A Bian is Willing to Split the DPP to Protect Himself
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 13, 2008
For members of the Green Camp and the Democratic Progressive Party who still respect democracy, the Chen family money-laundering fiasco is a nightmare from which they cannot awake. When the overseas money-laundering scandal exploded on August 14, the DPP had a chance to make break with A Bian and rehabilitate itself. But the DPP Central Committee's hesitancy and indecisiveness allowed pro-A Bian forces to seize the initiative. A Bian held a series of rallies to garner support. The DPP was unable to stop the bleeding. Worse still, now that A Bian has made his move, the party faces the prospect of a major schism.
Chen Fang-ming is the Director of the Institute of Taiwan Literature at National Chengchi University. He has performed a number of in-depth studies on Taiwan's democracy movement. Chen Fang-ming has expressed regret over Chen Shui-bian's words and deeds on several occasions. When A Bian boasted he would run for president in 2012, Chen Fang-ming said "Chen Shui-bian has gone mad." But he added that having a bunch of lunatics run for president will give the public a chance to repudiate them. Therefore it does not matter if Chen Shui-bian is crazy. "Once the fever breaks, Taiwan can return to normal."
Chen Fang-ming's hope is shared by others concerned about Taiwan's democracy. After all, democratic elections and the rule of law are democracy's last line of defense. Very few DPP defectors have ever succeeded in winning political office. If Chen Shui-bian insists on running, he will not be an exception.
Given the Democratic Progressive Party's record over the past few years, it can hardly afford to be optimistic. President Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office have destroyed the Democratic Progressive Party's core values. Some DPP elders and factions have been affected less than others. But none have been spared entirely. A Bian has painted himself into a corner. But when A Bian fights like a cornered rat, and resorts to any and all means at his disposal, the real loser will be the DPP. That worries many who are concerned about Taiwan's democracy.
Chao Chien-ming is Chen Shui-bian's son-in-law, and a prime suspect in the Taiwan Development Corporation insider trading scandal. During the Chen administration, one scandal has erupted after another, culminating in the overseas money-laundering scandal of August this year. Chen Shui-bian and the Green Camp have a pro forma response to these scandals. One. They admit to minor crimes in order to evade prosecution for major crimes. The DPP and the Green Camp's initial reaction to the overseas money-laundering scandal was to feign outrage and to hurl invectives. Later A Bian mobilized advocates of Taiwan independence to shield himself. Critics inside the party fell silent. A Bian has used this method to ignore the Democratic Progressive Party's calls for clean government and democracy.
In the process, the Democratic Progressive Party and the Green Camp have steadily lowered their moral standards. The most obvious example was on August 14. Chen knew the cat was out of the bag. Therefore he admitted to overseas money-laundering. But he gave it his own spin. He raised the stakes by recruiting advocates of Taiwan independence. He even used such incendiary language as "Mainlanders get to eat rice. Taiwanese get to eat shit." This time, not one DPP heavyweight raised any objections. During the Democratic Progressive Party's anniversary celebration, Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen did not even dare use the relatively moderate term, "the post-Chen era." The Democratic Progressive Party Committee for Clean Government's feeble response was, "If Chen is found guilty in the first instance, his party membership will be revoked."
The DPP Central Committee's feebleness has allowed A Bian to gain the upper hand. The crowds who showed up at Chen's rallies were sparse. But more than a few DPP officials competed among themselves for their approval. A Bian's words and deeds have become increasingly outrageous. Hsu Hsin-liang's simple remark, "A Bian has become a liability," provoked massive attacks. Wang Tuoh could not resist criticizing the DPP, saying that "The party's problem is it values friendship over truth, and has forgotten its core values." Not only did the mob attack him, so did key DPP players such as Chen Tang-shan.
A Bian has exploited internal grievances and next year's County Magistrate and City Mayoral Elections to encourage factional struggles within the DPP, thereby protecting himself. Tsai Ing-wen must cope with a factional balance of terror. Despite her systematic efforts, she has missed the boat. For the sake of next year's County and Municipal Elections, Tsai must ensure unity within the Democratic Progressive Party. But A Bian has no qualms about destroying the DPP. To save himself, A Bian is willing to risk splitting the DPP in two.
Chen Shui-bian is out of office and in disgrace. Yet he is still able to manipulate the DPP. The only reason being he still wields money and power. The myth of Taiwanese nation-building is A Bian's all powerful talisman. Taiwan independence elders are only too willing to cover for Chen Shui-bian. Two years ago, during the State Affairs Fund scandal, Taiwan independence advocates urged A Bian must not to relinquish his right to criminal immunity. When members of the DPP demanded serious soul-searching, Taiwan independence advocates denounced them as "Eleven Brigands selling out Taiwan." Taiwan independence advocates' supported A Bian uncritically. They ignored right and wrong. Ironically A Bian is repaying them by embezzling state funds, by laundering money, and by dressing up his ill-gotten gains as a "Taiwan Independence Fund." Taiwanese nation-building has become A Bian's "get out of jail free card." It has become his license to launder money. Taiwanese nation-building has become a mere tool. Taiwanese nation-building has been utterly discredited.
Former DPP Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang astutely noted that KMT incompetence has led to a swift decline in the ruling KMT's approval ratings. Ironically, this has led to an equally swift decline in the DPP's willingness to engage in necessary soul-searching. A Bian is a tar baby. The DPP is stuck to him, unable to extricate itself. The biggest victim in the short term is the Democratic Progressive Party. The DPP has long billed itself as the party of clean government and Taiwanese nativism. A Bian has cast a shadow over that image. The DPP is unable to re-position itself because it has lost its moral compass. Therefore no matter how inept the KMT's rule, it can nevertheless win lying down. If in the long run, the Democratic Progressive Party goes down with A Bian, so will Taiwan's democracy. This is the gravest concern of all.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.10.13
為自保 扁已不惜讓民進黨分裂
中時社論
民進黨或綠營人士中，只要還有一點民主理念的，面對扁洗錢案這一齣鬧劇，可能會覺得這是一場看不到盡頭的惡夢；八月十四日洗錢案爆發以來，民進黨本來有機會與扁切割，重建民進黨清廉價值，但是，由於民進黨中央的遲疑未決，再度讓扁取得先機。在扁一系列取暖之旅造勢後，民進黨現在面臨的，已不是能否止血停損，而是在扁的撥弄後，黨可能因而分裂的重大危機。
對台灣民主運動涉獵甚深的政大台灣文學研究所所長陳芳明，對扁近來言行數次表示痛心，尤其陳水扁嗆聲二○一二年要參選總統，陳芳明直言，「阿扁已經生病了。」但是，他也樂觀地說，寧願有一群瘋子出來參選，只有參選，民意才能把他否決掉，所以讓陳水扁發瘋不要緊，「痲疹出掉了，台灣就正常了。」
陳芳明的願望，也是很多關切台灣民主人士的期待；畢竟，除了司法，選舉才是政治良窳的最後把關者。再從民進黨的角度觀之，過去，凡是離開民進黨自行參選者，幾無成功前例，陳水扁若堅持參選，也不會例外。
但是，觀諸民進黨這幾年表現，卻無法樂觀以待。因為，陳水扁在八年總統任內，已將民進黨所有價值破壞怠盡，黨內諸大老及各派系，受牽連狀況雖有程度之別，但可以說是無一倖免。因此，現在的情勢是：扁雖然是作繭自縛，但是當扁不擇手段、困獸猶鬥，最後是否賠上整個民進黨，才是關心台灣民主的人士所擔憂的。
自扁女婿趙建銘爆發台開內線交易案以來，一直到今年八月爆發的海外洗錢案，面對接連不斷的醜聞，阿扁及綠營的回應，已有一套固定模式。首先，扁先避重就輕認錯，民進黨及綠營一開始則是震驚並且強烈批評；但是接下來，扁再援引極獨力量自保，黨內人士逐漸噤聲。阿扁用這一套模式，將民進黨的清廉、民主原則當做危機處理，屢試不爽，數次安然過關。
在這樣的過程中，民進黨及綠營逐步降低道德標準。最明顯的例子是，八月十四日扁知紙已包不住火、承認洗錢到海外後，他故技重施，不但援引極獨力量，而且變本加厲，連「外省人吃米、台灣人吃屎」這樣極度挑撥的不堪言詞都出口。但是這一次，民進黨內幾乎未見重量級人士提出質疑，民進黨黨慶活動中，黨主席蔡英文連「扁時代已結束」這樣溫和的話都不敢出口，而民進黨廉政委員會在洗錢案爆發兩月後，才軟弱地決定「扁一審有罪就除名」。
民進黨中央的軟弱已讓扁取得優勢，一系列「取暖之旅」群眾也許不多，卻有不少現任公職人員爭相站台；扁言行愈來愈離譜，許信良一句「扁已成壞帳」，卻引來群眾攻擊；而當王拓再也忍不住質疑民進黨「只問情義、不問是非，忘了核心價值，是黨的重大危機」，可不只是群眾攻訐他，連民進黨要角陳唐山都反擊。
真實的狀況是，扁利用民進黨內部恩怨及明年縣市長提名之爭，以發動派系鬥爭來要脅自保；蔡英文面臨派系恐怖平衡，雖步步為營卻逐漸失去先機。面對明年底縣市長選舉，蔡要營造民進黨團結氣氛；但是，扁為了自保卻不惜玉石俱焚，讓民進黨陷入分裂危機。
阿扁之所以能在下台而且聲敗名裂之際，繼續操縱民進黨，說穿了，不外錢與權。但更關鍵的是，扁以建國神話當做保命符，獨派大老也都樂意包庇陳水扁。兩年前國務費案，獨派倡議扁不可放棄刑事豁免權；當民進黨內有反省之議，獨派痛批民進黨十一寇賣台。對於獨派如此不問是非的支持，最諷刺的是，扁的回報竟是將貪汙洗錢贓款包裝成「台獨建國基金」。至此，台獨建國的理想竟成為扁洗錢的護身符，所謂的獨立建國理想不只是被工具化，更是被徹底汙名化。
對民進黨的現狀，民進黨前主席許信良有一番深刻的解讀。他指出，正由於國民黨執政能力太差，太快失去民意，也導致民進黨失去反省的動能；坦白說，民進黨到現在還陷在扁案泥淖中無法自拔，短期內最大受害者絕對是民進黨，因為無論是清廉還是「愛鄉土」的理想，在扁案的陰影下，民進黨都不可能重新定位。面對一個失去方向的民進黨，國民黨執政績效再差，躺著也能勝選。但長期而言，民進黨若和扁一起向下沉淪，危及的卻是台灣的民主水平，這才是最令人擔憂的。
Monday, October 13, 2008
Thursday, October 9, 2008
The Two Million Dollar Taiwan Independence Slush Fund?
The Two Million Dollar Taiwan Independence Slush Fund?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 9, 2008
Summary: Yesterday Chen Shui-bian and Yeh Sheng-mao testified in court. The biggest bombshell was Chen Shui-bian's claim that in February of this year he deposited 2 million USD (approximately 60 million NTD) in "a certain Taiwan independence elder's" overseas accounts. He claimed the funds were to be used for international diplomacy and public relations, and that it was in effect a "Taiwan independence fund." Can the Taiwan independence movement's conscience be bought for 2 million dollars? Chen Shui-bian's contempt for the Taiwan independence movement's intelligence and integrity is abundantly clear.
Full Text below:
Yesterday Chen Shui-bian and Yeh Sheng-mao testified in court. The biggest bombshell was Chen Shui-bian's claim that in February of this year he deposited 2 million USD (approximately 60 million NTD) in "a certain Taiwan independence elder's" overseas accounts. He claimed the money was to be used for international diplomacy and public relations, and that it was in effect a "Taiwan independence fund."
Chen Shui-bian's claim has at least three implications. One. The Chen family's overseas accounts are not limited to the 700 million dollars frozen by a Swiss bank. Sure enough, out popped another 2 million. Two. During his term of office Chen Shui-bian enjoyed immunity from criminal prosecution. Obviously his legal defense strategy was laid out long ago. The 2 million dollar "Taiwan independence fund" was deliberately planted. It is a red herring. Three. The "Taiwan independence fund" is not part of A Bian's legal defense strategy. It is part of a political strategy.
Those familiar with the law will see at a glance that the 2 million dollars is part of a ploy. If the 2 million dollars proves to be dirty money, to be part of Chen's slush fund, a number of consequences are likely. One. The court must recover the stolen money. Two. If the "elder" cares about his reputation, he will not accept dirty money for the Great Cause of Taiwan Independence. Three. The judge may order Chen Shui-bian to return the 2 million in dirty money and pay a gift tax. He may even fine him up to 50 million NTD. Four. If Chen Shui-bian refuses to return the money and pay gift taxes, the court may place a lien on his property. Five. The "elder" may be charged with receiving stolen goods, and required to return the money. Six. In that event, the "elder" may feel compelled to return the money in order to protect the image of the Taiwan independence movement. Chen Shui-bian will probably still be obligated to pay the gift tax.
Chen Shui-bian knows the law. He understands perfectly the legal and political ramifications of the 2 million dollar account. He knows the "fund" will eventually be exposed for what it is. But he insists on enacting this charade. The 2 million dollar "fund" is not enough to convict the Chen family on charges of graft and money laundering. Chen Shui-bian is enacting this charade for the benefit of the Green camp, for the sake of political accountability. The "Taiwan independence fund" is an illusion. It is merely evidence planted to "prove" he is innocent of graft. We still do not know who the "elder" is, and whether he transferred the funds in February in collusion with Chen Shui-bian. In effect, Chen Shui-bian shoved the dirty money into the "elder's" hands. He exploited the "elder's" reputation. He dragged the "elder" down with him. In effect, he sullied the image of Taiwan independence with dirty money.
The revelation of the 2 million dollar "fund" has put a shine on Bian's halo. Chen Shui-bian has been boasting about his generosity toward the Democratic Progressive Party and the Green Camp. This may not lead to his acquittal. This may not gloss over the lie that "not one dime ever entered my pockets." But this "explanation" is bound to evoke grass-roots sympathy and support within the Green camp. The 2 million dollars is not a "Taiwan independence Fund." The Green Camp may allow itself to be bought off with this "fund." But it will never see a single cent of the "fund." What it will see is Chen Shui-bian's corruption, fraud, and deceit. Will the Taiwan independence movement allow itself to be bought off for 2 million dollars? Will accepting the 2 million dollars leave the Taiwan independence movement with a stain that will never wash out?
Yeh Sheng-mao, who is suspected of complicity in graft, became the focus of yesterday's hearing. The Question and Answer session concentrated on the leaking of secrets and money-laundering. It forced Chen Shui-bian to reveal the outlines of his money-laundering scheme. The holes in his scheme became apparent. This development is extremely unfavorable to Chen Shui-bian's State Affairs Fund case and money-laundering case. Investigators must focus on the leaking of secrets. They must not fly off on tangents. If the progress and scope of the case exceeds the purview of the Special Investigation Unit, it may be decried as "double jeopardy."
Chen Shui-bian has already admitted he "questioned" Wu Shu-chen. In other words, he told Wu Shu-chen what Yeh Sheng-mao was doing about her case. In other words, he is already guilty of leaking evidence. As for the debate over what constitutes "information" and what constitutes an "official document," Yeh Sheng-mao retained a photocopy. Therefore Chen Shui-bian will find it difficult to evade prosecution for destroying official documents. After all, he has already admitted he "discarded them." Once the Yeh case reaches the appropriate stage, Chen Shui-bian must report to the judge and be indicted by the prosecutor. Chen Shui-bian's chances of acquittal are slim to none.
Can the Taiwan independence movement's conscience be bought for 2 million dollars? Chen Shui-bian's contempt for the Taiwan independence movement's intelligence and integrity is abundantly clear.
