Tsai Ing-wen, Chen Shui-bian, Who is "Too Moderate?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 10, 2009
While holding forth at the detention center, Chen Shui-bian said he hoped that "nativist" citizens' groups would organize a "Taiwan Independence Party." He said his representative would convey his message to Tsai Ing-wen upon meeting her tomorrow.
The most interesting part of Chen's remark was his reference to "conveying his message to Tsai Ing-wen." It was flagrant intimidation and blackmail. No wonder once the news broke, Democratic Progressive Party legislators Immediately proposed the passage of a Central Standing Committee resolution calling for Tsai Ing-wen to visit the detention center in Tucheng to mollify Chen Shui-bian.
Chen Shui-bian's take on the current situation is that he is being detained because the "DPP is not forceful enough," because "Tsai Ing-wen is too moderate," and because she wants to "disassociate herself from me." His is now threatening to organize a "Taiwan Independence Party" in order to extort concessions from Tsai Ing-wen. His implication is that if Tsai Ing-wen continues to be "too moderate," then no one can blame him for being "immoderate" when he tears the Democratic Progressive Party apart.
Actually the DPP's current dilemma is not the result of Tsai Ing-wen being "too moderate" toward the KMT or the court system. It is the result of Tsai Ing-wen being "too moderate" toward Chen Shui-bian, from day one.
When Tsai Ing-wen was elected party chairman last May, she promised to "lead the Democratic Progressive Party out of the Chen Shui-bian era." The Democratic Progressive Party had just lost the presidential election. The Green Camp was still taking a wait and see approach regarding Chen Shui-bian. Tsai Ing-wen, being "too moderate," failed to strike when the iron was hot. Instead she allowed Chen Shui-bian to nibble away at the party bit by bit, until it was in shreds. Tsai Ing-wen created a monster, Chen Shui-bian. He has consolidated substantial support from Deep Green Taiwan independence extremists. He now holds this bargaining chip. He may not be able to do much good. But he can do a great deal of harm. That is why Chen Shui-bian can openly intimidate and blackmail Tsai Ing-wen.
This is hardly the full extent of Chen Shui-bian's appetite. He has repeatedly said that if the Democratic Progressive Party has no leaders, he will lead it. For him, Tsai Ing-wen doesn't even exist. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP Central Committee have not responded aggressively. Tsai Ing-wen has not even visited him in prison. Chen Shui-bian has threatened to "organize a Taiwan Independence Party." He is essentially challenging Tsai to a showdown.
Taiwan independence has long been a tail which wags the DPP dog. The tail has long been that part of the dog which expresses the dog's emotions most clearly. If the tail gets chopped off, the dog may well bleed to death. The Democratic Progressive Party is unable to make a clean break with Chen Shui-bian because the tail is joined to the dog. Because Tsai Ing-wen was "too moderate," Chen Shui-bian is now an integral part of this tail. Taiwan independence is now synonymous with Chen Shui-bian, and Chen Shui-bian is now synonymous with Taiwan independence. The DPP is now unable to break with Chen Shui-bian.
Chen Shui-bian's threat to organize a new political party may not be a bluff. It may be an inevitable consequence of the Chen Shui-bian Corruption Case. Chen Shui-bian will probably be found guilty in the first instance. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP Central Committee will be required by the party's code of discipline to expell him from the party. Chen Shui-bian knows he will be expelled from the Democratic Progressive Party, and therefore needs a "Taiwan Independence Party" for political leverage. When the time comes, Chen Shui-bian will probably argue that the Democratic Progressive Party drew first blood, so he can hardly be blamed for the consequences.
Chen Shui-bian's "Taiwan Independence Party" is likely to have the same relationship to Tsai's Ing-wen's DPP, that Lee Teng-hui's Taiwan Solidarity Union had to Chen Shui-bian's DPP. Lee Teng-hui used Taiwan independence to hold Chen Shui-bian hostage for eight years. Chen Shui-bian may well use Taiwan independence to hold Tsai Ing-wen hostage as well. If he does, can the DPP survive? Chen Shui-bian must acquire even greater control of the Taiwan independence movement than Lee Teng-hui. Chen Shui-bian's "Taiwan Independence Party" will never be able to establish Taiwan independence. But it will probably be more than enough to allow the tail to wag the dog.
DPP reformers are confronted with a dangerous situation. They must once again consider whether to remain a "Taiwan Independence Party." They must consider two issues. One. Taiwan independence is now synonymous with Chen Shui-bian, and Chen Shui-bian is synonymous with Taiwan independence. It is too late to distance the DPP from Ah-Bian without simultaneously distancing it from Taiwan independence. Two. Taiwan independence will remain synonymouse with Chen Shui-bian, and Chen Shui-bian will remain synonymous with Taiwan independence. If this is what has become of the Taiwan independence movement, how can it possibly survive? So what if Su Tseng-chang is elected Taipei County Magistrate? Does that mean Taiwan independence will get a new lease on life?
Chen Shui-bian's attitude toward the Democratic Progressive Party has never been "moderate." How ironic that the DPP is currently being held hostage by "Betrayer to Taiwan independence" Chen Shui-bian. How ironic that Tsai Ing-wen, by being "too moderate," allowed Chen Shui-bian to become a Frankenstein Monster. Tsai Ing-wen knows how to be "moderate," moderate to a fault. She will remain "moderate" right up to the moment Chen Shui-bian drags the DPP down with him, into oblivion.
陳水扁與蔡英文，誰比誰「太溫和」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.10 04:03 am
陳水扁在看守所著人放話稱，他希望本土社團能發動組建「台灣獨立黨」；並要傳話者在明天見蔡英文時轉知這個訊息，要蔡與其他人討論一下。
這個動作的最微妙處在「轉知蔡英文」。這是對蔡英文的公然恐嚇與勒索。難怪，消息傳出，立即有民進黨立委稱，將在中常會提案，由中常會決議，要蔡英文到土城探監，以示安撫。
陳水扁對當前處境的解讀是：由於「民進黨沒有力」、「蔡英文太溫和」、「又要與我切割」，所以造成他被羈押。如今，他以組「台獨黨」來要脅蔡英文；弦外之音就是，蔡英文倘若仍是「太溫和」，就莫怪他「不溫和」，要撕裂民進黨了。
其實，民進黨形成今日僵局，恐非因為蔡英文（對國民黨或司法當局）太溫和；反而是因蔡英文自始至終對陳水扁「太溫和」所致。
蔡英文在去年五月當選黨主席，政治號召是「帶領民進黨開創一個沒有陳水扁的時代」。當時，民進黨大選初敗，綠營對如何處置陳水扁尚在觀望階段，蔡英文因 「太溫和」，未能即時建立黨內對陳水扁的是非評價，遂使陳水扁老蠶吃桑葉般地將民進黨啃噬得一片狼藉。如今，蔡英文養虎貽患，陳水扁已是尾大不掉，他既相 當程度地鞏固了深綠極獨這一塊，掌握了成事不足敗事有餘的籌碼，陳水扁於是開口恐嚇勒索蔡英文。
陳水扁原本的胃口尚不僅此。他幾次表示，如果民進黨沒人領導（不把蔡英文看在眼裡），他願領導。不過，蔡英文的黨中央並未給予積極回應，蔡英文甚至迄未探監。現在，陳水扁著人將「另組台獨黨」傳話給蔡英文，已形同與蔡攤牌。
台獨與民進黨的關係，始終是「尾巴搖狗」。這條尾巴是民進黨情緒最高、表情最生動的部位；且若切斷尾巴，整隻狗也可能流血致死，活不成；演變至今，遂成尾 巴搖狗的局面。民進黨切不斷與陳水扁的關係，其實是因切不斷這條血肉相連的尾巴。現在，由於蔡英文的「太溫和」，使陳水扁鑽進這條尾巴裡，台獨就是阿扁， 阿扁就是台獨，民進黨也就無論如何切不斷阿扁了。
陳水扁揚言組黨，未必是虛言恫嚇，而恐是扁案後續發展的必然結果。陳水扁一審被判有罪的可能極大，而蔡英文的黨中央即必須執行一審有罪除名的黨紀。陳水扁既知必將被民進黨除名，他也就必須以「台獨黨」為政治槓桿。屆時，陳水扁大可說：民進黨既不仁，莫怪我不義。
若回顧李登輝的台聯與民進黨的關係，也許即可預見未來陳水扁的「台獨黨」與民進黨的關係。以陳水扁的刁蠻，李登輝尚可用台獨挾持他八年；現在若換成陳水扁 用台獨來挾持蔡英文，民進黨豈有活命？陳水扁對台獨的掌握，必然優於李登輝。陳水扁的「台獨黨」一定搞不成台獨，但若只是要做那一條「搖狗的尾巴」，應是 綽綽有餘。
民進黨內改革派面對此一凶險情境，似應再次思考究竟要不要繼續做一個「台獨黨」？必要的思考有二：一、就當前言，台獨等於阿扁，阿扁等於台獨，已不可能切 扁不切獨。二、就未來看，台獨等於阿扁，阿扁等於台獨，這樣的台獨如何走得下去？難道倘若蘇貞昌當選台北縣長，就等於台獨復活？
陳水扁對民進黨始終「不溫和」，而民進黨今日竟遭被稱作「台獨罪人」的陳水扁用「台獨」挾持，實在是莫大諷刺。而蔡英文既因「太溫和」而使陳水扁這隻台獨妖怪成形，恐怕也只會繼續「溫和」下去，直到陳水扁將民進黨凌遲至無以超生。
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
Monday, March 9, 2009
Can Taiwan Win at Anything Against the Mainland?
