Rescuing the Economy: Plan for the Worst, Hope for the Best
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 12, 2009
The latest trade statistics, released in December, show that the government has again underestimated the impact of the global financial crisis on the economic outlook. Now, in the face of an even worse economic chill, the government can no longer afford to sit by and watch. It can no longer afford to be complacent. It must plan for the worst, while hoping for the best. It must redouble its efforts to rescue the economy.
Last week the Ministry of Finance announced that December exports totalled only 13.6 billion USD, 42% less than the same month two years ago. This established a new record for the largest monthly decline in history. The DGBAS initially estimated that exports would decline 8% compared to the previous quarter. It has now increased that estimate to 25%. This means the economy declined even more than the 1.7% expected during the previous quarter. These numbers raise at least three warning flags. One. The economy is rapidly deteriorating. Two. The government overestimated the last quarter's economic performance. Three. Maintaining a growth rate of at least 2% this year will be difficult. The risk of recession is rising. Its duration may be longer.
This is not the first time the government has misjudged the situation. The last time was in August, just before the financial crisis struck. July showed symptoms of a deficit. But a still optimistic DGBAS nevertheless forecast a growth rate above 3 percent for the second half. Therefore it was unprepared for the coming crisis. It was unable to implement countermeasures to increase domestic demand and to build local public infrastructure. Its administrative efficiency was low. It has now blundered again. This means its previous programs to revitalize the economy were already inadequate. Naturally they are also in adequate to meet future needs. The government's efforts to rescue the economy must be redoubled and accelerated to resist the impact of the recession.
Less than half an hour after the central bank released its export data, it announced an emergency rate cut of 0.5%. It allowed the discount rate to fall to 1.5%, only 0.25% above the historic low. It wanted to keep interest rates low to defend the NTD and prevent further deterioration in exports. But interest rates and exchange rates are a double-edged sword. Set them too low and they will do Taiwan's economy more harm than good. The central bank has no more room for interest rate cuts. The next step may be to print banknotes and stuff them into people's pockets. The U.S. Federal Reserve is already doing this. But the side effects are serious. The central bank will resort to it only as a last resort.
Now that the effectiveness of monetary policy has been exhausted, governments are redoubling their efforts to rescue their economies. Take United States President-elect Barack Obama's economic stimulus package. Unemployment and retail sales have hit record lows. The size of the package has increased from 200 billion USD when Obama was elected, to one trillion USD. During Bush's term of office, Congress passed a 700 billion USD injection of liquidity into the market. Altogether the United States has invested 8.5 trillion dollars in rescuing its economy. This is more than it spent on all its wars combined. Clearly the United States considers the economic recession "Public Enemy Number One."
Mainland China has decided to spend nearly 600 billion USD to stimulate domestic demand. Local governments have also redoubled their efforts. The Eurozone has approved the use of at least 1.5% of its GDP, approximately 180 billion USD, to stabilize demand within the region. Japan, South Korea and India have also been steadily increasing the size of their stimulus packages. All these moves indicate that the swiftness of the economic decline exceeded all expectations. Will it become a second Great Depression? In order to combat indifference, governments are clearly anticipating the worst. Better too much than not enough. Better late than never.
Yet on Taiwan, even after the export statistics were announced, only the central bank took action. The Ministry of Economic Affairs, whose direct responsibility is to address such matters, expressed "surprise." Its plans for stimulation of demand remained unchanged. At the Executive Yuan meanwhile, Premier Liu Chao-shiuan, after passing this year's economic reconstruction plans, gave himself a pep talk. He said there was no room for pessimism. At the same time he offered no policy in response. When speaking to the public, the government cannot of course be pessimistic. But when facing problems, the government must anticipate the worst. Only such pessimism can force one to treat problems more seriously, anticipate them a little earlier, and deal with them in greater depth. Bit by bit, one can narrow the gap between policy and implementation, avoid nasty surprises, and give Taiwan the opportunity to rejuvenate its economy more rapidly.
Therefore the government must act immediately. It must develop new programs to rescue the economy. It must not take consumer vouchers, tax cuts, cross-Strait direct links, and central bank interest rate cuts for granted. It must act as if these policies are not in place. It must remain pessimistic. In particular, the government must aggressively promote the five year, 500 billion NTD special budget for public works to be adopted this week. It must also increase its administrative efficiency, and undergo intensive reorganization. Spending the money now rather than next year will have an entirely different effect on the economy.
加碼救經濟：最壞的打算，最好的準備
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.12 02:29 am
最新出爐的十二月貿易統計顯示，政府對於經濟前景的預期，再一次低估金融海嘯的衝擊；如今，面對可能更劇烈的景氣寒流，政府不能再觀望、再自滿，唯有以最壞的打算、做最好的準備，加碼救經濟。
財政部上周公布，十二月出口只有一百卅六億美元，較前年同月劇減近四成二，創下歷年單月最大減幅；這使得上季出口降幅，由主計處估計的百分之八，大舉擴大 到百分之廿五，意謂上季經濟將比預期的衰退百分之一點七還差。因此，這個數字發出至少三項紅色警報，不只呈現景氣惡化之速、凸顯政府高估上季經濟表現的錯 誤，也預示今年台灣經濟成長率「保二」困難，衰退風險正在升高、衰退期間可能更長。
這已不是政府第一次誤判情勢。上一次是在金融海嘯前的八月，七月出現逆差已見苗頭，但主計處還是樂觀預測下半年能維持百分之三以上的成長，以致面對風暴措 手不及，擴大內需及地方建設等多項對策未能即時接上，執行率也因此偏低；如今再錯，代表之前所有振興經濟方案的依據已經偏差，方案的效果自然也不足以因應 未來的需要，政府的救經濟作為必須加倍、加速，頑強抵抗不景氣的衝擊。
就像中央銀行，在出口數據公布後不到一小時，緊急宣布降息兩碼（零點五個百分點），讓重貼現率降到百分之一點五，距歷史最低只剩半碼，主要目的就是要以低 利率維持弱勢新台幣，防止出口再惡化。但是，利率、匯率都是雙面刃，過低的雙率對台灣經濟是弊大於利，央行加碼降息救經濟的空間已所剩無幾；接下來，就可 能要走到直接印鈔票、塞進民眾口袋的地步，美國聯邦準備理事會（Fed）已在這麼做，但因後遺症大，央行非到萬不得已不會用。
事實上，在貨幣政策幾乎用到盡頭後，各國都在加碼救經濟。像美國候任總統歐巴馬的經濟刺激方案，隨著失業、零售等迭創歷史最差紀錄的數據一一公布，其規模 就從當選之初的二千億美元一路倍增，如今已達一兆美元，連同布希任內國會通過的七千億美元、Fed為市場注入的流動性，美國共投入八點五兆美元拯救經濟， 超過歷次戰爭支出總和，美國顯然已將「經濟衰退」當成頭號敵人。
除了美國，中國大陸已決定動用近六千億美元擴大內需，各地方政府還要加碼；歐元區也通過至少動用區內生產毛額（GDP）百分之一點五、約一千八百億美元的 資源，穩定區內需求；日本、韓國、印度等，也都在不斷上調財政擴張的規模。這一切的舉動顯示，這波經濟下墜之速超乎想像，不管它會否演變成二次大蕭條，各 國顯然是「寧可信其有」，莫不升高對抗力度，寧可多做、絕不少做，即使遲做，也要趕快補做。
然而，出口統計公布後唯一有行動的，還是中央銀行；與貿易業務直接相關的經濟部竟是表示「意外」，拓銷計畫照舊；行政院方面，劉兆玄院長在通過今年經建成 長目標時自勉，強調沒有悲觀的權利，卻還是沒有相應的政策。面對民眾，政府當然不能悲觀；但面對問題，政府卻需要以悲觀為原動力，因為悲觀，才能把問題看 得重一點、想得早一點、準備得多一點、做得深一點，這一點一點的累積，可以縮小政策與執行間的差距，可以避免措手不及，還可以讓台灣更快抓到景氣回春的契 機。
因此，現在政府必須立即研擬新的方案，加碼救經濟；而且，不要把發放消費券、減稅、兩岸大三通、央行降息等政策效益的顯現視為理所當然，而要假設這些政策 未如預期到位時的最悲觀情況；尤其，擴大公共建設條例五年五千億元特別預算本周要通過，政府應集中火力推動，這包括了提高執行效率，並能做密集的配置，同 樣的錢此時花、明年花，對經濟貢獻的效果是截然不同的。
Monday, January 12, 2009
Saturday, January 10, 2009
A Third Force: An Impossible Dream?
A Third Force: An Impossible Dream?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 10, 2009
Shih Ming-teh and Lee Teng-hui recently held a secret meeting. Rumor has it the two intend to establish a "Third Force." Both the Blue Camp and the Green Camp scoffed at such reports, saying you can't start a fire with a couple of wet logs.
Actually, the public on Taiwan is disappointed with both the Blue and Green political parties. A "Third Force" isn't out of the question. But a "Shi Li Alliance" is hardly the answer the public was looking for.
Why are Shih Ming-teh and Lee Teng-hui finding it so difficult to generate any political sparks? Shih Ming-teh's political credentials and Quixotic bent have undeniable appeal. Unfortunately his Quixotic bent is also his Achilles Heel. After leading one million "Red Shirt Army" supporters onto the streets, he lost control of them and his organization fell apart, seriously damaging his reputation. Shih Ming-teh's strength is that he is less selfish than most politicians. His weakness is his lack of organizational ability. He now finds it difficult to summon the masses. For the Quixotic Shih to associate himself with the Machievellian Lee, is like sticking a flower in cow dung.
Unable to make it within the KMT, Lee Teng-hui formed the Taiwan Solidarity Union. The Taiwan Solidarity Union wouldn't fly. He is now trying to establish a Third Force. No wonder the public perceives him as a political chameleon. In terms of real world influence, he even lost the crown of "Nativist Godfather" to someone behind bars, Chen Shui-bian. It's curtain time for him on the political stage. What's more, Chen Shui-bian has exposed Lee's own corruption and money-laundering. Prosecutors have many questions they want to ask him. For Lee Teng-hui to talk about the creation of Third Force at at a time like this, looks like an attempt to rally political support to evade criminal prosecution. Few people care about the larger picture. Furtermore, the Shi Lee Meeting was brokered by scandal-ridden Taiwan independence "elder" George T. Chang. If that isn't a marriage made in Hell, what is?
Is there no room for a "Third Force" on Taiwan? Yes and no. The Democratic Progressive Party's eight years of terror tore Taiwan apart. Yet it stubbornly denies any wrongdoing and refuses engage in any soul-searching. It persists in valuing political affiliation over truth and justice. It is going to have a hard time functioning as an effective opposition party. Now let's look at the KMT. The Ma administration has disappointed the public. Yet it can't be bothered to change. It has the support of a supermajority in the Legislature. Yet it never follows up by correcting its many blunders. According to the polls, over 60% of the public does not support any political party. Given such a high percentage, there should be room for a "Third Force."
Let's examine the issue more closely. In fact political evolution on Taiwan over the past twenty years has led to the emergence of a variety of "Third Forces." This includes the New Party and the People First Party. Their split from the KMT even led to the emergence of the TSU. All were efforts to check and balance the two major parties. All were attempts to gain public support outside the KMT and DPP. Unfortunately the development of these parties was often limited by "geneology" or pull. They became pawns at the fringes of the Blue vs. Green power struggle. In the end they either collapsed or lost their unique character. This includes the "Pan-Purple Alliance" and even the "Red Party", the "Third Socialist Party." These organizations or initiatives were all inspired by public discontent, but all failed.
This record reveals a harsh fact. Whenever the two major parties perform badly, the public looks to a "Third Force." It looks to a fresh political wind to clear the air. But the political reality is that the emergence of any Third Force usually hinges on some high-profile figure within the political establishment. One simply cannot expect such people to champion any transcendent values. In fact, everyone on Taiwan would like to transcend Blue and Green. But every time a new political force emerges, it invariably ends up in either the Blue camp or Green camp, intensifying the vicious cycle of struggle and turmoil.
Last year's presidential election essentially consolidated Taiwan's two-party political system. The Blue and Green parties were each presented with the opportunity to develop their own potential, and to spare Taiwan another Warring States Period. Unfortunately, the ruling party failed to meet public expectations, and the opposition party failed to restructure itself as a morally persuasive opposition party. leaving the public disappointed with both. That Shih and Lee wouid attempt to establish a "Third Force" at this time is hardly an accident. Shih Ming-teh in particular spoke of a "Twenty-first Century Taiwan Dream." Isn't that precisely the sort of vision the public expects from both the ruling and opposition parties?
Shih Ming-teh and Lee Teng-hui group may not have created a meaningful "Third Force." But at least they held up a mirror. They forced the Blue and Green political parties to acknowledge the public's dissatisfaction. They forced them to consider their own responsibility at this moment in history.
