Uphold Neutrality and the Rule of Law
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 22, 2008
Chang Cheng-hsiung and his ilk must vacate the political arena. They must vanish without a trace. The Central Election Commission (CEC) was meant to be a professional and neutral institution. But Chang Cheng-hsiung and others like him have turned it into the Democratic Progressive Party's political tool. Chang Cheng-hsiung and his ilk are a disgrace to democracy, a detriment to constitutional rule.
The results of the legislative elections is likely to be a second regime change. To the nation's civil servants, this is an unforgettable experience. No party rules in perpetuity. But civil servants serve for a lifetime. Ruling parties come and go. It is civil servants who are the gatekeepers of constitutional values and the maintainers of government standards. If a ruling party tramples over the constitution, violates the law, misrules the nation, and undermines society's morals, civil servants must be able to maintain order until regime change brings another party into power.
Chang Cheng-hsiung is not an ordinary civil servant. The CEC chairmanship is a constitutionally-mandate, specially-appointed, politically-neutral role. The Democratic Progressive Party applied Superglue to the locks on the doors to the Legislative Yuan. They prevented Chang Cheng-hsiung's firing. Chang Cheng-hsiung then used the CEC as a tool in the DPP's political struggles. He manipulated elections and violated neutrality. But even Chang Cheng-hsiung was unable to revive the Democratic Progressive Party. Not this time. Instead, his attempt to deliberately sow confusion by package-dealing the plebiscite with the election infuriated the electorate, who used their ballots to punish the DPP. In the end, Chang Cheng-hsiung destroyed himself. He destroyed the CEC. He destroyed the spirit of the constitution. He even destroyed the DPP.
The CEC is neutral in theory. It ought to be neutral in fact. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party's has committed many sins during its eight years of misrule. But its most unforgiveable sin is that it has virtually destroyed all remnants of neutrality required under constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Can you imagine Nita Ying as the Minister of Audit, nominating members of the Bureau of Audit? Have you seen the list of rejected Control Yuan nominees? Is any political trust possible under such circumstances? Can you believe that Grand Justice Cheng Chung-mo strongarmed legislators on behalf of the ruling regime's constitutional interpretation case? Have you seen the way the grand justices twisted the meaning of the constitution on behalf of the ruling regime during its constitutional interpretation cases? How could our Attorney General let us down so badly? How could our Special Investigative Unit be so flagrantly partisan? How could our state-owned enterprises become political spoils? How could our banks become underwriters of our ruling regime?
Grand justices, CEC officials, state-owned enterprises, and special investigative unit officials all require neutrality and professionalism to a greater or lesser degree. The black hand of political manipulators and partisan interests must be excluded. But every one of these these realms has been coopted. The nominally public Council of Grand Justices has become a private service provider for partisan interests. The nominally public CEC has become a private service provider for the ruling DPP. Neutrality has disappeared and constitutional rule is nowhere to be found.
Neutrality and professionalism are indispensable to constitutionalism and the rule of law. One must fight for them tooth and nail. Compromise is not an option. If the CEC is not neutral, then constitutional rule has been seriously undermined. When the CEC produced Chang Cheng-hsiung, the CEC became a DPP pawn, instead of a fair and impartial entity. The DPP's special aptitude is its ability to plant counterparts of Chang Cheng-hsiung everywhere, from the Council of Grand Justices to the China Steel Corporation. No need to enumerate. The public can count.
Lin Wen-hu, the Vice-chairman of the National Parents Union, concluded that Minister of Education Tu Cheng-shen's "political machinations were not good. He (Tu) is working for the DPP, not for education." This remark rang true with many parents. In fact, it hit the nail on the head. Parents are concerned that professionalism and the spirit of education have been lost. By the same token, many peoples' concern is that Chang Cheng-hsiung is working for the DPP, not for fair elections.
A second "regime change" is imminent. Major reconstruction is required to restore constitutionalism and the rule of law, along with neutrality and professionalism. Grand justices like Cheng Chung-mo, CEC Commissioners like Chang Cheng-hsiung, and Ministers of Education like Tu Cheng-shen are out of the question. Such individuals must not be nominated. Individuals nominated must display neutrality and professionalism, and not willingly debase themselves.
Parents' representatives lament that Tu Cheng-sheng is "working for the Democratic Progressive Party, not for education." Every civil servant today needs to hear this lament. If indeed a "second regime change" is imminent, every civil servant needs to hear it again: "The Civil Service does not belong to the KMT. It belongs to the people. It serves the people."
憲政法治的中立領域不容斷送
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.01.22 03:16 am
務使「張政雄」之輩在政壇絕跡。中選會是一個「專業中立」及「特任中立」的機構，卻被張政雄等操弄成民進黨的政爭工具。張政雄等是民主的恥辱，憲政的災難。
這次立委選舉的結果顯示，「二次政黨輪替」不無可能。這對全國公務員，皆應是一個刻骨銘心的經歷。沒有永遠的執政黨，卻有終生任職的公務員。執政黨可以如走馬燈，公務員才是憲政價值與政府品質的守門人。如果換來一個毀憲亂法、失政敗德的執政黨，公務員就要挺得住，一直挺到政黨輪替為止。
張政雄不是一般的公務員，中選會主委是「特任中立」的憲政角色。民進黨用「三秒膠」鎖住了立法院，保住了張政雄；張政雄竟將中選會當作民進黨的政爭工具，玩弄選舉，盡失中立原則。然而，張政雄這次卻未救活民進黨，反而因「公投亂大選」，使國人義憤難遏，用選票唾棄了民進黨。最後，張政雄毀了自己，毀了中選會，毀了憲政精神，其實也毀了民進黨。
眾人皆知「行政中立」，中選會更應「絕對中立」。而民進黨執政八年來，最重大的罪孽，即在幾乎摧毀了一切在憲政法治上應當固守的「中立」地帶。
你能想像用殷琪做監察委員的提名審核人嗎？你看到上一波被否決的監委名單能夠產生政治信任嗎？你相信大法官如城仲模居然為釋憲案替主政者關說立委嗎？你難道看不出大法官釋憲案中那種曲筆護主的姿態嗎？我們的檢察總長何以如此令人失望？我們的特偵組何以如此惹人議論？我們的公營事業怎麼變成分贓的籌碼？甚至我們的銀行何以竟成了主政者的政治金主？
從大法官、中選會到公營事業、特偵組，其中皆有程度不一的中立地帶，及專業領域；不容政治黑手操弄，不容黨派利益入侵。但是，縱目四望，竟是無一倖免。大法官會議若成了黨派入侵的「公營事業」，中選會若成了黑手介入的「公私行庫」，中立既失，憲政民主也就不堪聞問了。
這些中立地帶及專業領域，是維持憲政法治之所需。寸土必爭，無可妥協。中選會不中立，憲政就受重傷；中選會出了一個張政雄，中選會就成了民進黨的政治籌碼，而非中立公正的憲政機關。民進黨的本事，就是從大法官會議到中鋼公司，都布置了「張政雄」這樣的角色。此處毋庸列舉，國人扳著手指算算即可。
全國家長聯盟副理事長林文虎，談到他對教育部長杜正勝的觀感，他說：「政治操弄不太好；他（杜正勝）是為民進黨工作，不是為教育！」這句話引發了極多家長的共鳴，誠是一針見血之論。家長們的憂慮是：教育的專業被摧毀了，教育的精神被汙染了。同理，豈不是也有許多國人深自怨嘆：張政雄是在為民進黨工作，不是為公正的選舉！
值此可能出現「二次政黨輪替」的時機，主要的「災後重建」工作之一，就是要回復憲政法治體制中一切的中立地帶與專業原則。大法官裡勿再有「城仲模」，中選會裡勿再有「張政雄」，教育部裡勿再有「杜正勝」。一方面，提名任命者不可拔擢這類人物；另一方面，接受任命者應當體現其職位上應具的中立專業角色，不可自甘墮落。
家長代表對杜正勝的評語：「他是為民進黨工作，不是為教育！」這句話可以說給今天的全體公務員聽；如果出現「二次政黨輪替」，亦應再說一次：「公務員不是為國民黨工作，要為國家、為人民！」
Tuesday, January 22, 2008
Monday, January 21, 2008
The DPP must transform itself from a Gang into a Party
The DPP must transform itself from a Gang into a Party
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 21, 2007
"Don't think of the DPP as a political party." When referring to the manner in which the DPP went about reflecting on the reasons for its election debacle, one Green Camp scholar noted with irony that the DPP is nothing more than an ad hoc alliance of political factions. For the DPP, elections are merely procedures by which to divvy up the loot.
In the eyes of pro-green academics the "ruling party" that has been leading the ROC for the past eight years is more "gang" than "political party." That's an astonishing notion. But based on the DPP's conduct, it is not far from the truth. Over the past several days voices within the party have been demanding self-introspection. Criticisms however have been directed exclusively at Chuang Kuo-jung, Hsieh Chi-wei, and other minor players. They have not touched on the party's political platform and principles of governance. Following a power struggle, Chen is out and Hsieh is in. The party machinery has already changed hands. It is combat ready and has already undergone redeployment. That the DPP is dealing with its defeat in such a cavalier manner leaves observers in stunned disappointment.
From being in the opposition to being the ruling party, the DPP's unchanging characteristic has been its pugnacity and its ability to reinvent itself. These make the DPP more like the "war council" of an organized crime family than a modern political party.
Because of its natural pugnacity, the DPP has always been able to develop innovative tactics and novel rhetoric in the service of its political struggles. But also due to this natural pugnacity, the DPP invariably lashes out full force. It is unable to settle down and put the welfare of the nation first. It lives only to fight. It has forgotten that the people only want to live in peace. It has forgotten that society needs a stable environment can to develop. As an old Chinese saying goes: "For those in authority making trouble is not an option." But over the past eight years the DPP has never been able to understand this principle. It has relentlessly been making trouble, until the public could not longer put up with its irresponsibility and decided to ruthlessly cast it aside.
After the DPP came to power, it had the opportunity to make the transition from an alliance of factions to a more stable, more effective modern political party. Unfortunately, faced with the seduction of power and a wealth of resources, the DPP immediately yielded to temptation. In order to rapidly expand its domain, the DPP eagerly absorbed local political machines and other political remnants. It attempted to undermine the Blue Camp by inducing members to defect. The result of its expansionist ambition was that economic advantage promptly supplanted the party's former political idealism. In the blink of an eye, a political alliance degenerated into a criminal gang. By contrast, many reformist-oriented elders were either ostracized or left in disgust. The lack of inclusiveness, the loss of idealism, and the emergence of a single voice suppressing dissent, all testified to the DPP's failure to transform itself into a modern political party.
Factions within the DPP proliferate. They attack each other. They jostle for advantage. They also engage in quid pro quo exchanges. This is one reason the DPP has not been able to transform itself into a modern political party. Yu Shyi-kun during his term as premier attempted to promote the eradication of factions. But the reality is that many small factions have encircled the more cohesive and organized New Tide faction. In the final analysis, this was merely an internal power struggle initiated by the DPP party hierarchy. As of now, factional power struggles within the DPP are no longer about political convictions, they are about realpolitik. Just take a look at the dominant Chen Shui-bian faction, at the Hsieh faction, sharpening its swords, at the Su faction, ready to rumble. What about Yu Shyi-kun? During his term as premier he built up the power of the Yu faction. The DPP's true colors as a criminal enterprise are becoming every more apparent.
When Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang fought each other over the presidential nomination during the party primaries, Lee Ying-yuan angrily resigned as Chairman of the Council of Labor Affairs in order to help Frank Hsieh's campaign. Would such a thing happen in a normal political party in the modern era? A political appointee identifies more strongly with his political faction than with his role within the government? What is this, if not the nature of a criminal gang? Frank Hsieh's campaign committee shut out members of other factions. The party's nominees for the legislature had strong ties to local party machines. Frank Hsieh even refused to appear on the same podium with Chen Shui-bian. Chiou I-jen and Chang Chun-hsiung both resigned their positions as Hsieh camp campaign workers. Factionalism within the DPP is so rampant it can no longer be covered up. Such strange bedfellows, each with their own hidden agendas. How can one expect such a political party to assume collective responsibility for the failures of the past eight years?
"Don't think of the Democratic Progressive Party as a political party." This assessment reveals the secret behind the swift rise and and even swifter fall of the DPP. It also reveals the vulnerability of the ROC's constitutional structure. Looking back we realize that every one of the Democratic Progressive Party's self-styled virtues, from "honesty, diligence, love of the land" to "Champion of Taiwan independence and statehood" was a Big Lie, was political treachery. How this is a modern political party? Isn't this more akin to a street gang?
For years, DPP leaders were seen as fearsome electioneering experts. But after eight years in power, these electioneering experts have sunk to this level. Can they blame an electoral system they now denounce as unfair, but which they themselves rammed through the legislature? The DPP had better engage in some serious soul-searching about how it destroyed the nation's constitutional structures, abused its power, and lost the public trust. Otherwise it will remain nothing more than a gang of political thugs only capable of stirring up trouble and only concerned with getting their share of the loot.