二百萬美元貪汙贓款充作台獨基金？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.10.09 03:03 am
扁葉對質最勁爆的發展，陳水扁當庭供稱，他在今年二月將約二百萬美金（約台幣六千萬元）海外存款，匯交「某大老」，供做外交工作與公共事務之用，亦即「台獨基金」。
陳水扁的供詞，至少可有三點解讀：一、扁家在海外的存款，果然不止是瑞士銀行查扣凍結的「海角七億」，現在不就又冒出了二百萬美金嗎？二、陳水扁在任內刑 事豁免的數年間，顯然早已完成訴訟策略的構思與部署，這二百萬美金就是他為「台獨基金」預設的「證據」。三、「台獨基金」不止是司法訴訟的辯詞，更是他政 治操作的策略。
但是，通曉法律者一眼即可看出，這二百萬美元根本是個充滿權謀計算的假動作；因為，倘若未來證明這二百萬美金是出自貪汙贓款的大水庫中，很可能發生以下後 果：一、法院必將追繳這筆贓款；二、這名大老若是稍具清望，亦不致同意將這些髒錢用於台獨大業；三、司法當局可判處陳水扁繳回二百萬美元贓款，並命其繳納 贈與稅，連罰金可達新台幣約五千萬元；四、倘若陳水扁拒繳贓款及稅金，可追徵其家產抵數；五、大老可能涉嫌「收贓」，在法律上必須繳回；六、若發展至此種 情勢，大老為顧惜台獨形象，應當會將錢繳回，但陳水扁恐仍不能免於補繳贈與稅。
陳水扁通曉法律，他對於這二百萬美元在法律及政治上的上述效應早已計算清楚；然而，他雖明知這筆「基金」最後勢將落空，但他仍處心積慮地做出了這個假動 作。這二百萬美元的「基金」，在法律上無論如何皆不足辯解扁家的貪汙洗錢罪行；陳水扁要這樣做，主要是在為案發後向綠營作政治交代，欲藉以狡證他不是貪汙 自肥，而是確有「台獨基金」的構想並已見諸實際行動。如今尚不知這名「大老」的身分，亦不知他究竟是與陳水扁套招或在二月收錢時並不知情；倘係不知情，陳 水扁形同將贓款硬塞到大老手中，不但是惡意利用了這名大老，拖人下水，也不啻是用髒錢汙染了台獨的形象。
這二百萬美元的曝光，使得扁案更加金光閃爍。陳水扁一路以來，不斷揭示他對民進黨及綠營的大量金錢資助，這未必能在司法上脫罪，亦不可能圓飾「一毛錢未入 個人口袋」的謊言；但他的這套說詞，必然可以引發綠營基層的同情與支持。所以，這不是「台獨基金」，而是綠營看不到也拿不到的「收買基金」。然而，陳水扁 的貪腐及騙詐狡賴卻是天日共見的事實，台獨難道相信那轉彎抹角匯到海外的二百萬美金是清白的？難道台獨的理智會受二百萬美元蒙蔽收買？動用這二百萬美金髒 錢會不會使台獨永遠洗刷不清？
昨日開庭的另一焦點，是因葉案又涉圖利罪，所以庭訊內容涉及洩密與洗錢的關係；問答之間，形同逼使陳水扁將貪汙案及洗錢案的辯護架構充分暴露，破綻百出， 這對陳水扁在國務費案及洗錢案的情勢甚為不利。不過，葉案似仍應以洩密案為重點，不必橫生枝節；若在進度及範圍上超越了特偵組的專案，未來恐將涉及「一事 不再理」的爭議。
至於洩密案，姑不論其他，陳水扁既已承認他將葉盛茂告知之事，「詢問」犯罪嫌疑人吳淑珍，如此即已經成為洩密罪之共犯；至於「情資／公文」之辯，只要認定 葉盛茂自留之影印本為公文，則陳水扁亦難逃隱匿或毀棄公文之罪，畢竟他也承認「扔掉了」。待葉案審判進行至適當階段，法官即可將陳水扁告發，由地檢署起 訴。陳水扁欲脫罪，機率極微。
台獨的是非標準，是這兩百萬美元收買得通的嗎？陳水扁如此鄙視台獨的理智與良知，用心可誅。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 9, 2008
Summary: Yesterday Chen Shui-bian and Yeh Sheng-mao testified in court. The biggest bombshell was Chen Shui-bian's claim that in February of this year he deposited 2 million USD (approximately 60 million NTD) in "a certain Taiwan independence elder's" overseas accounts. He claimed the funds were to be used for international diplomacy and public relations, and that it was in effect a "Taiwan independence fund." Can the Taiwan independence movement's conscience be bought for 2 million dollars? Chen Shui-bian's contempt for the Taiwan independence movement's intelligence and integrity is abundantly clear.
Full Text below:
Yesterday Chen Shui-bian and Yeh Sheng-mao testified in court. The biggest bombshell was Chen Shui-bian's claim that in February of this year he deposited 2 million USD (approximately 60 million NTD) in "a certain Taiwan independence elder's" overseas accounts. He claimed the money was to be used for international diplomacy and public relations, and that it was in effect a "Taiwan independence fund."
Chen Shui-bian's claim has at least three implications. One. The Chen family's overseas accounts are not limited to the 700 million dollars frozen by a Swiss bank. Sure enough, out popped another 2 million. Two. During his term of office Chen Shui-bian enjoyed immunity from criminal prosecution. Obviously his legal defense strategy was laid out long ago. The 2 million dollar "Taiwan independence fund" was deliberately planted. It is a red herring. Three. The "Taiwan independence fund" is not part of A Bian's legal defense strategy. It is part of a political strategy.
Those familiar with the law will see at a glance that the 2 million dollars is part of a ploy. If the 2 million dollars proves to be dirty money, to be part of Chen's slush fund, a number of consequences are likely. One. The court must recover the stolen money. Two. If the "elder" cares about his reputation, he will not accept dirty money for the Great Cause of Taiwan Independence. Three. The judge may order Chen Shui-bian to return the 2 million in dirty money and pay a gift tax. He may even fine him up to 50 million NTD. Four. If Chen Shui-bian refuses to return the money and pay gift taxes, the court may place a lien on his property. Five. The "elder" may be charged with receiving stolen goods, and required to return the money. Six. In that event, the "elder" may feel compelled to return the money in order to protect the image of the Taiwan independence movement. Chen Shui-bian will probably still be obligated to pay the gift tax.
Chen Shui-bian knows the law. He understands perfectly the legal and political ramifications of the 2 million dollar account. He knows the "fund" will eventually be exposed for what it is. But he insists on enacting this charade. The 2 million dollar "fund" is not enough to convict the Chen family on charges of graft and money laundering. Chen Shui-bian is enacting this charade for the benefit of the Green camp, for the sake of political accountability. The "Taiwan independence fund" is an illusion. It is merely evidence planted to "prove" he is innocent of graft. We still do not know who the "elder" is, and whether he transferred the funds in February in collusion with Chen Shui-bian. In effect, Chen Shui-bian shoved the dirty money into the "elder's" hands. He exploited the "elder's" reputation. He dragged the "elder" down with him. In effect, he sullied the image of Taiwan independence with dirty money.
The revelation of the 2 million dollar "fund" has put a shine on Bian's halo. Chen Shui-bian has been boasting about his generosity toward the Democratic Progressive Party and the Green Camp. This may not lead to his acquittal. This may not gloss over the lie that "not one dime ever entered my pockets." But this "explanation" is bound to evoke grass-roots sympathy and support within the Green camp. The 2 million dollars is not a "Taiwan independence Fund." The Green Camp may allow itself to be bought off with this "fund." But it will never see a single cent of the "fund." What it will see is Chen Shui-bian's corruption, fraud, and deceit. Will the Taiwan independence movement allow itself to be bought off for 2 million dollars? Will accepting the 2 million dollars leave the Taiwan independence movement with a stain that will never wash out?
Yeh Sheng-mao, who is suspected of complicity in graft, became the focus of yesterday's hearing. The Question and Answer session concentrated on the leaking of secrets and money-laundering. It forced Chen Shui-bian to reveal the outlines of his money-laundering scheme. The holes in his scheme became apparent. This development is extremely unfavorable to Chen Shui-bian's State Affairs Fund case and money-laundering case. Investigators must focus on the leaking of secrets. They must not fly off on tangents. If the progress and scope of the case exceeds the purview of the Special Investigation Unit, it may be decried as "double jeopardy."
Chen Shui-bian has already admitted he "questioned" Wu Shu-chen. In other words, he told Wu Shu-chen what Yeh Sheng-mao was doing about her case. In other words, he is already guilty of leaking evidence. As for the debate over what constitutes "information" and what constitutes an "official document," Yeh Sheng-mao retained a photocopy. Therefore Chen Shui-bian will find it difficult to evade prosecution for destroying official documents. After all, he has already admitted he "discarded them." Once the Yeh case reaches the appropriate stage, Chen Shui-bian must report to the judge and be indicted by the prosecutor. Chen Shui-bian's chances of acquittal are slim to none.
Can the Taiwan independence movement's conscience be bought for 2 million dollars? Chen Shui-bian's contempt for the Taiwan independence movement's intelligence and integrity is abundantly clear.
二百萬美元貪汙贓款充作台獨基金？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.10.09 03:03 am
扁葉對質最勁爆的發展，陳水扁當庭供稱，他在今年二月將約二百萬美金（約台幣六千萬元）海外存款，匯交「某大老」，供做外交工作與公共事務之用，亦即「台獨基金」。
陳水扁的供詞，至少可有三點解讀：一、扁家在海外的存款，果然不止是瑞士銀行查扣凍結的「海角七億」，現在不就又冒出了二百萬美金嗎？二、陳水扁在任內刑 事豁免的數年間，顯然早已完成訴訟策略的構思與部署，這二百萬美金就是他為「台獨基金」預設的「證據」。三、「台獨基金」不止是司法訴訟的辯詞，更是他政 治操作的策略。
但是，通曉法律者一眼即可看出，這二百萬美元根本是個充滿權謀計算的假動作；因為，倘若未來證明這二百萬美金是出自貪汙贓款的大水庫中，很可能發生以下後 果：一、法院必將追繳這筆贓款；二、這名大老若是稍具清望，亦不致同意將這些髒錢用於台獨大業；三、司法當局可判處陳水扁繳回二百萬美元贓款，並命其繳納 贈與稅，連罰金可達新台幣約五千萬元；四、倘若陳水扁拒繳贓款及稅金，可追徵其家產抵數；五、大老可能涉嫌「收贓」，在法律上必須繳回；六、若發展至此種 情勢，大老為顧惜台獨形象，應當會將錢繳回，但陳水扁恐仍不能免於補繳贈與稅。
陳水扁通曉法律，他對於這二百萬美元在法律及政治上的上述效應早已計算清楚；然而，他雖明知這筆「基金」最後勢將落空，但他仍處心積慮地做出了這個假動 作。這二百萬美元的「基金」，在法律上無論如何皆不足辯解扁家的貪汙洗錢罪行；陳水扁要這樣做，主要是在為案發後向綠營作政治交代，欲藉以狡證他不是貪汙 自肥，而是確有「台獨基金」的構想並已見諸實際行動。如今尚不知這名「大老」的身分，亦不知他究竟是與陳水扁套招或在二月收錢時並不知情；倘係不知情，陳 水扁形同將贓款硬塞到大老手中，不但是惡意利用了這名大老，拖人下水，也不啻是用髒錢汙染了台獨的形象。
這二百萬美元的曝光，使得扁案更加金光閃爍。陳水扁一路以來，不斷揭示他對民進黨及綠營的大量金錢資助，這未必能在司法上脫罪，亦不可能圓飾「一毛錢未入 個人口袋」的謊言；但他的這套說詞，必然可以引發綠營基層的同情與支持。所以，這不是「台獨基金」，而是綠營看不到也拿不到的「收買基金」。然而，陳水扁 的貪腐及騙詐狡賴卻是天日共見的事實，台獨難道相信那轉彎抹角匯到海外的二百萬美金是清白的？難道台獨的理智會受二百萬美元蒙蔽收買？動用這二百萬美金髒 錢會不會使台獨永遠洗刷不清？
昨日開庭的另一焦點，是因葉案又涉圖利罪，所以庭訊內容涉及洩密與洗錢的關係；問答之間，形同逼使陳水扁將貪汙案及洗錢案的辯護架構充分暴露，破綻百出， 這對陳水扁在國務費案及洗錢案的情勢甚為不利。不過，葉案似仍應以洩密案為重點，不必橫生枝節；若在進度及範圍上超越了特偵組的專案，未來恐將涉及「一事 不再理」的爭議。
至於洩密案，姑不論其他，陳水扁既已承認他將葉盛茂告知之事，「詢問」犯罪嫌疑人吳淑珍，如此即已經成為洩密罪之共犯；至於「情資／公文」之辯，只要認定 葉盛茂自留之影印本為公文，則陳水扁亦難逃隱匿或毀棄公文之罪，畢竟他也承認「扔掉了」。待葉案審判進行至適當階段，法官即可將陳水扁告發，由地檢署起 訴。陳水扁欲脫罪，機率極微。
台獨的是非標準，是這兩百萬美元收買得通的嗎？陳水扁如此鄙視台獨的理智與良知，用心可誅。
Wednesday, October 8, 2008
Will Chen Yunlin Respond to Mainstream Public Opinion on Taiwan?
Will Chen Yunlin Respond to Mainstream Public Opinion on Taiwan?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 8, 2008
Summary: Will Chen Yunlin come to Taiwan as expected? Apparently it depends upon the Democratic Progressive Party. Some think if the Democratic Progressive Party launches violent protests, the Ma administration and the Hu administration in Beijing will back down in fear. The possibility of demonstrations should not be ignored. But if one is a slave to such concerns, then breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations will be impossible. If Chen Yunlin postpones his visit until next year because the Democratic Progressive Party threatens to protest, what will he do next year? The Republic of China is a democracy. For elements within society to be critical of the current administration's cross-Strait policy is perfectly normal. No matter when Chen Yunlin arrives, someone is going to protest. The only difference is certain moments may be more sensitive than others.
Full Text below:
Will Chen Yunlin come to Taiwan as expected? Apparently it depends upon the Democratic Progressive Party. Some think if the Democratic Progressive Party launches violent protests, the Ma administration and the Hu administration in Beijing will back down in fear.
The possibility of demonstrations should not be ignored. But if one is a slave to such concerns, then breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations will be impossible. If Chen Yunlin postpones his visit until next year because the Democratic Progressive Party threatens to protest, what will he do next year? The Republic of China is a democracy. For elements within society to be critical of the current administration's cross-Strait policy is perfectly normal. No matter when Chen Yunlin arrives, someone is going to protest. The only difference is certain moments may be more sensitive than others.
This is precisely what cross-Strait interaction must transcend. The Beijing authorities have long regarded the Taiwan authorities as their primary objective. On the one hand they have taken advantage of partisan struggles on Taiwan. On the other hand they have become victims of these same partisan struggles on Taiwan. Actually, under the Republic of China's democracy, it is never certain which political party will win or lose, rise or fall. Therefore the Beijing authorities should respond not only to political parties, but also to public opinion. If Chen Yunlin's visit helps cross-Strait relations reflect mainstream public opinion, then Democratic Progressive Party and Green Camp protests need not be a cause for concern.