第三勢力為何有想像無空間？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.10 04:30 am
施明德與李登輝最近密會，傳出兩人要籌組「第三勢力」；此事立即引起藍綠同聲奚落，稱兩個「老梗」的合作點不燃新的火花。
事實上，以目前台灣民眾對藍綠政黨俱感失望的局面，「第三勢力」未必沒有存在之必要與空間；只不過，「施李合作」可能不是這道命題的正確解答罷了。
何以說施明德和李登輝已難再掀起政治風潮呢？施明德的從政資歷和浪漫性格，原具有其社會號召力；可惜浪漫性格也是他的致命傷，尤其他領導百萬紅衫軍倒扁運 動最後因組織失控而瓦解，其魅力也大受損傷。施明德的長處在於他較少一般政治人物的私心私欲，短處則在他不耐深度組織耕耘；且不說他如今已難再召喚群眾， 與李登輝合作更是一朵鮮花插在牛糞上。
至於李登輝，玩不成國民黨搞台聯，台聯搞不成又想玩第三勢力，留下的只是政治變色龍的形象。再論實際影響力，他在本土教主的爭奪戰中竟然敗於繫獄的陳水扁 之手，如今在政治舞台上也已到了謝幕的時刻。更何況，陳水扁咬他洗錢貪汙，還有許多疑點等待司法調查；李登輝此時談籌組第三勢力，恐怕是找尋政治憑藉以備 對抗司法者多，真正關注大局者少。再看，施、李之會，竟是弊案纏身的台獨大老張燦鍙牽線，那將是如何奇特的一部拼裝車？
儘管如此，能說台灣沒有「第三勢力」存在的空間嗎？這並不是一個「無」或「有」的答案。看當前的政治，民進黨不僅對執政八年撕裂台灣的惡行毫無反省，且至 今堅持顏色問政，這也使它成為一個稱職的在野黨都有困難。再看國民黨，馬政府執政表現讓人民失望，卻始終不設法改善，又仗著國會過半的護航，施政凸槌卻不 追究。根據媒體民調，民眾表態「不支持任何政黨」的比率已超過六成；這麼高的比率，難道不是「第三勢力」的空間？
進一步檢視，台灣過去廿年的政治發展，其實可發現許多「第三勢力」的變形品種。包括新黨、親民黨從國民黨的分裂，乃至台聯的成立，都是針對兩大黨的制衡與 反叛而生，意圖爭取不同於國、民兩黨的第三類的群眾。可惜這些政黨後來的發展，或受制於「血緣」，或受限於「感情」，均變成藍、綠板塊的邊緣附庸，淪為他 們的棋子，最後終告瓦解或失去獨立風格。不僅如此，包括「泛紫聯盟」乃至「紅黨」、「第三社會黨」的組織或倡議，也都是民間在同一脈絡下的發想，亦均未成 功。
這些歷史，指出了一個苦澀的事實：每當兩大黨表現惡劣，人民對「第三勢力」的渴望就會升高，期待更清新的力量來扭轉現狀。然而，在政治現實中，第三力量的 擴張卻往往依附著鮮明的人脈浮沉，而無法提煉為更高的價值理念。其實，超越藍綠是台灣人民的共同夢想，但每有不同政治力量出現時，卻只能依附藍綠，加深鬥 爭和動盪的痛苦，這已成為一個難解的封閉循環。
去年大選之後，台灣「兩黨政治」其實已基本成形，藍綠兩黨原本有很好的機會各自發展經營，使台灣的政治免於重淪戰國割據。可惜，執政黨未能滿足人民對效能 政府的期待，在野黨又未能以積極作為重整在野形象，雙雙讓人失望。施李籌組「第三勢力」在此時傳出並非偶然，尤其不該輕忽施明德提出建構「廿一世紀的台灣 夢」，那不正是朝野兩黨應向人民提供的願景嗎？
施明德和李登輝也許組不成一個有意義的「第三勢力」，但這個議題至少是一面鏡子，藍綠政黨都該看看人民為何不滿，想想自己在這個歷史時點能為自身責任盡什麼力量？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 10, 2009
Shih Ming-teh and Lee Teng-hui recently held a secret meeting. Rumor has it the two intend to establish a "Third Force." Both the Blue Camp and the Green Camp scoffed at such reports, saying you can't start a fire with a couple of wet logs.
Actually, the public on Taiwan is disappointed with both the Blue and Green political parties. A "Third Force" isn't out of the question. But a "Shi Li Alliance" is hardly the answer the public was looking for.
Why are Shih Ming-teh and Lee Teng-hui finding it so difficult to generate any political sparks? Shih Ming-teh's political credentials and Quixotic bent have undeniable appeal. Unfortunately his Quixotic bent is also his Achilles Heel. After leading one million "Red Shirt Army" supporters onto the streets, he lost control of them and his organization fell apart, seriously damaging his reputation. Shih Ming-teh's strength is that he is less selfish than most politicians. His weakness is his lack of organizational ability. He now finds it difficult to summon the masses. For the Quixotic Shih to associate himself with the Machievellian Lee, is like sticking a flower in cow dung.
Unable to make it within the KMT, Lee Teng-hui formed the Taiwan Solidarity Union. The Taiwan Solidarity Union wouldn't fly. He is now trying to establish a Third Force. No wonder the public perceives him as a political chameleon. In terms of real world influence, he even lost the crown of "Nativist Godfather" to someone behind bars, Chen Shui-bian. It's curtain time for him on the political stage. What's more, Chen Shui-bian has exposed Lee's own corruption and money-laundering. Prosecutors have many questions they want to ask him. For Lee Teng-hui to talk about the creation of Third Force at at a time like this, looks like an attempt to rally political support to evade criminal prosecution. Few people care about the larger picture. Furtermore, the Shi Lee Meeting was brokered by scandal-ridden Taiwan independence "elder" George T. Chang. If that isn't a marriage made in Hell, what is?
Is there no room for a "Third Force" on Taiwan? Yes and no. The Democratic Progressive Party's eight years of terror tore Taiwan apart. Yet it stubbornly denies any wrongdoing and refuses engage in any soul-searching. It persists in valuing political affiliation over truth and justice. It is going to have a hard time functioning as an effective opposition party. Now let's look at the KMT. The Ma administration has disappointed the public. Yet it can't be bothered to change. It has the support of a supermajority in the Legislature. Yet it never follows up by correcting its many blunders. According to the polls, over 60% of the public does not support any political party. Given such a high percentage, there should be room for a "Third Force."
Let's examine the issue more closely. In fact political evolution on Taiwan over the past twenty years has led to the emergence of a variety of "Third Forces." This includes the New Party and the People First Party. Their split from the KMT even led to the emergence of the TSU. All were efforts to check and balance the two major parties. All were attempts to gain public support outside the KMT and DPP. Unfortunately the development of these parties was often limited by "geneology" or pull. They became pawns at the fringes of the Blue vs. Green power struggle. In the end they either collapsed or lost their unique character. This includes the "Pan-Purple Alliance" and even the "Red Party", the "Third Socialist Party." These organizations or initiatives were all inspired by public discontent, but all failed.
This record reveals a harsh fact. Whenever the two major parties perform badly, the public looks to a "Third Force." It looks to a fresh political wind to clear the air. But the political reality is that the emergence of any Third Force usually hinges on some high-profile figure within the political establishment. One simply cannot expect such people to champion any transcendent values. In fact, everyone on Taiwan would like to transcend Blue and Green. But every time a new political force emerges, it invariably ends up in either the Blue camp or Green camp, intensifying the vicious cycle of struggle and turmoil.
Last year's presidential election essentially consolidated Taiwan's two-party political system. The Blue and Green parties were each presented with the opportunity to develop their own potential, and to spare Taiwan another Warring States Period. Unfortunately, the ruling party failed to meet public expectations, and the opposition party failed to restructure itself as a morally persuasive opposition party. leaving the public disappointed with both. That Shih and Lee wouid attempt to establish a "Third Force" at this time is hardly an accident. Shih Ming-teh in particular spoke of a "Twenty-first Century Taiwan Dream." Isn't that precisely the sort of vision the public expects from both the ruling and opposition parties?
Shih Ming-teh and Lee Teng-hui group may not have created a meaningful "Third Force." But at least they held up a mirror. They forced the Blue and Green political parties to acknowledge the public's dissatisfaction. They forced them to consider their own responsibility at this moment in history.
第三勢力為何有想像無空間？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.10 04:30 am
施明德與李登輝最近密會，傳出兩人要籌組「第三勢力」；此事立即引起藍綠同聲奚落，稱兩個「老梗」的合作點不燃新的火花。
事實上，以目前台灣民眾對藍綠政黨俱感失望的局面，「第三勢力」未必沒有存在之必要與空間；只不過，「施李合作」可能不是這道命題的正確解答罷了。
何以說施明德和李登輝已難再掀起政治風潮呢？施明德的從政資歷和浪漫性格，原具有其社會號召力；可惜浪漫性格也是他的致命傷，尤其他領導百萬紅衫軍倒扁運 動最後因組織失控而瓦解，其魅力也大受損傷。施明德的長處在於他較少一般政治人物的私心私欲，短處則在他不耐深度組織耕耘；且不說他如今已難再召喚群眾， 與李登輝合作更是一朵鮮花插在牛糞上。
至於李登輝，玩不成國民黨搞台聯，台聯搞不成又想玩第三勢力，留下的只是政治變色龍的形象。再論實際影響力，他在本土教主的爭奪戰中竟然敗於繫獄的陳水扁 之手，如今在政治舞台上也已到了謝幕的時刻。更何況，陳水扁咬他洗錢貪汙，還有許多疑點等待司法調查；李登輝此時談籌組第三勢力，恐怕是找尋政治憑藉以備 對抗司法者多，真正關注大局者少。再看，施、李之會，竟是弊案纏身的台獨大老張燦鍙牽線，那將是如何奇特的一部拼裝車？
儘管如此，能說台灣沒有「第三勢力」存在的空間嗎？這並不是一個「無」或「有」的答案。看當前的政治，民進黨不僅對執政八年撕裂台灣的惡行毫無反省，且至 今堅持顏色問政，這也使它成為一個稱職的在野黨都有困難。再看國民黨，馬政府執政表現讓人民失望，卻始終不設法改善，又仗著國會過半的護航，施政凸槌卻不 追究。根據媒體民調，民眾表態「不支持任何政黨」的比率已超過六成；這麼高的比率，難道不是「第三勢力」的空間？
進一步檢視，台灣過去廿年的政治發展，其實可發現許多「第三勢力」的變形品種。包括新黨、親民黨從國民黨的分裂，乃至台聯的成立，都是針對兩大黨的制衡與 反叛而生，意圖爭取不同於國、民兩黨的第三類的群眾。可惜這些政黨後來的發展，或受制於「血緣」，或受限於「感情」，均變成藍、綠板塊的邊緣附庸，淪為他 們的棋子，最後終告瓦解或失去獨立風格。不僅如此，包括「泛紫聯盟」乃至「紅黨」、「第三社會黨」的組織或倡議，也都是民間在同一脈絡下的發想，亦均未成 功。
這些歷史，指出了一個苦澀的事實：每當兩大黨表現惡劣，人民對「第三勢力」的渴望就會升高，期待更清新的力量來扭轉現狀。然而，在政治現實中，第三力量的 擴張卻往往依附著鮮明的人脈浮沉，而無法提煉為更高的價值理念。其實，超越藍綠是台灣人民的共同夢想，但每有不同政治力量出現時，卻只能依附藍綠，加深鬥 爭和動盪的痛苦，這已成為一個難解的封閉循環。
去年大選之後，台灣「兩黨政治」其實已基本成形，藍綠兩黨原本有很好的機會各自發展經營，使台灣的政治免於重淪戰國割據。可惜，執政黨未能滿足人民對效能 政府的期待，在野黨又未能以積極作為重整在野形象，雙雙讓人失望。施李籌組「第三勢力」在此時傳出並非偶然，尤其不該輕忽施明德提出建構「廿一世紀的台灣 夢」，那不正是朝野兩黨應向人民提供的願景嗎？
施明德和李登輝也許組不成一個有意義的「第三勢力」，但這個議題至少是一面鏡子，藍綠政黨都該看看人民為何不滿，想想自己在這個歷史時點能為自身責任盡什麼力量？
Friday, January 9, 2009
"Yet To Be Reunified" Offers More Creative Possibilities than "Immediate Reunification"
"Yet To Be Reunified" Offers More Creative Possibilities than "Immediate Reunification"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 9, 2009
Hu Jintao said, "The two sides of the Taiwan Strait can explore pragmatic political relations, under special circumstances under which the nation has yet to be reunified." This would seem to be the first time a new issue has been raised since "military security confidence building measures" and a "peace agreement," and leaves considerable room for the imagination.
Hong Kong's implementation of "One Country, Two Systems", has maintained its democratic capitalist system, and is moving toward direct elections of its Regional Governor. If "One Country, Two Systems" were implemented on Taiwan, what would happen to the Republic of China? Would it continue to hold presidential elections? The answer is obvious. Would Beijing have the ROC reduced to electing its own Regional Governor?
This is what we mean when we speak of room for the imagination. For example, the two sides could form a confederation under the "Big Roof Theory." The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China would remain part of One China, even though they were not yet reunified. They would not be reunified into a single nation. This would accord with "special circumstances under which the nation has yet to be reunified." But it would not be "Two Chinas," yet it could also be referred to as "One Country, Two Systems." The leaders of the two sides of the Strait would alternate as president and vice-president of this confederation. As we said, does this not leave considerable room for the imagination? Could this not be considered "political relations in special circumstances under which the nation has yet to be reunified?
This is not the place to discuss a confederation. We merely wish to stress how much room there is for creative possibilities. Taipei has its bottom line. It cannot accept One China as the People's Republic of China. Beijing has its bottom line. It cannot accept de jure Taiwan independence. Between these two bottom lines, the two sides have enormous room in which to maneuver. This would include such arrangements as a confederation.
Hu's Six Points has far reaching possibilities, and has provoked differing responses. As yesterday's editorial noted, Hu has shifted the focus of cross-Strait relations from goal oriented "Eventual Reunification," to process oriented "Peaceful Development." This ought to be acceptable to the majority of people reading this editorial. Actually reunification is not possible in the immediate future, because under current conditions "reunification" for Taipei would amount to annexation. For Beijing on the other hand, premature reunification would mean an intractable and ungovernable Taiwan. Reluctant reunification that destroyed the ROC's democratic achievements would be an irreparable loss for the Chinese nation as a whole. Therefore talk of process oriented "Peaceful Development" is more relevant than talk of goal oriented "Eventual Reunification." As the two sides invest their energy in process, rather than goals, considerable room for creative possibilities will spontaneously emerge.
Yesterday's editorial noted that when Hu Jintao's wrote about process, he addressed a wide range of social, cultural, economic, diplomatic, military, and political issues. If Hu Jintao's "peaceful development of cross-Strait relations" is indeed Beijing's highest priority, then it should respect the ROC's system of democracy. It should make an effort to expand democracy on the mainland. As our editorial the day before yesterday noted, "Peaceful Development is Democratic Development." Hu Jintao pointed out many issues worthy of attention. These include social, cultural, economic, diplomatic, and military issues. Efforts in these areas can influence and guide public opinion in a positive manner, creating solutions to cross-Strait political problems.