民進黨須從「幫派」向「政黨」轉型
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.01.21 03:01 am
「不要把民進黨想得太像個政黨。」一位綠營學者談到民進黨將如何反省敗選時諷刺地說，民進黨不過是派系結盟罷了，選舉只是為了分配利益。
領 導台灣八年的「執政黨」，在親綠學者眼裡，竟是「幫派」成分多過「政黨」，豈不令人駭然？但對照民進黨的表現，此話又顯然不假：連日來黨內發出的檢討聲 音，皆集中在莊國榮、謝志偉之類的小角色身上，完全未觸及黨的從政路線和治國方針；一番權鬥後，「扁下謝上」黨機器易手，馬上又進入新的戰鬥部署。民進黨 因應敗局如此舉重若輕，令人錯愕亦復失望。
從在野到執政，民進黨始終不變的特色，是它強大的鬥爭能力和反覆自如的性格，這使它更像一個幫派型的「戰鬥團體」，而不像一個「現代政黨」。
由 於它強烈的戰鬥天性，所以能源源不斷研發新穎的戰術及議題，進行政治鬥爭；但也因為這種好鬥善鬥的本能，它將全副精力用來部署攻擊，而無法安靜下來思考治 國。它沉湎於硝煙征戰，卻忘了老百姓需要休養生息，忘了社會需要安定的環境才能扎根、發展。所謂「當家不鬧事」，但民進黨八年來始終無法體悟到其中道理， 它終於鬧到讓人民忍無可忍，狠狠地將它唾棄。
民進黨執政後，本來有機會從「派系聯盟」轉型為更穩定、更有效能的現代政黨；可惜，面對誘人 的權力和豐盛的資源，民進黨立即向現實主義屈服。為了迅速擴張版圖，民進黨大肆吸收地方上渴望分享權力的派系散兵游勇，同時為了挖藍軍牆腳，而廣為招降納 叛。如此貪圖擴張的結果，使得黨內原來政治屬性較強的「派系聯盟」，在轉眼間就惡化為利益取向的「幫派聯盟」；相對的，不少具有改革理想的黨外「前輩」遭 到排擠或選擇出走。包容性的缺乏、理想性的喪失、一言堂的出現，在在驗證了民進黨向現代化政黨轉型的失敗。
民進黨內派系林立，彼此攻伐、 彼此掣肘，或彼此利益交換，也是妨礙它蛻變為現代政黨的主要原因之一。雖然游錫?在主席任內推動消滅派系，但其真相其實是眾小派系聯合圍剿組織力較凝聚的 新潮流系，歸根究柢，這只是一場黨中央發動的內部權鬥。此時，民進黨內派系生態已走向以「現實勢力」而非「政治理念」為結合的架構，只消看龐大的扁系、磨 刀霍霍的謝系、蠢蠢欲動的蘇系，乃至游錫?在擔任主席期間收編壯大的游系，民進黨的幫派色彩只是有增無減。
試想：在謝蘇初選相爭期間，李 應元憤而辭去勞委會主委，回去為謝長廷抬轎；若在一個正常的現代政黨，這種事如何可能發生？一個政務官的派系認同，遠大過自己執政角色的認知，這不是幫派 政治的表徵嗎？再看，謝營的助選團隊排拒「外系」人馬進駐，黨內立委提名充滿地方利益色彩，乃至謝長廷拒絕與扁同台，以及張俊雄和邱義仁雙辭謝營輔選工 作，不都說明民進黨幫派現象已到無法遮掩的地步嗎？這種同床異夢、各懷鬼胎的政黨，又如何奢望它為執政八年的失敗負起共同責任？
「不要把民進黨想得太像個政黨」，這項評論一語道破民進黨暴起與暴落的祕密，同時也揭穿了台灣民主體質的脆弱。仔細回想，民進黨自「清廉、勤政、愛鄉土」，到「台獨建國」，無一不是騙術，無一不是權謀；這豈是現代政黨？這豈不是混世幫派？
許 多年來，民進黨一直被視為可怕的「選戰高手」，但八年大權在握後，這個慓悍的「戰鬥團體」竟淪落到今日的慘況，它能怪自己一手強力推動的新選制對它太不公 允嗎？民進黨如果不深刻反省自己如何摧毀了民主真諦、如何濫用了權力、如何失去了人心，它恐怕永遠只是一個興風作浪、坐地分贓的政治幫派而已。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 21, 2007
"Don't think of the DPP as a political party." When referring to the manner in which the DPP went about reflecting on the reasons for its election debacle, one Green Camp scholar noted with irony that the DPP is nothing more than an ad hoc alliance of political factions. For the DPP, elections are merely procedures by which to divvy up the loot.
In the eyes of pro-green academics the "ruling party" that has been leading the ROC for the past eight years is more "gang" than "political party." That's an astonishing notion. But based on the DPP's conduct, it is not far from the truth. Over the past several days voices within the party have been demanding self-introspection. Criticisms however have been directed exclusively at Chuang Kuo-jung, Hsieh Chi-wei, and other minor players. They have not touched on the party's political platform and principles of governance. Following a power struggle, Chen is out and Hsieh is in. The party machinery has already changed hands. It is combat ready and has already undergone redeployment. That the DPP is dealing with its defeat in such a cavalier manner leaves observers in stunned disappointment.
From being in the opposition to being the ruling party, the DPP's unchanging characteristic has been its pugnacity and its ability to reinvent itself. These make the DPP more like the "war council" of an organized crime family than a modern political party.
Because of its natural pugnacity, the DPP has always been able to develop innovative tactics and novel rhetoric in the service of its political struggles. But also due to this natural pugnacity, the DPP invariably lashes out full force. It is unable to settle down and put the welfare of the nation first. It lives only to fight. It has forgotten that the people only want to live in peace. It has forgotten that society needs a stable environment can to develop. As an old Chinese saying goes: "For those in authority making trouble is not an option." But over the past eight years the DPP has never been able to understand this principle. It has relentlessly been making trouble, until the public could not longer put up with its irresponsibility and decided to ruthlessly cast it aside.
After the DPP came to power, it had the opportunity to make the transition from an alliance of factions to a more stable, more effective modern political party. Unfortunately, faced with the seduction of power and a wealth of resources, the DPP immediately yielded to temptation. In order to rapidly expand its domain, the DPP eagerly absorbed local political machines and other political remnants. It attempted to undermine the Blue Camp by inducing members to defect. The result of its expansionist ambition was that economic advantage promptly supplanted the party's former political idealism. In the blink of an eye, a political alliance degenerated into a criminal gang. By contrast, many reformist-oriented elders were either ostracized or left in disgust. The lack of inclusiveness, the loss of idealism, and the emergence of a single voice suppressing dissent, all testified to the DPP's failure to transform itself into a modern political party.
Factions within the DPP proliferate. They attack each other. They jostle for advantage. They also engage in quid pro quo exchanges. This is one reason the DPP has not been able to transform itself into a modern political party. Yu Shyi-kun during his term as premier attempted to promote the eradication of factions. But the reality is that many small factions have encircled the more cohesive and organized New Tide faction. In the final analysis, this was merely an internal power struggle initiated by the DPP party hierarchy. As of now, factional power struggles within the DPP are no longer about political convictions, they are about realpolitik. Just take a look at the dominant Chen Shui-bian faction, at the Hsieh faction, sharpening its swords, at the Su faction, ready to rumble. What about Yu Shyi-kun? During his term as premier he built up the power of the Yu faction. The DPP's true colors as a criminal enterprise are becoming every more apparent.
When Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang fought each other over the presidential nomination during the party primaries, Lee Ying-yuan angrily resigned as Chairman of the Council of Labor Affairs in order to help Frank Hsieh's campaign. Would such a thing happen in a normal political party in the modern era? A political appointee identifies more strongly with his political faction than with his role within the government? What is this, if not the nature of a criminal gang? Frank Hsieh's campaign committee shut out members of other factions. The party's nominees for the legislature had strong ties to local party machines. Frank Hsieh even refused to appear on the same podium with Chen Shui-bian. Chiou I-jen and Chang Chun-hsiung both resigned their positions as Hsieh camp campaign workers. Factionalism within the DPP is so rampant it can no longer be covered up. Such strange bedfellows, each with their own hidden agendas. How can one expect such a political party to assume collective responsibility for the failures of the past eight years?
"Don't think of the Democratic Progressive Party as a political party." This assessment reveals the secret behind the swift rise and and even swifter fall of the DPP. It also reveals the vulnerability of the ROC's constitutional structure. Looking back we realize that every one of the Democratic Progressive Party's self-styled virtues, from "honesty, diligence, love of the land" to "Champion of Taiwan independence and statehood" was a Big Lie, was political treachery. How this is a modern political party? Isn't this more akin to a street gang?
For years, DPP leaders were seen as fearsome electioneering experts. But after eight years in power, these electioneering experts have sunk to this level. Can they blame an electoral system they now denounce as unfair, but which they themselves rammed through the legislature? The DPP had better engage in some serious soul-searching about how it destroyed the nation's constitutional structures, abused its power, and lost the public trust. Otherwise it will remain nothing more than a gang of political thugs only capable of stirring up trouble and only concerned with getting their share of the loot.
民進黨須從「幫派」向「政黨」轉型
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.01.21 03:01 am
「不要把民進黨想得太像個政黨。」一位綠營學者談到民進黨將如何反省敗選時諷刺地說，民進黨不過是派系結盟罷了，選舉只是為了分配利益。
領 導台灣八年的「執政黨」，在親綠學者眼裡，竟是「幫派」成分多過「政黨」，豈不令人駭然？但對照民進黨的表現，此話又顯然不假：連日來黨內發出的檢討聲 音，皆集中在莊國榮、謝志偉之類的小角色身上，完全未觸及黨的從政路線和治國方針；一番權鬥後，「扁下謝上」黨機器易手，馬上又進入新的戰鬥部署。民進黨 因應敗局如此舉重若輕，令人錯愕亦復失望。
從在野到執政，民進黨始終不變的特色，是它強大的鬥爭能力和反覆自如的性格，這使它更像一個幫派型的「戰鬥團體」，而不像一個「現代政黨」。
由 於它強烈的戰鬥天性，所以能源源不斷研發新穎的戰術及議題，進行政治鬥爭；但也因為這種好鬥善鬥的本能，它將全副精力用來部署攻擊，而無法安靜下來思考治 國。它沉湎於硝煙征戰，卻忘了老百姓需要休養生息，忘了社會需要安定的環境才能扎根、發展。所謂「當家不鬧事」，但民進黨八年來始終無法體悟到其中道理， 它終於鬧到讓人民忍無可忍，狠狠地將它唾棄。
民進黨執政後，本來有機會從「派系聯盟」轉型為更穩定、更有效能的現代政黨；可惜，面對誘人 的權力和豐盛的資源，民進黨立即向現實主義屈服。為了迅速擴張版圖，民進黨大肆吸收地方上渴望分享權力的派系散兵游勇，同時為了挖藍軍牆腳，而廣為招降納 叛。如此貪圖擴張的結果，使得黨內原來政治屬性較強的「派系聯盟」，在轉眼間就惡化為利益取向的「幫派聯盟」；相對的，不少具有改革理想的黨外「前輩」遭 到排擠或選擇出走。包容性的缺乏、理想性的喪失、一言堂的出現，在在驗證了民進黨向現代化政黨轉型的失敗。
民進黨內派系林立，彼此攻伐、 彼此掣肘，或彼此利益交換，也是妨礙它蛻變為現代政黨的主要原因之一。雖然游錫?在主席任內推動消滅派系，但其真相其實是眾小派系聯合圍剿組織力較凝聚的 新潮流系，歸根究柢，這只是一場黨中央發動的內部權鬥。此時，民進黨內派系生態已走向以「現實勢力」而非「政治理念」為結合的架構，只消看龐大的扁系、磨 刀霍霍的謝系、蠢蠢欲動的蘇系，乃至游錫?在擔任主席期間收編壯大的游系，民進黨的幫派色彩只是有增無減。
試想：在謝蘇初選相爭期間，李 應元憤而辭去勞委會主委，回去為謝長廷抬轎；若在一個正常的現代政黨，這種事如何可能發生？一個政務官的派系認同，遠大過自己執政角色的認知，這不是幫派 政治的表徵嗎？再看，謝營的助選團隊排拒「外系」人馬進駐，黨內立委提名充滿地方利益色彩，乃至謝長廷拒絕與扁同台，以及張俊雄和邱義仁雙辭謝營輔選工 作，不都說明民進黨幫派現象已到無法遮掩的地步嗎？這種同床異夢、各懷鬼胎的政黨，又如何奢望它為執政八年的失敗負起共同責任？
「不要把民進黨想得太像個政黨」，這項評論一語道破民進黨暴起與暴落的祕密，同時也揭穿了台灣民主體質的脆弱。仔細回想，民進黨自「清廉、勤政、愛鄉土」，到「台獨建國」，無一不是騙術，無一不是權謀；這豈是現代政黨？這豈不是混世幫派？
許 多年來，民進黨一直被視為可怕的「選戰高手」，但八年大權在握後，這個慓悍的「戰鬥團體」竟淪落到今日的慘況，它能怪自己一手強力推動的新選制對它太不公 允嗎？民進黨如果不深刻反省自己如何摧毀了民主真諦、如何濫用了權力、如何失去了人心，它恐怕永遠只是一個興風作浪、坐地分贓的政治幫派而已。
Thursday, January 17, 2008
Did the DPP really lose the Election because the System is Unfair?
Did the DPP really lose the Election because the System is Unfair?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 17, 2008
The results of the legislative elections are considered a vote of non-confidence in Chen Shui-bian. But when Chen Shui-bian discussed the election during a diplomatic visit yesterday, he stubbornly maintained that his political path was correct. A centrist path was out of the question. This kind of mentality makes it clear that not only are Frank Hsieh's election prospects at risk, so is the political future of the DPP.
DPP officials are currently reviewing the election process. The overwhelming majority of them are blaming the electoral system for alleged unfairness. In fact, this is a deliberate attempt to mislead the public. Because the KMT won, it received an extraordinary number of seats. But no matter whether we are talking about At Large Party Ballots, or District Representative Ballots, the KMT received over half the votes. The District Representative vote was 53.5% vs. the DPP's 38.7%. The At Large Party vote was 51.23% vs. the DPP's 36.91%. The gap between the two votes was as high as 15%. In any democratic nation, this would be considered a clear indication of public sentiment.
Such an election result looks like radical change. But in a democratic nation it is the norm. Just last year alone, the ruling party in the United States, Japan, Poland, and Venezuela faced electoral defeat due to ideological dogmatism. The governments of Japan and Poland were forced to modify their political paths. Even Venezuelan eccentric Hugo Chavez had to make concessions to the public.
Yesterday Chen Shui-bian said "Everyone is to blame, but I am assuming responsibility." Having done so, he passed the buck for the election debacle to others. He told AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt that under the old electoral system the DPP would have gotten 44 seats instead of 27 seats. Perhaps Chen Shui-bian is unwilling to admit that the loss of 17 seats was largely due to his own strategic miscalculations.
This is the first time the ROC has ever used the Single Member District Electoral System. Its most distinctive feature is that it is extremely sensitive to shifts in public sentiment. Particularly in political regions as small as Japan or Taiwan, due to local issues that may not be obvious. The election results often become votes of confidence in the leaders of the ruling party. During the 2008 ROC Legislative Yuan elections, all other topics were eclipsed. Chen Shui-bian single-handedly orchestrated the "Join the UN" and reunification vs. independence plebiscite campaigns. The election result amounted to a vote of no-confidence in Chen Shui-bian. An average of five percentage points in each electoral district was enough to cause many candidates to go from winners to losers.
To win under such an electoral system, one must win a plurality in each electoral district. In other words, one must appeal to swing voters. This of course runs completely counter to an election strategy in which one appeals only to one's core supporters. Yet even after the election Chen Shui-bian continued talking about how the DPP's core support was still intact, and stubbornly asserted that his election strategy was perfectly sound. But if his strategy was so sound, why couldn't he get a majority of the public to support it?
Constitutional amendments two years ago meant that the ROC's electoral system would change. Changes in the electoral system invariably lead to changes in the party system. In order to comply with the requirements for the Single Member District Electoral System, the Democratic Progressive Party modified its Deep Green party line. But why did the DPP, which has always been sensitive to the larger political environment, allow buffoons such as Hsieh Chi-wei, Tu Cheng-sheng, and even Chuang Kuo-jung, to engage in outrageous political stunts that alienated voters? They knew perfectly well that the Single Member District Electoral System posed a serious challenge to their election prospects. Yet they concocted a "Blues Excluded Clause" and incorporated it into the party primary process, deliberately shutting out potential candidates with more moderate images. How does one go about explaining the DPP's insanely self-destructive behaviour?
Do the Democratic Progressive Party's keepers of the flame really not see that the relationship between Chen Shui-bian and the DPP is now an adversarial, zero sum relationship? Chen Shui-bian knows that adopting a radical independence posture won't win any votes. But he must stick to it to the bitter end. Only then can he remain secure in his position as the Godfather of Taiwan independence. Only then can he shield himself from impending prosecution. If Chen Shui-bian is correct, if insistence on the "Primacy of Taiwan" is not merely a Deep Green position, but the majority view on Taiwan, then why have so-called "Chinese Fellow Travelers" who support the Blue Camp emerged triumphant in the legislative elections? Obviously Chen Shui-bian's arguments on behalf of any particular political path are merely political tools.