We have repeatedly stressed that the Beijing authorities must acknowledge the Republic of China's democratic institutions. The Democratic Progressive Party has been in power for eight years. Its Taiwan independence path has ended in complete failure, because it was rejected by the public on Taiwan. The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy has been better received. But its "diplomatic truce," its "non state-to-state relations," and other policies have raised eyebrows, even in the Blue camp. Such is mainstream public opinion. The Beijing authorities must find a way to base their cross-Strait policy on mainstream public opinion on Taiwan. Only then can they liberate themselves from the need to respond to partisan struggles on Taiwan. Only then can they establish a stable framework for cross-Strait interaction. Is Chen Yunlin ready to begin a dialogue with the public on Taiwan?
When considering cross-Strait relations, the public on Taiwan has two major concerns. One. Dignity. Two. Self interest. The public on Taiwan looks forward to a cross-Strait framework that treats them with dignity and protects their self interests. The Chen Shui-bian administration was not up to the task. The Ma Ying-jeou administration may not be either. Chen Shui-bian's "Nation of Taiwan path" was a dead end. Ma Ying-jeou's "Republic of China path" may or may not be. The problem is the Beijing authorities have been unable to break out of the existing framework. Will Chen Yunlin be able to break out of the existing framework? That remains to be seen.
Will Chen Yunlin's visit be seen as a willingness to defer to mainstream public opinion on Taiwan? Can Chen Yunlin win over the public on Taiwan? If Chen Yunlin is able to win over the public on Taiwan, he just might break through the partisan deadlock on Taiwan. Why hesitate? Why stop?
As yesterday's editorial in the United Daily News noted, Chen Yunlin's visit is also a hot potato for the DPP. The Democratic Progressive Party must deal with an internal struggle over "supporting Taiwan independence" and "supporting A Bian." It must defer to mainstream public opinion. Regardless of whether the DPP or Chen Shui-bian wins the battle for hearts and minds on Taiwan, Chen Yunlin's visit will have an historic impact on cross-Strait relations.
Chen Yunlin's visit is important. The resolution of direct maritime transportation links and other urgent problems can no longer be delayed. If Chen Yunlin's visit is postponed, their resolution may be affected by unexpected developments in the Chen Shui-bian corruption trial. If Chen Yunlin's visit is postponed even one year, precious momentum may be lost. Whether the Green Camp, Chen Shui-bian, and the Democratic Progressive Party protest, and whether elements on Taiwan object to Chen Yunlin's visit, must be seen in context. The acid test will be mainstream public opinion. The only reason to postpone Chen Yunlin's visit should be problems with protocol.
The issues addressed should not be limited to pandas, direct flights, and other familiar problems. Instead we should adopt a broader historical perspective. We may as well raise the issue of international breathing room. Will Chen Yunlin's visit allow the public on Taiwan to experience a cross-Strait exchange that treats them with dignity and protects their self interest? If it does, then we can establish a cross-Strait framework that transcends Blue vs. Green partisanship. If it does, Chen Yunlin's visit will be both a crisis and an opportunity.
Lien Chan, Wu Po-hsiung, Chiang Pin-kung have all visited the mainland. The atmosphere during their visits was amicable and harmonious. But Chen Yunlin's visit to Taiwan is sure to provoke controversy, demonstrations, and protests. This is where the two sides differ. This is why we must repeat, the Beijing authorities must respond to the Republic of China's democracy.
The Taiwan region is in a state of flux. The only constant is its democracy. Therefore, cross-Strait relations must be founded on mainstream public opinion as manifested in democratic institutions.
陳雲林能否回應台灣主流民意？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.10.08 02:01 am
陳雲林是否如期來訪，似乎卡在必須考慮民進黨的反應。有人想像：倘若屆時民進黨發動激烈的示威抗議，非但會使馬政府與北京胡政權臉上掛不住，恐怕亦為兩岸互動平添變數。
這類的顧慮或有必要，但若完全受制於這類顧慮，兩岸的交往即難有超越及突破。因為，陳雲林若今年因顧慮民進黨遊行而推遲來訪，換成明年到訪民進黨就不遊行 了嗎？畢竟，台灣是一個民主體制，社會上存在著對兩岸政策持批評觀點者原是常態；陳雲林在任何時間來訪皆不能免此，只是此時或許更尖銳一些而已。
這正是兩岸互動必須超越及突破之處。北京當局一向視台灣的政府或政黨為主要互動對象，於是一方面利用台灣的黨爭，另一方面亦陷溺於台灣的黨爭。其實，在台 灣的民主體制中，政黨的勝敗、消長及輪替，本是一個不定的變數；所以，北京當局除了因應台灣的政黨消長，更當回應台灣的主流民意。即以陳雲林來訪言，倘若 能將兩岸關係推向一個明確回應台灣主流民意的高度，那麼民進黨或綠營的示威抗議似也就不足為慮了。
我們曾一再強調：北京當局必須回應台灣的民主體制。民進黨的台獨路線經執政八年的操作而終告失敗，是因被台灣主流民意所否決；馬政府的兩岸政策雖較受肯 定，但在「外交休兵」、「非國與國的特殊關係」等操作技巧上，甚至受到藍營內部的質疑，亦可見到主流民意的身影。北京當局必須設法以台灣的主流民意為準據 來建構兩岸關係，如此始可能跳脫台灣的黨爭，搭建一個可大可久的兩岸互動架構。陳雲林來訪，是否已準備好了與台灣的主流民意對話？
對於兩岸關係，台灣主流民意的主要期待有二：一、尊嚴；二、利益。也就是說，台灣主流民意期待一個不失台灣尊嚴及對台灣有利的兩岸關係。這樣的兩岸關係， 過去扁政府不能實現，現在馬政府其實也未必能達成；也就是說，陳水扁走「台灣國」路線做不到，馬英九走「中華民國路線」也未必做得到；而最後的原因皆卡在 北京當局未能跳出框架。陳雲林來訪，能否有跳出框架的宣示？
陳雲林是否來訪，將被解讀成是否願意面對台灣的民意，及能否贏取台灣的民意。直白而言，倘若陳雲林帶來的「伴手禮」能打動台灣主流民意，即可超越及突破台灣的黨爭，又何須步履踟躕，欲行又止？
其實，如昨日社論所言，陳雲林來訪，對民進黨亦是一顆燙手山芋。民進黨除了將面臨「挺獨 ／挺扁」的內部鬥爭，亦將面臨台灣主流民意的考驗。從此一角度來看，屆時陳雲林在兩岸關係上，不啻將與民進黨或陳水扁競爭贏取台灣的主流民意，這將是兩岸關係史上的重大紀錄。
陳雲林來訪是否推遲，茲事體大。畢竟，海運直航及截彎取直等既定議題，皆不宜再拖；倘若延遲，可能撞上扁案起訴等變數，是否又再延擱？若竟延至明年，恐怕 所有的味道皆將走味。何況，陳雲林到訪的意義，與綠營陳水扁或民進黨的抗議，及台灣社會的其他批評之聲，只是一個相對的概念；最後皆將面對台灣主流民意的 檢驗。因而，與其考慮推遲與否，何如考慮如何籌辦陳雲林的伴手禮？
因此，我們建議，不必拘限於熊貓、直航等已知項目，而應放開歷史視野，不妨從兩岸關係論述及開放國際空間等領域思考；倘若能藉陳雲林來訪，使台灣主流民意 感受到一個「有尊嚴／有利益」的兩岸互動架構可望進一步體現，則海峽兩岸也許可以藉此共同成就一個超越及突破台灣藍綠黨爭的兩岸大架構。準此以論，陳雲林 來訪，是危機，也是轉機。
連戰、吳伯雄、江丙坤往訪大陸，一片溫馨祥和的喜慶氣氛；但陳雲林來訪，卻必將是喧擾不寧、抗議遊行。這正是兩岸的差異所在，也正是我們一再重申這句話的道理：北京當局必須回應台灣的民主體制！
台灣充滿變數，唯一不可能改變的就是民主體制；所以，兩岸關係必定要建立在民主體制所表現的主流民意之上。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 8, 2008
Summary: Will Chen Yunlin come to Taiwan as expected? Apparently it depends upon the Democratic Progressive Party. Some think if the Democratic Progressive Party launches violent protests, the Ma administration and the Hu administration in Beijing will back down in fear. The possibility of demonstrations should not be ignored. But if one is a slave to such concerns, then breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations will be impossible. If Chen Yunlin postpones his visit until next year because the Democratic Progressive Party threatens to protest, what will he do next year? The Republic of China is a democracy. For elements within society to be critical of the current administration's cross-Strait policy is perfectly normal. No matter when Chen Yunlin arrives, someone is going to protest. The only difference is certain moments may be more sensitive than others.
Full Text below:
Will Chen Yunlin come to Taiwan as expected? Apparently it depends upon the Democratic Progressive Party. Some think if the Democratic Progressive Party launches violent protests, the Ma administration and the Hu administration in Beijing will back down in fear.
The possibility of demonstrations should not be ignored. But if one is a slave to such concerns, then breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations will be impossible. If Chen Yunlin postpones his visit until next year because the Democratic Progressive Party threatens to protest, what will he do next year? The Republic of China is a democracy. For elements within society to be critical of the current administration's cross-Strait policy is perfectly normal. No matter when Chen Yunlin arrives, someone is going to protest. The only difference is certain moments may be more sensitive than others.
This is precisely what cross-Strait interaction must transcend. The Beijing authorities have long regarded the Taiwan authorities as their primary objective. On the one hand they have taken advantage of partisan struggles on Taiwan. On the other hand they have become victims of these same partisan struggles on Taiwan. Actually, under the Republic of China's democracy, it is never certain which political party will win or lose, rise or fall. Therefore the Beijing authorities should respond not only to political parties, but also to public opinion. If Chen Yunlin's visit helps cross-Strait relations reflect mainstream public opinion, then Democratic Progressive Party and Green Camp protests need not be a cause for concern.
We have repeatedly stressed that the Beijing authorities must acknowledge the Republic of China's democratic institutions. The Democratic Progressive Party has been in power for eight years. Its Taiwan independence path has ended in complete failure, because it was rejected by the public on Taiwan. The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy has been better received. But its "diplomatic truce," its "non state-to-state relations," and other policies have raised eyebrows, even in the Blue camp. Such is mainstream public opinion. The Beijing authorities must find a way to base their cross-Strait policy on mainstream public opinion on Taiwan. Only then can they liberate themselves from the need to respond to partisan struggles on Taiwan. Only then can they establish a stable framework for cross-Strait interaction. Is Chen Yunlin ready to begin a dialogue with the public on Taiwan?
When considering cross-Strait relations, the public on Taiwan has two major concerns. One. Dignity. Two. Self interest. The public on Taiwan looks forward to a cross-Strait framework that treats them with dignity and protects their self interests. The Chen Shui-bian administration was not up to the task. The Ma Ying-jeou administration may not be either. Chen Shui-bian's "Nation of Taiwan path" was a dead end. Ma Ying-jeou's "Republic of China path" may or may not be. The problem is the Beijing authorities have been unable to break out of the existing framework. Will Chen Yunlin be able to break out of the existing framework? That remains to be seen.
Will Chen Yunlin's visit be seen as a willingness to defer to mainstream public opinion on Taiwan? Can Chen Yunlin win over the public on Taiwan? If Chen Yunlin is able to win over the public on Taiwan, he just might break through the partisan deadlock on Taiwan. Why hesitate? Why stop?
As yesterday's editorial in the United Daily News noted, Chen Yunlin's visit is also a hot potato for the DPP. The Democratic Progressive Party must deal with an internal struggle over "supporting Taiwan independence" and "supporting A Bian." It must defer to mainstream public opinion. Regardless of whether the DPP or Chen Shui-bian wins the battle for hearts and minds on Taiwan, Chen Yunlin's visit will have an historic impact on cross-Strait relations.
Chen Yunlin's visit is important. The resolution of direct maritime transportation links and other urgent problems can no longer be delayed. If Chen Yunlin's visit is postponed, their resolution may be affected by unexpected developments in the Chen Shui-bian corruption trial. If Chen Yunlin's visit is postponed even one year, precious momentum may be lost. Whether the Green Camp, Chen Shui-bian, and the Democratic Progressive Party protest, and whether elements on Taiwan object to Chen Yunlin's visit, must be seen in context. The acid test will be mainstream public opinion. The only reason to postpone Chen Yunlin's visit should be problems with protocol.
The issues addressed should not be limited to pandas, direct flights, and other familiar problems. Instead we should adopt a broader historical perspective. We may as well raise the issue of international breathing room. Will Chen Yunlin's visit allow the public on Taiwan to experience a cross-Strait exchange that treats them with dignity and protects their self interest? If it does, then we can establish a cross-Strait framework that transcends Blue vs. Green partisanship. If it does, Chen Yunlin's visit will be both a crisis and an opportunity.
Lien Chan, Wu Po-hsiung, Chiang Pin-kung have all visited the mainland. The atmosphere during their visits was amicable and harmonious. But Chen Yunlin's visit to Taiwan is sure to provoke controversy, demonstrations, and protests. This is where the two sides differ. This is why we must repeat, the Beijing authorities must respond to the Republic of China's democracy.
The Taiwan region is in a state of flux. The only constant is its democracy. Therefore, cross-Strait relations must be founded on mainstream public opinion as manifested in democratic institutions.
陳雲林能否回應台灣主流民意？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.10.08 02:01 am
陳雲林是否如期來訪，似乎卡在必須考慮民進黨的反應。有人想像：倘若屆時民進黨發動激烈的示威抗議，非但會使馬政府與北京胡政權臉上掛不住，恐怕亦為兩岸互動平添變數。
這類的顧慮或有必要，但若完全受制於這類顧慮，兩岸的交往即難有超越及突破。因為，陳雲林若今年因顧慮民進黨遊行而推遲來訪，換成明年到訪民進黨就不遊行 了嗎？畢竟，台灣是一個民主體制，社會上存在著對兩岸政策持批評觀點者原是常態；陳雲林在任何時間來訪皆不能免此，只是此時或許更尖銳一些而已。
這正是兩岸互動必須超越及突破之處。北京當局一向視台灣的政府或政黨為主要互動對象，於是一方面利用台灣的黨爭，另一方面亦陷溺於台灣的黨爭。其實，在台 灣的民主體制中，政黨的勝敗、消長及輪替，本是一個不定的變數；所以，北京當局除了因應台灣的政黨消長，更當回應台灣的主流民意。即以陳雲林來訪言，倘若 能將兩岸關係推向一個明確回應台灣主流民意的高度，那麼民進黨或綠營的示威抗議似也就不足為慮了。
我們曾一再強調：北京當局必須回應台灣的民主體制。民進黨的台獨路線經執政八年的操作而終告失敗，是因被台灣主流民意所否決；馬政府的兩岸政策雖較受肯 定，但在「外交休兵」、「非國與國的特殊關係」等操作技巧上，甚至受到藍營內部的質疑，亦可見到主流民意的身影。北京當局必須設法以台灣的主流民意為準據 來建構兩岸關係，如此始可能跳脫台灣的黨爭，搭建一個可大可久的兩岸互動架構。陳雲林來訪，是否已準備好了與台灣的主流民意對話？
對於兩岸關係，台灣主流民意的主要期待有二：一、尊嚴；二、利益。也就是說，台灣主流民意期待一個不失台灣尊嚴及對台灣有利的兩岸關係。這樣的兩岸關係， 過去扁政府不能實現，現在馬政府其實也未必能達成；也就是說，陳水扁走「台灣國」路線做不到，馬英九走「中華民國路線」也未必做得到；而最後的原因皆卡在 北京當局未能跳出框架。陳雲林來訪，能否有跳出框架的宣示？
陳雲林是否來訪，將被解讀成是否願意面對台灣的民意，及能否贏取台灣的民意。直白而言，倘若陳雲林帶來的「伴手禮」能打動台灣主流民意，即可超越及突破台灣的黨爭，又何須步履踟躕，欲行又止？
其實，如昨日社論所言，陳雲林來訪，對民進黨亦是一顆燙手山芋。民進黨除了將面臨「挺獨 ／挺扁」的內部鬥爭，亦將面臨台灣主流民意的考驗。從此一角度來看，屆時陳雲林在兩岸關係上，不啻將與民進黨或陳水扁競爭贏取台灣的主流民意，這將是兩岸關係史上的重大紀錄。
陳雲林來訪是否推遲，茲事體大。畢竟，海運直航及截彎取直等既定議題，皆不宜再拖；倘若延遲，可能撞上扁案起訴等變數，是否又再延擱？若竟延至明年，恐怕 所有的味道皆將走味。何況，陳雲林到訪的意義，與綠營陳水扁或民進黨的抗議，及台灣社會的其他批評之聲，只是一個相對的概念；最後皆將面對台灣主流民意的 檢驗。因而，與其考慮推遲與否，何如考慮如何籌辦陳雲林的伴手禮？
因此，我們建議，不必拘限於熊貓、直航等已知項目，而應放開歷史視野，不妨從兩岸關係論述及開放國際空間等領域思考；倘若能藉陳雲林來訪，使台灣主流民意 感受到一個「有尊嚴／有利益」的兩岸互動架構可望進一步體現，則海峽兩岸也許可以藉此共同成就一個超越及突破台灣藍綠黨爭的兩岸大架構。準此以論，陳雲林 來訪，是危機，也是轉機。
連戰、吳伯雄、江丙坤往訪大陸，一片溫馨祥和的喜慶氣氛；但陳雲林來訪，卻必將是喧擾不寧、抗議遊行。這正是兩岸的差異所在，也正是我們一再重申這句話的道理：北京當局必須回應台灣的民主體制！
台灣充滿變數，唯一不可能改變的就是民主體制；所以，兩岸關係必定要建立在民主體制所表現的主流民意之上。
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Will Chen Yunlin's Visit Precipitate a Schism within the Democratic Progressive Party?