Assuming Hu's Six Points were made in good faith, Beijing can demonstrate that good faith through its handling of WHA and ASEAN plus N. ROC participation in WHA relates to Hu's fifth point, "Taiwan's participation in the activities of international organizations." It has also been the focus of public attention on Taiwan in recent years. Beijing has no reason not to respond positively. ROC participation in ASEAN relates to Hu's second point, "Exploring cross-Strait economic cooperation mechanisms as part of the Asia-Pacific region's economic convergence." Postive gestures on these two matters would constitute the most up to date evidence of Beijing's good faith. We must note that if such issues are loaded with political baggage, they may be counter-productive, even destructive. WHA should only be about WHA. ASEAN should only be about ASEAN. Only then can such gestures enhance goodwill in cross-Strait political relations.
This year is the 60th anniversary of divided rule. Cross-Strait issues cannot be resolved in one fell swoop via "Holistic Engineering." They must be resolved step by step by means of "Piecemeal Engineering." Can Beijing shift its attention from goal oriented "reunification" thinking, to process oriented "yet to be reunified" thinking? Is this what Hu meant in his sixth point, "Establish a framework for peaceful development of cross-Strait relations?"
Actually, all processes, at any stage, are also goals. Conversely, even if one has an eventual goal, attempting to achieve that goal merely starts another process. For example, the difficulties encountered by East and West Germany following reunification were more serious than expected. The difficulties ecountered by Taipei and Beijing would be even greater.
For the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, "yet to be reunified" offers more room for the imagination and for maneuveuring than "immediate reunification." It offers more options. Could this be the basis for Hu's Six Points? (End of Series)
「未統一」比「統一」有更大的想像空間
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.09 03:26 am
胡錦濤說，「兩岸可以就在國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係展開務實探討」，就其上下文來看，這似乎是在過去所指的「軍事安全互信機制」，及「和平協議」之外，首次拋出的新議題。其間充滿想像空間。
香港實施「一國兩制」，維持資本主義民主體制，且朝直選特首邁進；若與香港對照，則倘在台灣實施「一國兩制」，是否即應維持中華民國的體制，並繼續直選總統？答案其實十分清楚。否則，難道要台灣倒退回頭選特首？
本文所指的想像空間在此。比如說，倘若採邦聯制，即可在「屋頂理論」下，維持中華民國與中華人民共和國的「雖未統一，但同屬一個中國」；而既未「統一」成 為「單一國家」，則亦符合「尚未統一的特殊情況」；且並非「兩個中國」，又可堪稱作「一國兩制」。至於邦聯的正副元首，可由兩岸交互輪替。有沒有這種想像 空間？這算不算「在國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係」？
此處並非要討論邦聯制，而只是想強調想像的空間可以有多大。若要討論「尚未統一前的兩岸政治關係」，就台灣而言，其底線或許是不能接受「一個中國是中華人 民共和國」；就大陸而言，其底線則是不能接受「法理台獨」。在這兩條底線之間，應當即是廣闊的想像空間與經營平台，其中自可包括了諸如邦聯制等思維與設 計。
胡六點橫看成嶺側成峰，引起見仁見智。但是，如昨日社論所說，他將兩岸關係的重點從「終極統一」（目的論）移至「和平發展」（過程論），則應是多數人可以 接受的解讀。其實，兩岸在未來相當時期中，確實不可能「統一」；因為，對台灣言，在現今條件下，統一就是被併吞；對大陸言，即使統一，也難治理台灣；對 「中華民族」言，則若因勉強統一而摧毀了台灣已經實現的民主成果，那將是無可彌償的「民族」損失。因而，談「終極統一」之目的論，不如談「和平發展」的過 程論；在努力經營「過程」之中，自會出現想像空間。
昨日社論說，胡錦濤對「過程論」多所著墨；他廣泛論及社會、文化、經濟、外交、軍事、政治等領域。倘若胡錦濤所說的「兩岸關係和平發展」是最高準則，則在 政治面，北京除了應當尊重台灣的民主體制，其自身亦應努力提升大陸的民主內涵；正如前天社論所說，「和平發展」就是「民主發展」。相對而言，在政治以外的 各方面，如社會、文化、經濟、外交、軍事等領域，則胡錦濤已指出了諸多可以用心用力之處。我們認為，藉著在這些領域方面的努力，可以影響及引導民意朝正面 思考，進而營造累積解決兩岸政治難題的資源。
倘若胡六點出自真誠，我們認為，在短期內北京可藉ＷＨＡ及東協加Ｎ作出初步印證。ＷＨＡ是關於第五點的「台灣參與國際組織活動問題」，也是近年台灣視聽的 焦點，北京沒有理由不作回應。東協議題則是關於第二點「探討兩岸經濟共同發展同亞太區域經濟合作機制相銜接的可行途徑」，這應是近期測試北京真誠的關鍵考 題。我們必須提醒：若在這類題材上加添政治黃魚，將有反效果，甚至破局；倘能就ＷＨＡ論ＷＨＡ，就東協談東協，則反而能為兩岸關係添增政治好感。
今年是兩岸分裂分治六十周年。兩岸難題不易出現一個一次解決的整體包裹方案（Holistic Engineering），而必然是一個逐步化解歧見的點滴工程（Piecemeal Engineering）。換句話說，北京若能將心力從「統一」之目的論，移轉至「未統一」的過程論，這或許就是胡六點所主張的「建構兩岸關係和平發展框 架」之意旨所在。
其實，所有的「過程」，皆是階段性的「目的」；反過來說，即使有一終極「目的」，在達成「目的」之際，亦是另一「過程」的開始。例如，東西德「統一後」的「過程」，比當初「統一」之「目的」的實現，可謂更加艱辛。何況台海兩岸？
對兩岸而言，「未統一」，比「統一」，其實有更大的想像空間與經營空間，也有更大的各自轉圜餘裕。這或許亦是胡六點的思考基礎。（系列刊完）
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 9, 2009
Hu Jintao said, "The two sides of the Taiwan Strait can explore pragmatic political relations, under special circumstances under which the nation has yet to be reunified." This would seem to be the first time a new issue has been raised since "military security confidence building measures" and a "peace agreement," and leaves considerable room for the imagination.
Hong Kong's implementation of "One Country, Two Systems", has maintained its democratic capitalist system, and is moving toward direct elections of its Regional Governor. If "One Country, Two Systems" were implemented on Taiwan, what would happen to the Republic of China? Would it continue to hold presidential elections? The answer is obvious. Would Beijing have the ROC reduced to electing its own Regional Governor?
This is what we mean when we speak of room for the imagination. For example, the two sides could form a confederation under the "Big Roof Theory." The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China would remain part of One China, even though they were not yet reunified. They would not be reunified into a single nation. This would accord with "special circumstances under which the nation has yet to be reunified." But it would not be "Two Chinas," yet it could also be referred to as "One Country, Two Systems." The leaders of the two sides of the Strait would alternate as president and vice-president of this confederation. As we said, does this not leave considerable room for the imagination? Could this not be considered "political relations in special circumstances under which the nation has yet to be reunified?
This is not the place to discuss a confederation. We merely wish to stress how much room there is for creative possibilities. Taipei has its bottom line. It cannot accept One China as the People's Republic of China. Beijing has its bottom line. It cannot accept de jure Taiwan independence. Between these two bottom lines, the two sides have enormous room in which to maneuver. This would include such arrangements as a confederation.
Hu's Six Points has far reaching possibilities, and has provoked differing responses. As yesterday's editorial noted, Hu has shifted the focus of cross-Strait relations from goal oriented "Eventual Reunification," to process oriented "Peaceful Development." This ought to be acceptable to the majority of people reading this editorial. Actually reunification is not possible in the immediate future, because under current conditions "reunification" for Taipei would amount to annexation. For Beijing on the other hand, premature reunification would mean an intractable and ungovernable Taiwan. Reluctant reunification that destroyed the ROC's democratic achievements would be an irreparable loss for the Chinese nation as a whole. Therefore talk of process oriented "Peaceful Development" is more relevant than talk of goal oriented "Eventual Reunification." As the two sides invest their energy in process, rather than goals, considerable room for creative possibilities will spontaneously emerge.
Yesterday's editorial noted that when Hu Jintao's wrote about process, he addressed a wide range of social, cultural, economic, diplomatic, military, and political issues. If Hu Jintao's "peaceful development of cross-Strait relations" is indeed Beijing's highest priority, then it should respect the ROC's system of democracy. It should make an effort to expand democracy on the mainland. As our editorial the day before yesterday noted, "Peaceful Development is Democratic Development." Hu Jintao pointed out many issues worthy of attention. These include social, cultural, economic, diplomatic, and military issues. Efforts in these areas can influence and guide public opinion in a positive manner, creating solutions to cross-Strait political problems.
Assuming Hu's Six Points were made in good faith, Beijing can demonstrate that good faith through its handling of WHA and ASEAN plus N. ROC participation in WHA relates to Hu's fifth point, "Taiwan's participation in the activities of international organizations." It has also been the focus of public attention on Taiwan in recent years. Beijing has no reason not to respond positively. ROC participation in ASEAN relates to Hu's second point, "Exploring cross-Strait economic cooperation mechanisms as part of the Asia-Pacific region's economic convergence." Postive gestures on these two matters would constitute the most up to date evidence of Beijing's good faith. We must note that if such issues are loaded with political baggage, they may be counter-productive, even destructive. WHA should only be about WHA. ASEAN should only be about ASEAN. Only then can such gestures enhance goodwill in cross-Strait political relations.
This year is the 60th anniversary of divided rule. Cross-Strait issues cannot be resolved in one fell swoop via "Holistic Engineering." They must be resolved step by step by means of "Piecemeal Engineering." Can Beijing shift its attention from goal oriented "reunification" thinking, to process oriented "yet to be reunified" thinking? Is this what Hu meant in his sixth point, "Establish a framework for peaceful development of cross-Strait relations?"
Actually, all processes, at any stage, are also goals. Conversely, even if one has an eventual goal, attempting to achieve that goal merely starts another process. For example, the difficulties encountered by East and West Germany following reunification were more serious than expected. The difficulties ecountered by Taipei and Beijing would be even greater.
For the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, "yet to be reunified" offers more room for the imagination and for maneuveuring than "immediate reunification." It offers more options. Could this be the basis for Hu's Six Points? (End of Series)
「未統一」比「統一」有更大的想像空間
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.09 03:26 am
胡錦濤說，「兩岸可以就在國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係展開務實探討」，就其上下文來看，這似乎是在過去所指的「軍事安全互信機制」，及「和平協議」之外，首次拋出的新議題。其間充滿想像空間。
香港實施「一國兩制」，維持資本主義民主體制，且朝直選特首邁進；若與香港對照，則倘在台灣實施「一國兩制」，是否即應維持中華民國的體制，並繼續直選總統？答案其實十分清楚。否則，難道要台灣倒退回頭選特首？
本文所指的想像空間在此。比如說，倘若採邦聯制，即可在「屋頂理論」下，維持中華民國與中華人民共和國的「雖未統一，但同屬一個中國」；而既未「統一」成 為「單一國家」，則亦符合「尚未統一的特殊情況」；且並非「兩個中國」，又可堪稱作「一國兩制」。至於邦聯的正副元首，可由兩岸交互輪替。有沒有這種想像 空間？這算不算「在國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係」？
此處並非要討論邦聯制，而只是想強調想像的空間可以有多大。若要討論「尚未統一前的兩岸政治關係」，就台灣而言，其底線或許是不能接受「一個中國是中華人 民共和國」；就大陸而言，其底線則是不能接受「法理台獨」。在這兩條底線之間，應當即是廣闊的想像空間與經營平台，其中自可包括了諸如邦聯制等思維與設 計。
胡六點橫看成嶺側成峰，引起見仁見智。但是，如昨日社論所說，他將兩岸關係的重點從「終極統一」（目的論）移至「和平發展」（過程論），則應是多數人可以 接受的解讀。其實，兩岸在未來相當時期中，確實不可能「統一」；因為，對台灣言，在現今條件下，統一就是被併吞；對大陸言，即使統一，也難治理台灣；對 「中華民族」言，則若因勉強統一而摧毀了台灣已經實現的民主成果，那將是無可彌償的「民族」損失。因而，談「終極統一」之目的論，不如談「和平發展」的過 程論；在努力經營「過程」之中，自會出現想像空間。
昨日社論說，胡錦濤對「過程論」多所著墨；他廣泛論及社會、文化、經濟、外交、軍事、政治等領域。倘若胡錦濤所說的「兩岸關係和平發展」是最高準則，則在 政治面，北京除了應當尊重台灣的民主體制，其自身亦應努力提升大陸的民主內涵；正如前天社論所說，「和平發展」就是「民主發展」。相對而言，在政治以外的 各方面，如社會、文化、經濟、外交、軍事等領域，則胡錦濤已指出了諸多可以用心用力之處。我們認為，藉著在這些領域方面的努力，可以影響及引導民意朝正面 思考，進而營造累積解決兩岸政治難題的資源。
倘若胡六點出自真誠，我們認為，在短期內北京可藉ＷＨＡ及東協加Ｎ作出初步印證。ＷＨＡ是關於第五點的「台灣參與國際組織活動問題」，也是近年台灣視聽的 焦點，北京沒有理由不作回應。東協議題則是關於第二點「探討兩岸經濟共同發展同亞太區域經濟合作機制相銜接的可行途徑」，這應是近期測試北京真誠的關鍵考 題。我們必須提醒：若在這類題材上加添政治黃魚，將有反效果，甚至破局；倘能就ＷＨＡ論ＷＨＡ，就東協談東協，則反而能為兩岸關係添增政治好感。
今年是兩岸分裂分治六十周年。兩岸難題不易出現一個一次解決的整體包裹方案（Holistic Engineering），而必然是一個逐步化解歧見的點滴工程（Piecemeal Engineering）。換句話說，北京若能將心力從「統一」之目的論，移轉至「未統一」的過程論，這或許就是胡六點所主張的「建構兩岸關係和平發展框 架」之意旨所在。
其實，所有的「過程」，皆是階段性的「目的」；反過來說，即使有一終極「目的」，在達成「目的」之際，亦是另一「過程」的開始。例如，東西德「統一後」的「過程」，比當初「統一」之「目的」的實現，可謂更加艱辛。何況台海兩岸？
對兩岸而言，「未統一」，比「統一」，其實有更大的想像空間與經營空間，也有更大的各自轉圜餘裕。這或許亦是胡六點的思考基礎。（系列刊完）
Thursday, January 8, 2009
Is Taiwan to be Ruled by a Regional Governor?