Can Taiwan Win at Anything Against the Mainland?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 9, 2009
During the Beijing Olympics the Chinese Taipei baseball team lost to the Mainland Chinese team, seven to eight. The day before yesterday the Chinese Taipei baseball team suffered another defeat, losing one to four. Fans called the loss a "national humiliation" and wondered aloud "Can Taiwan win at anything against the mainland?"
Looking at cross-strait relations from high atop a baseball stadium provides us with a thought-provoking perspective. For starters, we need not sell ourselves short. The Republic of China's political and economic systems have already emerged victorious over the mainland's. On this basis alone, Taiwan remains a beacon of freedom for the mainland. Cross-Strait competition is likely to result in a draw. But if the ROC's political and economic freedoms are compromised the result will be disaster.
Taiwan's role has changed in recent years. Baseball is hardly the only competition in which it has lost to the mainland. We should be far more alarmed about losing our position as the head of the four Asian Tigers. We are now bringing up the rear. Losing a baseball game to the mainland has provoked an island-wide uproar. Losing our status as the head of the Four Asian Tigers, on the other hand, have done nothing to encourage either self-reflection or soul-searching. They are upset about a baseball game, but indifferent to the strategic picture. What is this, if not Taiwan's tragedy?
Mainland teams won 51 Olympic gold medals. Taiwan teams did not lose to mainland teams only in baseball. Even if the Taiwan team lost to the mainland team in baseball, our political and economic systems are better than the mainland's. Look at cross-Strait political and economic competition from the macro level. Three decades of political and economic reform on the mainland emulated the "Taiwan Experience." Losing to the mainland at baseball may make the public on Taiwan sad. But it does no harm to the strategic picture. What the public on Taiwan ought to ask itself is, what can Taiwan win at besides baseball?
A ball is round. Our circumstances and global circumstances are constantly changing. We lost to the mainland at baseball. We came in last among the Four Asian Tigers. The coach for the Chinese Taipei team said "We must admit the mainland baseball team has made rapid progress, while we have remained stagnant." This is true for baseball, and we must guard against becoming true in other areas.
The Chinese Taipei team lost in Beijing and in Tokyo. Next year the Chinese Taipei team will play the mainland Chinese team in Guangzhou. The mainland Chinese team will not vanish into thin air. The Chinese Taipei team must confront it head on. In fact, in cross-Straits competition of all sorts, the mainland will not vanish into thin air, and Taiwan must confront it head on. If some day the Chinese Taipei baseball team no longer appears in baseball stadiums, other forms of cross-Strait competition will persist. Participation in sports is optional. The mainland won 51 Olympic gold medals. The Chinese Taipei team did not compete in most of those events. Therefore winning or losing was not even an issue. But cross-strait political and economic competition is compulsory. One must play. Forfeiting is not an option.
The ROC's strength lies in its political system. This system must not be corrupted. The ROC's vitality lies in its free economy and civil society. This life force must not be stifled. If our political system can make 1.3 billion mainland compatriots envious, if our civil society can impress the world with its vitality and dynamism, we will be able to maintain stable cross-Strait relations. Baseball is a zero sum game. Someone must win, and someone must lose. But cross-Strait political and economic competition is a win/win proposition.
Taiwan remains mired in 2/28, Taiwan independence and the Chen corruption case. That's more worrisome than losing a ball game. Our economic future remains at the mercy of demands for a Closed Door Policy, and demands that we not sign ECFA. Mainland visitors like Zhang Mingqing can be attacked by Green Camp hooligans, who equate assaulting a guest the equivalent of a military victory. Local officials like Annette Lu are so cowed by Green Camp agitators they dare not accept invitations from the mainland to visit. We don't even have the courage to step onto the playing field. So how can we possibly compete? Our democracy mires Taiwan deep in the quicksand of self-deception. Our economy locks Taiwan securely behind closed doors. Meanwhile, as Yeh Chi-hsian noted, the mainland has made rapid progress, while we have remained stagnant. Will refusing to play prove Taiwan has not lost to the mainland? Will refusing to play make the mainland go away?
Do not toy with democracy. Liberate the energy of the marketplace. We may lose at baseball, but we must make full use of the advantages our system of liberty offers us in cross-Strait competition. We must strive for a win/win outcome and mutual prosperity.
台灣還有什麼能贏大陸？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.09 02:16 am
繼在京奧以七比八敗給中國隊，中華隊前天又以一比四在經典賽再嚐敗績。球迷以此為「國恥」，並嘆謂：「台灣還有什麼可以贏大陸？」
從球場風雲看兩岸消長，這是發人深省的宏觀省思。在進一步對此申論之前，我們要先指出：不必妄自菲薄，台灣其實在民主自由的政經體制上大幅贏過大陸；只要 在此一主軸上台灣能維持燈塔的指標地位，兩岸的賽局即可能維持均勢。然而，倘若台灣在民主自由的政經體制上竟也變質走樣，那將是一個不堪設想的局面。
台灣近年來角色地位的變化，其實不只是棒球輸給中國；更應警惕的是，我們曾居亞洲四小龍領頭羊的地位，如今卻幾已敗退至敬陪末座。現在輸一場棒球給中國， 搞得舉國嗟嘆；但是，台灣近年痛失四小龍龍頭的大挫敗，卻似乎未見國人有什麼反省與警覺。對球賽敏感，對大局冷感，這是不是台灣的悲哀？
中國畢竟是贏得五十一面金牌的奧運首強，所以台灣在體育運動上也不只是棒球輸給中國而已；反過來說，台灣即使棒球輸給中國，但我們仍在政經體制的發展上優 於大陸，就兩岸的宏觀政經賽局而言，中國近三十年來的政經改革即不無參照「台灣經驗」之處。或許可以這麼說：棒球輸給中國，雖使台灣人傷心，但其實尚無傷 大局，台灣必須思考的是：除了棒球，台灣還有什麼可以贏大陸？
球是圓的，國情世局亦是變動不居的。不論是棒球輸給中國，或台灣變成敬陪四小龍之末，也許皆應在中華隊教練葉志仙的一句話：「必須承認中國隊的棒球進步很大，我們則卻停滯不前的事實。」棒球如此，更應警惕的是，台灣在其他方面，是否亦復如此？
北京、東京兩場棒球輸了，明年中華隊還要在廣州面對中國隊；中國隊不會人間蒸發，中華隊也唯有全力迎戰。其實，在兩岸競合的其他領域中，中國亦不會消失， 台灣也必須全面迎對。縱使有一天台灣棒球隊因沒落而在國際球場消失，兩岸全面的競合關係也仍將存在，仍須面對及處理，無可迴避。也就是說，體育競技或許可 以不參加，正如中國五十一枚金牌的奧運項目，台灣大多未參加，因此就談不上輸贏的問題；但是，兩岸整體政經體制的競合發展，台灣卻無閃避的餘地，只能迎 對，不容退縮。
這就回到兩岸政經體制的競賽了。台灣的強項是民主政治，但民主不可變質；台灣的強項是自由經濟形成的民間活力，但此種活力不可扼殺。台灣倘若能發展出令對 岸十三億人敬佩珍惜的民主政治，又倘若能提供民間活力向對岸及世界進取的動能，台灣就很可能維持平衡穩定的兩岸關係。因為，球賽一定是你輸我贏；但兩岸政 經體制的宏觀競合，卻可以「雙贏」！
比輸掉一場球賽更使人憂慮者是：台灣的民主，仍然深陷二二八、台獨及扁案之中；台灣的經濟生機，仍然深陷要不要鎖國，要不要簽ＥＣＦＡ的爭議之中。對岸來 訪，張銘清被圍毆追打（打人，就能贏得球賽？）；對岸邀訪，呂秀蓮則被綠營嚇得不敢應邀（連上場都不敢，如何贏球？）。這樣的民主，是要將台灣埋在自欺欺 人的台獨流沙之中；這樣的經濟，是要閉關鎖國。但是，如葉志仙所說，在「對岸進步很快，我們停滯不前」的憂慮中，難道將以拒絕上場打球，來證明台灣沒有輸 給大陸？或證明中國根本不存在？
不要玩弄民主，必須解放經濟動能。我們即使輸掉棒球，但也必須竭盡台灣民主自由體制的優勢，在兩岸宏觀競合關係中，全力爭取「雙贏共榮」！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 9, 2009
During the Beijing Olympics the Chinese Taipei baseball team lost to the Mainland Chinese team, seven to eight. The day before yesterday the Chinese Taipei baseball team suffered another defeat, losing one to four. Fans called the loss a "national humiliation" and wondered aloud "Can Taiwan win at anything against the mainland?"