Will Chen Yunlin's Visit Precipitate a Schism within the Democratic Progressive Party?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 7, 2008
Chen Yunlin's announced visit in late October or early November is a problem for the Ma administration and the Hu administration in Beijing. Ironically, it has also become a hot potato for the Democratic Progressive Party also. If not handled properly, Chen Yunlin's visit could be the catalyst that precipitates a schism within the DPP.
Chen Shui-bian is rapidly gaining in influence. He initiated the first protest march against the Ma administration. The DPP was forced to dance to his tune. Tsai Ing-wen was originally reluctant to participate. Her reaction was, "Protest march? Didn't we just have a protest march?" But developments forced her to yield. A number of questions have now arisen. One. Are the DPP and Chen Shui-bian co-sponsoring this protest march? Two. Suppose the DPP chooses not to participate in Chen Shui-bian's protest march? Three. Will Chen Shui-bian hold his own protest march on the same day as the DPP? Four. Will the DPP refrain from holding its own protest march in order to avoid redundancy? Will it permit DPP officials and party members to attend the march?
In reference to the August 30 protest march, Chen Shui-bian has said only that "My heart is with you." Chen Shui-bian has gathered considerable political momentum. He is unlikely to pass up an opportunity to make political hay out of Chen Yunlin's visit. He will probably use the political momentum accumulated on the streets to consolidate his status as the standard-bearer of the Taiwan independence movement. Therefore we predict that when Chen Yunlin comes to visit, Chen Shui-bian will take to the streets.
The Democratic Progressive Party must decide how to respond to Chen Yunlin's visit. Tsai Ing-wen said the DPP must first arrive at a clear position and adopt a clear policy. DPP leaders must first clarify why they are protesting. Only then can they talk about whether they should launch a protest. But Chen Shui-bian has already seized the initiative, and is setting the agenda. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have lost the initiative, and have lost the opportunity to set the agenda. If they attempt to regroup, they will certainly be drowned out by Chen Shui-bian's high decibel rhetoric. Chen Shui-bian is rapidly consolidating his power. If the Democratic Progressive Party attempts to compete, many think Chen Shui-bian's protest march will prove more popular.
Therefore the DPP's real nemesis is not either Chen Yunlin or the Ma administration, but Chen Shui-bian. Chen Yunlin's visit means the DPP will find itself besieged from all sides. One. Will the DPP continue to take a hard line on Taiwan independence in response to Chen Yunlin? Will the DPP's cross-Strait policy still rest on founding a "Nation of Taiwan?" Two. The Democratic Progressive Party Central Committee and Chen Shui-bian may have a showdown. Will the DPP allow Chen Shui-bian to hijack the party, or will it find a way to make a clean break with him? Three. The DPP may be forced to choose between supporting A Bian and Taiwan independence, or blazing a new trail for itself. Four. The Democratic Progressive Party must answer to the public over Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan independence, and cross-strait policy.
Chen Shui-bian faces three or four more years of legal battles. In other words, the DPP must contend with Chen Shui-bian for at least three or four more years. Chen Shui-bian's strategy is to rally mob sentiment and use it as a bargaining chip in his criminal trial. This includes cultivating the notion that he deserves amnesty. He may lack the support of a majority of Democratic Progressive Party members. But he retains the support of a significant minority. If Chen Yunlin's visit provides this minority with an excuse to take to the streets, Chen Shui-bian's strategic plan will be finalized, and the Democratic Progressive Party's attempt to purge the party of Chen's legacy will have failed.
During the 2008 presidential election, the United Daily News was the first to predict Chen Shui-bian's strategy. We explained that Chen's strategy was not intended to help Frank Hsieh or the DPP win the election. Its purpose was to help Chen Shui-bian remain the standard bearer of the Taiwan independence movement following the election. Our prediction has come true. What's puzzling is how Frank Hsieh and the DPP allowed themselves to be held hostage for fear of losing the election. But having lost the election as well as the public's trust, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP still can't free themselves from A Bian's grasp. They continue to offer their necks to the vampire, powerless to resist, perhaps unwilling to resist.
Tsai Ing-wen said the DPP must first arrive at a clear position and adopt a clear policy. If Chen Yunlin's visit consolidates Chen Shui-bian's brand of Taiwan independence, how will Tsai Ing-wen face reformers within the Democratic Progressive Party? How will she face members of the public who still look to the Democratic Progressive Party for reform? How will she face her own conscience?
The August 30 protest march, could be interpreted as a minor victory for Tsai Ing-wen. She temporarily suppressed support for A Bian. But Chen Shui-bian intends to use Chen Yunlin's visit to consolidate support for himself and Taiwan independence, and to use that support to hijack the Democratic Progressive Party. He intends to turn his rhetoric into reality. "If nobody is leading the Democratic Progressive Party, then I will return to lead it!" In other words, according to A Bian, Tsai Ing-wen is "nobody" and the DPP has once again reverted to Chen Shui-bian's "leadership."
Tsai Ing-wen and the reformists within the Democratic Progressive Party need not worry about how to respond to Chen Yunlin. Protesting his visit is merely for the sake of appearance. The person they really need to respond to is Chen Shui-bian. They must prevent the Democratic Progressive Party from becoming Chen Shui-bian's bargaining chip in the coming years.
Chen Yunlin's visit will either precipitate a schism within the DPP, or help Chen Shui-bian to hijack the DPP. Either alternative is intolerable to Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP.
陳雲林來訪是造成民進黨分裂的觸媒？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.10.07 03:08 am
陳雲林是否在十月底十一月初來訪，被認為是馬政府及北京胡政權的難題；相對而言，如今這也成了民進黨十分棘手的燙手山芋。倘若處理不當，陳雲林來訪可能成為造成民進黨分裂的觸媒。
正在快速增加影響力的變數是陳水扁。他最先倡議舉行大遊行，民進黨無可迴避。蔡英文原本的態度顯有保留，她的反應是：「遊行，不是剛遊行過嗎？」但是，隨 著情勢的推移，似已把持不住。於是，現在的問題似乎變成：一、民進黨與陳水扁是否共同舉辦遊行？二、民進黨若排拒陳水扁參加黨辦遊行，陳水扁會不會自辦遊 行？三、甚至，陳水扁會不會與黨同日舉辦遊行，進行拚場？四、或者，為避免拚場，民進黨是否宣布不舉辦遊行，但也不限制黨公職人員及黨員參加陳水扁的遊 行。
八三○大遊行時，陳水扁只稱「心與大家在一起」；如今的陳水扁已成相當氣候，他不會放過陳雲林來訪的題材，極可能運用這個情勢在街頭重建並鞏固他台獨旗手的地位。因此，也許可以研判：陳雲林來訪時，陳水扁不會在街頭缺席。
如何因應陳雲林來訪，是民進黨的重大議題。蔡英文曾說，必須先建立論述及政策，亦即先辯明為何遊行，始能談要不要遊行？但是，如今卻被陳水扁奪佔了「議題 設定」的主導地位，蔡英文及民進黨已失去了重建「論述及政策」的空間，即使設法重建，屆時亦必將淹沒在陳水扁的高分貝中。陳水扁正在快速累積實力之中，若 與民進黨拚場遊行，恐怕有許多人會猜測：阿扁的場子也許會比民進黨熱。
因此，民進黨屆時真正的對手，其實不是陳雲林或馬政府，而是陳水扁。陳雲林來訪，對民進黨而言，其實宛如「四面楚歌」：一、民進黨是否仍將以明確的台獨立 場面對陳雲林，並仍以「台灣國」標定其兩岸政策。二、民進黨中央與陳水扁可能面臨攤牌情勢：或被陳水扁就此「附身」不去，或設法切割？三、民進黨內部勢將 陷入「挺扁／挺獨」的情感與路線的撕裂之中。四、民進黨勢須面對全體國人，就其對陳水扁、台獨及兩岸政策的基調作出交代。
陳水扁面對可能長達三、四年或更長久的貪案訴訟，換句話說，民進黨也將至少必須與陳水扁進行三、四年的角力。陳水扁現在的策略是：他必須擁有一股社會力量 作為他在訴訟及政治上的操作籌碼，包括預先醞釀未來要求特赦的街頭勢力；如今可見，這一股力量雖未必是民進黨支持者的大多數，但也絕非無關痛癢的少數。陳 水扁把持了這股勢力，若在陳雲林來訪時將他們帶上街頭，即可差堪宣示他的戰略部署已告完成。於彼同時，當然亦宣告民進黨「去扁化」的完全失敗。
在二○○八總統大選時，本報首先預言，陳水扁當時的戰略，並非為民進黨或謝長廷贏得大選，而是要為陳水扁自己在選後保全台獨旗手的地位。此一預言，已經應 驗。令人不解的是：大選時民進黨及謝長廷被挾持，終於葬送了大選及多數國人的信任；如今民進黨大選已敗，但民進黨及蔡英文卻仍被已經退黨的阿扁挾持，竟也 仍是伸長了脖子被這隻吸血鬼咬住，毫無抵擋之力，甚至亦無逃脫之心。
正如蔡英文所說，面對陳雲林來訪，必須重建論述及政策。如今陳雲林來訪，倘若竟然反而鞏固了「扁記台獨」的地位，蔡英文如何向民進黨內改革派交代？又如何向許多仍對民進黨之改革尚有期待的國人交代？更如何向自己的良知交代？
八三○遊行，也許可視為蔡英文的小勝利，因為她當時畢竟暫時壓制了「挺扁」的聲音；但是，如今陳水扁勢將運用陳雲林來訪，要把挺扁、挺獨及挾持民進黨「三 合一」綁在一起，不啻實踐了他近日的豪語：「民進黨若沒有人領導，我願回來領導！」倘係如此，蔡英文就成了「沒有人」，而民進黨則在實質上又落回陳水扁的 「領導」之中。
蔡英文及民進黨的改革派，不必在意如何因應陳雲林，那些皆是表象；而必須面對陳水扁，更須避免民進黨就此淪為陳水扁今後數年一路打官司的政治籌碼。
陳雲林來訪，不論造成了民進黨分裂或造成了民進黨被扁挾持的定局，恐怕皆是蔡英文的黨中央無法承受之重。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 7, 2008
Chen Yunlin's announced visit in late October or early November is a problem for the Ma administration and the Hu administration in Beijing. Ironically, it has also become a hot potato for the Democratic Progressive Party also. If not handled properly, Chen Yunlin's visit could be the catalyst that precipitates a schism within the DPP.
Chen Shui-bian is rapidly gaining in influence. He initiated the first protest march against the Ma administration. The DPP was forced to dance to his tune. Tsai Ing-wen was originally reluctant to participate. Her reaction was, "Protest march? Didn't we just have a protest march?" But developments forced her to yield. A number of questions have now arisen. One. Are the DPP and Chen Shui-bian co-sponsoring this protest march? Two. Suppose the DPP chooses not to participate in Chen Shui-bian's protest march? Three. Will Chen Shui-bian hold his own protest march on the same day as the DPP? Four. Will the DPP refrain from holding its own protest march in order to avoid redundancy? Will it permit DPP officials and party members to attend the march?
In reference to the August 30 protest march, Chen Shui-bian has said only that "My heart is with you." Chen Shui-bian has gathered considerable political momentum. He is unlikely to pass up an opportunity to make political hay out of Chen Yunlin's visit. He will probably use the political momentum accumulated on the streets to consolidate his status as the standard-bearer of the Taiwan independence movement. Therefore we predict that when Chen Yunlin comes to visit, Chen Shui-bian will take to the streets.
The Democratic Progressive Party must decide how to respond to Chen Yunlin's visit. Tsai Ing-wen said the DPP must first arrive at a clear position and adopt a clear policy. DPP leaders must first clarify why they are protesting. Only then can they talk about whether they should launch a protest. But Chen Shui-bian has already seized the initiative, and is setting the agenda. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have lost the initiative, and have lost the opportunity to set the agenda. If they attempt to regroup, they will certainly be drowned out by Chen Shui-bian's high decibel rhetoric. Chen Shui-bian is rapidly consolidating his power. If the Democratic Progressive Party attempts to compete, many think Chen Shui-bian's protest march will prove more popular.
Therefore the DPP's real nemesis is not either Chen Yunlin or the Ma administration, but Chen Shui-bian. Chen Yunlin's visit means the DPP will find itself besieged from all sides. One. Will the DPP continue to take a hard line on Taiwan independence in response to Chen Yunlin? Will the DPP's cross-Strait policy still rest on founding a "Nation of Taiwan?" Two. The Democratic Progressive Party Central Committee and Chen Shui-bian may have a showdown. Will the DPP allow Chen Shui-bian to hijack the party, or will it find a way to make a clean break with him? Three. The DPP may be forced to choose between supporting A Bian and Taiwan independence, or blazing a new trail for itself. Four. The Democratic Progressive Party must answer to the public over Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan independence, and cross-strait policy.
Chen Shui-bian faces three or four more years of legal battles. In other words, the DPP must contend with Chen Shui-bian for at least three or four more years. Chen Shui-bian's strategy is to rally mob sentiment and use it as a bargaining chip in his criminal trial. This includes cultivating the notion that he deserves amnesty. He may lack the support of a majority of Democratic Progressive Party members. But he retains the support of a significant minority. If Chen Yunlin's visit provides this minority with an excuse to take to the streets, Chen Shui-bian's strategic plan will be finalized, and the Democratic Progressive Party's attempt to purge the party of Chen's legacy will have failed.