Is Taiwan to be Ruled by a Regional Governor?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 8, 2009
Ever since the Lien Chan/Hu Jintao Meeting of 2005, terms such as "One China," "China's reunification," and "One Country, Two Systems" have been bandied about. They have also appeared in Hu's Six Points.
Hu Jintao's remarks invoked the 1979 "Message to Our Taiwan Compatriots" from 30 years ago. As one traces one's roots and acknowledges one's heritage, it is natural to invoke such language. The thinking behind such expressions is undoubtedly Hu's own. At the macro level, Hu Jintao's may be seeking "China's reunification." But his language reveals that when it come to process, Hu advocates the "peaceful development of cross-strait relations."
Reunification and independence issues are goal oriented. Immediate reunification and immediate independence are indifferent to process. They are concerned only with goals. Concern for process, on the other hand, means delaying the pursuit of one's goals. It means using a process to solve problems. Those concerned only with goals, do not accept the status quo. They advocate changing the status quo. Those concerned with process, respect the status quo. They advocate maintaining the status quo, improving the status quo. Hu Jintao has been goal oriented. But he is becoming process oriented. He has not given up his goals, but he has become more process oriented. He has gone from hailing "reunification," to acknowledging and respecting the reality of "special circumstances under which the nation is not yet reunified."
Goal oriention can easily lead one to an impasse. Take Beijing's long-standing Taiwan policy. The term "One Country, Two Systems" has not appeared in quite a while. What exactly does "One Country" mean? Hu Jintao's recent talk did not stipulate that "One China" is the People's Republic of China. That being the case, what exactly does "Two Systems" mean? Look at Hong Kong. "Two Systems" means an appointed Regional Governor. But the Republic of China has directly elected four presidents. Is Taiwan to be ruled by a Regional Governor?
Beijing was once goal oriented. It did not accept the status quo. It advocated changing the status quo, i.e., promoting reunification. But since 2000, Beijing and Washington have both advocated maintaining the status quo. They have both expressed opposition to "unilaterally changing the status quo." The reason is Taiwan independence had gained momentum. But how does one define the status quo? Does it mean recognizing and maintaining the Republic of China? Little progress has been made on this front. If one fails to maintain the Republic of China, how can one maintain the status quo? If one refuses to accept the Republic of China, then what is the status quo?
Beijing's recent interpretation is "Although the two sides have not been reunified, the mainland and Taiwan belong to One China. This has never changed." This interpretation can also be found within Hu's Six Points. In practical terms, this means that although the two sides are ruled separately by the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, they still belong to One China. This is the Roof Theory in which One China refers to a Third Entity that encompasses "Taiwan + Mainland China," or "Republic of China + People's Republic of China." But based on Beijing's real world practices, this is not what it really means.
In order to rebuild cross-strait relations, we must improve our understanding of both goals and processes. In terms of goals, the One China Roof Theory will remain deadlocked unless it is liberated from Beijing's unilaterally defined "One China means the People's Republic of China." In terms of process, Hu's Six Points include the signing of a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement, the establishment of a cross-Strait economic cooperation mechanism, the creation of a mechanism for Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation, a halt to internal conflict over foreign relations, a relaxation of restraints on Taipei's participation in international activities, the establishment of military security mechanisms, and a peace agreement. Although the nation has yet to be reunified, the two sides would explore the possibility of pragmatic political relations under special circumstances. These all stress process. These all stress "doing something positive, doing something concrete." These may be beneficial to reunification. But more importantly, they are beneficial to maintaining a status quo in which the nation has yet to be reunified.
Cross-strait interaction has moved from goal oriention to process orientation. This is a positive development. The best approach is to adopt the right process in order to spontaneously discover the right goal. To impose goals on the process will distort the process. If the goal is to return Taiwan to rule by an appointed Regional Governor, under "One Country, Two Systems," not only will the goal not be achieved, the process will be undermined as well.
In Hu's Six Points, Hu mentions "political relations under yet to be reunified special cross-Strait circumstances." Is Hu suggesting a new "Roof Theory?" Is Hu suggesting a neutral framework for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations? Does this respect history, reality, and the wishes of the people? Can it introduce a new process to cross-Strait relations? We will have to wait and see.
難道要台灣倒退回頭選特首？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.08 02:35 am
二○○五年「連胡會」以來，潛隱已久的「一個中國」、「中國統一」及「一國兩制」等兩岸語彙，又在胡六點中出現。
胡錦濤的談話，既是借一九七九年《告台灣同胞書》三十周年之題而發，為了追溯淵源，為了表彰傳承，自然要重新啟用這些歷史語彙。當然，這些語彙所蘊含的思 維無疑亦是胡錦濤個人的認知與追求；唯就大處來看，胡錦濤雖然是「中國統一」的「目的論」者，但他在通篇談話中，亦顯示他也是「兩岸關係和平發展」的「過 程論」者。
統獨議題，皆是「目的論」；急統急獨，更是不問「過程」、不擇手段之「唯目的論」。「過程論」，則是延緩對「目的」的追求，而主張以「互動過程」來累積解 決難題的資源與條件。亦即，目的論不接受現狀，主張改變現狀；過程論則主張尊重現狀，維持現狀，改善現狀。胡錦濤近幾年來的表現，應可視為從「目的論」， 向「過程論」移動；他未放棄「目的」，但向「過程」傾斜；也就是從高喊「統一」，轉移至承認並重視「尚未統一的特殊情況」。
目的論極易形成僵局。以在北京對台政策中好久沒有出現的「一國兩制」而言，「一國」作何定義？連胡錦濤此次都未說「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」。「兩制」又作何定義？對香港言，兩制是委選特首，但台灣卻已直選四屆總統，難道要台灣倒退回頭去選特首？
北京過去是「目的論」者，不接受現狀，主張改變現狀（推動統一）；但自二○○○ 年前後以降，則與美國一起主張維持現狀，反對「片面改變現狀」，原因是台獨聲勢上揚。但是，「現狀」作何定義，是否在某種程度上承認及維持「中華民國」， 卻是似有改變又迄無進展。然而，若不維持中華民國，如何維持現狀？若不接受中華民國，現狀是什麼？
北京近年來的說法是：「儘管兩岸尚未統一，但大陸與台灣同屬一個中國的事實從未改變。」此種理論這次也見諸胡六點。在現實上，這應當是指兩岸雖以「中華民 國」與「中華人民共和國」分裂分治，但仍同屬「一個中國」。倘係如此，就「屋頂理論」而言，「一個中國」即應是指「台灣／大陸」或「中華民國／中華人民共 和國」之上的「第三概念」。但是，在北京的實際操作中，顯然並非作此定義。
欲重建兩岸關係，須從「目的論」及「過程論」兩方面皆進行改善。就目的論言，例如，「一個中國」的「屋頂理論」，若不能跳出「一個中國就是中華人民共和 國」的「片面主義」，即生僵局。就過程論言，則胡六點此次多所著墨，包括簽定綜合性經濟合作協議、建立兩岸經濟合作機制、與亞太經濟合作機制相銜接、停止 涉外事務之內耗、鬆綁台灣參與國際組織活動、建立軍事安全機制、達成和平協議，及就國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係展開務實探討等等。這些均是強調 「多辦好事／多辦實事」的「過程主義」，辦了或許有利於「統一」，但更重要的是尤其有利於維持「尚未統一／統一不成」的「現狀」。
兩岸互動，從「目的論」朝「過程論」移動，應屬正向發展。最好是以正確的「過程」，自然帶出「目的」；而不是用強拗的「目的」，扭曲了「過程」。否則，倘若是以台灣倒退回頭選特首的「一國兩制」為「目的」，不僅「目的」不能達成，且將毀掉在「過程」中所產生的種種可能性。
在胡六點中，還看不出「尚未統一的特殊情況下的（兩岸）政治關係」究何所指。是否指一個新的「屋頂理論」？是否指一個「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」的「兩岸 關係和平發展框架」？是否有尊重歷史、尊重現實、尊重人民願望的新內涵？能否為兩岸關係帶入一個新的「過程」？在在似乎皆有想像空間。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 8, 2009
Ever since the Lien Chan/Hu Jintao Meeting of 2005, terms such as "One China," "China's reunification," and "One Country, Two Systems" have been bandied about. They have also appeared in Hu's Six Points.
Hu Jintao's remarks invoked the 1979 "Message to Our Taiwan Compatriots" from 30 years ago. As one traces one's roots and acknowledges one's heritage, it is natural to invoke such language. The thinking behind such expressions is undoubtedly Hu's own. At the macro level, Hu Jintao's may be seeking "China's reunification." But his language reveals that when it come to process, Hu advocates the "peaceful development of cross-strait relations."
Reunification and independence issues are goal oriented. Immediate reunification and immediate independence are indifferent to process. They are concerned only with goals. Concern for process, on the other hand, means delaying the pursuit of one's goals. It means using a process to solve problems. Those concerned only with goals, do not accept the status quo. They advocate changing the status quo. Those concerned with process, respect the status quo. They advocate maintaining the status quo, improving the status quo. Hu Jintao has been goal oriented. But he is becoming process oriented. He has not given up his goals, but he has become more process oriented. He has gone from hailing "reunification," to acknowledging and respecting the reality of "special circumstances under which the nation is not yet reunified."
Goal oriention can easily lead one to an impasse. Take Beijing's long-standing Taiwan policy. The term "One Country, Two Systems" has not appeared in quite a while. What exactly does "One Country" mean? Hu Jintao's recent talk did not stipulate that "One China" is the People's Republic of China. That being the case, what exactly does "Two Systems" mean? Look at Hong Kong. "Two Systems" means an appointed Regional Governor. But the Republic of China has directly elected four presidents. Is Taiwan to be ruled by a Regional Governor?
Beijing was once goal oriented. It did not accept the status quo. It advocated changing the status quo, i.e., promoting reunification. But since 2000, Beijing and Washington have both advocated maintaining the status quo. They have both expressed opposition to "unilaterally changing the status quo." The reason is Taiwan independence had gained momentum. But how does one define the status quo? Does it mean recognizing and maintaining the Republic of China? Little progress has been made on this front. If one fails to maintain the Republic of China, how can one maintain the status quo? If one refuses to accept the Republic of China, then what is the status quo?
Beijing's recent interpretation is "Although the two sides have not been reunified, the mainland and Taiwan belong to One China. This has never changed." This interpretation can also be found within Hu's Six Points. In practical terms, this means that although the two sides are ruled separately by the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, they still belong to One China. This is the Roof Theory in which One China refers to a Third Entity that encompasses "Taiwan + Mainland China," or "Republic of China + People's Republic of China." But based on Beijing's real world practices, this is not what it really means.
In order to rebuild cross-strait relations, we must improve our understanding of both goals and processes. In terms of goals, the One China Roof Theory will remain deadlocked unless it is liberated from Beijing's unilaterally defined "One China means the People's Republic of China." In terms of process, Hu's Six Points include the signing of a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement, the establishment of a cross-Strait economic cooperation mechanism, the creation of a mechanism for Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation, a halt to internal conflict over foreign relations, a relaxation of restraints on Taipei's participation in international activities, the establishment of military security mechanisms, and a peace agreement. Although the nation has yet to be reunified, the two sides would explore the possibility of pragmatic political relations under special circumstances. These all stress process. These all stress "doing something positive, doing something concrete." These may be beneficial to reunification. But more importantly, they are beneficial to maintaining a status quo in which the nation has yet to be reunified.
Cross-strait interaction has moved from goal oriention to process orientation. This is a positive development. The best approach is to adopt the right process in order to spontaneously discover the right goal. To impose goals on the process will distort the process. If the goal is to return Taiwan to rule by an appointed Regional Governor, under "One Country, Two Systems," not only will the goal not be achieved, the process will be undermined as well.
In Hu's Six Points, Hu mentions "political relations under yet to be reunified special cross-Strait circumstances." Is Hu suggesting a new "Roof Theory?" Is Hu suggesting a neutral framework for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations? Does this respect history, reality, and the wishes of the people? Can it introduce a new process to cross-Strait relations? We will have to wait and see.