Looking at cross-strait relations from high atop a baseball stadium provides us with a thought-provoking perspective. For starters, we need not sell ourselves short. The Republic of China's political and economic systems have already emerged victorious over the mainland's. On this basis alone, Taiwan remains a beacon of freedom for the mainland. Cross-Strait competition is likely to result in a draw. But if the ROC's political and economic freedoms are compromised the result will be disaster.
Taiwan's role has changed in recent years. Baseball is hardly the only competition in which it has lost to the mainland. We should be far more alarmed about losing our position as the head of the four Asian Tigers. We are now bringing up the rear. Losing a baseball game to the mainland has provoked an island-wide uproar. Losing our status as the head of the Four Asian Tigers, on the other hand, have done nothing to encourage either self-reflection or soul-searching. They are upset about a baseball game, but indifferent to the strategic picture. What is this, if not Taiwan's tragedy?
Mainland teams won 51 Olympic gold medals. Taiwan teams did not lose to mainland teams only in baseball. Even if the Taiwan team lost to the mainland team in baseball, our political and economic systems are better than the mainland's. Look at cross-Strait political and economic competition from the macro level. Three decades of political and economic reform on the mainland emulated the "Taiwan Experience." Losing to the mainland at baseball may make the public on Taiwan sad. But it does no harm to the strategic picture. What the public on Taiwan ought to ask itself is, what can Taiwan win at besides baseball?
A ball is round. Our circumstances and global circumstances are constantly changing. We lost to the mainland at baseball. We came in last among the Four Asian Tigers. The coach for the Chinese Taipei team said "We must admit the mainland baseball team has made rapid progress, while we have remained stagnant." This is true for baseball, and we must guard against becoming true in other areas.
The Chinese Taipei team lost in Beijing and in Tokyo. Next year the Chinese Taipei team will play the mainland Chinese team in Guangzhou. The mainland Chinese team will not vanish into thin air. The Chinese Taipei team must confront it head on. In fact, in cross-Straits competition of all sorts, the mainland will not vanish into thin air, and Taiwan must confront it head on. If some day the Chinese Taipei baseball team no longer appears in baseball stadiums, other forms of cross-Strait competition will persist. Participation in sports is optional. The mainland won 51 Olympic gold medals. The Chinese Taipei team did not compete in most of those events. Therefore winning or losing was not even an issue. But cross-strait political and economic competition is compulsory. One must play. Forfeiting is not an option.
The ROC's strength lies in its political system. This system must not be corrupted. The ROC's vitality lies in its free economy and civil society. This life force must not be stifled. If our political system can make 1.3 billion mainland compatriots envious, if our civil society can impress the world with its vitality and dynamism, we will be able to maintain stable cross-Strait relations. Baseball is a zero sum game. Someone must win, and someone must lose. But cross-Strait political and economic competition is a win/win proposition.
Taiwan remains mired in 2/28, Taiwan independence and the Chen corruption case. That's more worrisome than losing a ball game. Our economic future remains at the mercy of demands for a Closed Door Policy, and demands that we not sign ECFA. Mainland visitors like Zhang Mingqing can be attacked by Green Camp hooligans, who equate assaulting a guest the equivalent of a military victory. Local officials like Annette Lu are so cowed by Green Camp agitators they dare not accept invitations from the mainland to visit. We don't even have the courage to step onto the playing field. So how can we possibly compete? Our democracy mires Taiwan deep in the quicksand of self-deception. Our economy locks Taiwan securely behind closed doors. Meanwhile, as Yeh Chi-hsian noted, the mainland has made rapid progress, while we have remained stagnant. Will refusing to play prove Taiwan has not lost to the mainland? Will refusing to play make the mainland go away?
Do not toy with democracy. Liberate the energy of the marketplace. We may lose at baseball, but we must make full use of the advantages our system of liberty offers us in cross-Strait competition. We must strive for a win/win outcome and mutual prosperity.
台灣還有什麼能贏大陸？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.09 02:16 am
繼在京奧以七比八敗給中國隊，中華隊前天又以一比四在經典賽再嚐敗績。球迷以此為「國恥」，並嘆謂：「台灣還有什麼可以贏大陸？」
從球場風雲看兩岸消長，這是發人深省的宏觀省思。在進一步對此申論之前，我們要先指出：不必妄自菲薄，台灣其實在民主自由的政經體制上大幅贏過大陸；只要 在此一主軸上台灣能維持燈塔的指標地位，兩岸的賽局即可能維持均勢。然而，倘若台灣在民主自由的政經體制上竟也變質走樣，那將是一個不堪設想的局面。
台灣近年來角色地位的變化，其實不只是棒球輸給中國；更應警惕的是，我們曾居亞洲四小龍領頭羊的地位，如今卻幾已敗退至敬陪末座。現在輸一場棒球給中國， 搞得舉國嗟嘆；但是，台灣近年痛失四小龍龍頭的大挫敗，卻似乎未見國人有什麼反省與警覺。對球賽敏感，對大局冷感，這是不是台灣的悲哀？
中國畢竟是贏得五十一面金牌的奧運首強，所以台灣在體育運動上也不只是棒球輸給中國而已；反過來說，台灣即使棒球輸給中國，但我們仍在政經體制的發展上優 於大陸，就兩岸的宏觀政經賽局而言，中國近三十年來的政經改革即不無參照「台灣經驗」之處。或許可以這麼說：棒球輸給中國，雖使台灣人傷心，但其實尚無傷 大局，台灣必須思考的是：除了棒球，台灣還有什麼可以贏大陸？
球是圓的，國情世局亦是變動不居的。不論是棒球輸給中國，或台灣變成敬陪四小龍之末，也許皆應在中華隊教練葉志仙的一句話：「必須承認中國隊的棒球進步很大，我們則卻停滯不前的事實。」棒球如此，更應警惕的是，台灣在其他方面，是否亦復如此？
北京、東京兩場棒球輸了，明年中華隊還要在廣州面對中國隊；中國隊不會人間蒸發，中華隊也唯有全力迎戰。其實，在兩岸競合的其他領域中，中國亦不會消失， 台灣也必須全面迎對。縱使有一天台灣棒球隊因沒落而在國際球場消失，兩岸全面的競合關係也仍將存在，仍須面對及處理，無可迴避。也就是說，體育競技或許可 以不參加，正如中國五十一枚金牌的奧運項目，台灣大多未參加，因此就談不上輸贏的問題；但是，兩岸整體政經體制的競合發展，台灣卻無閃避的餘地，只能迎 對，不容退縮。
這就回到兩岸政經體制的競賽了。台灣的強項是民主政治，但民主不可變質；台灣的強項是自由經濟形成的民間活力，但此種活力不可扼殺。台灣倘若能發展出令對 岸十三億人敬佩珍惜的民主政治，又倘若能提供民間活力向對岸及世界進取的動能，台灣就很可能維持平衡穩定的兩岸關係。因為，球賽一定是你輸我贏；但兩岸政 經體制的宏觀競合，卻可以「雙贏」！
比輸掉一場球賽更使人憂慮者是：台灣的民主，仍然深陷二二八、台獨及扁案之中；台灣的經濟生機，仍然深陷要不要鎖國，要不要簽ＥＣＦＡ的爭議之中。對岸來 訪，張銘清被圍毆追打（打人，就能贏得球賽？）；對岸邀訪，呂秀蓮則被綠營嚇得不敢應邀（連上場都不敢，如何贏球？）。這樣的民主，是要將台灣埋在自欺欺 人的台獨流沙之中；這樣的經濟，是要閉關鎖國。但是，如葉志仙所說，在「對岸進步很快，我們停滯不前」的憂慮中，難道將以拒絕上場打球，來證明台灣沒有輸 給大陸？或證明中國根本不存在？
不要玩弄民主，必須解放經濟動能。我們即使輸掉棒球，但也必須竭盡台灣民主自由體制的優勢，在兩岸宏觀競合關係中，全力爭取「雙贏共榮」！
Friday, March 6, 2009
The World's Factory Faces a Crisis of Transition
The World's Factory Faces a Crisis of Transition
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 6, 2009
The Second Session of the Eleventh National People's Congress China convened in Beijing yesterday. Most investors expected good news. Therefore the Asia-Pacific and European stock markets rose the day before yesterday, sweeping away the gloom. This shows that mainland China's economic influence is greater than ever. Amidst the global financial turmoil, it has become the focus of global attention.