During the 2008 presidential election, the United Daily News was the first to predict Chen Shui-bian's strategy. We explained that Chen's strategy was not intended to help Frank Hsieh or the DPP win the election. Its purpose was to help Chen Shui-bian remain the standard bearer of the Taiwan independence movement following the election. Our prediction has come true. What's puzzling is how Frank Hsieh and the DPP allowed themselves to be held hostage for fear of losing the election. But having lost the election as well as the public's trust, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP still can't free themselves from A Bian's grasp. They continue to offer their necks to the vampire, powerless to resist, perhaps unwilling to resist.
Tsai Ing-wen said the DPP must first arrive at a clear position and adopt a clear policy. If Chen Yunlin's visit consolidates Chen Shui-bian's brand of Taiwan independence, how will Tsai Ing-wen face reformers within the Democratic Progressive Party? How will she face members of the public who still look to the Democratic Progressive Party for reform? How will she face her own conscience?
The August 30 protest march, could be interpreted as a minor victory for Tsai Ing-wen. She temporarily suppressed support for A Bian. But Chen Shui-bian intends to use Chen Yunlin's visit to consolidate support for himself and Taiwan independence, and to use that support to hijack the Democratic Progressive Party. He intends to turn his rhetoric into reality. "If nobody is leading the Democratic Progressive Party, then I will return to lead it!" In other words, according to A Bian, Tsai Ing-wen is "nobody" and the DPP has once again reverted to Chen Shui-bian's "leadership."
Tsai Ing-wen and the reformists within the Democratic Progressive Party need not worry about how to respond to Chen Yunlin. Protesting his visit is merely for the sake of appearance. The person they really need to respond to is Chen Shui-bian. They must prevent the Democratic Progressive Party from becoming Chen Shui-bian's bargaining chip in the coming years.
Chen Yunlin's visit will either precipitate a schism within the DPP, or help Chen Shui-bian to hijack the DPP. Either alternative is intolerable to Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP.
陳雲林來訪是造成民進黨分裂的觸媒？
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.10.07 03:08 am
陳雲林是否在十月底十一月初來訪，被認為是馬政府及北京胡政權的難題；相對而言，如今這也成了民進黨十分棘手的燙手山芋。倘若處理不當，陳雲林來訪可能成為造成民進黨分裂的觸媒。
正在快速增加影響力的變數是陳水扁。他最先倡議舉行大遊行，民進黨無可迴避。蔡英文原本的態度顯有保留，她的反應是：「遊行，不是剛遊行過嗎？」但是，隨 著情勢的推移，似已把持不住。於是，現在的問題似乎變成：一、民進黨與陳水扁是否共同舉辦遊行？二、民進黨若排拒陳水扁參加黨辦遊行，陳水扁會不會自辦遊 行？三、甚至，陳水扁會不會與黨同日舉辦遊行，進行拚場？四、或者，為避免拚場，民進黨是否宣布不舉辦遊行，但也不限制黨公職人員及黨員參加陳水扁的遊 行。
八三○大遊行時，陳水扁只稱「心與大家在一起」；如今的陳水扁已成相當氣候，他不會放過陳雲林來訪的題材，極可能運用這個情勢在街頭重建並鞏固他台獨旗手的地位。因此，也許可以研判：陳雲林來訪時，陳水扁不會在街頭缺席。
如何因應陳雲林來訪，是民進黨的重大議題。蔡英文曾說，必須先建立論述及政策，亦即先辯明為何遊行，始能談要不要遊行？但是，如今卻被陳水扁奪佔了「議題 設定」的主導地位，蔡英文及民進黨已失去了重建「論述及政策」的空間，即使設法重建，屆時亦必將淹沒在陳水扁的高分貝中。陳水扁正在快速累積實力之中，若 與民進黨拚場遊行，恐怕有許多人會猜測：阿扁的場子也許會比民進黨熱。
因此，民進黨屆時真正的對手，其實不是陳雲林或馬政府，而是陳水扁。陳雲林來訪，對民進黨而言，其實宛如「四面楚歌」：一、民進黨是否仍將以明確的台獨立 場面對陳雲林，並仍以「台灣國」標定其兩岸政策。二、民進黨中央與陳水扁可能面臨攤牌情勢：或被陳水扁就此「附身」不去，或設法切割？三、民進黨內部勢將 陷入「挺扁／挺獨」的情感與路線的撕裂之中。四、民進黨勢須面對全體國人，就其對陳水扁、台獨及兩岸政策的基調作出交代。
陳水扁面對可能長達三、四年或更長久的貪案訴訟，換句話說，民進黨也將至少必須與陳水扁進行三、四年的角力。陳水扁現在的策略是：他必須擁有一股社會力量 作為他在訴訟及政治上的操作籌碼，包括預先醞釀未來要求特赦的街頭勢力；如今可見，這一股力量雖未必是民進黨支持者的大多數，但也絕非無關痛癢的少數。陳 水扁把持了這股勢力，若在陳雲林來訪時將他們帶上街頭，即可差堪宣示他的戰略部署已告完成。於彼同時，當然亦宣告民進黨「去扁化」的完全失敗。
在二○○八總統大選時，本報首先預言，陳水扁當時的戰略，並非為民進黨或謝長廷贏得大選，而是要為陳水扁自己在選後保全台獨旗手的地位。此一預言，已經應 驗。令人不解的是：大選時民進黨及謝長廷被挾持，終於葬送了大選及多數國人的信任；如今民進黨大選已敗，但民進黨及蔡英文卻仍被已經退黨的阿扁挾持，竟也 仍是伸長了脖子被這隻吸血鬼咬住，毫無抵擋之力，甚至亦無逃脫之心。
正如蔡英文所說，面對陳雲林來訪，必須重建論述及政策。如今陳雲林來訪，倘若竟然反而鞏固了「扁記台獨」的地位，蔡英文如何向民進黨內改革派交代？又如何向許多仍對民進黨之改革尚有期待的國人交代？更如何向自己的良知交代？
八三○遊行，也許可視為蔡英文的小勝利，因為她當時畢竟暫時壓制了「挺扁」的聲音；但是，如今陳水扁勢將運用陳雲林來訪，要把挺扁、挺獨及挾持民進黨「三 合一」綁在一起，不啻實踐了他近日的豪語：「民進黨若沒有人領導，我願回來領導！」倘係如此，蔡英文就成了「沒有人」，而民進黨則在實質上又落回陳水扁的 「領導」之中。
蔡英文及民進黨的改革派，不必在意如何因應陳雲林，那些皆是表象；而必須面對陳水扁，更須避免民進黨就此淪為陳水扁今後數年一路打官司的政治籌碼。
陳雲林來訪，不論造成了民進黨分裂或造成了民進黨被扁挾持的定局，恐怕皆是蔡英文的黨中央無法承受之重。
Monday, October 6, 2008
Washington/Beijing/Taipei Relations Following the Arms Sales
Washington/Beijing/Taipei Relations Following the Arms Sales
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 6, 2008
On October 3, the current administration in Washington announced the sale of six items to Taipei, totalling 6.4 billion USD. This is the largest arms sale since the 1992 sale of 150 F-16A/B fighters.
The Bush administration decided long ago to proceed with the sales. But it delayed carrying them out until the end of Bush's second term. The public is not attributing the delay to the Ma administration. Instead, it is attributing the delay to tensions between Washington and Taipei. The delay reflects not merely tensions between Washington and Taipei, but also the complex relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. A spokesman for the Office of the President said the arms sale symbolizes an era of peace, security, and renewed trust between Taipei and Washington. That may be an overstatement. Critics of the Ma administration consider it an ultimatum from Washington, or even a deterioration in relations between Washington and Taipei. That is also an exaggeration.
The arms sales originated when the Bush administration took office. The Democratic Progressive Party was already in office. But as a result of the Five Noes commitment, national security was given priority. The ruling US administration joined forces with right wing Neoconservatives within the US government, in an effort to prevent China's rise. This was the background for the arms sales. At the time Blue vs. Green confrontation involved Blue Camp legislators such as Su Chi, who is now Secretary General of the National Security Council. Their vehement opposition delayed approval of the arms budget.
By the end of Bush's first term, the war in Iraq was no longer going so well. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz left one after another. The Neoconservatives lost power. The Realists gained the upper hand. The ruling DPP repeatedly upset cross-Strait relations, becoming the troublemaker for relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Washington halted arms sales to Taipei. It could not afford to reward Taipei for making trouble. This has since become the consensus.
A new administration is in office. The freeze on arm sales has been lifted. But the new administration is also promoting cross-Strait reconciliation. National defense policy is being subordinated to larger strategic concerns. One allegation after another has been leveled. One allegation was that the Han Kuang Manueuvers would not use live ammunition. The most widely discussed was an alleged change in the arms sales situation, that the Ma administration had leaned too far toward Beijing. Not only had he implemented a diplomatic cease-fire, he was destroying our national defense, handing the nation over to Beijing. Another allegation was that Washington had doubts about Ma's political views before the election, and that following the election, it was unhappy with the Ma administration's policy tilt. Washington was said to be using arms sales as a slap on the wrist.
In any case, the arms sales have been approved. That in itself refutes many of the allegations. What really deserves our attention is future relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. We must take Taipei's interests and position into account. Cross-Strait relations may be improving, but the Republic of China should continue to maintain a strong national defense. This includes enhancing weapons performance and strengthening relations with our allies. Weapons R&D and the purchase of weapons from foreign sources go hand in hand, and should not be neglected. Military cooperation with friendly nations, arms purchases, and joint maneuveurs must all be maintained.
Specifically, arms sales and military cooperation should be a matter of Washington/Taipei relations. This is not something Taipei needs to discuss or should discuss with Beijing. By the same token, Washington should not negotiate arms sales to Taipei with Beijing. The Taiwan Relations Act and other security commitments to Taiwan should be Washington's sole criterion. The issue of reduced arms sales can be placed on the table only if Beijing is willing to reduce the military threat to Taipei and the two sides sign a truce, increasing the level of mutual confidence.
Washington is willing to offend Beijing by selling Taipei arms. That means Taipei/Washington relations have not changed substantially. It also confirms international Realpolitik. Washington has not changed its mind. It still wants the two sides to remain politically divided. Taipei's military armaments amount to a bargaining chip in negotiations with Beijing. Washington does not want Taipei to develop or obtain offensive weapons. Submarines are out of the question. Medium-range surface-to-surface missiles sales were also suspended. However defensive weapons may help maintain cross-Strait divided government.
From a larger perspective, Taipei is not a special case. All of East Asia, including South Korea and Japan, finds itself positioned between the two hegemons. Taipei is not alone. US involvement in arms sales to Taipei should not be assigned too much significance. It may actually help reduce tension between the three sides.
Once the arms sales were announced, Beijing's protest was to be expected. But has the unprecedented intensity of Beijing's protest had other consequences? Last week, Washington asked Beijing to cooperate with Washington in the United Nations on Iran and North Korea. Now Washington has turned around and announced its arms sales to Taipei. No wonder Beijing feels betrayed. But as we look back, we see that among the original sales items, the Patriot missiles were reduced from six sets to four. The Blackhawk helicopters were eliminated. This was Washington's way of placating Beijing, and allowing leaders in Beijing to justify themselves at home.
In any case, relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei have changed. Washington's policy toward Taipei now has a clear bottom line. Cross-Strait relations have eased up. The Taiwan issue is unlikely to get so far out of control as to threaten Beijing. Therefore the Taiwan issue should not be the sum total of Washington/Beijing relations. The two sides should cooperate in other areas. To Beijing, this constitutes another form of diplomatic truce.
In other words, the current relationship between Washington and Beijing will not and should not lead to conflict over Taiwan. Washington understands this. So do Beijing and Taipei.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.10.06
軍售案通過後的美中台關係
中時社論
美國行政當局終於在三日公布了對台六筆軍售，總額高達六十四億美元。這是自一九九二年出售一百五十架F-16A/B戰機以來，最大的一筆軍售。
但從布希政府初期就決定的這批軍售，遲遲要到布希任期最後一個會期才過關，一般輿論並不以此歸功於馬政府，甚至認為這反映了美台關係危機。我們以為這次軍 售案延後通過不僅反映美台關係，且是整個美中台關係的函數，總統府發言人聲稱象徵「一個和平安全及台美新信心時期」的開始，未免太樂觀；而批評者以為這是 美國「下馬威」，甚至美台關係質變，也言過其實。
軍售案的根源要從布希政府上台開始。雖然當時民進黨已執政，但受限於四不一沒有的承諾，施政以國家安全為優先，當時執政當局結合美國政府右派新保守勢力， 抑制中國的擴張，軍售案就是這種背景下的產物。但當時藍綠對抗，包括現在國安會祕書長蘇起在內的藍軍立委，動員強烈反對，導致軍售預算遲遲不能過關。
到了布希政權中期，伊拉克戰事失利，國防部長倫斯斐、副部長伍佛維茲紛紛去職，新保守派失勢，穩健派得勢，加上台灣一再衝撞既存的兩岸關係，成了美中台架構中的麻煩製造者，這時美國反倒對軍售遲疑起來：「不能夠在此時獎勵台灣」，成了當時的政策共識。
新政府上台後，雖然軍售預算解凍通過，但同時力求兩岸和解，國防政策服從於大戰略，陸續傳出令外界不解的訊息，如漢光演習不實彈射擊，其中又以軍售生變最 讓外界議論紛紛。有一說認為馬政府倒向中國太過，不僅外交休兵，連國防都自毀長城，拱手讓中國予取予求；另一說則認為美國在選前就對馬的政見有懷疑，後來 又對馬政府政策過於傾斜不滿，用軍售案施以薄懲。
無論如何，軍售既然通過，本身就反駁了許多過去的議論，但是真正應該注意的是：未來的美中台關係要往哪個方向發展？首先，從台灣的利益與立場考慮，兩岸在 逐步改善關係的同時，台灣仍應維持堅實的國防，其中包括提升武器性能，加強與友好盟邦的協防關係，而自行研發武器與外購軍品是相輔相成的手段也不能偏廢。 其他與友邦的軍事合作，除了軍購、演習計畫的相互參與觀摩，都不能停止。
更具體來說，包括軍售在內的軍事合作，應該是屬於美台之間的雙邊事務，這是兩岸不應該、也不用談的。同樣的，我們也期待美國不與中共談判對台軍售，而以 「台灣關係法」等對台安全承諾為準繩。畢竟，只有中共真正願意降低對台軍事威脅，兩岸進入停戰協定與信心增進措施談判時，軍售問題才有可能放上檯面。
其次，美國這次肯為軍售得罪北京，反映了台美之間的實質關係並未改變，也重新確認了國際政治上現實的一面。亦即美國希望兩岸在政治上分立的初衷並沒有改 變，而台灣的軍備就是面對中共談判時的籌碼本錢。美國並不希望台灣發展或取得「攻擊性」武器，所以潛艦不用談，中程地對地飛彈也被叫停，但「防禦性」武器 可以維持兩岸分治。
擴大來看，台灣並不是東亞的特例，無論是南韓或日本，都同樣置身於兩霸權之間，要怎麼協調，不是專屬台灣的難題。我們認為，美國介入台灣軍售毋須賦予太特殊的意義，相對可以減少三方的緊張。
最後，軍售宣布之後，中共抗議本來是預料中的，但這次抗議程度空前激烈，是否會造成其他衝擊？上周，美國才剛在聯合國場邊要求中共配合伊朗與北韓政策，轉 過身來就宣布軍售，也難怪北京覺得有被欺騙的感覺。但從事後來看，原定軍售項目中，愛國者飛彈由六套減為四套，黑鷹直昇機最後沒有，這已經都是安撫北京的 妥協安排，讓北京領導人能夠對內交代。
無論如何，現在的美中台關係已經不同過往，美國對台政策的底限已經清晰，兩岸關係也見和緩，台灣問題已不致再失控到能威脅中共政權的程度，因此台灣問題也不應該是美中關係的全部，雙方應該還有其他合作的領域。對中國，這是另一層意義的外交休兵。
換句話說，當前華府與北京的關係，不會也不應再因台灣問題而引爆，華盛頓看得很清楚，北京也逐漸了解，台北又何嘗不清楚。
A Translation
October 6, 2008
On October 3, the current administration in Washington announced the sale of six items to Taipei, totalling 6.4 billion USD. This is the largest arms sale since the 1992 sale of 150 F-16A/B fighters.