Chen Shui-bian has adopted his self-contradictory positions merely to ensure his personal survival. If the DPP continues down the Chen Shui-bian path however, it will not be ensuring its survival. It will be marching into the political wilderness. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party achieved power by uniting Deep Green and centrist voters. But Chen Shui-bian's corruption led to the loss of centrist support. Chen Shui-bian then reached out to fundamentalist elements, using them to hold off the center. This left the DPP, which might have been able to reconcile centrist with Deep Green voters, in an insoluble dilemma.
The DPP's predicament was obvious during the recent election. When it lost to the KMT even in Kaohsiung City and Kaohsiung County, when even solidly DPP districts began to slip from the DPP's grasp, its core support was lost. It is hardly surprising that many DPP supporters are concerned. This is no longer merely a question of whether their candidate can win the presidency. The Democratic Progressive Party must prepare itself mentally to being in the political opposition for years to come.
During the past eight years, under Chen Shui-bian's leadership, the Democratic Progressive Party has virtually nullified the rule of law. It has demonstrated contempt for the legislature, destroyed the credibility of the judiciary, and undermined the independence of independent agencies. The only democratic mechanism intact under DPP misrule is the electoral system. Chen Shui-bian has deliberately misinterpreted the meaning of the outcome of the legislative elections. The DPP had better wake up. When even the democratic procedures by which the people send messages to the ruling administration are being flouted, the public will certainly demand even stronger punishments.
民進黨真是輸在選制不公平嗎？
中國時報
2008.01.17
這次立委選舉的結果，一般都認為是一次典型的對陳水扁不信任投票。但面對敗選現實，陳水扁日昨在外交出訪的談話中卻依舊堅持路線正確，沒有中間路線，這種心態令人清楚的感覺到，目前岌岌可危的已不只是謝長廷的總統選情，而是整個民進黨未來的發展了。
目前民進黨內檢討敗選的原因，絕大多數都是歸咎於選制對民進黨不公平。這其實是故意在混淆視聽，要知道即使國民黨因為勝選而拿到若干超額席次，但不論是就政黨票還是區域票計，國民黨都超過半數，區域立委選票以五三．五％對民進黨的三八．一七％，政黨票以五一．二三％對上民進黨的三六．九一％，兩種選票的差距都高達十五個百分點，這在任何民主國家，已經都是相當清楚的民意表達了。
這樣的選舉結果，表面看來變動很大，但在民主國家卻是常態，單單去年一年，就有美國、日本、波蘭、委內瑞拉等多國，因為執政黨以意識形態治國，都相繼面臨大選挫敗，日本、波蘭政府因此調整路線，即使委內瑞拉狂人查維茲都必須向民意讓步。
但到昨日為止，陳水扁除了一句「萬方有罪、罪在朕躬」之外，仍然將敗選責任推給他人，他向薄瑞光說，如果是舊選制，民進黨應該拿到四十四席，不是二十七席。陳水扁或許不願承認，這少掉的十七席，很大一部分就是因為是他的操作而流失的。
以這次在台灣首次實施的單一選制論，它最大的特色，就是對輕微的民意變動相當敏感，尤其是如日本及台灣這樣幅員小的國家，由於地方議題不明顯，選舉結果往往就成為對執政黨或領導人的信任投票，這次台灣立委選舉，其他議題完全消失，扁一手主導入聯公投、統獨公投議題，釀成整個選舉結果其實是對陳水扁的不信任投票，只要每個選區平均少五個百分點，就夠讓許多候選人從贏轉為輸。
換言之，要在這種選制下勝選，就是要在各個選區內爭取相對多數的選票，也就是要爭取中間選民，這當然是和只固基本盤的選舉策略完全背道而馳的；但扁卻在選後不斷大談基本盤還在，更堅持選舉路線正確，問題是，他如何解釋既然路線正確，卻為何無法得到多數民意支持？
二年前的修憲，就已確定台灣選制將改變，制度調整必然改變政黨行為，民進黨為了符合單一選制要求，當然該調整過去深綠路線，但為何向來對大環境相當敏感的民進黨，竟任由謝志偉、杜正勝、甚至莊國榮等小丑盡情演出，聽任選票流失？甚至在明知要面對單一選區挑戰下，竟然還發明了「排藍條款」，刻意封殺黨內中間形象候選人。該如何解釋民進黨如此瘋狂的自毀行為呢？
至此，有心維持民進黨香火的大將，難道還看不出來，扁與民進黨之間，已是利害衝突的關係。對扁而言，即使採取急獨冒進路線沒有選票，他也必須堅持到底，才能穩坐獨派教主地位以自保。畢竟如果真如扁所說，堅持台灣主體路線的，不只是深綠，而是台灣多數的意見，那麼為何是支持藍營的所謂「中國的同路人」最後勝選？足見任何路線之辯，對當今的陳水扁而言，都是工具罷了。
如果扁的自相矛盾，其實就是為了他個人的利益，那麼對民進黨而言，跟著扁走下去，已是山窮水盡。民進黨二千年能執政，靠著是深綠與中間路線合作，但當扁涉貪腐，導致中間選民流失後，扁卻拉攏基本教義派與中間對抗，讓本來已有能力調和中間與深綠的民進黨，掉入非此即彼的兩難困境中。
這樣的困境，在此次選舉相當明顯，而當民進黨在高雄縣市得票率都輸國民黨，南部鐵票區逐漸失守，所謂的基本盤也在流失。面對未來，也難怪不少支持民進黨的人會擔憂，這已不是總統是否當選的問題，而是民進黨必須有長期在野臥薪嘗膽的決心。
這八年來，陳水扁帶領民進黨所採取的路線，幾乎將法治基礎摧毀殆盡：藐視國會、破壞司法公信力，摧毀獨立機關等，所謂的民主制度，在當下台灣只餘選舉投票一項了，而當陳水扁故意曲解選舉的結果，民進黨內若又完全沒有警覺，連人民藉由民主程序傳達的訊息都遭到蔑視時，必然還會遭受民意更強烈懲罰的。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 17, 2008
The results of the legislative elections are considered a vote of non-confidence in Chen Shui-bian. But when Chen Shui-bian discussed the election during a diplomatic visit yesterday, he stubbornly maintained that his political path was correct. A centrist path was out of the question. This kind of mentality makes it clear that not only are Frank Hsieh's election prospects at risk, so is the political future of the DPP.
DPP officials are currently reviewing the election process. The overwhelming majority of them are blaming the electoral system for alleged unfairness. In fact, this is a deliberate attempt to mislead the public. Because the KMT won, it received an extraordinary number of seats. But no matter whether we are talking about At Large Party Ballots, or District Representative Ballots, the KMT received over half the votes. The District Representative vote was 53.5% vs. the DPP's 38.7%. The At Large Party vote was 51.23% vs. the DPP's 36.91%. The gap between the two votes was as high as 15%. In any democratic nation, this would be considered a clear indication of public sentiment.
Such an election result looks like radical change. But in a democratic nation it is the norm. Just last year alone, the ruling party in the United States, Japan, Poland, and Venezuela faced electoral defeat due to ideological dogmatism. The governments of Japan and Poland were forced to modify their political paths. Even Venezuelan eccentric Hugo Chavez had to make concessions to the public.
Yesterday Chen Shui-bian said "Everyone is to blame, but I am assuming responsibility." Having done so, he passed the buck for the election debacle to others. He told AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt that under the old electoral system the DPP would have gotten 44 seats instead of 27 seats. Perhaps Chen Shui-bian is unwilling to admit that the loss of 17 seats was largely due to his own strategic miscalculations.
This is the first time the ROC has ever used the Single Member District Electoral System. Its most distinctive feature is that it is extremely sensitive to shifts in public sentiment. Particularly in political regions as small as Japan or Taiwan, due to local issues that may not be obvious. The election results often become votes of confidence in the leaders of the ruling party. During the 2008 ROC Legislative Yuan elections, all other topics were eclipsed. Chen Shui-bian single-handedly orchestrated the "Join the UN" and reunification vs. independence plebiscite campaigns. The election result amounted to a vote of no-confidence in Chen Shui-bian. An average of five percentage points in each electoral district was enough to cause many candidates to go from winners to losers.
To win under such an electoral system, one must win a plurality in each electoral district. In other words, one must appeal to swing voters. This of course runs completely counter to an election strategy in which one appeals only to one's core supporters. Yet even after the election Chen Shui-bian continued talking about how the DPP's core support was still intact, and stubbornly asserted that his election strategy was perfectly sound. But if his strategy was so sound, why couldn't he get a majority of the public to support it?
Constitutional amendments two years ago meant that the ROC's electoral system would change. Changes in the electoral system invariably lead to changes in the party system. In order to comply with the requirements for the Single Member District Electoral System, the Democratic Progressive Party modified its Deep Green party line. But why did the DPP, which has always been sensitive to the larger political environment, allow buffoons such as Hsieh Chi-wei, Tu Cheng-sheng, and even Chuang Kuo-jung, to engage in outrageous political stunts that alienated voters? They knew perfectly well that the Single Member District Electoral System posed a serious challenge to their election prospects. Yet they concocted a "Blues Excluded Clause" and incorporated it into the party primary process, deliberately shutting out potential candidates with more moderate images. How does one go about explaining the DPP's insanely self-destructive behaviour?
Do the Democratic Progressive Party's keepers of the flame really not see that the relationship between Chen Shui-bian and the DPP is now an adversarial, zero sum relationship? Chen Shui-bian knows that adopting a radical independence posture won't win any votes. But he must stick to it to the bitter end. Only then can he remain secure in his position as the Godfather of Taiwan independence. Only then can he shield himself from impending prosecution. If Chen Shui-bian is correct, if insistence on the "Primacy of Taiwan" is not merely a Deep Green position, but the majority view on Taiwan, then why have so-called "Chinese Fellow Travelers" who support the Blue Camp emerged triumphant in the legislative elections? Obviously Chen Shui-bian's arguments on behalf of any particular political path are merely political tools.
Chen Shui-bian has adopted his self-contradictory positions merely to ensure his personal survival. If the DPP continues down the Chen Shui-bian path however, it will not be ensuring its survival. It will be marching into the political wilderness. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party achieved power by uniting Deep Green and centrist voters. But Chen Shui-bian's corruption led to the loss of centrist support. Chen Shui-bian then reached out to fundamentalist elements, using them to hold off the center. This left the DPP, which might have been able to reconcile centrist with Deep Green voters, in an insoluble dilemma.
The DPP's predicament was obvious during the recent election. When it lost to the KMT even in Kaohsiung City and Kaohsiung County, when even solidly DPP districts began to slip from the DPP's grasp, its core support was lost. It is hardly surprising that many DPP supporters are concerned. This is no longer merely a question of whether their candidate can win the presidency. The Democratic Progressive Party must prepare itself mentally to being in the political opposition for years to come.
During the past eight years, under Chen Shui-bian's leadership, the Democratic Progressive Party has virtually nullified the rule of law. It has demonstrated contempt for the legislature, destroyed the credibility of the judiciary, and undermined the independence of independent agencies. The only democratic mechanism intact under DPP misrule is the electoral system. Chen Shui-bian has deliberately misinterpreted the meaning of the outcome of the legislative elections. The DPP had better wake up. When even the democratic procedures by which the people send messages to the ruling administration are being flouted, the public will certainly demand even stronger punishments.
民進黨真是輸在選制不公平嗎？
中國時報
2008.01.17
這次立委選舉的結果，一般都認為是一次典型的對陳水扁不信任投票。但面對敗選現實，陳水扁日昨在外交出訪的談話中卻依舊堅持路線正確，沒有中間路線，這種心態令人清楚的感覺到，目前岌岌可危的已不只是謝長廷的總統選情，而是整個民進黨未來的發展了。
目前民進黨內檢討敗選的原因，絕大多數都是歸咎於選制對民進黨不公平。這其實是故意在混淆視聽，要知道即使國民黨因為勝選而拿到若干超額席次，但不論是就政黨票還是區域票計，國民黨都超過半數，區域立委選票以五三．五％對民進黨的三八．一七％，政黨票以五一．二三％對上民進黨的三六．九一％，兩種選票的差距都高達十五個百分點，這在任何民主國家，已經都是相當清楚的民意表達了。
這樣的選舉結果，表面看來變動很大，但在民主國家卻是常態，單單去年一年，就有美國、日本、波蘭、委內瑞拉等多國，因為執政黨以意識形態治國，都相繼面臨大選挫敗，日本、波蘭政府因此調整路線，即使委內瑞拉狂人查維茲都必須向民意讓步。
但到昨日為止，陳水扁除了一句「萬方有罪、罪在朕躬」之外，仍然將敗選責任推給他人，他向薄瑞光說，如果是舊選制，民進黨應該拿到四十四席，不是二十七席。陳水扁或許不願承認，這少掉的十七席，很大一部分就是因為是他的操作而流失的。
以這次在台灣首次實施的單一選制論，它最大的特色，就是對輕微的民意變動相當敏感，尤其是如日本及台灣這樣幅員小的國家，由於地方議題不明顯，選舉結果往往就成為對執政黨或領導人的信任投票，這次台灣立委選舉，其他議題完全消失，扁一手主導入聯公投、統獨公投議題，釀成整個選舉結果其實是對陳水扁的不信任投票，只要每個選區平均少五個百分點，就夠讓許多候選人從贏轉為輸。
換言之，要在這種選制下勝選，就是要在各個選區內爭取相對多數的選票，也就是要爭取中間選民，這當然是和只固基本盤的選舉策略完全背道而馳的；但扁卻在選後不斷大談基本盤還在，更堅持選舉路線正確，問題是，他如何解釋既然路線正確，卻為何無法得到多數民意支持？
二年前的修憲，就已確定台灣選制將改變，制度調整必然改變政黨行為，民進黨為了符合單一選制要求，當然該調整過去深綠路線，但為何向來對大環境相當敏感的民進黨，竟任由謝志偉、杜正勝、甚至莊國榮等小丑盡情演出，聽任選票流失？甚至在明知要面對單一選區挑戰下，竟然還發明了「排藍條款」，刻意封殺黨內中間形象候選人。該如何解釋民進黨如此瘋狂的自毀行為呢？
至此，有心維持民進黨香火的大將，難道還看不出來，扁與民進黨之間，已是利害衝突的關係。對扁而言，即使採取急獨冒進路線沒有選票，他也必須堅持到底，才能穩坐獨派教主地位以自保。畢竟如果真如扁所說，堅持台灣主體路線的，不只是深綠，而是台灣多數的意見，那麼為何是支持藍營的所謂「中國的同路人」最後勝選？足見任何路線之辯，對當今的陳水扁而言，都是工具罷了。
如果扁的自相矛盾，其實就是為了他個人的利益，那麼對民進黨而言，跟著扁走下去，已是山窮水盡。民進黨二千年能執政，靠著是深綠與中間路線合作，但當扁涉貪腐，導致中間選民流失後，扁卻拉攏基本教義派與中間對抗，讓本來已有能力調和中間與深綠的民進黨，掉入非此即彼的兩難困境中。
這樣的困境，在此次選舉相當明顯，而當民進黨在高雄縣市得票率都輸國民黨，南部鐵票區逐漸失守，所謂的基本盤也在流失。面對未來，也難怪不少支持民進黨的人會擔憂，這已不是總統是否當選的問題，而是民進黨必須有長期在野臥薪嘗膽的決心。
這八年來，陳水扁帶領民進黨所採取的路線，幾乎將法治基礎摧毀殆盡：藐視國會、破壞司法公信力，摧毀獨立機關等，所謂的民主制度，在當下台灣只餘選舉投票一項了，而當陳水扁故意曲解選舉的結果，民進黨內若又完全沒有警覺，連人民藉由民主程序傳達的訊息都遭到蔑視時，必然還會遭受民意更強烈懲罰的。
Wednesday, January 16, 2008
Frank Hsieh: "Am I a Chen Shui-bian Clone?"