As expected, Premier Wen Jiabao's "Government Work Report" mentioned 14 attention-getting economic figures. Basically the report spoke of "increasing domestic demand, ensuring long term growth, and promoting consumption." Wen said Beijing would strive to maintain an 8% growth rate, aka "Bao Ba." On this point, the world is adopting a wait and see attitude. After all, the mainland's economic growth in the fourth quarter of last year fell to 6.8%, making this year's "Bao Ba" mission even more difficult.
But Premier Wen Jiabao's Government Work Report also shows that Beijing still has 1.95 trillion USD in foreign exchange reserves. Although this year's budget deficit reached a record high of 950 billion yuan, the decline in national power remains within tolerable limits. Add to this the 4 trillion RMB economic stimulus package announced last November and rolled out this year. Add to this the Ten Major Industries Revitalization Program announced early this year by the State Council. All these show Beijing's determination to ensure long term growth.
But history is cruel. Mainland China's 31 years of reform and liberalization have been the biggest beneficiaries of economic globalization. During the past five years mainland China's economic growth, standard of living, inflation rates, trade surpluses, foreign exchange reserves and other key economic indicators all reached historic highs. This has enabled the rise of mainland China and significantly raised its international status. But this rare good fortune may not prevail over the next five years.
Beijing's most urgent task is ensuring growth. That requires transitioning to a new and effective growth mode. The past thirty years of reform and liberalization have established a pattern of export-oriented external demand. Once the global economy weakened, and external demand shrank, the mainland's role as the "World's Factory" was immediately affected.
Since last August mainland China's export growth has fallen month by month as a result of the global financial crisis. Last November it even experienced unprecedented negative growth. Excessive dependence on exports reveals the vulnerabilities in this economic model. It shows that a "World's Factory" that lacks domestic demand cannot withstand the impact of the global financial crisis. The most urgent issue is how to establish a long term growth model led by domestic demand. This is a problem leaders in Beijing can no longer ignore. That is why last year Premier Wen Jiabao was so depressed.
Some may ask, "Won't the 4 trillion economic stimulus package mainland China announced late last year boost domestic demand and encourage consumption?" The answer that is the 4 trillion stimulus program will only meet "investment needs" and not "consumer needs." The latter require targeted programs. For the mainland, this transition in growth modes is probably the most difficult challenge it has faced since it began reform and liberalization thirty years ago.
Yesterday Premier Wen Jiabao made public the Government Work Report. In a single breath he mentioned numerous measures to stimulate demand and closely linked them to standard of living issues. He provided a clear timetable. He seemed to be telling the people the government was not merely going through the motions, and that he would be personally answerable. These measures include the full implementation of poverty programs to aid low-income people in rural areas this year, targeting 40,070,000 people; educational programs to provide long term campus housing for over 95% of the student body by the end of this year; an average 10% increase in retirement benefits for retirees this year and next; the completion of road improvements for the nation's townships and villages and eastern and central regions by the end of next year, and the construction of a road network for the western region.
Wen Jiabao also promised central government support for the construction of 5000 township hospitals over the next three years; 2000 county-level hospitals and 2400 community health service centers; housing for 7.5 million low-income urban families within three years; housing for 2.4 million families living in squatters camps in forest areas, wilderness areas, and coal mining camps; and a solution to the debts incurred by the rural "Pu Jiu," nine years of compulsory education program.
These are the most generous measures instituted by the mainland since the beginning of reform and liberalization. They attempt to resolve both domestic demand and standard of living issues. They are transitional measures intended to tide the economy over for the year. Mainland economists have already warned that short-term stimulus programs will not necessarily ensure long term growth. Structural imbalances must be resolved before one can escape from the export-dependent economic growth mode of the past. Otherwise, even an economic recovery this year will not ensure a new round of economic development.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.03.06
社論－大陸「世界工廠」的角色將面臨重大轉型
本報訊
大陸十一屆人大二次會議日昨在北京揭幕，由於投資人普遍預期會議有重大利多消息釋出，使得亞太和歐洲股市於前日應聲上揚，一掃連日陰霾，顯示中國大陸的經濟影響力今非昔比，在驚濤駭浪的全球金融風暴中，儼然成為全球關注的焦點。
恰如各界的預期，中國總理溫家寶在大會發表《政府工作報告》時，提出十四個令人矚目的經濟數據，大致可用「拉內需、保增長、促消費」等幾句話概括，他宣稱將力爭今年中國的經濟成長維持在八％（又稱保八），這一點各界倒是真是要拭目以待。畢竟中國去年第四季的經濟成長跌至六．八％，使得今年「保八」的任務更形艱鉅。
但溫家寶的政府工作報告中也顯示，中國尚擁有一兆九千五百億美元的外匯存底作為家底；儘管今年財政赤字創歷史新高的達九千五百億元人民幣，仍在綜合國力可承受的範圍之內；加上去年十一月公布四兆元人民幣的經濟刺激方案今年起陸續推出；以及國務院年初先後提出十大產業振興方案等等，在在說明北京當局力保增長的決心。
然而，歷史終究是殘酷的。中國的改革開放迄今卅一年，是經濟全球化最大的受益者。尤其過去五年，中國的經濟增幅、財富增長率、人民福祉、通貨膨脹、貿易順差和外匯存底等主要經濟指標，幾乎達到歷史高峰，不僅國際地位大幅提高，也促進了中國的崛起。但這種難得的際遇恐怕已不可能在未來五年再重現。
對當前大陸來說，最緊迫的任務是確保成長，而成長的背後卻是怎麼將成長模式有效轉型。過去卅多年的改革開放，把大陸形塑成一個以出口創匯為主的「外需型」經濟型態，一旦經濟衰退，外需緊縮，中國作為「世界工廠」的角色立即受到波及。
去年八月以來，受金融危機影響，大陸的出口增長逐月下滑，去年十一月甚至出現前所未見的負成長，不僅顯示過度依賴出口的經濟模式有其脆弱性，更說明一個缺乏內需動力的「世界工廠」，其實經不起全球金融危機的衝擊。而未來究竟該怎麼建構「內需主導」型的成長模式，時間相當緊迫，已經不允許北京領導人再虛應故事，溫家寶年前夕間華髮，愁苦滿面的心結，即在於此。
有人也許會問：大陸去年底公布四兆元經濟刺激方案，難道無助於拉動內需，刺激消費？沒錯，這四兆元的刺激方案僅滿足「投資需求」，並不包括「消費需要」，而後者需要針對性的作為才能達到。對大陸來說，成長模式的轉型恐怕是繼卅年前改革開放後，再度面臨的一次抉擇難關。
溫家寶日昨在宣讀政府工作報告時，一口氣談到多項「拉動內需」措施，並緊緊扣合民生議題，列出明確的「時間表」，似乎是告訴民眾政府不按表操課，可以唯他是問！這些措施包括：今年對農村低收入人口全面實施扶貧政策，扶貧對象及於四千零七萬人；教育方面確保今年底九五％以上的學生都能在永久性校舍中學習；今明兩年繼續提高企業退休人員基本養老金，每人平均每年成長一○％；交通方面則是到明年底完成全國鄉鎮和東中部地區的道路改善，以及西部地區公路網絡的建設等。
此外溫家寶也承諾今後三年內由中央財政支持建設五千所中心鄉鎮衛生院、二千所縣級醫院和二千四百所城市社區衛生服務中心；爭取用三年時間解決七百五十萬戶城市低收入住房困難家庭，以及二百四十萬戶林區、墾區、煤礦等棚戶區居民的住房問題；並爭取三年內基本解決農村「普九」（普及九年義務教育）債務問題。
可以說，上述措施可謂為大陸改革開放以來，結合內需和民生議題的最大手筆。這些措施都著眼於今年能否度過難關。大陸經濟學界已經提出警語，短期的刺激方案並不一定能確保經濟成長，而需有效解決結構性失衡問題，才能擺脫往昔依賴出口的經濟成長模式，否則今年經濟即便有些復甦，也不能保證新一輪的發展必然能見到曙光。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 6, 2009
The Second Session of the Eleventh National People's Congress China convened in Beijing yesterday. Most investors expected good news. Therefore the Asia-Pacific and European stock markets rose the day before yesterday, sweeping away the gloom. This shows that mainland China's economic influence is greater than ever. Amidst the global financial turmoil, it has become the focus of global attention.