The Bush administration decided long ago to proceed with the sales. But it delayed carrying them out until the end of Bush's second term. The public is not attributing the delay to the Ma administration. Instead, it is attributing the delay to tensions between Washington and Taipei. The delay reflects not merely tensions between Washington and Taipei, but also the complex relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. A spokesman for the Office of the President said the arms sale symbolizes an era of peace, security, and renewed trust between Taipei and Washington. That may be an overstatement. Critics of the Ma administration consider it an ultimatum from Washington, or even a deterioration in relations between Washington and Taipei. That is also an exaggeration.
The arms sales originated when the Bush administration took office. The Democratic Progressive Party was already in office. But as a result of the Five Noes commitment, national security was given priority. The ruling US administration joined forces with right wing Neoconservatives within the US government, in an effort to prevent China's rise. This was the background for the arms sales. At the time Blue vs. Green confrontation involved Blue Camp legislators such as Su Chi, who is now Secretary General of the National Security Council. Their vehement opposition delayed approval of the arms budget.
By the end of Bush's first term, the war in Iraq was no longer going so well. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz left one after another. The Neoconservatives lost power. The Realists gained the upper hand. The ruling DPP repeatedly upset cross-Strait relations, becoming the troublemaker for relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Washington halted arms sales to Taipei. It could not afford to reward Taipei for making trouble. This has since become the consensus.
A new administration is in office. The freeze on arm sales has been lifted. But the new administration is also promoting cross-Strait reconciliation. National defense policy is being subordinated to larger strategic concerns. One allegation after another has been leveled. One allegation was that the Han Kuang Manueuvers would not use live ammunition. The most widely discussed was an alleged change in the arms sales situation, that the Ma administration had leaned too far toward Beijing. Not only had he implemented a diplomatic cease-fire, he was destroying our national defense, handing the nation over to Beijing. Another allegation was that Washington had doubts about Ma's political views before the election, and that following the election, it was unhappy with the Ma administration's policy tilt. Washington was said to be using arms sales as a slap on the wrist.
In any case, the arms sales have been approved. That in itself refutes many of the allegations. What really deserves our attention is future relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. We must take Taipei's interests and position into account. Cross-Strait relations may be improving, but the Republic of China should continue to maintain a strong national defense. This includes enhancing weapons performance and strengthening relations with our allies. Weapons R&D and the purchase of weapons from foreign sources go hand in hand, and should not be neglected. Military cooperation with friendly nations, arms purchases, and joint maneuveurs must all be maintained.
Specifically, arms sales and military cooperation should be a matter of Washington/Taipei relations. This is not something Taipei needs to discuss or should discuss with Beijing. By the same token, Washington should not negotiate arms sales to Taipei with Beijing. The Taiwan Relations Act and other security commitments to Taiwan should be Washington's sole criterion. The issue of reduced arms sales can be placed on the table only if Beijing is willing to reduce the military threat to Taipei and the two sides sign a truce, increasing the level of mutual confidence.
Washington is willing to offend Beijing by selling Taipei arms. That means Taipei/Washington relations have not changed substantially. It also confirms international Realpolitik. Washington has not changed its mind. It still wants the two sides to remain politically divided. Taipei's military armaments amount to a bargaining chip in negotiations with Beijing. Washington does not want Taipei to develop or obtain offensive weapons. Submarines are out of the question. Medium-range surface-to-surface missiles sales were also suspended. However defensive weapons may help maintain cross-Strait divided government.
From a larger perspective, Taipei is not a special case. All of East Asia, including South Korea and Japan, finds itself positioned between the two hegemons. Taipei is not alone. US involvement in arms sales to Taipei should not be assigned too much significance. It may actually help reduce tension between the three sides.
Once the arms sales were announced, Beijing's protest was to be expected. But has the unprecedented intensity of Beijing's protest had other consequences? Last week, Washington asked Beijing to cooperate with Washington in the United Nations on Iran and North Korea. Now Washington has turned around and announced its arms sales to Taipei. No wonder Beijing feels betrayed. But as we look back, we see that among the original sales items, the Patriot missiles were reduced from six sets to four. The Blackhawk helicopters were eliminated. This was Washington's way of placating Beijing, and allowing leaders in Beijing to justify themselves at home.
In any case, relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei have changed. Washington's policy toward Taipei now has a clear bottom line. Cross-Strait relations have eased up. The Taiwan issue is unlikely to get so far out of control as to threaten Beijing. Therefore the Taiwan issue should not be the sum total of Washington/Beijing relations. The two sides should cooperate in other areas. To Beijing, this constitutes another form of diplomatic truce.
In other words, the current relationship between Washington and Beijing will not and should not lead to conflict over Taiwan. Washington understands this. So do Beijing and Taipei.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.10.06
軍售案通過後的美中台關係
中時社論
美國行政當局終於在三日公布了對台六筆軍售，總額高達六十四億美元。這是自一九九二年出售一百五十架F-16A/B戰機以來，最大的一筆軍售。
但從布希政府初期就決定的這批軍售，遲遲要到布希任期最後一個會期才過關，一般輿論並不以此歸功於馬政府，甚至認為這反映了美台關係危機。我們以為這次軍 售案延後通過不僅反映美台關係，且是整個美中台關係的函數，總統府發言人聲稱象徵「一個和平安全及台美新信心時期」的開始，未免太樂觀；而批評者以為這是 美國「下馬威」，甚至美台關係質變，也言過其實。
軍售案的根源要從布希政府上台開始。雖然當時民進黨已執政，但受限於四不一沒有的承諾，施政以國家安全為優先，當時執政當局結合美國政府右派新保守勢力， 抑制中國的擴張，軍售案就是這種背景下的產物。但當時藍綠對抗，包括現在國安會祕書長蘇起在內的藍軍立委，動員強烈反對，導致軍售預算遲遲不能過關。
到了布希政權中期，伊拉克戰事失利，國防部長倫斯斐、副部長伍佛維茲紛紛去職，新保守派失勢，穩健派得勢，加上台灣一再衝撞既存的兩岸關係，成了美中台架構中的麻煩製造者，這時美國反倒對軍售遲疑起來：「不能夠在此時獎勵台灣」，成了當時的政策共識。
新政府上台後，雖然軍售預算解凍通過，但同時力求兩岸和解，國防政策服從於大戰略，陸續傳出令外界不解的訊息，如漢光演習不實彈射擊，其中又以軍售生變最 讓外界議論紛紛。有一說認為馬政府倒向中國太過，不僅外交休兵，連國防都自毀長城，拱手讓中國予取予求；另一說則認為美國在選前就對馬的政見有懷疑，後來 又對馬政府政策過於傾斜不滿，用軍售案施以薄懲。
無論如何，軍售既然通過，本身就反駁了許多過去的議論，但是真正應該注意的是：未來的美中台關係要往哪個方向發展？首先，從台灣的利益與立場考慮，兩岸在 逐步改善關係的同時，台灣仍應維持堅實的國防，其中包括提升武器性能，加強與友好盟邦的協防關係，而自行研發武器與外購軍品是相輔相成的手段也不能偏廢。 其他與友邦的軍事合作，除了軍購、演習計畫的相互參與觀摩，都不能停止。
更具體來說，包括軍售在內的軍事合作，應該是屬於美台之間的雙邊事務，這是兩岸不應該、也不用談的。同樣的，我們也期待美國不與中共談判對台軍售，而以 「台灣關係法」等對台安全承諾為準繩。畢竟，只有中共真正願意降低對台軍事威脅，兩岸進入停戰協定與信心增進措施談判時，軍售問題才有可能放上檯面。
其次，美國這次肯為軍售得罪北京，反映了台美之間的實質關係並未改變，也重新確認了國際政治上現實的一面。亦即美國希望兩岸在政治上分立的初衷並沒有改 變，而台灣的軍備就是面對中共談判時的籌碼本錢。美國並不希望台灣發展或取得「攻擊性」武器，所以潛艦不用談，中程地對地飛彈也被叫停，但「防禦性」武器 可以維持兩岸分治。
擴大來看，台灣並不是東亞的特例，無論是南韓或日本，都同樣置身於兩霸權之間，要怎麼協調，不是專屬台灣的難題。我們認為，美國介入台灣軍售毋須賦予太特殊的意義，相對可以減少三方的緊張。
最後，軍售宣布之後，中共抗議本來是預料中的，但這次抗議程度空前激烈，是否會造成其他衝擊？上周，美國才剛在聯合國場邊要求中共配合伊朗與北韓政策，轉 過身來就宣布軍售，也難怪北京覺得有被欺騙的感覺。但從事後來看，原定軍售項目中，愛國者飛彈由六套減為四套，黑鷹直昇機最後沒有，這已經都是安撫北京的 妥協安排，讓北京領導人能夠對內交代。
無論如何，現在的美中台關係已經不同過往，美國對台政策的底限已經清晰，兩岸關係也見和緩，台灣問題已不致再失控到能威脅中共政權的程度，因此台灣問題也不應該是美中關係的全部，雙方應該還有其他合作的領域。對中國，這是另一層意義的外交休兵。
換句話說，當前華府與北京的關係，不會也不應再因台灣問題而引爆，華盛頓看得很清楚，北京也逐漸了解，台北又何嘗不清楚。
Friday, October 3, 2008
The Democratic Progressive Party's Last Chance to Break with Chen Shui-bian
The Democratic Progressive Party's Last Chance to Break with Chen Shui-bian
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 1, 2008
The Democratic Progressive Party's Committee for Clean Government will decide how to deal with Chen Shui-bian this week. This is the Democratic Progressive Party's last chance to make a clean break with Chen Shui-bian.
Chen Shui-bian and the DPP are not on an equal footing. One. They are not on an equal footing in terms of maneuveuring room. Chen Shui-bian only needs to control a small number of Green Camp supporters to make big trouble for the DPP. The Democratic Progressive Party, on the other hand, must remain accountable to the community as a whole. Two. They are not on an equal footing in terms of time. Time is on Chen's side. The longer the situation remains unclear, the better for Chen Shui-bian, and the worse for the Democratic Progressive Party.
The Democratic Progressive Party has been slow to deal with Chen Shui-bian. It lost the opportunity to take matters into its hands, within both the party and the larger community. Take party members for example. One. Should the Democratic Progressive Party condemn Chen Shui-bian's corruption, or sympathize with him? Two. Does the Democratic Progressive Party consider Chen Shui-bian's brand of Taiwan independence Orthodox Taiwan independence? Or should the DPP condemn Chen Shui-bian's brand of Taiwan independence? Should it denounce it as false? As heresy?
The Democratic Progressive Party must adopt a clear and unequivocal position regarding Chen Shui-bian. If it fails to do so, Green Camp followers will perceive Chen Shui-bian as the standard-bearer for Taiwan independence. They may even conclude that Chen Shui-bian engaged in corruption only for the sake of the DPP, to fund the DPP's election campaigns and political protests. How then will the DPP be able to help Green Camp followers discern right from wrong? How then will the DPP be able to prevent Green Camp followers from sympathizing with Chen Shui-bian and feeling solidarity with him? The DPP Central Standing Committee has failed to establish a clear set of standards of right and wrong regarding Chen Shui-bian. By failing to do so, it has left Chen Shui-bian room to wriggle.
The public is waiting for the Democratic Progressive Party to take a stand on Chen Shui-bian's brand of Taiwan independence and corruption. If the Democratic Progressive Party cannot solve the Chen Shui-bian problem, how can it solve the problem of Taiwan's future? If the Democratic Progressive Party fails to engage in serious soul-searching on Chen Shui-bian's brand of Taiwan independence, what will the public think of the DPP? If the Democratic Progressive Party shies away from criticizing Chen Shui-bian's flagrant corruption, how can the public trust the DPP?
Chen Shui-bian is seeking warmth from diehard supporters. He is working his way from south to north. The arguments he has rallied in his own defense are beginning to take shape. The impact of his arguments on society are becoming apparent. Chen Shui-bian has made two major revisions to his defense strategy since stepping down. One. While in office, his main defense was to use the Executive Privilege of secrecy to shield other defendants. After stepping down, his main defense has been to pass the buck for any crimes he cannot weasel out of onto Wu Shu-chen. Two. While in office, his main defense was that the funds were for secret diplomacy. After stepping down, his main defense has been that the funds financed Democratic Progressive Party election campaigns and political protests. He offered two major defense arguments. One. Chen Shui-bian is also a victim. He is a victim of Wu Shu-cheng, aka "Lady MacBeth." Two. Even though the accounts remain unclear, most of the funds were nevertheless to be used on behalf of the Democratic Progressive Party and the Green Camp. Chen Shui-bian clearly hopes to turn these two themes into Green Camp articles of faith. One. I did not embezzle money. What Wu Shu-chen did had nothing to do with me. Two. The books may contain irregularities, but the funds were to be used for the Democratic Progressive Party and the Green Camp. This defense strategy may not be of much use in the courtroom, but they may have an impact in the Green Camp. They may provide Chen Shui-bian with sufficient leverage to hijack the Democratic Progressive Party.
Therefore the longer the Democratic Progressive Party waits before dealing with Chen Shui-bian, the denser the smokescreen Chen will be able to lay down. The Democratic Progressive will lose the opportunity to influence party members and the general public. It will lose the initiative. Chen Shui-bian's arguments may not change the big picture, but they may allow him to become the moral arbiter for hardline Green Camp supporters. They may give the public the impression the Democratic Progressive Party is indifferent to right and wrong. Chen Shui-bian is fighting like a caged animal. The Democratic Progressive Party may be dragged down with him.
Based on Chen Shui-bian's ability to manipulate the facts, he may be able to create an image of himself as someone who did not engage in corruption, but instead selflessly channeled wealth into the party's coffers. If so, he will be able to consolidate his status as the standard bearer for the Taiwan independence movement. Even if he is tried and found guilty, he needs only a pardon. Even though he has been stripped of political authority, Chen Shui-bian can still become the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party. This is a long term concern for the Democratic Progressive Party's reformist faction. Chen Shui-bian must not be regarded as merely a temporary inconvenience. For the DPP to distance itself from Chen Shui-bian, does not mean merely ridding itself of Chen Shui-bian. It means establishing a new set of standards for right and wrong within the Green Camp.
To sum up, the DPP must repudiate Chen Shui-bian. It must compete with Chen Shui-bian for the right to define the party's values. It must compete with Chen Shui-bian for the right to define Taiwan independence, to define democracy, to define the rule of law, to define ethics, to define integrity, to define honor, to define justice, and finally, to define the nature and image of the Democratic Progressive Party. When the viper bites the hero's hand, the hero cuts the hand off. This is the DPP's last chance to make a clean break with Chen Shui-bian.