難道要台灣倒退回頭選特首？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.08 02:35 am
二○○五年「連胡會」以來，潛隱已久的「一個中國」、「中國統一」及「一國兩制」等兩岸語彙，又在胡六點中出現。
胡錦濤的談話，既是借一九七九年《告台灣同胞書》三十周年之題而發，為了追溯淵源，為了表彰傳承，自然要重新啟用這些歷史語彙。當然，這些語彙所蘊含的思 維無疑亦是胡錦濤個人的認知與追求；唯就大處來看，胡錦濤雖然是「中國統一」的「目的論」者，但他在通篇談話中，亦顯示他也是「兩岸關係和平發展」的「過 程論」者。
統獨議題，皆是「目的論」；急統急獨，更是不問「過程」、不擇手段之「唯目的論」。「過程論」，則是延緩對「目的」的追求，而主張以「互動過程」來累積解 決難題的資源與條件。亦即，目的論不接受現狀，主張改變現狀；過程論則主張尊重現狀，維持現狀，改善現狀。胡錦濤近幾年來的表現，應可視為從「目的論」， 向「過程論」移動；他未放棄「目的」，但向「過程」傾斜；也就是從高喊「統一」，轉移至承認並重視「尚未統一的特殊情況」。
目的論極易形成僵局。以在北京對台政策中好久沒有出現的「一國兩制」而言，「一國」作何定義？連胡錦濤此次都未說「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」。「兩制」又作何定義？對香港言，兩制是委選特首，但台灣卻已直選四屆總統，難道要台灣倒退回頭去選特首？
北京過去是「目的論」者，不接受現狀，主張改變現狀（推動統一）；但自二○○○ 年前後以降，則與美國一起主張維持現狀，反對「片面改變現狀」，原因是台獨聲勢上揚。但是，「現狀」作何定義，是否在某種程度上承認及維持「中華民國」， 卻是似有改變又迄無進展。然而，若不維持中華民國，如何維持現狀？若不接受中華民國，現狀是什麼？
北京近年來的說法是：「儘管兩岸尚未統一，但大陸與台灣同屬一個中國的事實從未改變。」此種理論這次也見諸胡六點。在現實上，這應當是指兩岸雖以「中華民 國」與「中華人民共和國」分裂分治，但仍同屬「一個中國」。倘係如此，就「屋頂理論」而言，「一個中國」即應是指「台灣／大陸」或「中華民國／中華人民共 和國」之上的「第三概念」。但是，在北京的實際操作中，顯然並非作此定義。
欲重建兩岸關係，須從「目的論」及「過程論」兩方面皆進行改善。就目的論言，例如，「一個中國」的「屋頂理論」，若不能跳出「一個中國就是中華人民共和 國」的「片面主義」，即生僵局。就過程論言，則胡六點此次多所著墨，包括簽定綜合性經濟合作協議、建立兩岸經濟合作機制、與亞太經濟合作機制相銜接、停止 涉外事務之內耗、鬆綁台灣參與國際組織活動、建立軍事安全機制、達成和平協議，及就國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係展開務實探討等等。這些均是強調 「多辦好事／多辦實事」的「過程主義」，辦了或許有利於「統一」，但更重要的是尤其有利於維持「尚未統一／統一不成」的「現狀」。
兩岸互動，從「目的論」朝「過程論」移動，應屬正向發展。最好是以正確的「過程」，自然帶出「目的」；而不是用強拗的「目的」，扭曲了「過程」。否則，倘若是以台灣倒退回頭選特首的「一國兩制」為「目的」，不僅「目的」不能達成，且將毀掉在「過程」中所產生的種種可能性。
在胡六點中，還看不出「尚未統一的特殊情況下的（兩岸）政治關係」究何所指。是否指一個新的「屋頂理論」？是否指一個「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」的「兩岸 關係和平發展框架」？是否有尊重歷史、尊重現實、尊重人民願望的新內涵？能否為兩岸關係帶入一個新的「過程」？在在似乎皆有想像空間。
Wednesday, January 7, 2009
Hu's Three Forms of Respect: Peaceful Development is Democratic Development
Hu's Three Forms of Respect: Peaceful Development is Democratic Development
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 7, 2009
The theme of Hu Jintao's New Year's Eve talk was "peaceful development." Throughout his talk, Hu spoke of "establishing a framework for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations."
Actually, we are placing our hopes on "establishing a framework for the democratic development of cross-Strait relations."
Hu feels that three decades of cross-Strait relations reflect a respect for history, a respect for reality, and a respect for the aspirations of the people, for their effort to "seek truth from facts." These three forms of respect can be understood as follows: Historical evolution has changed reality, and a changed reality has led to changes in public opinion. We can of course reverse this formula as well. The evolution of public opinion has changed reality, and a changed reality has changed our understanding of history.
Hu Jintao spoke of "respect for history." He considers today's cross-Strait stand-off a continuation of the 1949 Chinese Civil War. Yes, the 60 year old Chinese Civil War was indeed a power struggle between two parties, the KMT and the CCP. But at a deeper level it was a struggle to determine the future of China. It was a the Chinese people's demand that China's rulers sho greater respect for democracy, and do more to improve people's lives. Sixty years later, the Chinese Civil War is no longer merely a narrowly defined KMT vs. CCP Civil War. Rather, given globalization, the "civil war" has evolved into a bilateral pursuit of universal values, of the people's well being, and of cooperation and competition. Sixty years ago, the KMT and CCP divided the people with a bloody civil war. Sixty years later, must the people still resort to civil war to achieve power?
Hu Jintao spoke of "respect for reality." But he seems to have revised history. In his talk, the term he invoked most was "pragmatism." He cited Beijing's loosening of restraints on Taipei's international space as evidence of Beijing's "respect for reality." He added that "the two sides can conduct pragmatic political relations under special circumstances, even though the nation is not yet reunified." His suggestion was unprecedented. First, he reaffirmed the "the nation is not yet reunified," and is "under special circumstances." That means reunification is future tense, and that the "special circumstances" under which the nation is "not yet reunified," ought to be acknowledged and maintained. That means the maintenance of the recent cross-Strait status quo. Secondly, he pointed out that "under special circumstances," in which the nation is "not yet reunified," the two sides should explore pragmatic cross-Strait political relations. That leaves considerable room for the imagination, including such notions as "pre-reunified," for "quasi-reunified," or "non-reunified" political relations. We may address this issue tomorrow. In short, Hu apparently acknowledged that today's cross-Strait reality is different from the "civil war" of 60 years ago.
Hu Jintao also demonstrated "respect for the people's aspirations." He mentioned that a "Taiwanese consciousness is not the same as a Taiwan independence consciousness." This is hardly new, but it does evince Hu's awareness of a "Taiwanese consciousness." He also repeated his message to the Democratic Progressive Party. He acknowledged Taiwan's pluralistic party politics. If Beijing evinces a psychological awareness of a "Taiwanese consciousness," and acknowledges the political reality of Taiwan's partisan politics, the two sides ought to be able to conduct pragmatic negotiations, and arrive at peaceful win/win solutions.
Now let's look at Hu's three forms of respect. Sixty years ago cross-Strait relations were predicated upon a civil war and a Cold War. Realistically speaking, calls to "Liberate Taiwan!" or "Retake the Mainland!" treated the people as tools and "straw dogs" in a cross-Strait civil war. But six decades later, democracy, the people's livelihood, and globalization reign supreme. Realistically speaking, the situation is "divided rule," the nation is "not yet reunified," and "reunification is difficult." Who has the heart to ask people on both sides to kill each for the sake of a 60 year old civil war?
In fact, ever since Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms and liberalization, both realpolitik and public aspirations have undergone substantial change. That is the significance of Hu's three forms of respect.
Chiang Ching-kuo single-handedly lifted martial law. He single-handedly authorized visits among relatives across the Strait, and initiated cross-Strait exchanges. He linked cross-Strait relations to Taiwan's democratic politics. Taiwan's leaders must promote cross-Strait relations in accordance with Taiwan's democracy. This is why the Taiwan independence movement lost power last year, and why cross-Strait exchanges have surged. Beijing must find a way to resolve cross-Strait problems that accords with Taiwan's democracy. This is why in recent years Beijing has turned from "halting separatism and accelerating reunification," to "maintaining a status quo" in which the nation is "not yet reunified." Deng Xiaoping reformed and liberalized the mainland, Broadly speaking, it was democratically oriented. The people's livelihood took precedence. Internationally the "peaceful rise" of China became Beijing's clarion call. Domestically, "class struggle" was abandoned. Under such circumstances it is impossible to define cross-Strait relations in such narrow terms as a "civil war."
Sixty years ago, history changed reality, and reality changed the meaning of public opinion. Sixty years later, public opinion changed reality, and reality changed our understanding of history. Hu Jintao speaks of a framework of "peaceful development of cross-Strait relations." Why not consider a framework of "democratic development of cross-Strait relations?"
胡錦濤的三尊重：和平發展就是民主發展
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.07 03:32 am
胡錦濤除夕談話的主軸是「和平發展」，通篇用心在於「建構兩岸關係和平發展框架」。
我們認為，「和平發展」在運作層次應當落實在「民主發展」之上，亦即必須寄託於「建構兩岸關係民主發展架構」。
胡錦濤認為，三十年來兩岸關係的實踐，體現了尊重歷史、尊重現實、尊重人民願望的實事求是精神。這「三尊重」可順向演繹：歷史的演變，改變了現實；現實的演變，改變了民意的內涵。然而，亦可反溯詮釋：民意的演變，改變了現實；現實的演變，改變了對歷史的思考。
胡 錦濤談「尊重歷史」，他認為：今日兩岸情勢，是一九四九年「中國內戰遺留並延續的政治對立」。其實，六十年前的「中國內戰」，一方面是國共兩黨的政權之 爭，但更深一層的意義，卻是中國走哪條路之爭，更是中國人民要求統治者尊重民主、改善民生之爭；何況，六十年後，當歷史的進程演化至今日地步，所謂「中國 內戰」，當然已非「國共內戰」那種狹義，而是在全球化的趨勢下，所謂的「內戰」其實已經演化成兩岸在追求普世價值及民生福祉上的合作與競爭。六十年前，國 共用流血「內戰」來分割人民；六十年後，難道仍要讓人民用「內戰」來取捨政權？
胡錦濤談「尊重現實」，似乎已對歷史的詮釋有了修正。他在 談話中，使用最多的詞彙之一，就是「務實」，且對鬆綁台灣的國際空間表達善意，此皆顯示其「尊重現實」的態度。他又說，「兩岸可以就在國家尚未統一的特殊 情況下的政治關係展開務實探討」，這是過去未有的論述。第一，他再次確認了「國家尚未統一的特殊情況」之存在，這應是說，「統一」是「未來式」，而「尚未 統一」的「特殊情況」當予承認並維持；這應當就是近年兩岸所說「維持現狀」的意思。第二，他又指出，在「尚未統一的特殊情況下」，可以就兩岸的「政治關係 展開務實探討」；若依此論，兩岸是否可能出現「前統一」、「準統一」或「非統一」的「政治關係」，已予人極大想像空間。這一部分，明天可作續論。總之，胡 錦濤似乎承認，今日的兩岸現實，畢竟已與六十年前的「內戰」不同。
胡錦濤對「尊重人民願望」，亦有發揮。他提到「台灣意識不等於台獨意 識」，這雖不是新論述，但應是表示認知到「台灣意識」的主體性；至於他對民進黨再次喊話，也是回應台灣政黨政治所反映的多元民意。只要北京當局能夠體認 「台灣意識」（人民心理）與「政黨政治」（政治體制）這兩大塊，在務實協商下，兩岸關係即應可找到和平雙贏的道路。
回頭談「三尊重」。六 十年前，兩岸關係就歷史言，是內戰與國際冷戰；就現實言，是「解放台灣」與「反攻大陸」；就人民願望言，則兩岸人民皆是「內戰」的工具與芻狗。然而，六十 年後，就歷史言，則是民主與民生至上及全球化；就現實言，則是「分裂分治」、「尚未統一」、「統一不易」；就人民願望言，則誰敢又誰忍叫兩岸人民再像六十 年前那般因「內戰」而相互殘殺？
其實，自蔣經國宣布解嚴及鄧小平操持改革開放以來，兩岸的歷史詮釋、現實思維及人民願望皆已大幅改變；這應當即是「三尊重」的新內涵。
蔣 經國一手解嚴，一手以開放探親啟動兩岸交流；即已將兩岸關係與台灣的民主政治繫為一體。台灣主政者必須依民主運作來推動兩岸關係，這正是去年台獨失勢及兩 岸交流再起的原因；而北京當局亦必須在台灣的民主體制中，找到化解兩岸難題的條件，這則是近年來北京漸從「必須停止分裂，儘速統一」轉至「承認尚未統一的 特殊現狀」之原因。至於鄧小平的改革開放，廣義而言亦是民主取向，民生掛帥，對外「和平崛起」，對內揚棄「階級鬥爭」，當然亦不可能再用狹義的「內戰」來 定義兩岸關係。
六十年來，歷史改變現實，現實改變民意內涵；六十年後，則已是民意改變現實，現實改變歷史詮釋。胡錦濤的「兩岸關係和平發展框架」，何不落實於「兩岸關係民主發展架構」？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 7, 2009
The theme of Hu Jintao's New Year's Eve talk was "peaceful development." Throughout his talk, Hu spoke of "establishing a framework for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations."
Actually, we are placing our hopes on "establishing a framework for the democratic development of cross-Strait relations."
Hu feels that three decades of cross-Strait relations reflect a respect for history, a respect for reality, and a respect for the aspirations of the people, for their effort to "seek truth from facts." These three forms of respect can be understood as follows: Historical evolution has changed reality, and a changed reality has led to changes in public opinion. We can of course reverse this formula as well. The evolution of public opinion has changed reality, and a changed reality has changed our understanding of history.
Hu Jintao spoke of "respect for history." He considers today's cross-Strait stand-off a continuation of the 1949 Chinese Civil War. Yes, the 60 year old Chinese Civil War was indeed a power struggle between two parties, the KMT and the CCP. But at a deeper level it was a struggle to determine the future of China. It was a the Chinese people's demand that China's rulers sho greater respect for democracy, and do more to improve people's lives. Sixty years later, the Chinese Civil War is no longer merely a narrowly defined KMT vs. CCP Civil War. Rather, given globalization, the "civil war" has evolved into a bilateral pursuit of universal values, of the people's well being, and of cooperation and competition. Sixty years ago, the KMT and CCP divided the people with a bloody civil war. Sixty years later, must the people still resort to civil war to achieve power?
Hu Jintao spoke of "respect for reality." But he seems to have revised history. In his talk, the term he invoked most was "pragmatism." He cited Beijing's loosening of restraints on Taipei's international space as evidence of Beijing's "respect for reality." He added that "the two sides can conduct pragmatic political relations under special circumstances, even though the nation is not yet reunified." His suggestion was unprecedented. First, he reaffirmed the "the nation is not yet reunified," and is "under special circumstances." That means reunification is future tense, and that the "special circumstances" under which the nation is "not yet reunified," ought to be acknowledged and maintained. That means the maintenance of the recent cross-Strait status quo. Secondly, he pointed out that "under special circumstances," in which the nation is "not yet reunified," the two sides should explore pragmatic cross-Strait political relations. That leaves considerable room for the imagination, including such notions as "pre-reunified," for "quasi-reunified," or "non-reunified" political relations. We may address this issue tomorrow. In short, Hu apparently acknowledged that today's cross-Strait reality is different from the "civil war" of 60 years ago.
Hu Jintao also demonstrated "respect for the people's aspirations." He mentioned that a "Taiwanese consciousness is not the same as a Taiwan independence consciousness." This is hardly new, but it does evince Hu's awareness of a "Taiwanese consciousness." He also repeated his message to the Democratic Progressive Party. He acknowledged Taiwan's pluralistic party politics. If Beijing evinces a psychological awareness of a "Taiwanese consciousness," and acknowledges the political reality of Taiwan's partisan politics, the two sides ought to be able to conduct pragmatic negotiations, and arrive at peaceful win/win solutions.