Frank Hsieh: "Am I a Chen Shui-bian Clone?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 16, 2008
Is Chen Shui-bian up to his old tricks again? During his state visit he said that his "Five Noes" were merely his personal commitment, that they were not binding upon the new president.
Chen Shui-bian's implication was clear. If Frank Hsieh wants to hitch a ride on the Five Noes bandwagon, he must make his own preference known. He cannot evade the issue. Chen Shui-bian added that the legislative elections were largely concerned with domestic affairs. The presidential election is about cross-strait policy and national identity. In other words, he thinks Hsieh has to come clean.
Chen Shiu-bian will probably withdraw from the front lines of the presidential campaign. He will adopt the position that "national policy must be decided by the President." He will issue an endless stream of opinions on cross-straits policy and "national identity" issues. He will offer his own presidential campaign platform, forcing Frank Hsieh to lay his cards on the table.
Frank Hsieh is surrounded by enemies front and rear. To win over centrist voters, he must reaffirm the Five Noes, even if he calls them by some other name. He must champion cross-straits reconciliation and cross-straits exchanges. To mollify Deep Green Taiwan independence hardliners meanwhile, he must consider the feelings of Chen Shui-bian. Chen Shui-bian has been gravely wounded. But he still has the ability to spin Frank Hsieh's campaign platform as "treasonous" to Deep Green Taiwan independence hardliners. Chen Shui-bian no longer has the power to do whatever he wants. But he still has the power to prevent Hsieh from doing what Hsieh wants.
Chen Shui-bian is one of the people who least wants Frank Hsieh to be elected. Chen Shui-bian was humiliated by his defeat in the legislative elections. If Frank Hsieh emerges victorious in the presidential election, how will that make Chen Shui-bian feel? If Hsieh's constitutional amendment path emerges victorious, It will demonstrate that Chen Shui-bian's path was a mistake. How is Chen Shui-bian going to deal with that?
Chen Shui-bian finds himself in the situation of a cornered animal. The Legislative Yuan elections have handed him the Deep Green Taiwan independence vote. The election defeat has forced him to resign as party chairman. But it has also given him a convenient pretext to withdraw from the front lines of the presidential election campaign. He can now devote his time to acquiring a golden parachute upon retirement from political life. Chen Shui-bian's strategy is obvious. Wait for the Democratic Progressive Party's presidential bid to fail. Make a come-back on the ruins of the Democratic Progressive Party.
Frank Hsieh's dilemma is that if he fails to draw a bright line between himself and Chen Shui-bian, centrist voters will ensure that he is unelectable. On the other hand, if he draws too bright a line between himself and Chen, Chen Shui-bian will ensure that he is unelectable. On the night of the legislative election, Frank Hsieh wanted Chen Shui-bian to retain chairmanship of the party, wanted Chen to take a "leave of absence" but not resign. Hsieh knew enough to "keep his friends close, but his enemies closer."
If Frank Hsieh fails to draw a bright line of distinction between himself and Chen Shui-bian, he will not be able to create a pendulum effect. If Frank Hsieh draws too bright a line of distinction between himself and Chen Shui-bian, he is likely to lose even his core support. For the DPP at least, the ROC Presidential Election has turned into a DPP Civil War. It is unlikely Frank Hsieh can win the election. Chen Shui-bian does not want to Hsieh to win. Therefore as we have been reminding everyone, the DPP might as well treat the ROC Presidential Election as a Struggle over the Party's Future. The DPP's presidential prospects are slim. But through the presidential election it may find a new political direction, it may find a new political leader. Even if the election is a debacle, it may find a way to rise from the ashes.
Chen Shui-bian hopes to keep the DPP hostage even after the presidential election. But reformist elements within the party are unlikely to tolerate Chen's return. The word is Chen Shui-bian will turn the ROC Presidential Election into a DPP Civil War during the next 60 days. Hsieh may not be able to win the ROC Presidential Election. But he cannot afford to lose the DPP Civil War.
Hsieh said that if he loses the election he will retire from the political arena. But that was nothing more than an election promise. The political rivalry between Frank Hsieh and Chen Shui-bian has degenerated to where Chen Shui-bian is deliberately undermining Frank Hsieh's campaign. If Frank Hsieh loses due to no fault of his own, this ought not end Hsieh's political life. He cannot sit idly by as the DPP falls into Chen Shui-bian's hands. If Chen Shui-bian destroys the Democratic Progressive Party the way Lee Teng-hui destroyed the KMT, doesn't Frank Hsieh want to be there to rebuild the DPP, the way Lien Chan rebuilt the KMT?
The Chen Shui-bian Path has been utterly discredited. Now as Frank Hsieh stands alone at night in the silence of his lavish campaign headquarters in Kaohsiung, he has to be asking himself a number of questions. Why did I sign on to the "Join the UN Plebiscite" knowing it was a transparent fraud? Why did I turn my election headquarters in Kaohsiung into a "spiritual bastion" for the "Join the UN Plebiscite?" Why did I allow this "Luxury Headquarters for the Join the UN Plebiscite" to become a Disneyland attraction, a political joke?
Frank Hsieh should ask himself "Am I a Chen Shui-bian clone?" He must answer himself honestly. Only then will Frank Hsieh know how to deal with the Chen/Hsieh rivalry. Only then will he know how to fight his intraparty civil war. Only then will he know how to wage his presidential campaign. Only then will he know how to face the Democratic Progressive Party. Only then will he know how to face the nation. Only then will he know how to face history. Only then will he know how to face himself.
謝長廷當自問：「我是不是第二個陳水扁？」
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.01.16 03:50 am
陳水扁是否又要作怪？他在出訪旅途中說：「四不」是他的「承諾」，對新總統沒有拘束力。
陳水扁的意思很清楚：謝長廷是否要延續「四不」，必須自己重新表態，不可迴避。陳水扁又說，立委選舉很多是地方事務，但總統大選則是攸關兩岸政策、國家認同；換句話說，他不認為謝長廷能對此不作交代。
接下來，很可能的發展是：退出「輔選第一線」的陳水扁，不斷站在「國家政策由總統作主」的立場，對「兩岸政策及國家認同」發表意見，用以與謝長廷的「競選策略」形成對照，並逼迫謝長廷表態。
謝 長廷已陷腹背受敵之境。面對中間選民，他必須返回「四不」（即使不用「四不」一詞），主張兩岸和解，開放兩岸交流；但面對深綠極獨，他卻不能不顧慮陳水扁 的感受。現在的陳水扁雖已重傷，但他仍有能力將謝長廷的「競選策略」定位為深綠極獨的「叛徒」；也就是說，陳水扁仍然穩穩盤踞在「敗事有餘」的堡壘中。
現在的陳水扁，是最不希望謝長廷當選者之一。立委選舉敗在陳水扁，倘若謝長廷贏得總統大選；請問扁是什麼滋味？謝的修正路線若獲勝，亦即反證陳水扁的路線為錯誤；請問扁將如何自處？
現 在的陳水扁，真正處於困獸猶鬥之境；經此次立委選舉，他已將深綠極獨掌握在手；而選舉既敗，他被迫辭去黨主席，也就名正言順地退出了總統大選的「輔選第一 線」，如今正可用全副心力，為自己布置總統大選後及卸任後的政治生命情境。陳水扁的最佳策略不問可知：等待民進黨總統大選失敗，他再設法從民進黨的政治廢 墟中捲土重來。
謝長廷的兩難正是在此。他若不與扁切割，中間選民會叫他選不上；他若與扁太過切割，陳水扁會叫他選不上。立委敗選當夜，謝長廷希望陳水扁勿辭黨主席，只要「請假」即可；足見謝深知此種「近之則不遜，遠之則怨」的扁謝關係，當然亦深悉其中風險。
若 不與扁大力切割，不可能營造「鐘擺效應」；但若與扁大力切割，謝長廷恐連「基本盤」都顧不住。事到如今，這場「總統大選」真正變成了一場「民進黨的內 戰」；謝長廷很難贏得大選，陳水扁又不希望謝贏。於是，正如我們一直提醒的：民進黨不妨就乾脆將這場「總統大選」，當作一場「黨內的路線內戰」來打；總統 大選的勝率渺茫，但至少應透過總統大選，重建黨的路線及黨的旗手。即使大選失敗，民進黨卻可再造重生。
陳水扁當然想在大選後繼續挾持民進黨，但黨內改革派恐怕不容扁在選後「復辟」。現在聞到的味道是：陳水扁極可能在未來六十餘日中，將「總統大選」當作「民進黨內戰」來打；因而，謝長廷亦須有總統大選即使打不贏，但不能輸掉「內戰」的破釜沉舟之心。
謝 長廷說敗選即退出政壇，畢竟只是競選語言。謝長廷一生與陳水扁的瑜亮爭鋒，竟至總統大選也被陳水扁拆台的地步；若是非戰之罪，則這不應是謝長廷政治生命的 句點，更不能坐視民進黨在選後又落入陳水扁的魔掌。也就是說，陳水扁之毀民進黨若是像李登輝之毀國民黨；則謝長廷亦當有再使民進黨中興，學做連戰使國民黨 再生的豪情壯志。
謝長廷應在夜深人靜時，站在他極盡豪奢的高雄競選總部前沉思：為什麼自己明知「入聯公投」是買空賣空，卻要將高雄總部建造成「鑽石級」的「入聯公投」精神堡壘？如今，「陳水扁路線」慘敗，這一「入聯公投豪奢總部」，儼然也成了一座「政治笑話迪士尼」。
謝長廷應潛心自問：「我是不是第二個陳水扁？」必須給自己一個誠實的答案，謝長廷才能知道如何處理扁謝關係，如何打「內戰」，如何打「選戰」，如何面對民進黨，如何面對國家，如何面對歷史，以及如何面對自己！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 16, 2008
Is Chen Shui-bian up to his old tricks again? During his state visit he said that his "Five Noes" were merely his personal commitment, that they were not binding upon the new president.
Chen Shui-bian's implication was clear. If Frank Hsieh wants to hitch a ride on the Five Noes bandwagon, he must make his own preference known. He cannot evade the issue. Chen Shui-bian added that the legislative elections were largely concerned with domestic affairs. The presidential election is about cross-strait policy and national identity. In other words, he thinks Hsieh has to come clean.
Chen Shiu-bian will probably withdraw from the front lines of the presidential campaign. He will adopt the position that "national policy must be decided by the President." He will issue an endless stream of opinions on cross-straits policy and "national identity" issues. He will offer his own presidential campaign platform, forcing Frank Hsieh to lay his cards on the table.
Frank Hsieh is surrounded by enemies front and rear. To win over centrist voters, he must reaffirm the Five Noes, even if he calls them by some other name. He must champion cross-straits reconciliation and cross-straits exchanges. To mollify Deep Green Taiwan independence hardliners meanwhile, he must consider the feelings of Chen Shui-bian. Chen Shui-bian has been gravely wounded. But he still has the ability to spin Frank Hsieh's campaign platform as "treasonous" to Deep Green Taiwan independence hardliners. Chen Shui-bian no longer has the power to do whatever he wants. But he still has the power to prevent Hsieh from doing what Hsieh wants.
Chen Shui-bian is one of the people who least wants Frank Hsieh to be elected. Chen Shui-bian was humiliated by his defeat in the legislative elections. If Frank Hsieh emerges victorious in the presidential election, how will that make Chen Shui-bian feel? If Hsieh's constitutional amendment path emerges victorious, It will demonstrate that Chen Shui-bian's path was a mistake. How is Chen Shui-bian going to deal with that?
Chen Shui-bian finds himself in the situation of a cornered animal. The Legislative Yuan elections have handed him the Deep Green Taiwan independence vote. The election defeat has forced him to resign as party chairman. But it has also given him a convenient pretext to withdraw from the front lines of the presidential election campaign. He can now devote his time to acquiring a golden parachute upon retirement from political life. Chen Shui-bian's strategy is obvious. Wait for the Democratic Progressive Party's presidential bid to fail. Make a come-back on the ruins of the Democratic Progressive Party.
Frank Hsieh's dilemma is that if he fails to draw a bright line between himself and Chen Shui-bian, centrist voters will ensure that he is unelectable. On the other hand, if he draws too bright a line between himself and Chen, Chen Shui-bian will ensure that he is unelectable. On the night of the legislative election, Frank Hsieh wanted Chen Shui-bian to retain chairmanship of the party, wanted Chen to take a "leave of absence" but not resign. Hsieh knew enough to "keep his friends close, but his enemies closer."
If Frank Hsieh fails to draw a bright line of distinction between himself and Chen Shui-bian, he will not be able to create a pendulum effect. If Frank Hsieh draws too bright a line of distinction between himself and Chen Shui-bian, he is likely to lose even his core support. For the DPP at least, the ROC Presidential Election has turned into a DPP Civil War. It is unlikely Frank Hsieh can win the election. Chen Shui-bian does not want to Hsieh to win. Therefore as we have been reminding everyone, the DPP might as well treat the ROC Presidential Election as a Struggle over the Party's Future. The DPP's presidential prospects are slim. But through the presidential election it may find a new political direction, it may find a new political leader. Even if the election is a debacle, it may find a way to rise from the ashes.
Chen Shui-bian hopes to keep the DPP hostage even after the presidential election. But reformist elements within the party are unlikely to tolerate Chen's return. The word is Chen Shui-bian will turn the ROC Presidential Election into a DPP Civil War during the next 60 days. Hsieh may not be able to win the ROC Presidential Election. But he cannot afford to lose the DPP Civil War.
Hsieh said that if he loses the election he will retire from the political arena. But that was nothing more than an election promise. The political rivalry between Frank Hsieh and Chen Shui-bian has degenerated to where Chen Shui-bian is deliberately undermining Frank Hsieh's campaign. If Frank Hsieh loses due to no fault of his own, this ought not end Hsieh's political life. He cannot sit idly by as the DPP falls into Chen Shui-bian's hands. If Chen Shui-bian destroys the Democratic Progressive Party the way Lee Teng-hui destroyed the KMT, doesn't Frank Hsieh want to be there to rebuild the DPP, the way Lien Chan rebuilt the KMT?
The Chen Shui-bian Path has been utterly discredited. Now as Frank Hsieh stands alone at night in the silence of his lavish campaign headquarters in Kaohsiung, he has to be asking himself a number of questions. Why did I sign on to the "Join the UN Plebiscite" knowing it was a transparent fraud? Why did I turn my election headquarters in Kaohsiung into a "spiritual bastion" for the "Join the UN Plebiscite?" Why did I allow this "Luxury Headquarters for the Join the UN Plebiscite" to become a Disneyland attraction, a political joke?