As expected, Premier Wen Jiabao's "Government Work Report" mentioned 14 attention-getting economic figures. Basically the report spoke of "increasing domestic demand, ensuring long term growth, and promoting consumption." Wen said Beijing would strive to maintain an 8% growth rate, aka "Bao Ba." On this point, the world is adopting a wait and see attitude. After all, the mainland's economic growth in the fourth quarter of last year fell to 6.8%, making this year's "Bao Ba" mission even more difficult.
But Premier Wen Jiabao's Government Work Report also shows that Beijing still has 1.95 trillion USD in foreign exchange reserves. Although this year's budget deficit reached a record high of 950 billion yuan, the decline in national power remains within tolerable limits. Add to this the 4 trillion RMB economic stimulus package announced last November and rolled out this year. Add to this the Ten Major Industries Revitalization Program announced early this year by the State Council. All these show Beijing's determination to ensure long term growth.
But history is cruel. Mainland China's 31 years of reform and liberalization have been the biggest beneficiaries of economic globalization. During the past five years mainland China's economic growth, standard of living, inflation rates, trade surpluses, foreign exchange reserves and other key economic indicators all reached historic highs. This has enabled the rise of mainland China and significantly raised its international status. But this rare good fortune may not prevail over the next five years.
Beijing's most urgent task is ensuring growth. That requires transitioning to a new and effective growth mode. The past thirty years of reform and liberalization have established a pattern of export-oriented external demand. Once the global economy weakened, and external demand shrank, the mainland's role as the "World's Factory" was immediately affected.
Since last August mainland China's export growth has fallen month by month as a result of the global financial crisis. Last November it even experienced unprecedented negative growth. Excessive dependence on exports reveals the vulnerabilities in this economic model. It shows that a "World's Factory" that lacks domestic demand cannot withstand the impact of the global financial crisis. The most urgent issue is how to establish a long term growth model led by domestic demand. This is a problem leaders in Beijing can no longer ignore. That is why last year Premier Wen Jiabao was so depressed.
Some may ask, "Won't the 4 trillion economic stimulus package mainland China announced late last year boost domestic demand and encourage consumption?" The answer that is the 4 trillion stimulus program will only meet "investment needs" and not "consumer needs." The latter require targeted programs. For the mainland, this transition in growth modes is probably the most difficult challenge it has faced since it began reform and liberalization thirty years ago.
Yesterday Premier Wen Jiabao made public the Government Work Report. In a single breath he mentioned numerous measures to stimulate demand and closely linked them to standard of living issues. He provided a clear timetable. He seemed to be telling the people the government was not merely going through the motions, and that he would be personally answerable. These measures include the full implementation of poverty programs to aid low-income people in rural areas this year, targeting 40,070,000 people; educational programs to provide long term campus housing for over 95% of the student body by the end of this year; an average 10% increase in retirement benefits for retirees this year and next; the completion of road improvements for the nation's townships and villages and eastern and central regions by the end of next year, and the construction of a road network for the western region.
Wen Jiabao also promised central government support for the construction of 5000 township hospitals over the next three years; 2000 county-level hospitals and 2400 community health service centers; housing for 7.5 million low-income urban families within three years; housing for 2.4 million families living in squatters camps in forest areas, wilderness areas, and coal mining camps; and a solution to the debts incurred by the rural "Pu Jiu," nine years of compulsory education program.
These are the most generous measures instituted by the mainland since the beginning of reform and liberalization. They attempt to resolve both domestic demand and standard of living issues. They are transitional measures intended to tide the economy over for the year. Mainland economists have already warned that short-term stimulus programs will not necessarily ensure long term growth. Structural imbalances must be resolved before one can escape from the export-dependent economic growth mode of the past. Otherwise, even an economic recovery this year will not ensure a new round of economic development.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.03.06
社論－大陸「世界工廠」的角色將面臨重大轉型
本報訊
大陸十一屆人大二次會議日昨在北京揭幕，由於投資人普遍預期會議有重大利多消息釋出，使得亞太和歐洲股市於前日應聲上揚，一掃連日陰霾，顯示中國大陸的經濟影響力今非昔比，在驚濤駭浪的全球金融風暴中，儼然成為全球關注的焦點。
恰如各界的預期，中國總理溫家寶在大會發表《政府工作報告》時，提出十四個令人矚目的經濟數據，大致可用「拉內需、保增長、促消費」等幾句話概括，他宣稱將力爭今年中國的經濟成長維持在八％（又稱保八），這一點各界倒是真是要拭目以待。畢竟中國去年第四季的經濟成長跌至六．八％，使得今年「保八」的任務更形艱鉅。
但溫家寶的政府工作報告中也顯示，中國尚擁有一兆九千五百億美元的外匯存底作為家底；儘管今年財政赤字創歷史新高的達九千五百億元人民幣，仍在綜合國力可承受的範圍之內；加上去年十一月公布四兆元人民幣的經濟刺激方案今年起陸續推出；以及國務院年初先後提出十大產業振興方案等等，在在說明北京當局力保增長的決心。
然而，歷史終究是殘酷的。中國的改革開放迄今卅一年，是經濟全球化最大的受益者。尤其過去五年，中國的經濟增幅、財富增長率、人民福祉、通貨膨脹、貿易順差和外匯存底等主要經濟指標，幾乎達到歷史高峰，不僅國際地位大幅提高，也促進了中國的崛起。但這種難得的際遇恐怕已不可能在未來五年再重現。
對當前大陸來說，最緊迫的任務是確保成長，而成長的背後卻是怎麼將成長模式有效轉型。過去卅多年的改革開放，把大陸形塑成一個以出口創匯為主的「外需型」經濟型態，一旦經濟衰退，外需緊縮，中國作為「世界工廠」的角色立即受到波及。
去年八月以來，受金融危機影響，大陸的出口增長逐月下滑，去年十一月甚至出現前所未見的負成長，不僅顯示過度依賴出口的經濟模式有其脆弱性，更說明一個缺乏內需動力的「世界工廠」，其實經不起全球金融危機的衝擊。而未來究竟該怎麼建構「內需主導」型的成長模式，時間相當緊迫，已經不允許北京領導人再虛應故事，溫家寶年前夕間華髮，愁苦滿面的心結，即在於此。
有人也許會問：大陸去年底公布四兆元經濟刺激方案，難道無助於拉動內需，刺激消費？沒錯，這四兆元的刺激方案僅滿足「投資需求」，並不包括「消費需要」，而後者需要針對性的作為才能達到。對大陸來說，成長模式的轉型恐怕是繼卅年前改革開放後，再度面臨的一次抉擇難關。
溫家寶日昨在宣讀政府工作報告時，一口氣談到多項「拉動內需」措施，並緊緊扣合民生議題，列出明確的「時間表」，似乎是告訴民眾政府不按表操課，可以唯他是問！這些措施包括：今年對農村低收入人口全面實施扶貧政策，扶貧對象及於四千零七萬人；教育方面確保今年底九五％以上的學生都能在永久性校舍中學習；今明兩年繼續提高企業退休人員基本養老金，每人平均每年成長一○％；交通方面則是到明年底完成全國鄉鎮和東中部地區的道路改善，以及西部地區公路網絡的建設等。
此外溫家寶也承諾今後三年內由中央財政支持建設五千所中心鄉鎮衛生院、二千所縣級醫院和二千四百所城市社區衛生服務中心；爭取用三年時間解決七百五十萬戶城市低收入住房困難家庭，以及二百四十萬戶林區、墾區、煤礦等棚戶區居民的住房問題；並爭取三年內基本解決農村「普九」（普及九年義務教育）債務問題。
可以說，上述措施可謂為大陸改革開放以來，結合內需和民生議題的最大手筆。這些措施都著眼於今年能否度過難關。大陸經濟學界已經提出警語，短期的刺激方案並不一定能確保經濟成長，而需有效解決結構性失衡問題，才能擺脫往昔依賴出口的經濟成長模式，否則今年經濟即便有些復甦，也不能保證新一輪的發展必然能見到曙光。
Thursday, March 5, 2009
The Legal Process: Not a Game of Russian Roulette
The Legal Process: Not a Game of Russian Roulette
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 5, 2009
The Taipei District Court under Judge Chou Chan-chun released Chen Shui-bian without bail. The very same court under Judge Tsai Shou-hsun continues to keep Chen Shui-bian under detention. Last week the High Court ruled that when Chou Chan-chun released Chen Shui-bian without bail he acted improperly, and overruled him. The very same court later ruled that when Tsai Shou-hsun detained Chen Shui-bian he acted impropertly, and overruled him. Is this "equal justice under the law," or a game of Russian roulette?