Now let's look at Hu's three forms of respect. Sixty years ago cross-Strait relations were predicated upon a civil war and a Cold War. Realistically speaking, calls to "Liberate Taiwan!" or "Retake the Mainland!" treated the people as tools and "straw dogs" in a cross-Strait civil war. But six decades later, democracy, the people's livelihood, and globalization reign supreme. Realistically speaking, the situation is "divided rule," the nation is "not yet reunified," and "reunification is difficult." Who has the heart to ask people on both sides to kill each for the sake of a 60 year old civil war?
In fact, ever since Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms and liberalization, both realpolitik and public aspirations have undergone substantial change. That is the significance of Hu's three forms of respect.
Chiang Ching-kuo single-handedly lifted martial law. He single-handedly authorized visits among relatives across the Strait, and initiated cross-Strait exchanges. He linked cross-Strait relations to Taiwan's democratic politics. Taiwan's leaders must promote cross-Strait relations in accordance with Taiwan's democracy. This is why the Taiwan independence movement lost power last year, and why cross-Strait exchanges have surged. Beijing must find a way to resolve cross-Strait problems that accords with Taiwan's democracy. This is why in recent years Beijing has turned from "halting separatism and accelerating reunification," to "maintaining a status quo" in which the nation is "not yet reunified." Deng Xiaoping reformed and liberalized the mainland, Broadly speaking, it was democratically oriented. The people's livelihood took precedence. Internationally the "peaceful rise" of China became Beijing's clarion call. Domestically, "class struggle" was abandoned. Under such circumstances it is impossible to define cross-Strait relations in such narrow terms as a "civil war."
Sixty years ago, history changed reality, and reality changed the meaning of public opinion. Sixty years later, public opinion changed reality, and reality changed our understanding of history. Hu Jintao speaks of a framework of "peaceful development of cross-Strait relations." Why not consider a framework of "democratic development of cross-Strait relations?"
胡錦濤的三尊重：和平發展就是民主發展
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.07 03:32 am
胡錦濤除夕談話的主軸是「和平發展」，通篇用心在於「建構兩岸關係和平發展框架」。
我們認為，「和平發展」在運作層次應當落實在「民主發展」之上，亦即必須寄託於「建構兩岸關係民主發展架構」。
胡錦濤認為，三十年來兩岸關係的實踐，體現了尊重歷史、尊重現實、尊重人民願望的實事求是精神。這「三尊重」可順向演繹：歷史的演變，改變了現實；現實的演變，改變了民意的內涵。然而，亦可反溯詮釋：民意的演變，改變了現實；現實的演變，改變了對歷史的思考。
胡 錦濤談「尊重歷史」，他認為：今日兩岸情勢，是一九四九年「中國內戰遺留並延續的政治對立」。其實，六十年前的「中國內戰」，一方面是國共兩黨的政權之 爭，但更深一層的意義，卻是中國走哪條路之爭，更是中國人民要求統治者尊重民主、改善民生之爭；何況，六十年後，當歷史的進程演化至今日地步，所謂「中國 內戰」，當然已非「國共內戰」那種狹義，而是在全球化的趨勢下，所謂的「內戰」其實已經演化成兩岸在追求普世價值及民生福祉上的合作與競爭。六十年前，國 共用流血「內戰」來分割人民；六十年後，難道仍要讓人民用「內戰」來取捨政權？
胡錦濤談「尊重現實」，似乎已對歷史的詮釋有了修正。他在 談話中，使用最多的詞彙之一，就是「務實」，且對鬆綁台灣的國際空間表達善意，此皆顯示其「尊重現實」的態度。他又說，「兩岸可以就在國家尚未統一的特殊 情況下的政治關係展開務實探討」，這是過去未有的論述。第一，他再次確認了「國家尚未統一的特殊情況」之存在，這應是說，「統一」是「未來式」，而「尚未 統一」的「特殊情況」當予承認並維持；這應當就是近年兩岸所說「維持現狀」的意思。第二，他又指出，在「尚未統一的特殊情況下」，可以就兩岸的「政治關係 展開務實探討」；若依此論，兩岸是否可能出現「前統一」、「準統一」或「非統一」的「政治關係」，已予人極大想像空間。這一部分，明天可作續論。總之，胡 錦濤似乎承認，今日的兩岸現實，畢竟已與六十年前的「內戰」不同。
胡錦濤對「尊重人民願望」，亦有發揮。他提到「台灣意識不等於台獨意 識」，這雖不是新論述，但應是表示認知到「台灣意識」的主體性；至於他對民進黨再次喊話，也是回應台灣政黨政治所反映的多元民意。只要北京當局能夠體認 「台灣意識」（人民心理）與「政黨政治」（政治體制）這兩大塊，在務實協商下，兩岸關係即應可找到和平雙贏的道路。
回頭談「三尊重」。六 十年前，兩岸關係就歷史言，是內戰與國際冷戰；就現實言，是「解放台灣」與「反攻大陸」；就人民願望言，則兩岸人民皆是「內戰」的工具與芻狗。然而，六十 年後，就歷史言，則是民主與民生至上及全球化；就現實言，則是「分裂分治」、「尚未統一」、「統一不易」；就人民願望言，則誰敢又誰忍叫兩岸人民再像六十 年前那般因「內戰」而相互殘殺？
其實，自蔣經國宣布解嚴及鄧小平操持改革開放以來，兩岸的歷史詮釋、現實思維及人民願望皆已大幅改變；這應當即是「三尊重」的新內涵。
蔣 經國一手解嚴，一手以開放探親啟動兩岸交流；即已將兩岸關係與台灣的民主政治繫為一體。台灣主政者必須依民主運作來推動兩岸關係，這正是去年台獨失勢及兩 岸交流再起的原因；而北京當局亦必須在台灣的民主體制中，找到化解兩岸難題的條件，這則是近年來北京漸從「必須停止分裂，儘速統一」轉至「承認尚未統一的 特殊現狀」之原因。至於鄧小平的改革開放，廣義而言亦是民主取向，民生掛帥，對外「和平崛起」，對內揚棄「階級鬥爭」，當然亦不可能再用狹義的「內戰」來 定義兩岸關係。
六十年來，歷史改變現實，現實改變民意內涵；六十年後，則已是民意改變現實，現實改變歷史詮釋。胡錦濤的「兩岸關係和平發展框架」，何不落實於「兩岸關係民主發展架構」？
Tuesday, January 6, 2009
The Outlook for 2009: Meeting Taiwan's Economic Difficulties Head On
The Outlook for 2009: Meeting Taiwan's Economic Difficulties Head On
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 6, 2008
The financial crisis of the century has brought down the modern West's proud financial system. The global economy has dropped into a bottomless abyss. As we look forward to 2009, the economic outlook remains pessimistic. For Taiwan's economy, 2009 will definitely be a difficult year. But as the saying goes, a crisis is also an opportunity. Precisely because we face difficulties, we will be extra careful. Precisely because we face difficulties, we will try extra hard. Precisely because we face difficulties, we will display our resilience. For Taiwan's economy, 2009 will be difficult. But we have no choice but to meet these difficulties, head on.
International organizations and economic research institutes are in agreement about this year's global economy. Trade will shrink. Growth will slow. Unemployment and inflation will increase. Social problems will worsen. International tensions will increase. Calls for protectionism will surge. Voices will be raised for governments to take aggressive measures to save the economy. In recent years Taiwan's economic growth has been almost exclusively export driven. It is at risk in the current recession. Taiwan's domestic market is small, and highly dependent upon foreign trade. It will be harder hit than other Asian countries. For example, the Economist predicts that Taiwan's growth rate will shrink 2.9 percent this year. It will experience the lowest growth rate in Asia, the sixth lowest in the world.
This year, research institutes are unanimously bearish about Taiwan's economic performance. But their forecasts about the economic growth rate are about the same. Among them, the Economist's are the most pessimistic. The International Monetary Fund's are the most optimistic. The IMF's approximate the government's official forecast of 2.1 percent. The Academia Sinica, the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, and the Taiwan Research Institute all forecast a domestic growth rate of around 1 percent. Each of these agencies has its own forecasting model. But from a negative 2.9 percent, to a positive 2.1 percent, represents a 5% difference, and nearly 680 billion NT in GDP. This includes both controllable and uncontrollable variables. But these are exactly what we are working to address. Given Taiwan's economic strength, this is all doable.
The overall economic environment is relatively stable. This is Taiwan's most powerful defense against an economic recession. It is also a renewable resource. For example, Taiwan has a high savings rate. By contrast, the United States must first undergo a recovery process by accumulating savings. Taiwan already has the resources necessary for the expansion of economic activity. Interest rates in one country after another have fallen to zero. By contrast, Taiwan's relatively stable investment rates and interest rates have made it a sponge for capital. In terms of financial soundness, our government has kept its debt below 40% GDP. By contrast, the Eurozone's debt ceiling is 60%. Developed nations such as the United States and Japan have long maintained a debt ceiling of over 100%. This gives the government the ability to increase anti-recessionary measures. We have nearly 300 billion US in foreign reserves. This remains a cornerstone of our stable exchange rate and international credibility.
In addition, we have a solid industrial base. This will be crucial to any breakthrough in Taiwan's current economic circumstances. An industrial base is not built in a day. Our current achievements are the result of long-term efforts. The global economy finds itself in a downturn. Numerous industries are now at risk. But the downturn has also provided us with an opportunity for industry consolidation. The government is concerned above all about the integrity of Taiwan's industrial structure, its skilled labor, and its position in the international supply chain. None of these can be replicated quickly. When demand surges, Taiwan's industries must be able to respond swiftly.
Taiwan has substantive strength. This year Taiwan also has something other countries do not have -- the opportunity to reap economic dividends from the normalization of cross-strait relations. Cross-strait restrictions were the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's economic straitjacket. They lost Taiwan many opportunities for economic expansion on the mainland. The two sides have now established direct links. This has reduced the cost of interaction. Taiwan is now a more open platform, a more open Asia-Pacific conduit. The mainland's economy will also face difficulties. Its landing and speed of recovery are still unknown. Any dividends may not be immediately apparent. But as long as we focus on the long-term, as long as we normalize Taiwan's economic development, as long as we move towards the next phase in economic growth, we have made a start, and we stand a chance.
Of course danger lurks throughout 2009. We must proceed cautiously. In particular, we predict a deterioration in the unemployment picture and a corresponding negative impact on social order during the the first quarter. The government must consider this its number one priority. It must not take the matter lightly. This year, there will be no surprises. Nor is there any need for surprises. This is a year to roll up our sleeves and get down to work. During the first quarter the government is issuing consumer vouchers. During the second quarter, it must follow up by expanding public works. It must not simply throw money at problems. It must restore confidence in our society. Confidence is intangible, but highly contagious. Furthermore, it is self-fulfilling. This is something the government must not overlook.
Difficulties and dangers abound. But if we meet difficulties head on, and deal with them, we can still look forward to a 2009 that opens low and closes high.
展望二○○九：台灣經濟，迎難而上
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.06 03:28 am
一場百年不遇的金融海嘯，掀垮了西方引以為傲的現代金融體系，也將世界經濟打落看不到底的深淵。從這個時點展望二○○九，所有的經濟預測都是悲觀的；二 ○○九對台灣經濟而言，絕對是困難的一年。但套句老話，危機就是轉機，正因為困難，我們會更小心，也因為困難，我們要更努力，更因為困難，才能展現韌性與 差異。二○○九，台灣經濟將迎難而上，也不得不迎難而進。
國際組織或經濟研究機構對今年全球經濟的預測頗為一致，大抵不脫貿易萎縮、成長遲滯、失業及通貨緊縮風險雙雙升高的基調，並由此擔心社會問題惡化、國際政 治趨於緊張、貿易保護主義再起等；進而呼籲各國必須採取積極的作為拯救經濟。在此大環境下，近年獨靠出口擴張支撐的台灣經濟，正承受極大的衰退風險，並因 台灣內需市場規模小，外貿比重相對高，所受衝擊將更甚於其他亞洲國家。例如，英國經濟學人就認為，今年台灣經濟將萎縮百分之二點九，是亞洲最低，在全球排 名倒數第六。
不過，各研究機構雖一致看淡今年台灣經濟表現，但對經濟成長率的預估差距不小。其中，經濟學人的預測最悲觀，最樂觀的是國際貨幣基金（ＩＭＦ），與政府的 官方預測百分之二點一相當；中研院、中經院、台綜院等國內經濟研究機構則預測在百分之一上下。各機構自有其估測模型，但單從負百分之二點九到正百分之二點 一而言，這五個百分點的差異，代表的是近六千八百億元的國民生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）能否被創造；其間固然存有可控與不可控的變數，但這正是我們要努力的目標， 而以台灣經濟的實力，這也是可以做得到的。
總體經濟環境的相對穩定，是台灣經濟力抗經濟衰退的最大後盾，更是待勢再起的推進器。例如台灣的高儲蓄率，相對於美國須先經累積儲蓄的復甦過程，我們已擁 有支持經濟活動擴張的資源；而在各國相繼走向零利率之際，台灣相對穩定的雙率更成了吸金利器。再如財政穩健度，目前我國政府債務餘額仍控制在GDP四成以 下，相對於歐元區的六成上限，以及美日等發達國家早已破百，也讓政府擁有相對較大的空間，來推動反景氣周期的擴張財政政策。至於近三千億美元的外匯存底， 更是穩定匯率及維持台灣國際信用的基石。
此外，堅實的產業基礎，則是台灣經濟突破成長困境的主要憑藉。產業的建立非一朝一夕之事，現有的成就是長時期的累積，如今雖因遭逢世界經濟逆流，導致部分 產業陷入險境，但也提供產業整合的契機，政府亦已關注；最重要的是，台灣產業的特色是結構的完整性、技術人力的匯集及在國際供應鏈上的地位；這些，皆非全 然可以快速複製的，當需求回潮，台灣產業也將能以最快的速度回應。
除了實力，台灣今年還擁有其他國家所沒有的機會酖酖兩岸關係正常化後的經濟紅利。兩岸設限曾是民進黨執政時期台灣經濟的緊身衣，也讓台灣失去許多隨大陸經 濟擴張的契機；如今兩岸實現大三通，互動成本的直接降低，更打通台灣建立亞太平台的渠道。儘管，大陸經濟今年也將面臨艱困，著陸及復甦速度未明，紅利不一 定立即可見；但著眼於長期，正常化是台灣發展新經濟型態、邁向下一階段成長高峰的前提和利基，有了開始，就有機會。
當然，二○○九的台灣經濟，絕對是險境處處，必須步步為營。尤其，第一季失業情勢的惡化及對社會秩序的影響，已可預見其發生，政府自必要當成第一要務因 應，不能掉以輕心。這一年，不太會有驚喜，也不需要驚喜，因為這該是實實在在做事的一年，除了第一季的消費券，第二季擴大公共建設必須即時接棒，而且不只 是把錢花出去，更重要的在於穩住民間信心。信心是看不到的意念，卻有很高的傳染性，更會自我實現；在這方面，政府尤其不能輕忽。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 6, 2008
The financial crisis of the century has brought down the modern West's proud financial system. The global economy has dropped into a bottomless abyss. As we look forward to 2009, the economic outlook remains pessimistic. For Taiwan's economy, 2009 will definitely be a difficult year. But as the saying goes, a crisis is also an opportunity. Precisely because we face difficulties, we will be extra careful. Precisely because we face difficulties, we will try extra hard. Precisely because we face difficulties, we will display our resilience. For Taiwan's economy, 2009 will be difficult. But we have no choice but to meet these difficulties, head on.