Frank Hsieh should ask himself "Am I a Chen Shui-bian clone?" He must answer himself honestly. Only then will Frank Hsieh know how to deal with the Chen/Hsieh rivalry. Only then will he know how to fight his intraparty civil war. Only then will he know how to wage his presidential campaign. Only then will he know how to face the Democratic Progressive Party. Only then will he know how to face the nation. Only then will he know how to face history. Only then will he know how to face himself.
謝長廷當自問：「我是不是第二個陳水扁？」
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.01.16 03:50 am
陳水扁是否又要作怪？他在出訪旅途中說：「四不」是他的「承諾」，對新總統沒有拘束力。
陳水扁的意思很清楚：謝長廷是否要延續「四不」，必須自己重新表態，不可迴避。陳水扁又說，立委選舉很多是地方事務，但總統大選則是攸關兩岸政策、國家認同；換句話說，他不認為謝長廷能對此不作交代。
接下來，很可能的發展是：退出「輔選第一線」的陳水扁，不斷站在「國家政策由總統作主」的立場，對「兩岸政策及國家認同」發表意見，用以與謝長廷的「競選策略」形成對照，並逼迫謝長廷表態。
謝 長廷已陷腹背受敵之境。面對中間選民，他必須返回「四不」（即使不用「四不」一詞），主張兩岸和解，開放兩岸交流；但面對深綠極獨，他卻不能不顧慮陳水扁 的感受。現在的陳水扁雖已重傷，但他仍有能力將謝長廷的「競選策略」定位為深綠極獨的「叛徒」；也就是說，陳水扁仍然穩穩盤踞在「敗事有餘」的堡壘中。
現在的陳水扁，是最不希望謝長廷當選者之一。立委選舉敗在陳水扁，倘若謝長廷贏得總統大選；請問扁是什麼滋味？謝的修正路線若獲勝，亦即反證陳水扁的路線為錯誤；請問扁將如何自處？
現 在的陳水扁，真正處於困獸猶鬥之境；經此次立委選舉，他已將深綠極獨掌握在手；而選舉既敗，他被迫辭去黨主席，也就名正言順地退出了總統大選的「輔選第一 線」，如今正可用全副心力，為自己布置總統大選後及卸任後的政治生命情境。陳水扁的最佳策略不問可知：等待民進黨總統大選失敗，他再設法從民進黨的政治廢 墟中捲土重來。
謝長廷的兩難正是在此。他若不與扁切割，中間選民會叫他選不上；他若與扁太過切割，陳水扁會叫他選不上。立委敗選當夜，謝長廷希望陳水扁勿辭黨主席，只要「請假」即可；足見謝深知此種「近之則不遜，遠之則怨」的扁謝關係，當然亦深悉其中風險。
若 不與扁大力切割，不可能營造「鐘擺效應」；但若與扁大力切割，謝長廷恐連「基本盤」都顧不住。事到如今，這場「總統大選」真正變成了一場「民進黨的內 戰」；謝長廷很難贏得大選，陳水扁又不希望謝贏。於是，正如我們一直提醒的：民進黨不妨就乾脆將這場「總統大選」，當作一場「黨內的路線內戰」來打；總統 大選的勝率渺茫，但至少應透過總統大選，重建黨的路線及黨的旗手。即使大選失敗，民進黨卻可再造重生。
陳水扁當然想在大選後繼續挾持民進黨，但黨內改革派恐怕不容扁在選後「復辟」。現在聞到的味道是：陳水扁極可能在未來六十餘日中，將「總統大選」當作「民進黨內戰」來打；因而，謝長廷亦須有總統大選即使打不贏，但不能輸掉「內戰」的破釜沉舟之心。
謝 長廷說敗選即退出政壇，畢竟只是競選語言。謝長廷一生與陳水扁的瑜亮爭鋒，竟至總統大選也被陳水扁拆台的地步；若是非戰之罪，則這不應是謝長廷政治生命的 句點，更不能坐視民進黨在選後又落入陳水扁的魔掌。也就是說，陳水扁之毀民進黨若是像李登輝之毀國民黨；則謝長廷亦當有再使民進黨中興，學做連戰使國民黨 再生的豪情壯志。
謝長廷應在夜深人靜時，站在他極盡豪奢的高雄競選總部前沉思：為什麼自己明知「入聯公投」是買空賣空，卻要將高雄總部建造成「鑽石級」的「入聯公投」精神堡壘？如今，「陳水扁路線」慘敗，這一「入聯公投豪奢總部」，儼然也成了一座「政治笑話迪士尼」。
謝長廷應潛心自問：「我是不是第二個陳水扁？」必須給自己一個誠實的答案，謝長廷才能知道如何處理扁謝關係，如何打「內戰」，如何打「選戰」，如何面對民進黨，如何面對國家，如何面對歷史，以及如何面對自己！
Tuesday, January 15, 2008
The KMT should worry about its Supermajority
The KMT should worry about its Supermajority
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 15, 2008
When KMT leaders lined up in a row to announce their victory, they all looked solemn. Not one of them showed any sign they were experiencing the "thrill of victory." The Chairman of the KMT Culture and Communications Committee stressed that those outside party headquarters lighting firecrackers and opening champagne had nothing to do with them. Their "once bitten, twice shy" demeanor did not appear to be affected. After all, it was a close victory against a well matched foe. Perhaps they felt some joy in having waged a successful campaign. If they had been gloating about scoring a crushing victory, that would be worrisome. Their caution is not entirely due to fear of a "pendulum effect" in which sympathy swings back toward the loser. It is also due to their realization that ROC voters are in deadly earnest, and that many of them have bet their futures on the KMT.
Ever since the ROC instituted universal suffrage in 1992 and passed a second round of constitutional amendments, the KMT has never experienced the thrill of victory. In 2000, following regime change, the KMT has constantly faced the pressure of imminent collapse. And even though it is an opposition party, the DPP has slapped all sorts of negative labels on it, including "alien regime," "black gold organization," "traitor to Taiwan," and "holder of illegitimate party assets." These charges follow the KMT around like a shadow. They never leave. Ever since the lifting of martial law, "Bashing the KMT" has become a Politically Correct past time. After seven years in the political wilderness, the KMT is not only used to being criticized, it is also gun shy. When it achieves a landslide victory, it doesn't know how to deal with it. The public has sent the KMT an important message: You say you can do the job? Well I'm handing you the power. Let's see what you can do with it.
One can list a hundred different reasons for the KMT's victory. But "The KMT has done a good job!" is not one of them. One reason for the KMT's victory was that the new electoral system was inherently disadvantageous to the Democratic Progressive Party. Another was that Chen Shui-bian's personal halo had been tarnished. Another was that the DPP had no clue how to govern the nation. Another was the DPP overplayed its hand with its negative campaigning. None of these reasons are important. What matters now is that in the coming four years the KMT will enjoy a supermajority in the legislature. The KMT's supermajority allows it to pretty much do whatever it pleases. If in 60 days it also takes the presidency, its control over the central government will be as solid as the Rock of Gilbraltar. Such an outcome is worrisome.
Therefore Ma Ying-jeou's swift assurance that the KMT would not abuse its supermajority to recall the president, to cast votes of non-confidence in the cabinet, or to ram through constitutional amendments, was reassuring. An absolute majority can be a stabilizing force. It can also be a source of chaos. Over the past seven years, citizens of the ROC have had it with a ruling party that takes the lead in creating chaos. The public wants to recuperate. It does not want a rerun of the partisan political struggles of the past seven years. The KMT is aware of this. But that is not enough.
Besides guarantees that it will not abuse its supermajority to do whatever it wants, the KMT will face several tough tests. The first is the "naked greed" test. One of the most repulsive sights in the world is the naked greed on the face of politicians as they fall over each other fighting over their share of the loot. The new legislature will convene in February. If the first act of the KMT Caucus is to launch a power struggle over the vice premiership, to see who can sponsor the most extravagant pork barrel legislation, not even bothering to disguise their naked greed, then public opinion of the KMT will plummet. Suppose the KMT resists demands for reform. Its arrogant assumption being that it had the support of the electorate, therefore their shortcomings can safely be ignored. The "Recovery of Party Assets" plebiscite failed to pass. That means that for three years it will be impossible to demand a similar plebiscite. Does that mean the KMT is home free on the party assets issue? Just the opposite. If the Democratic Progressive Party demands that the KMT account for its party assets during the next election, then the KMT really will have proven that it is a political party utterly unable to grow or advance. The third temptation confronting the KMT is the temptation to escalate the political struggle, to use its supermajority to indulge in political retaliation, to overturn any controversial legislation rammed through by the DPP, and start from scratch. The KMT could even cease consulting with the DPP. It could simply take a vote whenever it wished. A stable majority would then become a despotic majority, repeating the cycle of ruling vs. opposition party confrontation. If the KMT were to behave this way, its halo would soon lose its lustre.
Lest we forget, the election campaign isn't over. The DPP may have lost the legislative election. But based on its proportion of At Large Party Ballots, its support base remains intact. That coupled with its sense of crisis over its loss of political power, as well as a newfound resolve to defend "nativist rule," it may be able to recall many alienated votes. Besides, given the DPP's responsiveness, any mistakes it committed during the legislative elections will not be repeated during the presidential election. If it campaigns effectively during the presidential election, its last ditch struggle for survival could well lead to a "pendulum effect." If the KMT's humility and caution are genuine, what it most desperately needs is to tame the behemoth -- its own supermajority.
國民黨最要提防的就是自己這個「絕對多數」
中國時報
2008.01.15
國 民黨領導精英一字排開宣布勝選的瞬間，個個面色嚴肅凝重，絲毫不見勝選的喜悅，擔任司儀的文傳會主委還刻意強調在黨部外開香檳慶功的場面與他們無關，這般 「戒慎恐懼」的畫面看得出來不像是喬裝的。畢竟如果是勢均力敵下的些微險勝，或許還會有些拚戰成功的喜悅，但如果是秋風掃落葉式的壓倒性狂勝，那種感受反 到令人有些莫名的驚懼。這種驚懼並不全是害怕出現「鐘擺效應」，而是具體感受到台灣選民認真了，他們有很大一部分人已經把他們自己的未來，押在國民黨這一 邊了！
自台灣開放全面普選以來，除了一九九二年的二屆修憲國代選舉，國民黨就從未再體會過「大勝」的滋味。二○○○年政黨輪替後，國民黨 即無時無刻不面臨崩解潰散的壓力，而即便已是在野之身，民進黨加諸於國民黨的負面標籤，如外來政權、黑金體制、出賣台灣、不當黨產…等指控依舊如影隨形， 從未退燒過，某種程度說，從戒嚴到政黨輪替後，民間「批判國民黨」都還一直是論述上的政治正確。因而七年的在野經驗，國民黨不僅是被罵慣了，而且是輸怕 了，一旦獲得壓倒性勝利，反而有些不知所措，這彷彿是人民向國民黨傳達一項重要的指令：你既然說你行，我就真把權柄交給你，看你要怎麼做！
沒 錯，有一百個以上的理由，可以解釋國民黨這次的大勝，不是因為國民黨表現的好，如新選制先天上就對民進黨不利，如陳水扁個人光環褪色，如民進黨治國無方， 如負面選舉操作過度等，但此刻爭論這些緣由早已經不重要，重點是未來四年，國民黨已經確定就是國會多數黨，而且是「絕對多數」的政黨，多數到幾乎可以「為 所欲為」，六十多天後如果拿下總統，那簡直是政治上的「超穩定結構」了，這個結局，要說完全不令人擔心，是不可能的。
所以，馬英九很快就 保證絕不利用這個多數操作罷免、倒閣或修憲是對的。「絕對多數」可以是一股穩定的力量，也可以是製造紛亂的來源。過去七年多，台灣人早已經受夠了「當家帶 頭鬧事」的亂象，如今的主流民意，需要的是「休養生息」，絕對不是重新複製過去七年多的「藍綠惡鬥」，這一點國民黨是警覺到了，但是還不夠！
不 諱言說，除了保證不利用多數「為所欲為」外，國民黨的「絕對多數」勢將面臨幾項嚴酷的考驗：首先就是「吃相難看」的試煉。要知道，通常最令人厭惡的贏家， 就是才剛贏就就露出貪婪的嘴臉，爭先恐後的搶食資源。如果二月立院開議後軍容壯盛的國民黨黨團，在全體國人面前所搬演的第一齣戲碼，就是爭奪副院長，就是 競相提出錢坑法案，完全不掩飾贏家通吃的嘴臉，那麼民眾對國民黨的觀感馬上就折損掉一半；其次就是抗拒改革的傲慢。理所當然的認為既然獲得選民力挺，自身 曾受垢病的缺點也都可以不必再理會，譬如說這次「討黨產」的公投沒生效，三年內也不可能再提出類似議題的公投，那是否意味國民黨就可以放著黨產議題不再處 理？情況恐怕剛好相反。試想如果到了下次選舉民進黨還在訴求黨產議題，那國民黨就真的是完全不長進的政黨了。第三就是擴大戰線的誘惑。即藉著席次多數的優 勢展開政治報復，凡是民進黨先前強推的爭議性法案，一概推翻重新來過，甚至根本不再與民進黨協商，動不動就全院表決，讓「穩定多數」變成「鴨霸多數」，重 演朝野的循環對抗，真要這樣，國民黨的勝選光環，很快就折損光了。
不要忘記，選戰還沒打完，民進黨也許輸了立委選舉，但從政黨票的比例看 來，基本盤並未流失，加上失去政權的危機意識，以及捍衛本土政權的悲情意識雙雙驅動下，不少疏離的選票仍能召喚的回來。更何況以民進黨靈活的性格，立委選 戰犯過的錯，總統大選不可能再犯，如果屆時議題操作得當，背水一戰的達成「鐘擺效應」不是沒有可能，國民黨如果真的「誠惶誠恐」，他最需要做的就是先管好 自己這個「絕對多數」的巨獸。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 15, 2008
When KMT leaders lined up in a row to announce their victory, they all looked solemn. Not one of them showed any sign they were experiencing the "thrill of victory." The Chairman of the KMT Culture and Communications Committee stressed that those outside party headquarters lighting firecrackers and opening champagne had nothing to do with them. Their "once bitten, twice shy" demeanor did not appear to be affected. After all, it was a close victory against a well matched foe. Perhaps they felt some joy in having waged a successful campaign. If they had been gloating about scoring a crushing victory, that would be worrisome. Their caution is not entirely due to fear of a "pendulum effect" in which sympathy swings back toward the loser. It is also due to their realization that ROC voters are in deadly earnest, and that many of them have bet their futures on the KMT.
Ever since the ROC instituted universal suffrage in 1992 and passed a second round of constitutional amendments, the KMT has never experienced the thrill of victory. In 2000, following regime change, the KMT has constantly faced the pressure of imminent collapse. And even though it is an opposition party, the DPP has slapped all sorts of negative labels on it, including "alien regime," "black gold organization," "traitor to Taiwan," and "holder of illegitimate party assets." These charges follow the KMT around like a shadow. They never leave. Ever since the lifting of martial law, "Bashing the KMT" has become a Politically Correct past time. After seven years in the political wilderness, the KMT is not only used to being criticized, it is also gun shy. When it achieves a landslide victory, it doesn't know how to deal with it. The public has sent the KMT an important message: You say you can do the job? Well I'm handing you the power. Let's see what you can do with it.