As matters stand, Tsai Shou-hsun and the Full Court turned down Chen Shui-bian's appeals to both the High Court and District Court, and extended the term of his custody two more months.
The prosecution has four cases against Chen Shui-bian, all formulated in plain view of the public. The merits of the cases are clear. The Special Investigation Unit's investigation was detailed. The relationship between the defendant and witnesses, their personality traits and interactions are well-known. Judges may disagree on certain details, but given the same legal precedents and ethical premises, they shouldn't arrive at completely opposite views on the case. Otherwise the same defendant would be safe and sound under Judge A, but have the book thrown at him by Judge B. This sort of justice can only be described as terrifying.
Last Friday when the High Court ruled in favor of Chen Shui-bian's release and overruled the District Court, it left the public deeply disturbed. The High Court ruled that Chen Shui-bian was not a flight risk, that he would not destroy evidence, and that he would not coordinate his testimony with others. It even questioned whether there was real evidence he committed a crime. It ruled that the nature of the State Affairs Fund had yet to be determined, therefore Chen could hardly be charged with fraud. It ruled that whether Chen Shui-bian and Lee Chieh-mu were involved in a criminal conspiracy was yet to be established. The High Court completely overturned the prosecution's Bill of Indictment. After all, without reasonable suspiction, how can one even indict a suspect? It completely usurped the presiding courts' jurisdiction. After all, without a uniform definition of the Discretionary Fund, how can one talk about fraud? What the High Court did was tantamount to handing Chen Shui-bian an acquittal!
Previously, on a similar case, the High Court ruled that the requirements for detention stipulate "a high probability of," not "definitely established" flight risk, destruction of evidence, or coordination of testimony. The High Court now says that it does not consider Chen Shui-bian a flight risk. that it does not think he will destroy evidence, that it does not think he will coordinate testimony with others. It even says it does not think Chen Shui-bian qualifies as a prime suspect. The High Court's ruling is tantamount to tearing up the entire Bill of Indictment. Chen Shui-bian and his attorneys have staged hunger strikes and resorted to filibuster tactics to attack the judiciary and obstruct justice. It is questioning Chen Shui-bian's detention insteading of wondering whether his prosecution and trial can proceed smoothly, all without bothering to study the case. In full view of the public, the High Court has essentially ruled that Chen Shui-bian is innocent and that there is no reason to detain him. Their behavior has left the nation incredulous.
That such judges inhabit the judiciary casts grave doubt on the administration of justice. Because the judiciary includes such judges, defendants such as Chen Shui-bian, who have access to immense financial resources, and who are adept at political manipulation, can frustrate the legal process. They can obstruct justice through endless appeals. If the first appeal fails, the second one may succeed. The High Court has 12 criminal divisions. If one of them is biased, Chen Shui-bian has a one in twelve chance. If two of them are biased, he has a one in six chance. If three of them are biased, he has a one in four chance. Endless appeals compel judges to recuse themselves. Eventually Chen Shui-bian's appeals will land him a courtroom presided over by one of the "King's Men." Chen's chances of far better than most people imagine. Fire a shotgun and a few pellets will invariably strike home. For the legal system to be just, every judge must be just. Because any one particular judge may well make a ruling that makes a travesty of justice.
Ah-Bian has vowed to counterattack Tsai Shou-hsun and the Full Court's continuation of his detention. Chen call in the international media. Chen Shui-bian's forte is political manipulation. But rest assured that the verdict in the Chen case will not be made by the international media. It will be made by Tsai Shou-hsun and the Full Court. Chen Shui-bian refuses to show repentance. He slanders the judiciary. He obstructs justice. He politicizes what is plainly a criminal trial. He polarizes society. But the more he does so, the more he compels Tsai Shou-hsun to include factors other than the Chen family's crimes. These factors are the defendant's attitude following his commission of the crime, the social costs the defendant exacted upon society. These determine whether the court should stiffen the sentence, and whether prosecutors should offer greater latitude during plea bargaining. Chen Shui-bian needs to understand that the legal system is able to punish him for his crimes, and that it is not to be toyed with.
Administering justice fairly is not easy. Last Friday the High Court Full Court didn't even bother to review the case before shredding the 155 page Bill of Indictment. If Chen is found guilty in the first instance, and his appeal lands him in the same High Court that handed down last Friday's ruling, then Chen Shui-bian will have for all intents and purposes been handed a "not guilty" verdict!
If a nation's legal process becomes a game of Russian Roulette, that nation is no longer a nation.
司法不能淪為俄羅斯輪盤賭
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.05 03:24 am
同樣一個台北地院，周占春無保開釋陳水扁，蔡守訓當庭羈押陳水扁；同樣一個高院，先前認為周占春開釋不當而發回更裁，後來卻認為蔡守訓羈押不當又發回更裁。這豈是一碗水端平的法院？簡直是生死賭命的俄羅斯輪盤賭！
目前的進度是：蔡守訓的合議庭駁回陳水扁對高院及地院兩件撤押聲請案，另裁定延長羈押兩個月。
照理說，在眾目睽睽下，相對而言，四大扁案的眉目相當清楚，特偵組的偵查動作也相當細緻，相關被告及證人的人格特質與互動關係亦相當明白；因而，在相同法律學養及倫理薰陶下的法官們，容或對扁案枝節可有見仁見智，卻不至於對全案實體出現全盤相左的見解才是。否則，同樣一碗水，在甲法官手中平安無事，但到了乙法官手中卻水潑碗砸，這種司法何其恐怖？
高等法院上周五認定陳水扁的撤押抗告成立，發回地院更裁，就予人這種恐怖感。高院的裁定不啻認定：陳水扁非但無逃亡之虞，亦無湮滅證據及串證之虞，連是否「犯罪嫌疑重大」亦有疑義；尤有甚者，裁定書更指稱：國務費的性質未定如何謂為「詐領」，而陳水扁與李界木是否有犯意聯絡亦「未備理由」。這已不是應否羈押陳水扁的辯論，而幾乎是從根本上全盤否定了檢方的起訴書（嫌疑有疑議，豈可起訴？），及全盤剝奪了繫屬法院的審判權（特別費性質見解不一，談何詐領？）。這已形同是一本宣判陳水扁無罪的判決書！
高院曾在相關裁定指出，羈押要件中所規定的「逃亡之虞」或「滅證、串證之虞」，乃是指「很有可能」，而非「確有此事」。如今高院的裁定非但不認為陳水扁有逃亡、滅證、串證「之虞」，甚至認為陳水扁根本不符「犯罪嫌疑重大」，不啻撕毀了整本起訴書；且亦對陳水扁及其律師以絕食及「費力把死拖」（Filibuster）種種手法攻擊司法、干擾審判視若無睹，竟在未調卷審酌下，即全盤質疑羈押陳水扁的理由，而不問追訴與審判能否順利進行。在社會視聽關注下，高院此番竟以幾乎認定陳水扁根本無罪的論述來反對羈押陳水扁，誠屬匪夷所思。
司法界出現此種法官，使司法的安定性及公信力深受傷害。既然在黑箱角落中有此種法官，則如陳水扁這般有財力延宕訴訟且擅長政治操作的被告，即可不斷以抗告挑戰司法，第一次不成，第二次就有機會；現今高院有十二個刑事庭，其中若有一庭偏頗，陳水扁就有十二分之一的機會，兩庭則六分之一，三庭則四分之一；不斷抗告，若再經同案不再理的迴避排除，陳水扁的抗告終會落到所謂「暗樁」的法庭上，其成功機率實較想像中大得多。霰彈打鳥，必有擊中之時。司法這碗水要在每一位法官手中都端得平才行，因為，任何一名法官都可能製造出水潑碗砸的驚悚場面！
面對蔡守訓合議庭的延押裁定，扁辦揚言將大舉反擊，並訴諸外國媒體。然而，政治操作雖是陳水扁的強項，但可斷言未來能對扁案作出判決的絕非國際媒體，而是蔡守訓的合議庭。陳水扁愈無認罪悔過的表現，愈是汙蔑司法、干擾審判，愈是將刑案政治化以撕裂社會；則蔡守訓宜應審酌的非僅是陳水扁一家的犯罪事實，且是彼等的犯後態度及所消耗的社會成本，凡此皆應成為當否加重其刑及能否認罪協商的考慮因素。要使陳水扁知道，司法可以懲罰其罪行，且司法本身亦不容狎玩戲弄。
司法這一碗水不易端得平。上周五高院的合議庭，甚至不曾調卷，即可逕將一本一百五十五頁的起訴書撕得粉碎。如果未來扁案一審有罪，上訴高院而送到同一庭上，則上周五的裁定書，不啻已可視為陳水扁的無罪判決書！
司法倘若真變成俄羅斯輪盤，那也就國將不國了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 5, 2009
The Taipei District Court under Judge Chou Chan-chun released Chen Shui-bian without bail. The very same court under Judge Tsai Shou-hsun continues to keep Chen Shui-bian under detention. Last week the High Court ruled that when Chou Chan-chun released Chen Shui-bian without bail he acted improperly, and overruled him. The very same court later ruled that when Tsai Shou-hsun detained Chen Shui-bian he acted impropertly, and overruled him. Is this "equal justice under the law," or a game of Russian roulette?