International organizations and economic research institutes are in agreement about this year's global economy. Trade will shrink. Growth will slow. Unemployment and inflation will increase. Social problems will worsen. International tensions will increase. Calls for protectionism will surge. Voices will be raised for governments to take aggressive measures to save the economy. In recent years Taiwan's economic growth has been almost exclusively export driven. It is at risk in the current recession. Taiwan's domestic market is small, and highly dependent upon foreign trade. It will be harder hit than other Asian countries. For example, the Economist predicts that Taiwan's growth rate will shrink 2.9 percent this year. It will experience the lowest growth rate in Asia, the sixth lowest in the world.
This year, research institutes are unanimously bearish about Taiwan's economic performance. But their forecasts about the economic growth rate are about the same. Among them, the Economist's are the most pessimistic. The International Monetary Fund's are the most optimistic. The IMF's approximate the government's official forecast of 2.1 percent. The Academia Sinica, the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, and the Taiwan Research Institute all forecast a domestic growth rate of around 1 percent. Each of these agencies has its own forecasting model. But from a negative 2.9 percent, to a positive 2.1 percent, represents a 5% difference, and nearly 680 billion NT in GDP. This includes both controllable and uncontrollable variables. But these are exactly what we are working to address. Given Taiwan's economic strength, this is all doable.
The overall economic environment is relatively stable. This is Taiwan's most powerful defense against an economic recession. It is also a renewable resource. For example, Taiwan has a high savings rate. By contrast, the United States must first undergo a recovery process by accumulating savings. Taiwan already has the resources necessary for the expansion of economic activity. Interest rates in one country after another have fallen to zero. By contrast, Taiwan's relatively stable investment rates and interest rates have made it a sponge for capital. In terms of financial soundness, our government has kept its debt below 40% GDP. By contrast, the Eurozone's debt ceiling is 60%. Developed nations such as the United States and Japan have long maintained a debt ceiling of over 100%. This gives the government the ability to increase anti-recessionary measures. We have nearly 300 billion US in foreign reserves. This remains a cornerstone of our stable exchange rate and international credibility.
In addition, we have a solid industrial base. This will be crucial to any breakthrough in Taiwan's current economic circumstances. An industrial base is not built in a day. Our current achievements are the result of long-term efforts. The global economy finds itself in a downturn. Numerous industries are now at risk. But the downturn has also provided us with an opportunity for industry consolidation. The government is concerned above all about the integrity of Taiwan's industrial structure, its skilled labor, and its position in the international supply chain. None of these can be replicated quickly. When demand surges, Taiwan's industries must be able to respond swiftly.
Taiwan has substantive strength. This year Taiwan also has something other countries do not have -- the opportunity to reap economic dividends from the normalization of cross-strait relations. Cross-strait restrictions were the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's economic straitjacket. They lost Taiwan many opportunities for economic expansion on the mainland. The two sides have now established direct links. This has reduced the cost of interaction. Taiwan is now a more open platform, a more open Asia-Pacific conduit. The mainland's economy will also face difficulties. Its landing and speed of recovery are still unknown. Any dividends may not be immediately apparent. But as long as we focus on the long-term, as long as we normalize Taiwan's economic development, as long as we move towards the next phase in economic growth, we have made a start, and we stand a chance.
Of course danger lurks throughout 2009. We must proceed cautiously. In particular, we predict a deterioration in the unemployment picture and a corresponding negative impact on social order during the the first quarter. The government must consider this its number one priority. It must not take the matter lightly. This year, there will be no surprises. Nor is there any need for surprises. This is a year to roll up our sleeves and get down to work. During the first quarter the government is issuing consumer vouchers. During the second quarter, it must follow up by expanding public works. It must not simply throw money at problems. It must restore confidence in our society. Confidence is intangible, but highly contagious. Furthermore, it is self-fulfilling. This is something the government must not overlook.
Difficulties and dangers abound. But if we meet difficulties head on, and deal with them, we can still look forward to a 2009 that opens low and closes high.
展望二○○九：台灣經濟，迎難而上
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.06 03:28 am
一場百年不遇的金融海嘯，掀垮了西方引以為傲的現代金融體系，也將世界經濟打落看不到底的深淵。從這個時點展望二○○九，所有的經濟預測都是悲觀的；二 ○○九對台灣經濟而言，絕對是困難的一年。但套句老話，危機就是轉機，正因為困難，我們會更小心，也因為困難，我們要更努力，更因為困難，才能展現韌性與 差異。二○○九，台灣經濟將迎難而上，也不得不迎難而進。
國際組織或經濟研究機構對今年全球經濟的預測頗為一致，大抵不脫貿易萎縮、成長遲滯、失業及通貨緊縮風險雙雙升高的基調，並由此擔心社會問題惡化、國際政 治趨於緊張、貿易保護主義再起等；進而呼籲各國必須採取積極的作為拯救經濟。在此大環境下，近年獨靠出口擴張支撐的台灣經濟，正承受極大的衰退風險，並因 台灣內需市場規模小，外貿比重相對高，所受衝擊將更甚於其他亞洲國家。例如，英國經濟學人就認為，今年台灣經濟將萎縮百分之二點九，是亞洲最低，在全球排 名倒數第六。
不過，各研究機構雖一致看淡今年台灣經濟表現，但對經濟成長率的預估差距不小。其中，經濟學人的預測最悲觀，最樂觀的是國際貨幣基金（ＩＭＦ），與政府的 官方預測百分之二點一相當；中研院、中經院、台綜院等國內經濟研究機構則預測在百分之一上下。各機構自有其估測模型，但單從負百分之二點九到正百分之二點 一而言，這五個百分點的差異，代表的是近六千八百億元的國民生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）能否被創造；其間固然存有可控與不可控的變數，但這正是我們要努力的目標， 而以台灣經濟的實力，這也是可以做得到的。
總體經濟環境的相對穩定，是台灣經濟力抗經濟衰退的最大後盾，更是待勢再起的推進器。例如台灣的高儲蓄率，相對於美國須先經累積儲蓄的復甦過程，我們已擁 有支持經濟活動擴張的資源；而在各國相繼走向零利率之際，台灣相對穩定的雙率更成了吸金利器。再如財政穩健度，目前我國政府債務餘額仍控制在GDP四成以 下，相對於歐元區的六成上限，以及美日等發達國家早已破百，也讓政府擁有相對較大的空間，來推動反景氣周期的擴張財政政策。至於近三千億美元的外匯存底， 更是穩定匯率及維持台灣國際信用的基石。
此外，堅實的產業基礎，則是台灣經濟突破成長困境的主要憑藉。產業的建立非一朝一夕之事，現有的成就是長時期的累積，如今雖因遭逢世界經濟逆流，導致部分 產業陷入險境，但也提供產業整合的契機，政府亦已關注；最重要的是，台灣產業的特色是結構的完整性、技術人力的匯集及在國際供應鏈上的地位；這些，皆非全 然可以快速複製的，當需求回潮，台灣產業也將能以最快的速度回應。
除了實力，台灣今年還擁有其他國家所沒有的機會酖酖兩岸關係正常化後的經濟紅利。兩岸設限曾是民進黨執政時期台灣經濟的緊身衣，也讓台灣失去許多隨大陸經 濟擴張的契機；如今兩岸實現大三通，互動成本的直接降低，更打通台灣建立亞太平台的渠道。儘管，大陸經濟今年也將面臨艱困，著陸及復甦速度未明，紅利不一 定立即可見；但著眼於長期，正常化是台灣發展新經濟型態、邁向下一階段成長高峰的前提和利基，有了開始，就有機會。
當然，二○○九的台灣經濟，絕對是險境處處，必須步步為營。尤其，第一季失業情勢的惡化及對社會秩序的影響，已可預見其發生，政府自必要當成第一要務因 應，不能掉以輕心。這一年，不太會有驚喜，也不需要驚喜，因為這該是實實在在做事的一年，除了第一季的消費券，第二季擴大公共建設必須即時接棒，而且不只 是把錢花出去，更重要的在於穩住民間信心。信心是看不到的意念，卻有很高的傳染性，更會自我實現；在這方面，政府尤其不能輕忽。
Monday, January 5, 2009
Calmly Address the Pre-Trial Detention Controversy
Calmly Address the Pre-Trial Detention Controversy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 5, 2009
Chen Shui-bian has again been detained on charges of corruption and money-laundering, This has provoked controversy over the legal process. Some say privileged individuals have been recipients of favoritism. But it would be more accurate to say that an unprecedented case has attracted unprecedented attention. Within this highly-charged political atmosphere, the justice system has been accused of all sorts of political bias.
The reason the justice system has come under suspicion is poor institutional arrangements. Chen Shui-bian should neither receive better treatment than ordinary citizens, nor worse treatment. We must re-evaluate the pre-trial detention system, in order to avoid anyone being subjected to unconstitutional treatment.
Needless to say, the existing system of pre-trial custody labors under the authoritarian premise that one is "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent." We must not be cavalier about this. To prove either guilt or innocence requires fair trials. Presuming either guilt or innocence during the trial process, is the difference between a police state and a democratic nation under the rule of law. A system that clings to the premise that one is "guilty until proven innocent" does not meet the minimum standards for the rule of law. Fourteen years ago, the Grand Justices ruled that it was unconstitutional for prosecutors to detain suspects. This was the first step in getting rid of the premise of "guilty until proven innocent." Prosecutors who have decided to prosecute a suspect, are not going to presume that the suspect is innocent. Therefore, judges must make that presumption. Judges must examine the justifications for pre-trial detention. Pre-trial detention must be the exception, not the rule. The Grand Justices' interpretation of the Constitution led to changes in the system. Unfortunately, the justice system has yet to abandon the premise of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent."
Not long ago, the Grand Justices declared detention unconstitutional. Article entered into evidence number one: The legal system must not operate under the assumption of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent." It must not presume that the suspect is guilty before he is convicted but still under detention. In fact detention requires further justifications. The justifications for detention determine the methods of detention. For example, if there is no fear that the suspect may flee or commit suicide, then there is no need for restraints such as handcuffs. The purpose of pre-trial detention is to ensure the successful conduct of the trial. Not all suspects are automatically detained. Only those who obstruct the trial process should be detained. Current laws cling to the premise of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent."
First of all, pre-trial detention by the prosecution requires justifications. These justifications and evidence that a crime has been committed are two different matters. One cannot charge someone with a crime by relying solely upon accusations, without sufficient evidence. If one has sufficient evidence of guilt, one can indict. If one can prosecute, where is the need for detention? If the prosecution becomes accustomed to asking the court to detain suspects when the evidence is insufficient, it cannot escape the suspicion that suspects are being detained to extract evidence.
The most important reason for pre-trial detention is to prevent flight. If the defendant has flown the coop, obviously it will be difficult to conduct a trial. But even though a suspect has been indicted, one cannot always assume that the suspect will flee. The fact that Chen Chin-hsing or Wang You-tseng fled, can not be used to prove Chen Shui-bian or others will flee. Flight risk cannot be based merely on prosecutors' fears or suspicions. They must be based on evidence that the suspect is fleeing or preparing to flee. Barring the suspect from leaving the country or demanding bail are preferable to detention. Chou Chan-chung or Tsai Shou-hsiung may have been too lenient about detention in the past. But that is no reason to detain Chen Shui-bian or any other person. Instead, Chou and Tsai should be criticized for being lax gatekeepers in the past.
Detaining suspects to prevent collusion or the destruction of evidence is also plagued with problems. Practically speaking, the court has no clear definition of "collusion." To detain a suspect for fear of "collusion" is a serious threat to the suspect's rights. If we cannot clearly distinguish between the two, we may violate the suspect's constitutionally guaranteed rights. Destruction of evidence is itself a crime. But again, until the suspect has been tried, he must also be presumed innocent. If the prosecution can prove that the suspect is at risk of destroying evidence, it can seize the evidence or demand an indictment. The prosecution cannot detain suspects because it suspects the defendant might destroy evidence. For the same reason, the prosecution needs evidence to detain a felony suspect. It needs justifications to detain a suspect. Detaining everyone charged with a felony or accused of destroying evidence, negates the presumption of innocence, and is unconstitutional.
Pre-trial detention is a grave matter. Indiscriminate detention undermines fair trials. When the prosecution provides evidence to justify detention, it must give the suspect an opportunity to defend himself. The prosecution, not the defendant, is obliged to keep the investigation confidential to protect the defendant's reputation. Confidentiality cannot be used to prevent the defendant from arguing on his own behalf. If the prosecution denies the defendant the right of discovery, it has denied the defendant's right to defend himself, and is inconsistent with due process.
The power and responsibility to detain a suspect after indictment, rests with the trial court. If the court is unconcerned about whether the trial can continue, then it may not detain the suspect. Allowing the prosecution to appeal to a higher court, and consider whether to detain the suspect, is also a very strange arrangement. Frankly it is the same premise of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent."