One can list a hundred different reasons for the KMT's victory. But "The KMT has done a good job!" is not one of them. One reason for the KMT's victory was that the new electoral system was inherently disadvantageous to the Democratic Progressive Party. Another was that Chen Shui-bian's personal halo had been tarnished. Another was that the DPP had no clue how to govern the nation. Another was the DPP overplayed its hand with its negative campaigning. None of these reasons are important. What matters now is that in the coming four years the KMT will enjoy a supermajority in the legislature. The KMT's supermajority allows it to pretty much do whatever it pleases. If in 60 days it also takes the presidency, its control over the central government will be as solid as the Rock of Gilbraltar. Such an outcome is worrisome.
Therefore Ma Ying-jeou's swift assurance that the KMT would not abuse its supermajority to recall the president, to cast votes of non-confidence in the cabinet, or to ram through constitutional amendments, was reassuring. An absolute majority can be a stabilizing force. It can also be a source of chaos. Over the past seven years, citizens of the ROC have had it with a ruling party that takes the lead in creating chaos. The public wants to recuperate. It does not want a rerun of the partisan political struggles of the past seven years. The KMT is aware of this. But that is not enough.
Besides guarantees that it will not abuse its supermajority to do whatever it wants, the KMT will face several tough tests. The first is the "naked greed" test. One of the most repulsive sights in the world is the naked greed on the face of politicians as they fall over each other fighting over their share of the loot. The new legislature will convene in February. If the first act of the KMT Caucus is to launch a power struggle over the vice premiership, to see who can sponsor the most extravagant pork barrel legislation, not even bothering to disguise their naked greed, then public opinion of the KMT will plummet. Suppose the KMT resists demands for reform. Its arrogant assumption being that it had the support of the electorate, therefore their shortcomings can safely be ignored. The "Recovery of Party Assets" plebiscite failed to pass. That means that for three years it will be impossible to demand a similar plebiscite. Does that mean the KMT is home free on the party assets issue? Just the opposite. If the Democratic Progressive Party demands that the KMT account for its party assets during the next election, then the KMT really will have proven that it is a political party utterly unable to grow or advance. The third temptation confronting the KMT is the temptation to escalate the political struggle, to use its supermajority to indulge in political retaliation, to overturn any controversial legislation rammed through by the DPP, and start from scratch. The KMT could even cease consulting with the DPP. It could simply take a vote whenever it wished. A stable majority would then become a despotic majority, repeating the cycle of ruling vs. opposition party confrontation. If the KMT were to behave this way, its halo would soon lose its lustre.
Lest we forget, the election campaign isn't over. The DPP may have lost the legislative election. But based on its proportion of At Large Party Ballots, its support base remains intact. That coupled with its sense of crisis over its loss of political power, as well as a newfound resolve to defend "nativist rule," it may be able to recall many alienated votes. Besides, given the DPP's responsiveness, any mistakes it committed during the legislative elections will not be repeated during the presidential election. If it campaigns effectively during the presidential election, its last ditch struggle for survival could well lead to a "pendulum effect." If the KMT's humility and caution are genuine, what it most desperately needs is to tame the behemoth -- its own supermajority.
國民黨最要提防的就是自己這個「絕對多數」
中國時報
2008.01.15
國 民黨領導精英一字排開宣布勝選的瞬間，個個面色嚴肅凝重，絲毫不見勝選的喜悅，擔任司儀的文傳會主委還刻意強調在黨部外開香檳慶功的場面與他們無關，這般 「戒慎恐懼」的畫面看得出來不像是喬裝的。畢竟如果是勢均力敵下的些微險勝，或許還會有些拚戰成功的喜悅，但如果是秋風掃落葉式的壓倒性狂勝，那種感受反 到令人有些莫名的驚懼。這種驚懼並不全是害怕出現「鐘擺效應」，而是具體感受到台灣選民認真了，他們有很大一部分人已經把他們自己的未來，押在國民黨這一 邊了！
自台灣開放全面普選以來，除了一九九二年的二屆修憲國代選舉，國民黨就從未再體會過「大勝」的滋味。二○○○年政黨輪替後，國民黨 即無時無刻不面臨崩解潰散的壓力，而即便已是在野之身，民進黨加諸於國民黨的負面標籤，如外來政權、黑金體制、出賣台灣、不當黨產…等指控依舊如影隨形， 從未退燒過，某種程度說，從戒嚴到政黨輪替後，民間「批判國民黨」都還一直是論述上的政治正確。因而七年的在野經驗，國民黨不僅是被罵慣了，而且是輸怕 了，一旦獲得壓倒性勝利，反而有些不知所措，這彷彿是人民向國民黨傳達一項重要的指令：你既然說你行，我就真把權柄交給你，看你要怎麼做！
沒 錯，有一百個以上的理由，可以解釋國民黨這次的大勝，不是因為國民黨表現的好，如新選制先天上就對民進黨不利，如陳水扁個人光環褪色，如民進黨治國無方， 如負面選舉操作過度等，但此刻爭論這些緣由早已經不重要，重點是未來四年，國民黨已經確定就是國會多數黨，而且是「絕對多數」的政黨，多數到幾乎可以「為 所欲為」，六十多天後如果拿下總統，那簡直是政治上的「超穩定結構」了，這個結局，要說完全不令人擔心，是不可能的。
所以，馬英九很快就 保證絕不利用這個多數操作罷免、倒閣或修憲是對的。「絕對多數」可以是一股穩定的力量，也可以是製造紛亂的來源。過去七年多，台灣人早已經受夠了「當家帶 頭鬧事」的亂象，如今的主流民意，需要的是「休養生息」，絕對不是重新複製過去七年多的「藍綠惡鬥」，這一點國民黨是警覺到了，但是還不夠！
不 諱言說，除了保證不利用多數「為所欲為」外，國民黨的「絕對多數」勢將面臨幾項嚴酷的考驗：首先就是「吃相難看」的試煉。要知道，通常最令人厭惡的贏家， 就是才剛贏就就露出貪婪的嘴臉，爭先恐後的搶食資源。如果二月立院開議後軍容壯盛的國民黨黨團，在全體國人面前所搬演的第一齣戲碼，就是爭奪副院長，就是 競相提出錢坑法案，完全不掩飾贏家通吃的嘴臉，那麼民眾對國民黨的觀感馬上就折損掉一半；其次就是抗拒改革的傲慢。理所當然的認為既然獲得選民力挺，自身 曾受垢病的缺點也都可以不必再理會，譬如說這次「討黨產」的公投沒生效，三年內也不可能再提出類似議題的公投，那是否意味國民黨就可以放著黨產議題不再處 理？情況恐怕剛好相反。試想如果到了下次選舉民進黨還在訴求黨產議題，那國民黨就真的是完全不長進的政黨了。第三就是擴大戰線的誘惑。即藉著席次多數的優 勢展開政治報復，凡是民進黨先前強推的爭議性法案，一概推翻重新來過，甚至根本不再與民進黨協商，動不動就全院表決，讓「穩定多數」變成「鴨霸多數」，重 演朝野的循環對抗，真要這樣，國民黨的勝選光環，很快就折損光了。
不要忘記，選戰還沒打完，民進黨也許輸了立委選舉，但從政黨票的比例看 來，基本盤並未流失，加上失去政權的危機意識，以及捍衛本土政權的悲情意識雙雙驅動下，不少疏離的選票仍能召喚的回來。更何況以民進黨靈活的性格，立委選 戰犯過的錯，總統大選不可能再犯，如果屆時議題操作得當，背水一戰的達成「鐘擺效應」不是沒有可能，國民黨如果真的「誠惶誠恐」，他最需要做的就是先管好 自己這個「絕對多數」的巨獸。
Monday, January 14, 2008
Self-deception and Public Deception
Self-deception and Public Deception: How will the DPP reclaim the Mandate of Heaven?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 14, 2008
The Democratic Progressive Party has lost its status as the largest party in the Republic of China legislature. It is now a small party with only 27 seats. That's hardly the worst of it. The DPP has lost its status as spokesman for "native values," for "democracy," and for "Taiwanese values." That is what dealt the DPP its fatal wound.
The United Daily News noted this in yesterday's editorial. Even during the "dang wai" (party outsider) era, when the political opposition was weak, it had an aura of moral legitimacy and idealism. Today, by contrast, the DPP has not merely become a small party with less than a quarter of the seats in the legislature, it has lost its political idealism and its political legitimacy. For the DPP, that is its real tragedy.
Chen Shui-bian has turned the chairmanship of the party over to Frank Hsieh. But many observers feel that in style and temperament, Chen and Hsieh are Tweedledum and Tweedledee. The two differ only in their packaging. Therefore, whether Frank Hsieh has the ability to lead the DPP down the path toward genuine reform remains a huge question.
The DPP lost the election because it lost the Mandate of Heaven. It lost its idealism and its legitimacy. The DPP's "championing of democracy" was once one of its selling points. But look at how it has undermined the rule of law. Look at how it has become the bane of democracy. So-called "nativism" was once one of the DPP's selling points. But its rampant corruption has made it an detriment to nativism. The DPP's championing of Taiwan independence was once its "jewel in the crown." But its reckless brinksmanship has left Washington and Taipei at loggerheads. The DPP has torn society apart and discredited Taiwan independence as a political movement. The public has repudiated the DPP's boast that it represents the will of the people and the values of the community. Today, Chen is stepping down and Hsieh is stepping up. The Democratic Progressive Party's primary mission should be to reclaim its idealism and political legitimacy. It needs to reclaim its lost mandate.
The DPP's most fundamental character defect is its prediliction for self-deception. The proximate cause of its recent debacle at the polls is Chen Shui-bian's self-deception. The long term cause is Lin I-hsiung. Lin I-hsiung demanded that the legislature be halved in size, and that it adopt a Single Member District, Two Ballot System. It was rumored that one reason Lin wanted this system was that it would prevent "wai sheng ren" (mainlanders) from being elected to the legislature and ensure the future of the "nativist path." Events however have confirmed that such a system won't necessarily exclude "mainlanders." If anything, its adoption has resulted in the wholesale repudiation of the Democratic Progressive Party's so-called "nativist path." And so it is with the DPP's Nuclear Free policy. Opposition to nuclear power may be idealistic. But if one is in the midst of an energy crisis, one can hardly ignore practical concerns. Lin I-hsiung exploited his saintly image within the Green camp to demand a Nuclear Free island. The public was moved. But energy policy after all, is not merely a moral issue. It is also a practical issue.
The DPP has marched itself into a blind alley precisely because it has engaged in self-deception. It is the victim of its own self-induced hypnotic spell. Take Taiwan independence for example. Taiwan independence may involve idealism. but also requires wisdom. Whatever legitimacy Taiwan independence might have accrued in its moral account, has been swiped to the limit by the Democratic Progressive Party. The DPP has ripped apart society and the nation. It has put Washington and Taipei at loggerheads with each other. Yet the DPP still considers itself the voice of Taiwan independence. It still believes it has the right to "champion" Taiwan independence, by any means at its disposal. This is how the Taiwan independence movement is deceiving itself and deceiving others.
Look at the Democratic Progressive Party over the past four years. Look at Chen Shui-bian's rampant corruption. Yet the DPP persists in regarding itself as the standard-bearer for clean government. Look at how the DPP has undermined relations between Washington and Taipei. Look at the people's suffering. Yet the DPP imagines it can shift the focus of public attention by having the CEC package-deal its phony "Join the UN" plebiscite with the presidential election. Society has been ripped apart. Blood flows in the streets. Yet the DPP persists in its rabid anti-Chiang campaign. To top matters off, the DPP sicced its attack dogs on the public: Minister of Education Tu Cheng-sheng, Government Information Office Chief Hsieh Chi-wei, and General Secretary of the Ministry of Education Chuang Kuo-jung. They carried out the DPP's dirty deeds. So this is what "native values" were all about? So this was the DPP's conception of democracy? So this was what the DPP meant by "Taiwanese values?" This election gave the DPP an answer: You can deceive yourselves, but you cannot deceive the people.
If Frank Hsieh and the DPP are searching for Heaven's Mandate, they must cease attempting to deceive the people. Not deceiving the people means not deceiving yourself. Is the DPP willing to forsake its Quixotic "Resolution for a Normal Nation" and return to its more pragmatic "Resolution on Taiwan's Future?" Is the DPP willing to stop demagoguing the phony "Join the UN Plebiscite" and earnestly confront the real challenges of governance? These are Chen Shui-bian's axes to grind. They ought to disappear along with Chen.
It is said that over the past year Chen Shui-bian took the DPP hostage. In fact the DPP was in a self-induced hypnotic trance. It deceived itself. It allowed itself to be taken hostage. Is the Chen Shui-bian Path the Democratic Progressive Party's elixir of life? Is the DPP the flag bearer of political justice and "Taiwanese values?"
Chen Shui-bian has announced his withdrawal from the DPP chairmanship. Frank Hsieh and the DPP must stop attempting to deceive the people. The DPP must not continue down the Chen Shui-bian path under another name. More importantly, Frank Hsieh must not be allowed to become "Chen Shui-bian the Second."
