘孽指責，骨子裡卻企圖形成司法內部的寒蟬效應，在司法審判具體案件的結果上獲取選舉政治利益，那將是轉型正義的悖論與背反，不過是另一次踐踏司法獨立的惡劣權力示威舉動罷了！
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
August 1, 2007
"Transitional Justice" has been a hot topic on Taiwan lately. Its main theme is how to confront, process, and correct the negative impact of authoritarianism on a political system or culture. This requires close attention by men of vision, who must not assume that authoritarianism will automatically vanish with regime change, who must not assume that authoritarianism is a defect unique to a specific political party, rather than the abuse of power by any political authority. The implementation of Transitional Justice is often difficult, because those implementing Transitional Justice are often guilty of the same abuses as those they just replaced. They may fly the banner of democratic reform, but they have inherited the same habits, the same manners, and the same propensity to abuse power as those they just replaced. This is what makes the implementation of Transitional Justice so difficult.
President Chen received a foreign visitor the other day. Citing "Transitional Justice" as his reason, he spoke of the problem of judges and public prosecutors who were unfit for office. He cited the example of East Germany, which eliminated over five-tenths of its judges and public prosecutors. By contrast, Taiwan has not undergone the same process. He said it was difficult to avoid intervention by judges, public prosecutors, and criminal investigators, who motivated by political factors or election considerations, engaged in attempts to influence or even manipulate the results of ROC presidential elections. President Chen's words provoked an immediate reaction from the Judicial Yuan, the Prosecutors' Reform Association, and the private sector Judicial Reform Foundation. The consensus was that his remarks were improper. Examination, prosecutorial, and investigative bodies all affirmed that judicial personnel should not and would not abuse their authority to intervene in the presidential election. Some appealed to President Chen to exercise caution, to avoid misspeaking, and to avoid indiscriminately tarring everyone with the same broad brush.
Taken at face value, Chen's speech was a bold call for justice. Taken at actual value, it was a chilling threat against an independent judiciary. According to his logic, the government needs to engage in the wholesale elimination of judges and public prosecutors. The criterion for elimination would be which judges and public prosecutors are having an undesired impact on the presidential election. Those judges and prosecutors currently prosecuting the two presidential candidates, who have the power to influence the candidates' election prospects, are targets for elimination. Who has the authority to decide which judges and prosecutors are "unfit for office," therefore must be eliminated? Who else but Chen? Who is Chen suggesting as potential targets for elimination? Who else but the judges and prosecutors handling the Wu Shu-chen case, the Ma Ying-jeou case, the Frank Hsieh case, and the Chen Chu case? What is Chen telling them, if not that they will be eliminated under the pretext of implementing Transitional Justice in the event their prosecution of these cases or the outcome of these trials meet with his displeasure?
President Chen's improper remarks illustrate a problem with Transitional Justice that cannot be ignored, namely that those implementing Transitional Justice are often guilty of the same authoritarian abuses of power as those they just replaced.
Politically speaking, President Chen Shui-bian may be a lame duck. But because the ruling DPP considers the office of the president an indispensable component of its power, during the upcoming presidential election Chen will remain an influential player. On top of which, President Chen is a key figure, even an indirect litigant, in the ongoing State Affairs Confidential Expenses Case, the Wu Shu-chen case, the Ma Ying-jeou case, the Frank Hsieh case, and the Chen Chu case. Citing Transitional Justice as a pretext to hurl veiled accusations against the judiciary constitutes a serious conflict of interest, from which Chen should have recused himself. But when a head of state openly casts doubt on the impartiality of his own nation's judiciary in front of foreign dignitaries, is that merely a breach of etiquette? Or is it something far more serious -- the abuse of the power of his office in an attempt to influence or even intimidate the judiciary? Isn't a ruling regime's threat to conduct a political purge the nation's judiciary, depending upon whether pending court cases favor the ruling regime in the upcoming presidential election, precisely what "Transitional Justice" is all about?
Prior to regime change, the public had little faith in the judiciary. That lack of faith reflected weakness in the nation's political institutions. Years ago the ruling party boasted that "We own the courts." Those words probably still ring in many peoples' ears. It was the very reason some suspected the judiciary of containing "residual scum" from a bygone era. Prior to regime change, when the ruling party had the temerity to boast that "Our party owns the courts," the problem was not that a specific political party dared to boast that "Our party owns the courts." The problem was that the ruling party dared to boast that "Our party owns the courts." The name of the party was not important. What was important was that it was in power. Only the ruling party has the political wherewithal to own the courts, not the opposition party. That is why what matters is who is in power, not the name of the party in power.
If Transitional Justice is to avoid replicating past authoritarian manipulations of the judiciary, it must address two problems. The first problem is the new regime. The new regime must not be permitted to interfere with the judicial process the way the old regime did. The new regime might not have the chutzpah to openly manipulate the courts. But if the new regime nurses a morbid fear that "If we don't own the courts, then the courts will own us," and cites that as a justification for a political war against the courts, what difference is there between it and the old regime? The other problem is new judicial personnel. New judicial personnel may be unqualified to be part of a modern judicial system. But which judicial personnel should be eliminated must not be decided by the ruling regime, on the basis of partisan political advantage, on the basis of "Those who obey me, prosper. Those who defy me, perish." Such decisions must be made in accordance with human rights safeguards, with due process as a measuring rod. Political interests must make room for social dialogue, and allow deliberative democracy to inspire spontaneous reform from within the judiciary.