民進黨與陳水扁切割的最後時機
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.10.01
民進黨廉政委員會本周將對陳水扁作出處置，這應當是民進黨與陳水扁切割的最後時機。
民進黨與陳水扁處於不對等的地位。一、空間上的不對等：陳水扁只須掌握綠營少數支持者，即可興風作浪；但民進黨必須向整個社會交代。二、時間上的不對等：曖昧不明的情勢拖延下去，對陳水扁有利，對民進黨不利。
民進黨遲未對陳水扁作出處置，在黨內群眾及黨外社會皆失去操作的準據。對黨內群眾言：一、民進黨對陳水扁的貪腐應當同情或譴責？二、民進黨是否認為「扁式台獨」即是台獨的經典？反過來說，民進黨應否對「扁式台獨」有所批評，甚至指明他是假台獨？
民進黨若不對陳水扁作出明確處置，亦即是不對上述這兩大問題表達立場；綠營的群眾自然仍視陳水扁為台獨旗手，甚至認為陳水扁是為了民進黨而貪汙（用於選舉、遊行），則如何導正綠營群眾的是非，又如何阻止綠營群眾對陳水扁的同情與聲援？黨中央未能在綠營內部建立一個「如何認定陳水扁」的是非標準，陳水扁就有了操作的空間。
同理，社會大眾亦在等待民進黨對陳水扁的「台獨」與「貪腐」表達立場。倘若民進黨連陳水扁這個題目都沒有能力解決，民進黨豈有能力解決整個台灣的問題？倘若民進黨對「扁式台獨」亦不知檢討，則社會大眾將如何看待民進黨？倘若民進黨對陳水扁的奇貪惡腐亦不敢批評，社會大眾又如何重新信任民進黨？
陳水扁的「取暖之旅」，由南部漸漸北上，其自我辯護的論述亦已漸現輪廓，在社會影響上也可能漸成氣候。陳水扁的辯護主軸，從在職時至卸任後，有二大變化：一、在任時，辯護主軸是用總統機密特權來護衛其他被告；卸任後，則是將一切無法抵賴的罪行皆推給吳淑珍。二、在任時，辯護主軸是款項皆用於機密外交；卸任後，辯護主軸則又稱錢是用於資助民進黨選舉或遊行等途。這兩大主軸，一是家有惡妻，陳水扁也是「受害人」；二是帳目雖然不清，卻是用在民進黨及綠營。陳水扁顯然欲藉這兩大主軸漸漸形成一種綠營內部的輿情：一、我沒貪汙（吳淑珍不干我事）；二、我即使帳目不清，但大量用於民進黨及綠營。這樣的辯護主軸，在法庭攻防上未必有效，但極可能在綠營內部發酵，使陳水扁能夠掌握足以挾持民進黨的支持力量。
因此，民進黨愈遲未對陳水扁作出處置，陳水扁所製造的似是而非的氛圍勢必愈加瀰漫；如此一來，如前所述，民進黨對黨內群眾及社會大眾，亦將愈加失去操作的準據。陳水扁的論述雖不可能改變全局，卻對內佔據了在綠營基層的詮釋權，並對外決定了社會大眾認定民進黨不問是非的形象；陳水扁固可藉此困獸猶鬥，民進黨卻恐將被陳水扁拖到血盡氣絕。
以陳水扁的操作能力，他極可能在綠營基層塑造其「我未貪汙／錢皆餵黨」的新形象；如此，他即可鞏固其台獨旗手的地位。即使一旦審判有罪，只須獲得特赦，縱然被褫奪公權，陳水扁亦不無「再回來領導民進黨」的可能。民進黨今日之改革派，必須有此種「遠慮」，而不能將陳水扁僅僅視為一時之「近憂」；與陳水扁切割，不只是要甩掉陳水扁這個人，而是要全力開闢出一個重建綠營大是大非標準的政治情境。
綜上所論，民進黨必須與陳水扁作出切割，主要原因在於必須與陳水扁爭奪詮釋權；爭奪對台獨的詮釋權，對民主的詮釋權，對法治的詮釋權，對政治道德的詮釋權，對政治操守的詮釋權，對廉恥的詮釋權，對正義的詮釋權，更是爭奪對民進黨之本質與形象的詮釋權。蝮蛇螫手，壯士斷腕。現在，已到了民進黨必須與陳水扁切割的最後時機。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 1, 2008
The Democratic Progressive Party's Committee for Clean Government will decide how to deal with Chen Shui-bian this week. This is the Democratic Progressive Party's last chance to make a clean break with Chen Shui-bian.
Chen Shui-bian and the DPP are not on an equal footing. One. They are not on an equal footing in terms of maneuveuring room. Chen Shui-bian only needs to control a small number of Green Camp supporters to make big trouble for the DPP. The Democratic Progressive Party, on the other hand, must remain accountable to the community as a whole. Two. They are not on an equal footing in terms of time. Time is on Chen's side. The longer the situation remains unclear, the better for Chen Shui-bian, and the worse for the Democratic Progressive Party.
The Democratic Progressive Party has been slow to deal with Chen Shui-bian. It lost the opportunity to take matters into its hands, within both the party and the larger community. Take party members for example. One. Should the Democratic Progressive Party condemn Chen Shui-bian's corruption, or sympathize with him? Two. Does the Democratic Progressive Party consider Chen Shui-bian's brand of Taiwan independence Orthodox Taiwan independence? Or should the DPP condemn Chen Shui-bian's brand of Taiwan independence? Should it denounce it as false? As heresy?
The Democratic Progressive Party must adopt a clear and unequivocal position regarding Chen Shui-bian. If it fails to do so, Green Camp followers will perceive Chen Shui-bian as the standard-bearer for Taiwan independence. They may even conclude that Chen Shui-bian engaged in corruption only for the sake of the DPP, to fund the DPP's election campaigns and political protests. How then will the DPP be able to help Green Camp followers discern right from wrong? How then will the DPP be able to prevent Green Camp followers from sympathizing with Chen Shui-bian and feeling solidarity with him? The DPP Central Standing Committee has failed to establish a clear set of standards of right and wrong regarding Chen Shui-bian. By failing to do so, it has left Chen Shui-bian room to wriggle.
The public is waiting for the Democratic Progressive Party to take a stand on Chen Shui-bian's brand of Taiwan independence and corruption. If the Democratic Progressive Party cannot solve the Chen Shui-bian problem, how can it solve the problem of Taiwan's future? If the Democratic Progressive Party fails to engage in serious soul-searching on Chen Shui-bian's brand of Taiwan independence, what will the public think of the DPP? If the Democratic Progressive Party shies away from criticizing Chen Shui-bian's flagrant corruption, how can the public trust the DPP?
Chen Shui-bian is seeking warmth from diehard supporters. He is working his way from south to north. The arguments he has rallied in his own defense are beginning to take shape. The impact of his arguments on society are becoming apparent. Chen Shui-bian has made two major revisions to his defense strategy since stepping down. One. While in office, his main defense was to use the Executive Privilege of secrecy to shield other defendants. After stepping down, his main defense has been to pass the buck for any crimes he cannot weasel out of onto Wu Shu-chen. Two. While in office, his main defense was that the funds were for secret diplomacy. After stepping down, his main defense has been that the funds financed Democratic Progressive Party election campaigns and political protests. He offered two major defense arguments. One. Chen Shui-bian is also a victim. He is a victim of Wu Shu-cheng, aka "Lady MacBeth." Two. Even though the accounts remain unclear, most of the funds were nevertheless to be used on behalf of the Democratic Progressive Party and the Green Camp. Chen Shui-bian clearly hopes to turn these two themes into Green Camp articles of faith. One. I did not embezzle money. What Wu Shu-chen did had nothing to do with me. Two. The books may contain irregularities, but the funds were to be used for the Democratic Progressive Party and the Green Camp. This defense strategy may not be of much use in the courtroom, but they may have an impact in the Green Camp. They may provide Chen Shui-bian with sufficient leverage to hijack the Democratic Progressive Party.
Therefore the longer the Democratic Progressive Party waits before dealing with Chen Shui-bian, the denser the smokescreen Chen will be able to lay down. The Democratic Progressive will lose the opportunity to influence party members and the general public. It will lose the initiative. Chen Shui-bian's arguments may not change the big picture, but they may allow him to become the moral arbiter for hardline Green Camp supporters. They may give the public the impression the Democratic Progressive Party is indifferent to right and wrong. Chen Shui-bian is fighting like a caged animal. The Democratic Progressive Party may be dragged down with him.
Based on Chen Shui-bian's ability to manipulate the facts, he may be able to create an image of himself as someone who did not engage in corruption, but instead selflessly channeled wealth into the party's coffers. If so, he will be able to consolidate his status as the standard bearer for the Taiwan independence movement. Even if he is tried and found guilty, he needs only a pardon. Even though he has been stripped of political authority, Chen Shui-bian can still become the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party. This is a long term concern for the Democratic Progressive Party's reformist faction. Chen Shui-bian must not be regarded as merely a temporary inconvenience. For the DPP to distance itself from Chen Shui-bian, does not mean merely ridding itself of Chen Shui-bian. It means establishing a new set of standards for right and wrong within the Green Camp.
To sum up, the DPP must repudiate Chen Shui-bian. It must compete with Chen Shui-bian for the right to define the party's values. It must compete with Chen Shui-bian for the right to define Taiwan independence, to define democracy, to define the rule of law, to define ethics, to define integrity, to define honor, to define justice, and finally, to define the nature and image of the Democratic Progressive Party. When the viper bites the hero's hand, the hero cuts the hand off. This is the DPP's last chance to make a clean break with Chen Shui-bian.
民進黨與陳水扁切割的最後時機
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.10.01
民進黨廉政委員會本周將對陳水扁作出處置，這應當是民進黨與陳水扁切割的最後時機。
民進黨與陳水扁處於不對等的地位。一、空間上的不對等：陳水扁只須掌握綠營少數支持者，即可興風作浪；但民進黨必須向整個社會交代。二、時間上的不對等：曖昧不明的情勢拖延下去，對陳水扁有利，對民進黨不利。
民進黨遲未對陳水扁作出處置，在黨內群眾及黨外社會皆失去操作的準據。對黨內群眾言：一、民進黨對陳水扁的貪腐應當同情或譴責？二、民進黨是否認為「扁式台獨」即是台獨的經典？反過來說，民進黨應否對「扁式台獨」有所批評，甚至指明他是假台獨？
民進黨若不對陳水扁作出明確處置，亦即是不對上述這兩大問題表達立場；綠營的群眾自然仍視陳水扁為台獨旗手，甚至認為陳水扁是為了民進黨而貪汙（用於選舉、遊行），則如何導正綠營群眾的是非，又如何阻止綠營群眾對陳水扁的同情與聲援？黨中央未能在綠營內部建立一個「如何認定陳水扁」的是非標準，陳水扁就有了操作的空間。
同理，社會大眾亦在等待民進黨對陳水扁的「台獨」與「貪腐」表達立場。倘若民進黨連陳水扁這個題目都沒有能力解決，民進黨豈有能力解決整個台灣的問題？倘若民進黨對「扁式台獨」亦不知檢討，則社會大眾將如何看待民進黨？倘若民進黨對陳水扁的奇貪惡腐亦不敢批評，社會大眾又如何重新信任民進黨？
陳水扁的「取暖之旅」，由南部漸漸北上，其自我辯護的論述亦已漸現輪廓，在社會影響上也可能漸成氣候。陳水扁的辯護主軸，從在職時至卸任後，有二大變化：一、在任時，辯護主軸是用總統機密特權來護衛其他被告；卸任後，則是將一切無法抵賴的罪行皆推給吳淑珍。二、在任時，辯護主軸是款項皆用於機密外交；卸任後，辯護主軸則又稱錢是用於資助民進黨選舉或遊行等途。這兩大主軸，一是家有惡妻，陳水扁也是「受害人」；二是帳目雖然不清，卻是用在民進黨及綠營。陳水扁顯然欲藉這兩大主軸漸漸形成一種綠營內部的輿情：一、我沒貪汙（吳淑珍不干我事）；二、我即使帳目不清，但大量用於民進黨及綠營。這樣的辯護主軸，在法庭攻防上未必有效，但極可能在綠營內部發酵，使陳水扁能夠掌握足以挾持民進黨的支持力量。
因此，民進黨愈遲未對陳水扁作出處置，陳水扁所製造的似是而非的氛圍勢必愈加瀰漫；如此一來，如前所述，民進黨對黨內群眾及社會大眾，亦將愈加失去操作的準據。陳水扁的論述雖不可能改變全局，卻對內佔據了在綠營基層的詮釋權，並對外決定了社會大眾認定民進黨不問是非的形象；陳水扁固可藉此困獸猶鬥，民進黨卻恐將被陳水扁拖到血盡氣絕。
以陳水扁的操作能力，他極可能在綠營基層塑造其「我未貪汙／錢皆餵黨」的新形象；如此，他即可鞏固其台獨旗手的地位。即使一旦審判有罪，只須獲得特赦，縱然被褫奪公權，陳水扁亦不無「再回來領導民進黨」的可能。民進黨今日之改革派，必須有此種「遠慮」，而不能將陳水扁僅僅視為一時之「近憂」；與陳水扁切割，不只是要甩掉陳水扁這個人，而是要全力開闢出一個重建綠營大是大非標準的政治情境。
綜上所論，民進黨必須與陳水扁作出切割，主要原因在於必須與陳水扁爭奪詮釋權；爭奪對台獨的詮釋權，對民主的詮釋權，對法治的詮釋權，對政治道德的詮釋權，對政治操守的詮釋權，對廉恥的詮釋權，對正義的詮釋權，更是爭奪對民進黨之本質與形象的詮釋權。蝮蛇螫手，壯士斷腕。現在，已到了民進黨必須與陳水扁切割的最後時機。
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Lin Fang-Yu and Tu Cheng-sheng: A Tale of Two Political Appointees
Lin Fang-Yu and Tu Cheng-sheng: A Tale of Two Political Appointees
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 2, 2008
Helping Lin Fang-yu rehabilitate himself is no easy task. That's because he keeps changing his position, and has yet to explain why. But once the European Union and New Zealand announced their own melamine testing standards, Lin Fang-yu's 2.5 PPM standard ceased being the butt of jokes. It was acknowledged as a reasonable industry standard. Lin Fang-yu was forced to step down merely because he made a reasonable and well-intentioned policy decision. His forced resignation reveals the cabinet's inability to stand up to mob sentiment. It also reveals the impetuousness and superficiality of Taiwan society.
Lin Fang-yu became the Liu cabinet's first sacrificial pawn, and revealed the Liu cabinet's timidity and ineptitude. Contrast the Liu cabinet's demeanor with the high-handed demeanor of the Chen Shui-bian regime. Take for example, Minister of Education Tu Cheng-sheng. Even when a position he had adopted was utterly indefensible, he remained as immovable as the Rock of Gibraltar. The difference between the two administrations is like night and day. It is impossible to apply the same standards when evaluating the relative merits of the two administrations' political appointees.
Tu Cheng-sheng could be considered the Chen Shui-bian regime's most controversial cabinet member. Tu often made off the wall political comments and distorted the educational curriculum with political ideology. He picked his nose in public. He dozed off in the legislature. He condoned his son's abuse of official power. He never apologized. He remained indifferent to the impact of his behavior on the community. He felt no need to reflect on his misconduct. Instead he dug in his heels and stonewalled. Worried parents no longer knew what to teach their children. Tu Cheng-sheng went from Curator of the National Palace Museum to Minister of Education. Six Premiers came and went, but Tu's job remained secure. Even when Chen Shui-bian faced defeat, and Democratic Progressive Party legislators demanded that Tu step down, he held out to the very last minute, and became the longest-lived cabinet appointee.
The Green Camp considered Tu Cheng-sheng a hero. He reflected the Chen Shui-bian regime's political philosophy. He reflected the Democratic Progressive Party's gangster mentality. What modern political party would allow a political appointee to persist in making such intemperate remarks without disciplining him or replacing him? What democratic political party would ever allow a rogue official to become a party hero? Tu Cheng-sheng, by demonstrating his peculiar form of loyalty to Pan Green values, hitched his wagon to Chen Shui-bian's star. This of course is how Chen Shui-bian hijacked the Democratic Progressive Party. Only criminal organizations such as triads, or criminal organizations disguised as political parties, swear such blood oaths and demonstrate such blind loyalty.