自欺欺民：民進黨如何尋回失落的天命？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.01.14 11:03 am
民進黨從國會最大黨輸成只占二十七席的小黨，這不是最嚴重的事；民進黨經此選舉，輸掉了本土精神、民主意義及台灣價值的代表性，這才是致命傷。
昨日本報社論指出：即使在黨外時代，反對勢力雖小，但有其正當性及理想性；相對而言，民進黨如今不但輸成不及國會四分之一席次的小黨，更已失去了做為政治理想的代表性與正當性，這才是怵目驚心的歷史悲劇。
陳水扁把黨主席交給謝長廷，不少觀察者認為，就二人的根本氣質及權謀風格而論，不啻只是由「第一個陳水扁」，交給了「第二個陳水扁」；謝扁二人的差異，只在口號與手法上的包裝不同而已。因而，謝長廷能否領導民進黨走出精神及路線層次的真正變革，此時在多數國人心中恐怕皆是一個問號。
民進黨的這次慘敗，是「天命」的喪失，也就是理想性及正當性的喪失。民主原是民進黨的招牌，但如此毀憲亂法，卻成了民主的蟊賊；本土原是民進黨的本色，但如此貪腐，已成了本土的罪人；台獨原是民進黨的壓箱之寶，但操作到美台反目、社會撕裂的程度，亦已玷汙糟蹋了台獨。國人透過這次選舉，不承認民進黨再有代表本土精神、民主意義及台灣價值的資格；因而，如今扁下謝上，民進黨的首要使命，即在必須設法回復其理想性及代表性，亦即必須設法尋回喪失的「天命」。
民進黨最根本的病因是「自欺欺人」。此次選舉的近因在於陳水扁的「自欺欺人」，遠因卻或許可推到林義雄。國會減半及單一選區兩票制為林義雄所力倡，當時傳聞的諸種理由之一，是此制將使「外省人」難以進入國會，則本土路線即可確保；然而，如今非但證實此制未必能夠排除「外省人」，且甚至初次採行即全盤否定了民進黨所謂的「本土路線」。異曲同工的是「非核」政策，反核確有理想性；但若置於能源危機的視野來看，卻也不能沒有現實考量。林義雄以「人格者」的形象，力倡非核反核，確實感動人心；但能源政策畢竟不只是一個道德問題，更是一個知識議題。
民進黨走進了今天的死胡同，正因「理想蒙蔽了自己，自己又蒙蔽了理想」的自我催眠所致。以台獨為例：台獨是一個理想的議題，但也是一個知識的問題。台獨有其理想性及正當性，但民進黨將台獨操弄到今日這種社會撕裂、國家分裂、美台反目的地步，卻是玷汙糟蹋了台獨；但民進黨仍認為自己是台獨的代言人，有權力以一切不擇手段的方法去「捍衛」台獨。這正是：「理想」蒙蔽了自己，自己又蒙蔽了「理想」；「台獨」蒙蔽了自己，自己又蒙蔽了「台獨」。這不是「自欺欺人」，是什麼？
看一看四年來的民進黨，陳水扁貪腐猖狂至此，民進黨卻仍視其為旗手；美台關係破壞至此，民進黨亦在所不惜；民生民瘼痛苦至此，民進黨卻轉移視聽至「入聯公投」；「入聯公投」虛假至此，民進黨還要操弄中選會「公投綁大選」；社會撕裂、血流不止，民進黨卻仍要「去蔣拆匾」……。是的，當然有「上杜下謝又連莊」等無數鷹犬，為民進黨執行這些傷天害理、違憲亂法的惡行；但是，這一切的一切，難道是本土精神？難道是民主真諦？難道是台灣價值？這次選舉，給了「自欺欺民」的民進黨一個答案：你可以「自欺」，卻不能「欺民」。
民進黨及謝長廷若欲尋回「天命」，就不能再「欺民」；而「不欺民」的前提，則是在「不自欺」。例如，要不要從《正常國家決議文》，重新回到《台灣前途決議文》？要不要停止操作「入聯公投」的假議題，認真面對國家治理的真挑戰？因為，那些皆是「陳水扁議題」，皆應隨陳水扁退場。
過去一年，民進黨被陳水扁綁架挾持，其實正是陷於一種「自欺欺民」的自我催眠狀態。自欺：陳水扁路線是民進黨的救命還魂丹嗎？欺民：民進黨是政治公義及台灣價值的掌旗人嗎？
如今，陳水扁已然在口頭上宣示退場，民進黨及謝長廷就不能再「自欺欺民」；民進黨不可再走「沒有陳水扁之名的陳水扁路線」，謝長廷更不可再做「陳水扁二世」！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 14, 2008
The Democratic Progressive Party has lost its status as the largest party in the Republic of China legislature. It is now a small party with only 27 seats. That's hardly the worst of it. The DPP has lost its status as spokesman for "native values," for "democracy," and for "Taiwanese values." That is what dealt the DPP its fatal wound.
The United Daily News noted this in yesterday's editorial. Even during the "dang wai" (party outsider) era, when the political opposition was weak, it had an aura of moral legitimacy and idealism. Today, by contrast, the DPP has not merely become a small party with less than a quarter of the seats in the legislature, it has lost its political idealism and its political legitimacy. For the DPP, that is its real tragedy.
Chen Shui-bian has turned the chairmanship of the party over to Frank Hsieh. But many observers feel that in style and temperament, Chen and Hsieh are Tweedledum and Tweedledee. The two differ only in their packaging. Therefore, whether Frank Hsieh has the ability to lead the DPP down the path toward genuine reform remains a huge question.
The DPP lost the election because it lost the Mandate of Heaven. It lost its idealism and its legitimacy. The DPP's "championing of democracy" was once one of its selling points. But look at how it has undermined the rule of law. Look at how it has become the bane of democracy. So-called "nativism" was once one of the DPP's selling points. But its rampant corruption has made it an detriment to nativism. The DPP's championing of Taiwan independence was once its "jewel in the crown." But its reckless brinksmanship has left Washington and Taipei at loggerheads. The DPP has torn society apart and discredited Taiwan independence as a political movement. The public has repudiated the DPP's boast that it represents the will of the people and the values of the community. Today, Chen is stepping down and Hsieh is stepping up. The Democratic Progressive Party's primary mission should be to reclaim its idealism and political legitimacy. It needs to reclaim its lost mandate.
The DPP's most fundamental character defect is its prediliction for self-deception. The proximate cause of its recent debacle at the polls is Chen Shui-bian's self-deception. The long term cause is Lin I-hsiung. Lin I-hsiung demanded that the legislature be halved in size, and that it adopt a Single Member District, Two Ballot System. It was rumored that one reason Lin wanted this system was that it would prevent "wai sheng ren" (mainlanders) from being elected to the legislature and ensure the future of the "nativist path." Events however have confirmed that such a system won't necessarily exclude "mainlanders." If anything, its adoption has resulted in the wholesale repudiation of the Democratic Progressive Party's so-called "nativist path." And so it is with the DPP's Nuclear Free policy. Opposition to nuclear power may be idealistic. But if one is in the midst of an energy crisis, one can hardly ignore practical concerns. Lin I-hsiung exploited his saintly image within the Green camp to demand a Nuclear Free island. The public was moved. But energy policy after all, is not merely a moral issue. It is also a practical issue.
The DPP has marched itself into a blind alley precisely because it has engaged in self-deception. It is the victim of its own self-induced hypnotic spell. Take Taiwan independence for example. Taiwan independence may involve idealism. but also requires wisdom. Whatever legitimacy Taiwan independence might have accrued in its moral account, has been swiped to the limit by the Democratic Progressive Party. The DPP has ripped apart society and the nation. It has put Washington and Taipei at loggerheads with each other. Yet the DPP still considers itself the voice of Taiwan independence. It still believes it has the right to "champion" Taiwan independence, by any means at its disposal. This is how the Taiwan independence movement is deceiving itself and deceiving others.
Look at the Democratic Progressive Party over the past four years. Look at Chen Shui-bian's rampant corruption. Yet the DPP persists in regarding itself as the standard-bearer for clean government. Look at how the DPP has undermined relations between Washington and Taipei. Look at the people's suffering. Yet the DPP imagines it can shift the focus of public attention by having the CEC package-deal its phony "Join the UN" plebiscite with the presidential election. Society has been ripped apart. Blood flows in the streets. Yet the DPP persists in its rabid anti-Chiang campaign. To top matters off, the DPP sicced its attack dogs on the public: Minister of Education Tu Cheng-sheng, Government Information Office Chief Hsieh Chi-wei, and General Secretary of the Ministry of Education Chuang Kuo-jung. They carried out the DPP's dirty deeds. So this is what "native values" were all about? So this was the DPP's conception of democracy? So this was what the DPP meant by "Taiwanese values?" This election gave the DPP an answer: You can deceive yourselves, but you cannot deceive the people.
If Frank Hsieh and the DPP are searching for Heaven's Mandate, they must cease attempting to deceive the people. Not deceiving the people means not deceiving yourself. Is the DPP willing to forsake its Quixotic "Resolution for a Normal Nation" and return to its more pragmatic "Resolution on Taiwan's Future?" Is the DPP willing to stop demagoguing the phony "Join the UN Plebiscite" and earnestly confront the real challenges of governance? These are Chen Shui-bian's axes to grind. They ought to disappear along with Chen.
It is said that over the past year Chen Shui-bian took the DPP hostage. In fact the DPP was in a self-induced hypnotic trance. It deceived itself. It allowed itself to be taken hostage. Is the Chen Shui-bian Path the Democratic Progressive Party's elixir of life? Is the DPP the flag bearer of political justice and "Taiwanese values?"
Chen Shui-bian has announced his withdrawal from the DPP chairmanship. Frank Hsieh and the DPP must stop attempting to deceive the people. The DPP must not continue down the Chen Shui-bian path under another name. More importantly, Frank Hsieh must not be allowed to become "Chen Shui-bian the Second."
自欺欺民：民進黨如何尋回失落的天命？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.01.14 11:03 am
民進黨從國會最大黨輸成只占二十七席的小黨，這不是最嚴重的事；民進黨經此選舉，輸掉了本土精神、民主意義及台灣價值的代表性，這才是致命傷。
昨日本報社論指出：即使在黨外時代，反對勢力雖小，但有其正當性及理想性；相對而言，民進黨如今不但輸成不及國會四分之一席次的小黨，更已失去了做為政治理想的代表性與正當性，這才是怵目驚心的歷史悲劇。
陳水扁把黨主席交給謝長廷，不少觀察者認為，就二人的根本氣質及權謀風格而論，不啻只是由「第一個陳水扁」，交給了「第二個陳水扁」；謝扁二人的差異，只在口號與手法上的包裝不同而已。因而，謝長廷能否領導民進黨走出精神及路線層次的真正變革，此時在多數國人心中恐怕皆是一個問號。
民進黨的這次慘敗，是「天命」的喪失，也就是理想性及正當性的喪失。民主原是民進黨的招牌，但如此毀憲亂法，卻成了民主的蟊賊；本土原是民進黨的本色，但如此貪腐，已成了本土的罪人；台獨原是民進黨的壓箱之寶，但操作到美台反目、社會撕裂的程度，亦已玷汙糟蹋了台獨。國人透過這次選舉，不承認民進黨再有代表本土精神、民主意義及台灣價值的資格；因而，如今扁下謝上，民進黨的首要使命，即在必須設法回復其理想性及代表性，亦即必須設法尋回喪失的「天命」。
民進黨最根本的病因是「自欺欺人」。此次選舉的近因在於陳水扁的「自欺欺人」，遠因卻或許可推到林義雄。國會減半及單一選區兩票制為林義雄所力倡，當時傳聞的諸種理由之一，是此制將使「外省人」難以進入國會，則本土路線即可確保；然而，如今非但證實此制未必能夠排除「外省人」，且甚至初次採行即全盤否定了民進黨所謂的「本土路線」。異曲同工的是「非核」政策，反核確有理想性；但若置於能源危機的視野來看，卻也不能沒有現實考量。林義雄以「人格者」的形象，力倡非核反核，確實感動人心；但能源政策畢竟不只是一個道德問題，更是一個知識議題。
民進黨走進了今天的死胡同，正因「理想蒙蔽了自己，自己又蒙蔽了理想」的自我催眠所致。以台獨為例：台獨是一個理想的議題，但也是一個知識的問題。台獨有其理想性及正當性，但民進黨將台獨操弄到今日這種社會撕裂、國家分裂、美台反目的地步，卻是玷汙糟蹋了台獨；但民進黨仍認為自己是台獨的代言人，有權力以一切不擇手段的方法去「捍衛」台獨。這正是：「理想」蒙蔽了自己，自己又蒙蔽了「理想」；「台獨」蒙蔽了自己，自己又蒙蔽了「台獨」。這不是「自欺欺人」，是什麼？
看一看四年來的民進黨，陳水扁貪腐猖狂至此，民進黨卻仍視其為旗手；美台關係破壞至此，民進黨亦在所不惜；民生民瘼痛苦至此，民進黨卻轉移視聽至「入聯公投」；「入聯公投」虛假至此，民進黨還要操弄中選會「公投綁大選」；社會撕裂、血流不止，民進黨卻仍要「去蔣拆匾」……。是的，當然有「上杜下謝又連莊」等無數鷹犬，為民進黨執行這些傷天害理、違憲亂法的惡行；但是，這一切的一切，難道是本土精神？難道是民主真諦？難道是台灣價值？這次選舉，給了「自欺欺民」的民進黨一個答案：你可以「自欺」，卻不能「欺民」。
民進黨及謝長廷若欲尋回「天命」，就不能再「欺民」；而「不欺民」的前提，則是在「不自欺」。例如，要不要從《正常國家決議文》，重新回到《台灣前途決議文》？要不要停止操作「入聯公投」的假議題，認真面對國家治理的真挑戰？因為，那些皆是「陳水扁議題」，皆應隨陳水扁退場。
過去一年，民進黨被陳水扁綁架挾持，其實正是陷於一種「自欺欺民」的自我催眠狀態。自欺：陳水扁路線是民進黨的救命還魂丹嗎？欺民：民進黨是政治公義及台灣價值的掌旗人嗎？
如今，陳水扁已然在口頭上宣示退場，民進黨及謝長廷就不能再「自欺欺民」；民進黨不可再走「沒有陳水扁之名的陳水扁路線」，謝長廷更不可再做「陳水扁二世」！
Friday, January 11, 2008
The Bad Party and the Small Party: The Single Constituency, Two Ballots System
The Bad Party and the Small Party: The Single Constituency, Two Ballots System
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 10, 2008
In 2005, the constitution was amended for the seventh time. The electoral system was changed to a single constituency, two ballots system. The United Daily News expressed mixed feelings about the amendment at the time. On the one hand, we know that the single constituency, two ballots system has defects. It leads to localization, to domination by local party bosses, and to a loss of diversity. On the other hand, we also maintain that a single constituency, two ballots system is necessary. Only such a system can enable Taiwan's politics to transcend extremism and divisiveness.
The two political ailments bedeviling Taiwan are extremism and divisiveness. The main cause is the former multiple constituency, single ballot electoral system. A large electoral district could yield a large number of legislators. As few as 10,000 to 20,000 ballots was enough to elect a single legislator. This provided an mileu in which extremists could operate. Political demands and political styles became radicalized. Smaller parties could survive in such an environment. Decisive minorities led to political divisiveness. The lifting of martial law was followed by 20 years of extremism, divisiveness, and political instability. This led to political deadlock. The single constituency, two ballots system may help replace extremism and divisiveness with moderation and reconciliation.
The single constituency, two ballots system will encourage moderation and discourage parties that adopt an extremist posture. Under the "multiple constituency, single ballot" system, first only a minority behave radically. Examples include the "Three Stooges" in the Democratic Progressive Party. Later, the entire party found itself hijacked by a handful of extremists, the way Chen Shui-bian has hijacked the DPP today. The party deviated from the middle way. The Democratic Progressive Party, under a single constituency, two ballots system, is about to undergo its severest test.
Chen Shui-bian's campaign tactics are totally out of character wtih the single constituency, two ballots system. Chen's "Blues Excluded" opinion polls used during the DPP pary primaries violated the principle of the middle way. Chen's campaign theme of divisive hatred has moved even farther from the spirit of the new system.
If you carefully observe the way the Democratic Progressive Party is campaigning during this year's legislative elections, Chen Shui-bian is the only person adopting his extremist approach. Candidates produced by the "Blues Excluded" opinion polls have clear political colors and extreme political goals. But even they have been low-keyed in both their words and deeds. For example, When Chen Shui-bian launched his anti-Chiang campaign, hardly any DPP legislative candidates chimed in. As we can see, a single constituency electoral system has an immediate moderating effect on political agendas and political styles. Chen Shui-bian's campaign tactics are an anomaly, and cannot be considered the norm.
DPP candidates for the legislature are reserved. Can they repair the damage done to their party by Chen Shui-bian? This will be the key to the DPP's election results. Will the single constituent, two ballots system rein in an extremist political party? The Legislative Yuan elections will give us a clue.
The second effect of a single constituency, two ballots electoral system is that it moderates political divisions. Because it adopts a system of "coexistence," it adversely affects smaller parties. Smaller parties will now find it hard to win electoral district seats. As a result they are attempting to win non-constituency seats. So far however, polls show few voters expressing a willingness to vote for smaller parties.