As matters stand, Tsai Shou-hsun and the Full Court turned down Chen Shui-bian's appeals to both the High Court and District Court, and extended the term of his custody two more months.
The prosecution has four cases against Chen Shui-bian, all formulated in plain view of the public. The merits of the cases are clear. The Special Investigation Unit's investigation was detailed. The relationship between the defendant and witnesses, their personality traits and interactions are well-known. Judges may disagree on certain details, but given the same legal precedents and ethical premises, they shouldn't arrive at completely opposite views on the case. Otherwise the same defendant would be safe and sound under Judge A, but have the book thrown at him by Judge B. This sort of justice can only be described as terrifying.
Last Friday when the High Court ruled in favor of Chen Shui-bian's release and overruled the District Court, it left the public deeply disturbed. The High Court ruled that Chen Shui-bian was not a flight risk, that he would not destroy evidence, and that he would not coordinate his testimony with others. It even questioned whether there was real evidence he committed a crime. It ruled that the nature of the State Affairs Fund had yet to be determined, therefore Chen could hardly be charged with fraud. It ruled that whether Chen Shui-bian and Lee Chieh-mu were involved in a criminal conspiracy was yet to be established. The High Court completely overturned the prosecution's Bill of Indictment. After all, without reasonable suspiction, how can one even indict a suspect? It completely usurped the presiding courts' jurisdiction. After all, without a uniform definition of the Discretionary Fund, how can one talk about fraud? What the High Court did was tantamount to handing Chen Shui-bian an acquittal!
Previously, on a similar case, the High Court ruled that the requirements for detention stipulate "a high probability of," not "definitely established" flight risk, destruction of evidence, or coordination of testimony. The High Court now says that it does not consider Chen Shui-bian a flight risk. that it does not think he will destroy evidence, that it does not think he will coordinate testimony with others. It even says it does not think Chen Shui-bian qualifies as a prime suspect. The High Court's ruling is tantamount to tearing up the entire Bill of Indictment. Chen Shui-bian and his attorneys have staged hunger strikes and resorted to filibuster tactics to attack the judiciary and obstruct justice. It is questioning Chen Shui-bian's detention insteading of wondering whether his prosecution and trial can proceed smoothly, all without bothering to study the case. In full view of the public, the High Court has essentially ruled that Chen Shui-bian is innocent and that there is no reason to detain him. Their behavior has left the nation incredulous.
That such judges inhabit the judiciary casts grave doubt on the administration of justice. Because the judiciary includes such judges, defendants such as Chen Shui-bian, who have access to immense financial resources, and who are adept at political manipulation, can frustrate the legal process. They can obstruct justice through endless appeals. If the first appeal fails, the second one may succeed. The High Court has 12 criminal divisions. If one of them is biased, Chen Shui-bian has a one in twelve chance. If two of them are biased, he has a one in six chance. If three of them are biased, he has a one in four chance. Endless appeals compel judges to recuse themselves. Eventually Chen Shui-bian's appeals will land him a courtroom presided over by one of the "King's Men." Chen's chances of far better than most people imagine. Fire a shotgun and a few pellets will invariably strike home. For the legal system to be just, every judge must be just. Because any one particular judge may well make a ruling that makes a travesty of justice.
Ah-Bian has vowed to counterattack Tsai Shou-hsun and the Full Court's continuation of his detention. Chen call in the international media. Chen Shui-bian's forte is political manipulation. But rest assured that the verdict in the Chen case will not be made by the international media. It will be made by Tsai Shou-hsun and the Full Court. Chen Shui-bian refuses to show repentance. He slanders the judiciary. He obstructs justice. He politicizes what is plainly a criminal trial. He polarizes society. But the more he does so, the more he compels Tsai Shou-hsun to include factors other than the Chen family's crimes. These factors are the defendant's attitude following his commission of the crime, the social costs the defendant exacted upon society. These determine whether the court should stiffen the sentence, and whether prosecutors should offer greater latitude during plea bargaining. Chen Shui-bian needs to understand that the legal system is able to punish him for his crimes, and that it is not to be toyed with.
Administering justice fairly is not easy. Last Friday the High Court Full Court didn't even bother to review the case before shredding the 155 page Bill of Indictment. If Chen is found guilty in the first instance, and his appeal lands him in the same High Court that handed down last Friday's ruling, then Chen Shui-bian will have for all intents and purposes been handed a "not guilty" verdict!
If a nation's legal process becomes a game of Russian Roulette, that nation is no longer a nation.