The Chen Shui-bian regime was a hardcore criminal enterprise. Lin Fang-yu, on the other hand, was a sacrificial victim for the Ma administration's weak-kneed technocracy. Lin Fang-yu's fatal mistake was to change the decision-making process but fail to explain why. Had Lin Fangyu been more devious, he could have defined any amount undetectable by instruments as "zero." He could have turned a blind eye to the matter, and muddled through. But as a health official with a conscience, Lin Fang-yu did not want to equivocate. He wanted to clarify the issue factually and scientifically. Unfortunately his honesty was twisted by the opposition party and Green Camp talking heads into "humans being are being valued less than pigs." A cowed ruling party felt obliged to apologize for Lin's statement, characterizing it as a "bolt out of the blue." The public, having lost confidence in the administration, blasted it mercilessly.
Apart from Lin Fang-yu's resignation, the most regrettable aspect of the entire incident was the public's irrationality, intolerance, and scientific ignorance. In fact, the tested amounts of artificial melamine additives are often thousands of times the amount leached from containers. The harm inflicted by the two cannot be equated. The European Union standard is 2.5 PPM. New Zealand's standard is 5 PPM. Lin Fang-yu's standard had a sound scientific basis. Furthermore, over the past 20 years, Taiwan has produced and exported god knows how many melamine products. Melamine is not merely the English name of the finished product, it is also the name of the raw ingredient. Many restaurants on Taiwan still use melamine dinnerware. One must make rational distinctions between melamine contaminated milk and melamine dinnerware. If one cannot, then Taiwan's contaminated milk crisis may end, but many innocent food vendors will become victims, with serious social and economic repercussions. Unfortunately the attitude of many politicians is "out of sight, out of mind."
Lin Fang-yu served as a cabinet member for 129 days. Tu Cheng-sheng served as a cabinet member for eight years. The two officials' very different fates reflect two very different administrations and two very different styles of governance. Their very different fates give pause for thought. The Chen Shui-bian administration's high-handed and tyrannical style provokes anger. The Ma Ying-jeou administration's dull-witted, mealy-mouthed style provokes exasperation.
Remember the SARS crisis? Taiwan was overwhelmed by ignorance and panic. Only when the World Health Organization issued a scientific report did people breath a sigh of relief. We can only hope that the contaminated milk incident will teach us the value of science and rationality.
林芳郁和杜正勝：政務官的兩種身影
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.10.02 03:05 am
要 幫林芳郁「平反」並不容易，畢竟他自己決策反覆，又未能清楚說明政策轉變的邏輯。但在歐盟及紐西蘭相繼宣布三聚氰胺檢測標準後，林芳郁訂出的二點五ＰＰＭ 卻不再是笑話一則，而是相對合理的執行標準。林芳郁為了一個誠實的決策下台，除暴露劉內閣未能面對民粹壓力，也反映了台灣社會的急躁和淺碟。
林芳郁被當成第一顆犧牲的棋子，顯示了劉內閣的心虛和手拙；若比起陳水扁時代表現蠻橫、荒誕卻始終屹立不搖的教長杜正勝，兩個政府作風差異之大直如天壤。兩相對照，政務官的曲直良莠，已全然沒有判準可循。
陳 水扁任內，杜正勝可謂是最滋爭議的閣員。在職務表現上，他經常撈過界發表與己無關的政治謬論，更用政治教條扭曲教育價值；在私人言行上，他當眾挖鼻孔、打 瞌睡、縱容其子濫用官舍，毫無忌憚；在社會形象上，他失德失態卻不反省，反而一味硬拗，讓父母擔心不知如何教育子女。然而，杜正勝從故宮院長到教長歷經六 任閣揆，地位始終鞏固；即使在陳水扁敗象已露之際，民進黨立委點名他該下台，他仍隨扁政府撐到最後一刻，成為最長命的閣員。
杜正勝被綠營 視如瑰寶，除反映扁政府的施政哲學，也折射了民進黨的幫派性格。試想，若是一個現代化政黨，怎麼會容許政務官長期奇言異行而不加以糾正或撤換？若是一個民 主政黨，怎麼可能完全不顧社會觀瞻，卻將離經叛道官員當成本黨的英雄人物？從這個角度看，如果說杜正勝以其奇特的綠色忠誠拴住了扁政府，那麼，陳水扁綁架 民進黨不正出於同樣的邏輯嗎？一個歃血為盟的幫派組織，才會存在這種「私忠」的潛規則。
相對於扁政府死硬的幫派性格，林芳郁的命運，就是 馬政府「懦弱的專業主義」下的犧牲品。林芳郁的錯誤，在於他變更了決策標準，卻又無法向社會清楚交代變更的緣由，這是他致命所在。其實，林芳郁若是個狡猾 的官員，他大可將儀器檢測不出來的部分視同「零檢出」，在行政上睜一隻眼、閉一隻眼，也就過關了。但作為一個不失良心的衛生官員，林芳郁不想含糊了事，而 意圖將科學與事實間的出入作個釐清。可惜，他的誠實，被混淆是非的在野黨及綠色名嘴譏為「人不如豬」，被方寸已亂的執政黨說成「青天霹靂」，被失去信心的 民眾罵到臭頭。
在整起事件中，讓人惋惜的不只是林芳郁的去職，而是社會對理性的缺乏包容，以及對科學的缺乏信心。事實上，三聚氰胺若是人 工添加，其驗出成分往往是器皿溶出量的千百倍，兩者危害自不可同日而語。從歐盟訂出的二點五ＰＰＭ和紐西蘭的五ＰＰＭ，說明林芳郁的標準有其科學根據。再 說，過去廿多年，台灣生產及輸出了不知多少「美耐皿」產品，這個名稱不僅是以三聚氰胺的英文melamine命名，而且是以它為原料製成；何況，台灣許多 店家至今也仍在使用這種餐具供客人食用。如果不能把大陸毒奶和美耐皿作出區隔，台灣毒奶風暴難以停歇也就罷了，它還會禍延許多無辜小吃商販，對社會經濟造 成嚴重衝擊。可惜，許多政客卻陷溺於「眼不見為淨」的自欺。
林芳郁一百二十九天的短命閣員生涯，比起杜正勝八年的屹立不搖，兩人迥異的下場，映照兩個政府強弱極端的施政風格，讓人感慨。扁政府的強橫硬拗固令人厭憎，馬政府的遲鈍軟弱亦令人難耐。
回顧當年ＳＡＲＳ風暴，台灣也曾因充滿未知而陷入驚恐；直到世界衛生組織發布科學報告，人們才得以從口罩危機解放。這次毒奶風波，讓我們學會了尊重科學理性嗎？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 2, 2008
Helping Lin Fang-yu rehabilitate himself is no easy task. That's because he keeps changing his position, and has yet to explain why. But once the European Union and New Zealand announced their own melamine testing standards, Lin Fang-yu's 2.5 PPM standard ceased being the butt of jokes. It was acknowledged as a reasonable industry standard. Lin Fang-yu was forced to step down merely because he made a reasonable and well-intentioned policy decision. His forced resignation reveals the cabinet's inability to stand up to mob sentiment. It also reveals the impetuousness and superficiality of Taiwan society.
Lin Fang-yu became the Liu cabinet's first sacrificial pawn, and revealed the Liu cabinet's timidity and ineptitude. Contrast the Liu cabinet's demeanor with the high-handed demeanor of the Chen Shui-bian regime. Take for example, Minister of Education Tu Cheng-sheng. Even when a position he had adopted was utterly indefensible, he remained as immovable as the Rock of Gibraltar. The difference between the two administrations is like night and day. It is impossible to apply the same standards when evaluating the relative merits of the two administrations' political appointees.
Tu Cheng-sheng could be considered the Chen Shui-bian regime's most controversial cabinet member. Tu often made off the wall political comments and distorted the educational curriculum with political ideology. He picked his nose in public. He dozed off in the legislature. He condoned his son's abuse of official power. He never apologized. He remained indifferent to the impact of his behavior on the community. He felt no need to reflect on his misconduct. Instead he dug in his heels and stonewalled. Worried parents no longer knew what to teach their children. Tu Cheng-sheng went from Curator of the National Palace Museum to Minister of Education. Six Premiers came and went, but Tu's job remained secure. Even when Chen Shui-bian faced defeat, and Democratic Progressive Party legislators demanded that Tu step down, he held out to the very last minute, and became the longest-lived cabinet appointee.
The Green Camp considered Tu Cheng-sheng a hero. He reflected the Chen Shui-bian regime's political philosophy. He reflected the Democratic Progressive Party's gangster mentality. What modern political party would allow a political appointee to persist in making such intemperate remarks without disciplining him or replacing him? What democratic political party would ever allow a rogue official to become a party hero? Tu Cheng-sheng, by demonstrating his peculiar form of loyalty to Pan Green values, hitched his wagon to Chen Shui-bian's star. This of course is how Chen Shui-bian hijacked the Democratic Progressive Party. Only criminal organizations such as triads, or criminal organizations disguised as political parties, swear such blood oaths and demonstrate such blind loyalty.
The Chen Shui-bian regime was a hardcore criminal enterprise. Lin Fang-yu, on the other hand, was a sacrificial victim for the Ma administration's weak-kneed technocracy. Lin Fang-yu's fatal mistake was to change the decision-making process but fail to explain why. Had Lin Fangyu been more devious, he could have defined any amount undetectable by instruments as "zero." He could have turned a blind eye to the matter, and muddled through. But as a health official with a conscience, Lin Fang-yu did not want to equivocate. He wanted to clarify the issue factually and scientifically. Unfortunately his honesty was twisted by the opposition party and Green Camp talking heads into "humans being are being valued less than pigs." A cowed ruling party felt obliged to apologize for Lin's statement, characterizing it as a "bolt out of the blue." The public, having lost confidence in the administration, blasted it mercilessly.
Apart from Lin Fang-yu's resignation, the most regrettable aspect of the entire incident was the public's irrationality, intolerance, and scientific ignorance. In fact, the tested amounts of artificial melamine additives are often thousands of times the amount leached from containers. The harm inflicted by the two cannot be equated. The European Union standard is 2.5 PPM. New Zealand's standard is 5 PPM. Lin Fang-yu's standard had a sound scientific basis. Furthermore, over the past 20 years, Taiwan has produced and exported god knows how many melamine products. Melamine is not merely the English name of the finished product, it is also the name of the raw ingredient. Many restaurants on Taiwan still use melamine dinnerware. One must make rational distinctions between melamine contaminated milk and melamine dinnerware. If one cannot, then Taiwan's contaminated milk crisis may end, but many innocent food vendors will become victims, with serious social and economic repercussions. Unfortunately the attitude of many politicians is "out of sight, out of mind."
Lin Fang-yu served as a cabinet member for 129 days. Tu Cheng-sheng served as a cabinet member for eight years. The two officials' very different fates reflect two very different administrations and two very different styles of governance. Their very different fates give pause for thought. The Chen Shui-bian administration's high-handed and tyrannical style provokes anger. The Ma Ying-jeou administration's dull-witted, mealy-mouthed style provokes exasperation.
Remember the SARS crisis? Taiwan was overwhelmed by ignorance and panic. Only when the World Health Organization issued a scientific report did people breath a sigh of relief. We can only hope that the contaminated milk incident will teach us the value of science and rationality.
林芳郁和杜正勝：政務官的兩種身影
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.10.02 03:05 am
要 幫林芳郁「平反」並不容易，畢竟他自己決策反覆，又未能清楚說明政策轉變的邏輯。但在歐盟及紐西蘭相繼宣布三聚氰胺檢測標準後，林芳郁訂出的二點五ＰＰＭ 卻不再是笑話一則，而是相對合理的執行標準。林芳郁為了一個誠實的決策下台，除暴露劉內閣未能面對民粹壓力，也反映了台灣社會的急躁和淺碟。
林芳郁被當成第一顆犧牲的棋子，顯示了劉內閣的心虛和手拙；若比起陳水扁時代表現蠻橫、荒誕卻始終屹立不搖的教長杜正勝，兩個政府作風差異之大直如天壤。兩相對照，政務官的曲直良莠，已全然沒有判準可循。
陳 水扁任內，杜正勝可謂是最滋爭議的閣員。在職務表現上，他經常撈過界發表與己無關的政治謬論，更用政治教條扭曲教育價值；在私人言行上，他當眾挖鼻孔、打 瞌睡、縱容其子濫用官舍，毫無忌憚；在社會形象上，他失德失態卻不反省，反而一味硬拗，讓父母擔心不知如何教育子女。然而，杜正勝從故宮院長到教長歷經六 任閣揆，地位始終鞏固；即使在陳水扁敗象已露之際，民進黨立委點名他該下台，他仍隨扁政府撐到最後一刻，成為最長命的閣員。
杜正勝被綠營 視如瑰寶，除反映扁政府的施政哲學，也折射了民進黨的幫派性格。試想，若是一個現代化政黨，怎麼會容許政務官長期奇言異行而不加以糾正或撤換？若是一個民 主政黨，怎麼可能完全不顧社會觀瞻，卻將離經叛道官員當成本黨的英雄人物？從這個角度看，如果說杜正勝以其奇特的綠色忠誠拴住了扁政府，那麼，陳水扁綁架 民進黨不正出於同樣的邏輯嗎？一個歃血為盟的幫派組織，才會存在這種「私忠」的潛規則。
相對於扁政府死硬的幫派性格，林芳郁的命運，就是 馬政府「懦弱的專業主義」下的犧牲品。林芳郁的錯誤，在於他變更了決策標準，卻又無法向社會清楚交代變更的緣由，這是他致命所在。其實，林芳郁若是個狡猾 的官員，他大可將儀器檢測不出來的部分視同「零檢出」，在行政上睜一隻眼、閉一隻眼，也就過關了。但作為一個不失良心的衛生官員，林芳郁不想含糊了事，而 意圖將科學與事實間的出入作個釐清。可惜，他的誠實，被混淆是非的在野黨及綠色名嘴譏為「人不如豬」，被方寸已亂的執政黨說成「青天霹靂」，被失去信心的 民眾罵到臭頭。
在整起事件中，讓人惋惜的不只是林芳郁的去職，而是社會對理性的缺乏包容，以及對科學的缺乏信心。事實上，三聚氰胺若是人 工添加，其驗出成分往往是器皿溶出量的千百倍，兩者危害自不可同日而語。從歐盟訂出的二點五ＰＰＭ和紐西蘭的五ＰＰＭ，說明林芳郁的標準有其科學根據。再 說，過去廿多年，台灣生產及輸出了不知多少「美耐皿」產品，這個名稱不僅是以三聚氰胺的英文melamine命名，而且是以它為原料製成；何況，台灣許多 店家至今也仍在使用這種餐具供客人食用。如果不能把大陸毒奶和美耐皿作出區隔，台灣毒奶風暴難以停歇也就罷了，它還會禍延許多無辜小吃商販，對社會經濟造 成嚴重衝擊。可惜，許多政客卻陷溺於「眼不見為淨」的自欺。
林芳郁一百二十九天的短命閣員生涯，比起杜正勝八年的屹立不搖，兩人迥異的下場，映照兩個政府強弱極端的施政風格，讓人感慨。扁政府的強橫硬拗固令人厭憎，馬政府的遲鈍軟弱亦令人難耐。
回顧當年ＳＡＲＳ風暴，台灣也曾因充滿未知而陷入驚恐；直到世界衛生組織發布科學報告，人們才得以從口罩危機解放。這次毒奶風波，讓我們學會了尊重科學理性嗎？
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