If the ruling regime waves the banner of Transitional Justice, while drawing no distinctions between black and white or good and evil; If it accuses the judiciary of being filled with "residual scum" in order to intimidate the judiciary and make electoral gains from specific court decisions, that constitutes a betrayal of Transitional Justice. That constitutes the trampling of judicial independence by yet another abusive political authority.
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.08.01
陳總統議論司法是惡劣的權力示威
中時社論
「轉型正義」，是台灣最近常見的討論話題，所探究的主軸是如何面對、處理或矯正過去威權體制在政治社會乃至文化層面的遺緒。這確實需要有識之士嚴肅以對；尤其應該注意避免一項基本的思考盲點，那就是假設威權體制業已隨著政黨輪替而終結，誤認「威權體制」是與特定的政黨而非政治權力的濫用相連結。因為，轉型正義所要處理的一個重大難題，正是在正義轉型期間掌握政權的個人或政治勢力，不僅整套複製既有威權政治文化的遺緒，更在民主業已轉型的表象之下，繼承了濫用權力的習性與風格，使得轉型正義難以實現。
陳總統日前接見外賓，以「轉型正義」為由，說到如何處理不適任的法官與檢察官的問題，以東德淘汰了五成以上的法官與檢察官為例，對照台灣未做相同的處理，以為台灣很難避免法官、檢察官及調查員因政治因素或選舉考量，而介入、影響甚至企圖左右各黨總統候選人未來的競選活動。陳總統的話語，立即引起司法院、檢改會、民間司改會以及司法界人士的反應，普遍皆認為發言不當。審、檢、調機關各自重申，司法人員不該也不會動用手中的權力干預總統大選；有人呼籲陳總統慎言，不要模糊其詞，一竿子打翻一船人。
依我們看來，陳總統的不當發言，恰巧出現了「轉型正義」裡不容忽略的思考盲點：即民主轉型期中的掌權者，也依舊可能延續威權政治中的濫權遺緒。
陳總統的發言，表面上大義凜然，骨子裡卻令人不寒而慄。依照其發言邏輯，台灣似也該淘汰不適任的法官、檢察官，而意在言外的淘汰指標，似乎就是要看哪些法官、檢察官介入影響總統選舉？接下來，正在處理或審判總統大選候選人相關案件，還有足以影響選情、動見政治觀瞻等重大案件的法官、檢察官們，豈不就是淘汰指標所要觀察的對象？問題是，誰有權力運用特定的淘汰指標指認並發動淘汰「不適任」的法官、檢察官？陳總統所暗示的淘汰指標，難道不是在以吳淑珍案、馬英九案、謝長廷案、陳菊選舉案中的法官或檢察官為對象，告訴他們，如果處理或審判的結果不令當權者感到滿意，他們就會是轉型正義旗幟下遭到淘汰的法官與檢察官？
陳水扁總統雖已處於政治跛腳的位置，但是由於執政黨極度看重總統職位的分量，他在未來的總統大選中，顯然仍是舉足輕重的政治影武者。加上尚屬現在進行式的國務機要費刑事案件，陳總統在吳淑珍案、馬英九案、謝長廷案、陳菊案……中，都是不折不扣的政治利害關係人，甚或間接當事人，利用「轉型正義」的題目，從事含沙射影的發言，已經不只是應迴避而不迴避的利害衝突問題，也不能只問國家元首在接見外賓時是否欠缺了對於司法應有的尊重，而是涉及是否利用其身分及權勢地位干預甚至恫嚇司法了。一位執政者，利用總統選舉的案件關連性，對於司法人員提出淘汰說，有沒有威脅司法獨立的顧慮，不也正是轉型正義論述所該關心的話題？
政黨輪替之前的威權時代，司法的信用不彰，原是民主體質孱弱的社會現象指標。當年執政黨自詡是法院的經營者，許多人可能依舊言猶在耳，也就因此以為司法之中尚有昔日的威權餘孽存在。但是，政黨敢於號稱「法院是我黨所開」，原因不在它政黨的名號，而是在它執政的位置。有政治本錢經營法院的只能是執政黨，不會是在野黨，所以重點是誰在執政，不是那個政黨。
轉型正義要避免威權政治再度扭曲司法，必須針對兩種對象，一種是新的執政者，確保他們不會繼續伸手干預司法的前朝文化，他們也許不再明目張膽地經營法院，但是新的執政者如果本著深怕「法院不是本黨的地盤」的心態，以法院不利執政者的判決作為政治上聲討法院的根據，其實也與戕害司法的威權文化餘孽，相去無幾。另一種對象則是司法體系之中與現代司法體質格格不入的不適任人員。但是，如何區別甚或淘汰不適任司法人員，不該由執政者決定，也不該是直觀式的使用政黨的標籤進行順昌逆亡的聲討，而必須要以人權保障的司法正義實現程度，做為觀察標尺，由政治勢力讓出適當的空間，透過審議式民主的社會對話，引發司法體系自覺自發性的體質改良。
執政者若是打著轉型正義的旗號，表面上不分青紅皂白，對司法做出泛餘孽指責，骨子裡卻企圖形成司法內部的寒蟬效應，在司法審判具體案件的結果上獲取選舉政治利益，那將是轉型正義的悖論與背反，不過是另一次踐踏司法獨立的惡劣權力示威舉動罷了！
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