In the past, a number of smaller parties successfully fulfilled their transitional roles. But their subsequent performance disappointed voters. The People First Party betrayed the Pan Blues with its secret "Bian-Soong Meeting." The TSU held the DPP hostage until last month. Lee Teng-hui even referred to Chen Shui-bian as "crazy." Voters have had it with "critical minorities" blowing hot and cold. They want a political reshuffling. That is why the outlook for smaller parties' is bearish.
Between the Bue and Green camps, the smaller parties will have a relatively greater impact on the KMT than on the DPP. Among the 12 smaller parties, the only one that can affect the DPP is the TSU. But all the smaller parties can affect the KMT. These include the New Party, the Red Party, the Peasants' Party, the Third Party, and the TSU.
Whether voting for smaller parties "wastes" votes has become a hot topic. The threshold for smaller parties to win seats in the Legislative Yuan is very high. They need 5 percent of the vote. That equals 500,000 to 600,000 votes. In other words, if one of the Blue or Green camps' smaller parties receives "Five percent of the vote minus one," that could "waste" 500,000 to 600,000 votes. Not only will the smaller party not get any seats, it could cost the larger party in the same camp seats. Voters will inevitably be wary about "wasting" votes by casting their ballots for smaller parties.
The implementation of a single constituency, two ballots system is an opportunity to shift the political climate from extremist and divisive to moderate and conciliatory. Taiwan's political climate has degenerated. Whether it can be salvaged by adopting a middle course and by a political reshuffling remains uncertain. But if we continue toward extremism and divisiveness, we will be marching towards a dead end. That is why the single constituency, two ballots system may not be a cure for what ails Taiwan politically, but it will at least provide short term relief.
惡黨與小黨：單一選區兩票制的兩大課題
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.01.10 04:03 am
二○○五年第七次修憲改為單一選區兩票制時，本報社論曾經表達過當時的矛盾心情。一方面，我們深知單一選區兩票制的後遺症，如「地方化」、「山頭化」及「反多元化」等；另一方面，我們卻也主張，單一選區兩票制勢在必行，非此不能使台灣政治跳出偏激與分裂的死谷。
台 灣政治迄今的兩大絕症是「偏激」與「分裂」，主要導因於過去的複數選區一票制。由於一個大選區可選出多名國會議員，甚至只須一兩萬票即可出線，於是給了走 偏鋒者操弄的空間，政治訴求及風格皆趨「偏激」；而小黨在此制中亦有存活的空間，皆以「關鍵的少數」自詡，政局遂趨「分裂」。經歷解嚴後二十年偏激與分裂 的政治動盪，使政局陷於內耗空轉；而單一選區兩票制的主要效用，即是欲以「中道」與「整合」，來救治「偏激」與「分裂」。
「單一選區兩票 制」的第一個效用，在於鼓勵「中道」，用以淘汰走「偏激」路線的「惡黨」。「偏激」的形成，起初只是因少數人走極端，如「三寶」時代的民進黨；到了後來， 整個黨卻被少數極端分子挾持，如民進黨今日被陳水扁綁架，整個黨遂偏離「中道」。因而，民進黨今年所受單一選區兩票制的考驗，最為嚴峻。
陳水扁迄今的整個選舉操作，倒行逆施，可謂與單一選區兩票制的精神完全背道而馳。首先，排藍民調已違「中道」原則；繼而陳水扁以尖銳偏激的仇恨撕裂議題為選舉主軸，更與此制的精神大相逕庭。
然 而，若仔細觀察今年民進黨立委選舉的手法，幾乎只聞陳水扁一人操作極端議題，卻鮮見區域立委候選人旗幟鮮明地標榜極端路線；即使以排藍民調出線的候選人， 其競選言行，亦較往日收斂甚多。例如，陳水扁「去蔣拆匾」，幾乎未獲民進黨立委候選人的呼應。由此可見，單一選區對政治訴求及風格之「趨近中道」，已有立 竿見影的功效。陳水扁的操作是個異數，不能視為此制的常態。
然而，民進黨立委候選人之趨於保留，是否能夠修補陳水扁所製造的「惡黨效應」，將是此次民進黨立委選舉成績高下的關鍵；而單一選區兩票制，能否節制偏激的「惡黨」，亦可藉此次立委選舉看出一個趨勢。
單一選區兩票制的第二個效用，是節制政局分裂，尤其採「並立制」，因而對小黨不利。小黨在今日情勢中極難贏得區域立委席次，因此皆以政黨票的不分區席次為目標。然而，迄今民調顯示，選民對小黨似乎已無憧憬，表態願將政黨票投給小黨者不多。
過去，幾個重要的小黨確曾完成其「階段性的任務」，但後來的表現卻令選民失望。親民黨演出「扁宋會」；台聯則長期挾持民進黨，到這最後一個月，李登輝才罵陳水扁「瘋了」。選民嚐盡了「關鍵少數」的翻雲覆雨，願見政局出現「整合」，所以小黨的行情看跌。
然而，在藍綠兩大陣營中，相對而言，今年國民黨所受小黨的影響，可能較民進黨所受的影響為大。因為，在十二個掛名選票的政黨中，可以分得民進黨政黨票的小黨，幾乎只有台聯一黨；但所有的小黨都可能分得國民黨的政黨票，如新黨、紅黨、農民黨、第三社會黨，及台聯等。
投 給「小黨」，有否「浪費」的風險，已成熱門話題。小黨想要贏得立委席次的門檻相當高，需有五％的得票率，即約五十餘或六十餘萬票的得票數；換句話說，如果 操作不當，藍綠陣營的任一小黨若獲得「五％減一票」的選票，即可能形同投了近五十或六十萬張「廢票」；非但小黨自己不能獲得任何席次，且可能會相對影響同 色系大黨（國民黨／民進黨）損失不分區席位。得失相較，怕「浪費」選票，選民對投小黨不免有戒心。
單一選區兩票制的實施，是使政局由「偏 激／分裂」，趨向「中道／整合」的契機。台灣政局敗壞到今日這種地步，即使政局重返中道與整合尚不知是否有救；但倘若繼續偏激、分裂下去，則必無生路可 言。準此以論，單一選區兩票制雖非對台灣政局病症標本兼治的處方，但畢竟有其階段性的功效。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 10, 2008
In 2005, the constitution was amended for the seventh time. The electoral system was changed to a single constituency, two ballots system. The United Daily News expressed mixed feelings about the amendment at the time. On the one hand, we know that the single constituency, two ballots system has defects. It leads to localization, to domination by local party bosses, and to a loss of diversity. On the other hand, we also maintain that a single constituency, two ballots system is necessary. Only such a system can enable Taiwan's politics to transcend extremism and divisiveness.
The two political ailments bedeviling Taiwan are extremism and divisiveness. The main cause is the former multiple constituency, single ballot electoral system. A large electoral district could yield a large number of legislators. As few as 10,000 to 20,000 ballots was enough to elect a single legislator. This provided an mileu in which extremists could operate. Political demands and political styles became radicalized. Smaller parties could survive in such an environment. Decisive minorities led to political divisiveness. The lifting of martial law was followed by 20 years of extremism, divisiveness, and political instability. This led to political deadlock. The single constituency, two ballots system may help replace extremism and divisiveness with moderation and reconciliation.
The single constituency, two ballots system will encourage moderation and discourage parties that adopt an extremist posture. Under the "multiple constituency, single ballot" system, first only a minority behave radically. Examples include the "Three Stooges" in the Democratic Progressive Party. Later, the entire party found itself hijacked by a handful of extremists, the way Chen Shui-bian has hijacked the DPP today. The party deviated from the middle way. The Democratic Progressive Party, under a single constituency, two ballots system, is about to undergo its severest test.
Chen Shui-bian's campaign tactics are totally out of character wtih the single constituency, two ballots system. Chen's "Blues Excluded" opinion polls used during the DPP pary primaries violated the principle of the middle way. Chen's campaign theme of divisive hatred has moved even farther from the spirit of the new system.
If you carefully observe the way the Democratic Progressive Party is campaigning during this year's legislative elections, Chen Shui-bian is the only person adopting his extremist approach. Candidates produced by the "Blues Excluded" opinion polls have clear political colors and extreme political goals. But even they have been low-keyed in both their words and deeds. For example, When Chen Shui-bian launched his anti-Chiang campaign, hardly any DPP legislative candidates chimed in. As we can see, a single constituency electoral system has an immediate moderating effect on political agendas and political styles. Chen Shui-bian's campaign tactics are an anomaly, and cannot be considered the norm.
DPP candidates for the legislature are reserved. Can they repair the damage done to their party by Chen Shui-bian? This will be the key to the DPP's election results. Will the single constituent, two ballots system rein in an extremist political party? The Legislative Yuan elections will give us a clue.
The second effect of a single constituency, two ballots electoral system is that it moderates political divisions. Because it adopts a system of "coexistence," it adversely affects smaller parties. Smaller parties will now find it hard to win electoral district seats. As a result they are attempting to win non-constituency seats. So far however, polls show few voters expressing a willingness to vote for smaller parties.
In the past, a number of smaller parties successfully fulfilled their transitional roles. But their subsequent performance disappointed voters. The People First Party betrayed the Pan Blues with its secret "Bian-Soong Meeting." The TSU held the DPP hostage until last month. Lee Teng-hui even referred to Chen Shui-bian as "crazy." Voters have had it with "critical minorities" blowing hot and cold. They want a political reshuffling. That is why the outlook for smaller parties' is bearish.
Between the Bue and Green camps, the smaller parties will have a relatively greater impact on the KMT than on the DPP. Among the 12 smaller parties, the only one that can affect the DPP is the TSU. But all the smaller parties can affect the KMT. These include the New Party, the Red Party, the Peasants' Party, the Third Party, and the TSU.
Whether voting for smaller parties "wastes" votes has become a hot topic. The threshold for smaller parties to win seats in the Legislative Yuan is very high. They need 5 percent of the vote. That equals 500,000 to 600,000 votes. In other words, if one of the Blue or Green camps' smaller parties receives "Five percent of the vote minus one," that could "waste" 500,000 to 600,000 votes. Not only will the smaller party not get any seats, it could cost the larger party in the same camp seats. Voters will inevitably be wary about "wasting" votes by casting their ballots for smaller parties.
The implementation of a single constituency, two ballots system is an opportunity to shift the political climate from extremist and divisive to moderate and conciliatory. Taiwan's political climate has degenerated. Whether it can be salvaged by adopting a middle course and by a political reshuffling remains uncertain. But if we continue toward extremism and divisiveness, we will be marching towards a dead end. That is why the single constituency, two ballots system may not be a cure for what ails Taiwan politically, but it will at least provide short term relief.
惡黨與小黨：單一選區兩票制的兩大課題
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.01.10 04:03 am
二○○五年第七次修憲改為單一選區兩票制時，本報社論曾經表達過當時的矛盾心情。一方面，我們深知單一選區兩票制的後遺症，如「地方化」、「山頭化」及「反多元化」等；另一方面，我們卻也主張，單一選區兩票制勢在必行，非此不能使台灣政治跳出偏激與分裂的死谷。
台 灣政治迄今的兩大絕症是「偏激」與「分裂」，主要導因於過去的複數選區一票制。由於一個大選區可選出多名國會議員，甚至只須一兩萬票即可出線，於是給了走 偏鋒者操弄的空間，政治訴求及風格皆趨「偏激」；而小黨在此制中亦有存活的空間，皆以「關鍵的少數」自詡，政局遂趨「分裂」。經歷解嚴後二十年偏激與分裂 的政治動盪，使政局陷於內耗空轉；而單一選區兩票制的主要效用，即是欲以「中道」與「整合」，來救治「偏激」與「分裂」。
「單一選區兩票 制」的第一個效用，在於鼓勵「中道」，用以淘汰走「偏激」路線的「惡黨」。「偏激」的形成，起初只是因少數人走極端，如「三寶」時代的民進黨；到了後來， 整個黨卻被少數極端分子挾持，如民進黨今日被陳水扁綁架，整個黨遂偏離「中道」。因而，民進黨今年所受單一選區兩票制的考驗，最為嚴峻。
陳水扁迄今的整個選舉操作，倒行逆施，可謂與單一選區兩票制的精神完全背道而馳。首先，排藍民調已違「中道」原則；繼而陳水扁以尖銳偏激的仇恨撕裂議題為選舉主軸，更與此制的精神大相逕庭。
然 而，若仔細觀察今年民進黨立委選舉的手法，幾乎只聞陳水扁一人操作極端議題，卻鮮見區域立委候選人旗幟鮮明地標榜極端路線；即使以排藍民調出線的候選人， 其競選言行，亦較往日收斂甚多。例如，陳水扁「去蔣拆匾」，幾乎未獲民進黨立委候選人的呼應。由此可見，單一選區對政治訴求及風格之「趨近中道」，已有立 竿見影的功效。陳水扁的操作是個異數，不能視為此制的常態。
然而，民進黨立委候選人之趨於保留，是否能夠修補陳水扁所製造的「惡黨效應」，將是此次民進黨立委選舉成績高下的關鍵；而單一選區兩票制，能否節制偏激的「惡黨」，亦可藉此次立委選舉看出一個趨勢。
單一選區兩票制的第二個效用，是節制政局分裂，尤其採「並立制」，因而對小黨不利。小黨在今日情勢中極難贏得區域立委席次，因此皆以政黨票的不分區席次為目標。然而，迄今民調顯示，選民對小黨似乎已無憧憬，表態願將政黨票投給小黨者不多。
過去，幾個重要的小黨確曾完成其「階段性的任務」，但後來的表現卻令選民失望。親民黨演出「扁宋會」；台聯則長期挾持民進黨，到這最後一個月，李登輝才罵陳水扁「瘋了」。選民嚐盡了「關鍵少數」的翻雲覆雨，願見政局出現「整合」，所以小黨的行情看跌。
然而，在藍綠兩大陣營中，相對而言，今年國民黨所受小黨的影響，可能較民進黨所受的影響為大。因為，在十二個掛名選票的政黨中，可以分得民進黨政黨票的小黨，幾乎只有台聯一黨；但所有的小黨都可能分得國民黨的政黨票，如新黨、紅黨、農民黨、第三社會黨，及台聯等。
投 給「小黨」，有否「浪費」的風險，已成熱門話題。小黨想要贏得立委席次的門檻相當高，需有五％的得票率，即約五十餘或六十餘萬票的得票數；換句話說，如果 操作不當，藍綠陣營的任一小黨若獲得「五％減一票」的選票，即可能形同投了近五十或六十萬張「廢票」；非但小黨自己不能獲得任何席次，且可能會相對影響同 色系大黨（國民黨／民進黨）損失不分區席位。得失相較，怕「浪費」選票，選民對投小黨不免有戒心。
單一選區兩票制的實施，是使政局由「偏 激／分裂」，趨向「中道／整合」的契機。台灣政局敗壞到今日這種地步，即使政局重返中道與整合尚不知是否有救；但倘若繼續偏激、分裂下去，則必無生路可 言。準此以論，單一選區兩票制雖非對台灣政局病症標本兼治的處方，但畢竟有其階段性的功效。
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