Our remarks are not directed at the Chen Shui-bian corruption and money laundering case. Our remarks are an attempt to ensure that the trial process for everyone, innocent or guilty, remains fair. Suspects must not be put behind bards merely because they have been accused. The time has come for a comprehensive review of pre-trial detention. Just because Chen Shui-bian is about to stand trial, we should not turn a blind eye to the problem.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.01.05
平心靜氣談「審前羈押」爭議
中時社論
陳水扁因被控貪汙洗錢而被兩度審前羈押，引起不少司法程序爭論。與其說是特權人物使然，不如說是這樁空前的案件吸引了空前的檢視目光。這種高度敏感的政治氛圍，讓扁案的司法審判必須面對各種政治成見或質疑的考驗。
司法所以引起質疑，往往緣於制度安排不善。阿扁不該得到比他人更優越的司法待遇，其受審被押也不該出現比一般平民更差的待遇。我們必須重新檢視審前羈押制度，以免任何人受到不合憲法正當程序的對待。
不必諱言，現行審前羈押制度飽受「被控有罪就抓起來」的威權觀念支配；於是被控有罪的人被迫去證明自己清白；且在證明自己清白之前註定被關。然而此事不容 馬虎，證明有罪或是清白，需要公正審判的過程，過程之中假設有罪還是無罪，恰是警察國家與民主法治國家的分野。不能拋棄「被控有罪就該收押」的制度，就還 不符合法治國家的最低標準。十四年前大法官宣告檢察官有權羈押被告為違憲，就是破除觀念的第一步。檢方起心動念追訴犯罪，不會假設被告無罪；所以要讓法官 假設無罪，審視有無審前羈押的理由。審前羈押是刑事審判的異態，不是常態。當年的憲法解釋促成了制度改變，可惜改制後的審前羈押制度，仍未擺脫「被控有罪 就該收押」的觀念箝制。
不久前大法官又再宣告羈押法違憲，即為證明一例；法律不能受到「被控有罪就該收押」的影響，忽略審前羈押不在判處被告有罪。羈押其實需要另有理由；羈押的 理由足以決定羈押的手段。例如不虞逃亡、自殺的被告，就無施以手銬戒具的必要。審前羈押的目的，是保全審判的進行；不是所有被控有罪的人當然都該收押；而 是那些會阻礙審判進行的被告，才有羈押的理由。而現行法律規定的羈押事由，卻仍是「被控有罪就該收押」的思維產物。
首先，審前羈押要由檢方證明具羈押的理由，與犯罪的證據還是兩回事。有罪證據不足，當然不能只靠指控犯罪就要押人；如果有罪證據足可起訴，起訴即可，何必羈押？檢方如果總是起訴的證據尚不充分就慣於請求法院押人，當然難逃押人取供的懷疑與指責。
審前羈押最主要的理由是逃亡；被告逃亡，審判即難進行。但即使已起訴，也不能一概假設被告都會逃亡。陳進興或王又曾逃亡，不能用來證明陳水扁或無關的人也 會逃亡。虞逃羈押，不是基於檢方單純的擔心或猜想，而是被告確有逃亡可能（如正在逃亡或已準備逃亡）的證明。限制出境或具保，也恆應是取代虞逃羈押的優先 選擇！周占春或是蔡守訓過去，允許羈押過於寬鬆，不是羈押陳水扁或任何人的理由。他們該為過去把關不嚴受到批評指責。
串供或滅證羈押的制度也不大有問題。法院實務上並無「串供」的明確定義；「串供羈押」嚴重威脅被告的辯護防禦權利。如果不能畫出兩者的界限，就會違反憲法 保障的辯護權。「淹滅證據」本身就是犯罪，未經審判也該假設無罪。檢方如能證明被告有滅證之虞，可去扣押證據也可逕行起訴，制度下不能因檢方握有證據指被 告滅證就可押人。同理，重罪羈押也須在檢方舉證有罪之外，另有必要理由始可羈押。被控滅證或重罪者一概收押，否定無罪推定，即是違憲!
審前羈押事關重大，羈押過濫會動搖審判公平。檢方舉證聲押，要讓被告充分防禦。偵查不公開是檢方的法定義務，用來保護被告的名譽，不是被告的義務，更不能藉以限制被告辯護。檢方聲押時不許辯方閱卷質證，辯護權不能有效行使，不符正當程序。
起訴後的羈押，權責均在審判法院。法院不虞審判不能繼續，決定不予羈押時，讓檢方抗告到上級法院，越俎代庖思考應否羈押，制度安排也頗古怪。說穿了，仍是「被控有罪就該收押」的幽靈作祟。
我們不是針對陳水扁的個案說話，而是從審視個案中，看到所有的人──無論是否無辜，都該受到公平程序審判，不該因為被控有罪就要身陷囹圄。通盤檢討審前羈押制度的時候到了；請勿因為陳水扁正在受審，就對不該存在的現象，視而不見。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 5, 2009
Chen Shui-bian has again been detained on charges of corruption and money-laundering, This has provoked controversy over the legal process. Some say privileged individuals have been recipients of favoritism. But it would be more accurate to say that an unprecedented case has attracted unprecedented attention. Within this highly-charged political atmosphere, the justice system has been accused of all sorts of political bias.
The reason the justice system has come under suspicion is poor institutional arrangements. Chen Shui-bian should neither receive better treatment than ordinary citizens, nor worse treatment. We must re-evaluate the pre-trial detention system, in order to avoid anyone being subjected to unconstitutional treatment.
Needless to say, the existing system of pre-trial custody labors under the authoritarian premise that one is "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent." We must not be cavalier about this. To prove either guilt or innocence requires fair trials. Presuming either guilt or innocence during the trial process, is the difference between a police state and a democratic nation under the rule of law. A system that clings to the premise that one is "guilty until proven innocent" does not meet the minimum standards for the rule of law. Fourteen years ago, the Grand Justices ruled that it was unconstitutional for prosecutors to detain suspects. This was the first step in getting rid of the premise of "guilty until proven innocent." Prosecutors who have decided to prosecute a suspect, are not going to presume that the suspect is innocent. Therefore, judges must make that presumption. Judges must examine the justifications for pre-trial detention. Pre-trial detention must be the exception, not the rule. The Grand Justices' interpretation of the Constitution led to changes in the system. Unfortunately, the justice system has yet to abandon the premise of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent."
Not long ago, the Grand Justices declared detention unconstitutional. Article entered into evidence number one: The legal system must not operate under the assumption of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent." It must not presume that the suspect is guilty before he is convicted but still under detention. In fact detention requires further justifications. The justifications for detention determine the methods of detention. For example, if there is no fear that the suspect may flee or commit suicide, then there is no need for restraints such as handcuffs. The purpose of pre-trial detention is to ensure the successful conduct of the trial. Not all suspects are automatically detained. Only those who obstruct the trial process should be detained. Current laws cling to the premise of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent."
First of all, pre-trial detention by the prosecution requires justifications. These justifications and evidence that a crime has been committed are two different matters. One cannot charge someone with a crime by relying solely upon accusations, without sufficient evidence. If one has sufficient evidence of guilt, one can indict. If one can prosecute, where is the need for detention? If the prosecution becomes accustomed to asking the court to detain suspects when the evidence is insufficient, it cannot escape the suspicion that suspects are being detained to extract evidence.
The most important reason for pre-trial detention is to prevent flight. If the defendant has flown the coop, obviously it will be difficult to conduct a trial. But even though a suspect has been indicted, one cannot always assume that the suspect will flee. The fact that Chen Chin-hsing or Wang You-tseng fled, can not be used to prove Chen Shui-bian or others will flee. Flight risk cannot be based merely on prosecutors' fears or suspicions. They must be based on evidence that the suspect is fleeing or preparing to flee. Barring the suspect from leaving the country or demanding bail are preferable to detention. Chou Chan-chung or Tsai Shou-hsiung may have been too lenient about detention in the past. But that is no reason to detain Chen Shui-bian or any other person. Instead, Chou and Tsai should be criticized for being lax gatekeepers in the past.
Detaining suspects to prevent collusion or the destruction of evidence is also plagued with problems. Practically speaking, the court has no clear definition of "collusion." To detain a suspect for fear of "collusion" is a serious threat to the suspect's rights. If we cannot clearly distinguish between the two, we may violate the suspect's constitutionally guaranteed rights. Destruction of evidence is itself a crime. But again, until the suspect has been tried, he must also be presumed innocent. If the prosecution can prove that the suspect is at risk of destroying evidence, it can seize the evidence or demand an indictment. The prosecution cannot detain suspects because it suspects the defendant might destroy evidence. For the same reason, the prosecution needs evidence to detain a felony suspect. It needs justifications to detain a suspect. Detaining everyone charged with a felony or accused of destroying evidence, negates the presumption of innocence, and is unconstitutional.
Pre-trial detention is a grave matter. Indiscriminate detention undermines fair trials. When the prosecution provides evidence to justify detention, it must give the suspect an opportunity to defend himself. The prosecution, not the defendant, is obliged to keep the investigation confidential to protect the defendant's reputation. Confidentiality cannot be used to prevent the defendant from arguing on his own behalf. If the prosecution denies the defendant the right of discovery, it has denied the defendant's right to defend himself, and is inconsistent with due process.
The power and responsibility to detain a suspect after indictment, rests with the trial court. If the court is unconcerned about whether the trial can continue, then it may not detain the suspect. Allowing the prosecution to appeal to a higher court, and consider whether to detain the suspect, is also a very strange arrangement. Frankly it is the same premise of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent."
Our remarks are not directed at the Chen Shui-bian corruption and money laundering case. Our remarks are an attempt to ensure that the trial process for everyone, innocent or guilty, remains fair. Suspects must not be put behind bards merely because they have been accused. The time has come for a comprehensive review of pre-trial detention. Just because Chen Shui-bian is about to stand trial, we should not turn a blind eye to the problem.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.01.05
平心靜氣談「審前羈押」爭議
中時社論
陳水扁因被控貪汙洗錢而被兩度審前羈押，引起不少司法程序爭論。與其說是特權人物使然，不如說是這樁空前的案件吸引了空前的檢視目光。這種高度敏感的政治氛圍，讓扁案的司法審判必須面對各種政治成見或質疑的考驗。
司法所以引起質疑，往往緣於制度安排不善。阿扁不該得到比他人更優越的司法待遇，其受審被押也不該出現比一般平民更差的待遇。我們必須重新檢視審前羈押制度，以免任何人受到不合憲法正當程序的對待。
不必諱言，現行審前羈押制度飽受「被控有罪就抓起來」的威權觀念支配；於是被控有罪的人被迫去證明自己清白；且在證明自己清白之前註定被關。然而此事不容 馬虎，證明有罪或是清白，需要公正審判的過程，過程之中假設有罪還是無罪，恰是警察國家與民主法治國家的分野。不能拋棄「被控有罪就該收押」的制度，就還 不符合法治國家的最低標準。十四年前大法官宣告檢察官有權羈押被告為違憲，就是破除觀念的第一步。檢方起心動念追訴犯罪，不會假設被告無罪；所以要讓法官 假設無罪，審視有無審前羈押的理由。審前羈押是刑事審判的異態，不是常態。當年的憲法解釋促成了制度改變，可惜改制後的審前羈押制度，仍未擺脫「被控有罪 就該收押」的觀念箝制。
不久前大法官又再宣告羈押法違憲，即為證明一例；法律不能受到「被控有罪就該收押」的影響，忽略審前羈押不在判處被告有罪。羈押其實需要另有理由；羈押的 理由足以決定羈押的手段。例如不虞逃亡、自殺的被告，就無施以手銬戒具的必要。審前羈押的目的，是保全審判的進行；不是所有被控有罪的人當然都該收押；而 是那些會阻礙審判進行的被告，才有羈押的理由。而現行法律規定的羈押事由，卻仍是「被控有罪就該收押」的思維產物。
首先，審前羈押要由檢方證明具羈押的理由，與犯罪的證據還是兩回事。有罪證據不足，當然不能只靠指控犯罪就要押人；如果有罪證據足可起訴，起訴即可，何必羈押？檢方如果總是起訴的證據尚不充分就慣於請求法院押人，當然難逃押人取供的懷疑與指責。
審前羈押最主要的理由是逃亡；被告逃亡，審判即難進行。但即使已起訴，也不能一概假設被告都會逃亡。陳進興或王又曾逃亡，不能用來證明陳水扁或無關的人也 會逃亡。虞逃羈押，不是基於檢方單純的擔心或猜想，而是被告確有逃亡可能（如正在逃亡或已準備逃亡）的證明。限制出境或具保，也恆應是取代虞逃羈押的優先 選擇！周占春或是蔡守訓過去，允許羈押過於寬鬆，不是羈押陳水扁或任何人的理由。他們該為過去把關不嚴受到批評指責。
串供或滅證羈押的制度也不大有問題。法院實務上並無「串供」的明確定義；「串供羈押」嚴重威脅被告的辯護防禦權利。如果不能畫出兩者的界限，就會違反憲法 保障的辯護權。「淹滅證據」本身就是犯罪，未經審判也該假設無罪。檢方如能證明被告有滅證之虞，可去扣押證據也可逕行起訴，制度下不能因檢方握有證據指被 告滅證就可押人。同理，重罪羈押也須在檢方舉證有罪之外，另有必要理由始可羈押。被控滅證或重罪者一概收押，否定無罪推定，即是違憲!
審前羈押事關重大，羈押過濫會動搖審判公平。檢方舉證聲押，要讓被告充分防禦。偵查不公開是檢方的法定義務，用來保護被告的名譽，不是被告的義務，更不能藉以限制被告辯護。檢方聲押時不許辯方閱卷質證，辯護權不能有效行使，不符正當程序。
起訴後的羈押，權責均在審判法院。法院不虞審判不能繼續，決定不予羈押時，讓檢方抗告到上級法院，越俎代庖思考應否羈押，制度安排也頗古怪。說穿了，仍是「被控有罪就該收押」的幽靈作祟。
我們不是針對陳水扁的個案說話，而是從審視個案中，看到所有的人──無論是否無辜，都該受到公平程序審判，不該因為被控有罪就要身陷囹圄。通盤檢討審前羈押制度的時候到了；請勿因為陳水扁正在受審，就對不該存在的現象，視而不見。
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