司法不能淪為俄羅斯輪盤賭
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.05 03:24 am
同樣一個台北地院，周占春無保開釋陳水扁，蔡守訓當庭羈押陳水扁；同樣一個高院，先前認為周占春開釋不當而發回更裁，後來卻認為蔡守訓羈押不當又發回更裁。這豈是一碗水端平的法院？簡直是生死賭命的俄羅斯輪盤賭！
目前的進度是：蔡守訓的合議庭駁回陳水扁對高院及地院兩件撤押聲請案，另裁定延長羈押兩個月。
照理說，在眾目睽睽下，相對而言，四大扁案的眉目相當清楚，特偵組的偵查動作也相當細緻，相關被告及證人的人格特質與互動關係亦相當明白；因而，在相同法律學養及倫理薰陶下的法官們，容或對扁案枝節可有見仁見智，卻不至於對全案實體出現全盤相左的見解才是。否則，同樣一碗水，在甲法官手中平安無事，但到了乙法官手中卻水潑碗砸，這種司法何其恐怖？
高等法院上周五認定陳水扁的撤押抗告成立，發回地院更裁，就予人這種恐怖感。高院的裁定不啻認定：陳水扁非但無逃亡之虞，亦無湮滅證據及串證之虞，連是否「犯罪嫌疑重大」亦有疑義；尤有甚者，裁定書更指稱：國務費的性質未定如何謂為「詐領」，而陳水扁與李界木是否有犯意聯絡亦「未備理由」。這已不是應否羈押陳水扁的辯論，而幾乎是從根本上全盤否定了檢方的起訴書（嫌疑有疑議，豈可起訴？），及全盤剝奪了繫屬法院的審判權（特別費性質見解不一，談何詐領？）。這已形同是一本宣判陳水扁無罪的判決書！
高院曾在相關裁定指出，羈押要件中所規定的「逃亡之虞」或「滅證、串證之虞」，乃是指「很有可能」，而非「確有此事」。如今高院的裁定非但不認為陳水扁有逃亡、滅證、串證「之虞」，甚至認為陳水扁根本不符「犯罪嫌疑重大」，不啻撕毀了整本起訴書；且亦對陳水扁及其律師以絕食及「費力把死拖」（Filibuster）種種手法攻擊司法、干擾審判視若無睹，竟在未調卷審酌下，即全盤質疑羈押陳水扁的理由，而不問追訴與審判能否順利進行。在社會視聽關注下，高院此番竟以幾乎認定陳水扁根本無罪的論述來反對羈押陳水扁，誠屬匪夷所思。
司法界出現此種法官，使司法的安定性及公信力深受傷害。既然在黑箱角落中有此種法官，則如陳水扁這般有財力延宕訴訟且擅長政治操作的被告，即可不斷以抗告挑戰司法，第一次不成，第二次就有機會；現今高院有十二個刑事庭，其中若有一庭偏頗，陳水扁就有十二分之一的機會，兩庭則六分之一，三庭則四分之一；不斷抗告，若再經同案不再理的迴避排除，陳水扁的抗告終會落到所謂「暗樁」的法庭上，其成功機率實較想像中大得多。霰彈打鳥，必有擊中之時。司法這碗水要在每一位法官手中都端得平才行，因為，任何一名法官都可能製造出水潑碗砸的驚悚場面！
面對蔡守訓合議庭的延押裁定，扁辦揚言將大舉反擊，並訴諸外國媒體。然而，政治操作雖是陳水扁的強項，但可斷言未來能對扁案作出判決的絕非國際媒體，而是蔡守訓的合議庭。陳水扁愈無認罪悔過的表現，愈是汙蔑司法、干擾審判，愈是將刑案政治化以撕裂社會；則蔡守訓宜應審酌的非僅是陳水扁一家的犯罪事實，且是彼等的犯後態度及所消耗的社會成本，凡此皆應成為當否加重其刑及能否認罪協商的考慮因素。要使陳水扁知道，司法可以懲罰其罪行，且司法本身亦不容狎玩戲弄。
司法這一碗水不易端得平。上周五高院的合議庭，甚至不曾調卷，即可逕將一本一百五十五頁的起訴書撕得粉碎。如果未來扁案一審有罪，上訴高院而送到同一庭上，則上周五的裁定書，不啻已可視為陳水扁的無罪判決書！
司法倘若真變成俄羅斯輪盤，那也就國將不國了。
Wednesday, March 4, 2009
Beijing: An Invitation to a Funeral, or an Invitation to a Dance?
Beijing: An Invitation to a Funeral, or an Invitation to a Dance?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 4, 2009
Controversy over ECFA (formerly known as CECA) rages on. Yet Beijing has barely touched upon the subject. It is virtually silent. But it takes two to tango. What are the prospects for ECFA? Taipei must not engage in wishful thinking. The success of ECFA depends also on Beijing's attitude.
Beijing's attitude may well be the key to ECFA's success. If Beijing wants to take advantage of ECFA, if it is offering Taipei an "Invitation to a Funeral," then getting ECFA signed will be impossible. Even if it is signed, it might undermine cross-Strait relations. On the other hand, if Beijing is offering Taipei an "Invitation to A Dance," then ECFA, by doing the Tango with Taipei may improve once-troubled cross-Strait relations. It may help set up a long term framework for "peaceful development." The future hangs in the balance.
Beijing cannot help entertaining the notion of an "Invitation to a Funeral." Taipei cannot help having concerns about accepting an "Invitation to a Funeral." Short-sighted individuals in Beijing may think they can use ECFA to entrap Taipei. They may think that with ECFA they will hold the power of life and death over Taipei. If that is the case, the public on Taiwan can hardly agree to it. If the public on Taiwan feels that after signing it has been tricked into accepting an "Invitation to a Funeral," the situation will deteriorate. How will they view the Beijing authorities' treachery? How will we maintain sound cross-Strait relations?
If ECFA is signed, cross-Strait relations will most assuredly become closer. But a closer relationship must not make Taipei's political institutions and economic development increasingly subject to Beijing's control. A closer relationship must help Taipei preserve its political mechanisms and economic vitality. As long as ECFA can provide the public on Taiwan with such assurances, the public on Taiwan will support it, and ECFA will enhance cross-strait relations. Such an ECFA will benefit Taipei, benefit cross-Strait relations, and benefit Beijing.
Signing ECFA must not involve the endorsement of any technical or formal "One China" [under Beijing] political premise. The signing of ECFA will have undeniable political repercussions. The Beijing authorities must not make political hay out of such repercussions. ECFA must be interpreted correctly. On the one hand, ECFA will make de jure Taiwan independence even more difficult. On the other hand, ECFA will also make de jure reunification less urgent and less necessary. Therefore, the role of ECFA is not to "promote reunification." It is to help the public on Taiwan better understand cross-Strait relations. ECFA will establish a "no reunification, no independence, reunified, not reunified" framework for "peaceful development."
Therefore Beijing must not see ECFA as a short-term "Invitation to a Funeral," but rather as a long-term, win-win "Invitation to a Dance" that promotes mutual prosperity. If Beijing hopes to use ECFA to entrap Taipei, it will not improve cross-Strait relations. Beijing cannot use the Hong Kong or Tibet model to resolve the Taiwan question. If Taipei is able to find new opportunities for economic survival as a result of ECFA, the impact on cross-Strait relations will be positive. Therefore, we have two suggestions for Beijing.
First, the Comprehensive Economic Eooperation Agreement (CECA) has been revised at Taipei's request. It is now called the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The framework for the ECFA is like a clothesline. Clothes that have been washed are hung on the clothesline first. Clothes that have not been washed are not. Therefore there is no need for a "package deal." Instead one can enjoy an "early harvest." Beijing has agreed to this framework, and is not demanding a "package deal." It is responding to our priorities by making decisions that fulfill the practical requirements of both sides and the expectations of the public.
Second, most importantly, before and after the two sides sign ECFA, Beijing should announce that it favors simultaneously concluding, in step with Taipei, an FTA or other economic cooperation agreement with ASEAN and other countries. The signing of ECFA is not about entrapping Taipei, but about strengthening cross-Strait relations, by increasing Taiwan's economic vitality. The public on Taiwan knows that stable cross-Strait relations will promote Taiwan's economic development and increase its economic vitality. This will make the public more willing to support such cross-Strait relations. This is a virtuous circle. It allows Beijing to "pin its hopes on Taiwan compatriots." On the other hand, if Beijing sees ECFA as an "Invitation to a Funeral," as an opportunity to seal Taipei up in a funerary urn, it will be acting contrary to reason, contrary to humanity, contrary to public opinion, and cross-Strait relations will be led astray.
Hu Jintao's "Hu Six Points" calls for "the exploration of workable mechanisms for cross-Strait economic development and Asia-Pacific regional economic cooperation." This means cross-Strait economic and trade integration with ASEAN. As we can see Hu is not a short-sighted individual who sees ECFA as an "Invitation to a Funeral." Surely he is a visionary who has offered Taipei an "Invitation to the Dance."
北京的思考：請君入甕或與卿共舞？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.04 04:35 am
ＥＣＦＡ（原稱ＣＥＣＡ）在台灣已經吵得如火如荼，但海峽對岸卻只是輕描淡寫，幾乎不動聲色。然而，要兩個人才能跳探戈，ＥＣＦＡ的前景如何，不能只看台北一廂情願，也要看北京作何思考。
其實，北京的意念，也許才是ＥＣＦＡ成敗的關鍵。倘若北京是想藉此「請君入甕」，ＥＣＦＡ就不可能簽得成，即使簽成了也可能反使兩岸關係更形扭曲，更加惡化；相對而言，北京倘若有「與卿共舞」的想法，兩岸通過ＥＣＦＡ這一場行雲流水的探戈，非但可能將雙邊盤根錯節的關係理順，也應能藉此建立可大可久的「和平發展」框架。一念之差，判若天壤。
北京不免會有「請君入甕」的想法，而台灣則一定會有「不可入甕」的顧慮。北京的短視者或許會想，藉由ＥＣＦＡ將台灣「套」住，即可恣意生殺予奪。但是，倘係如此，台灣的民意如何能答應簽字？而簽成以後台灣人民若覺得「入甕」，處境惡化，將對北京當局的邪念惡意如何看待？又如何維繫一個平衡穩定的兩岸關係？
ＥＣＦＡ若簽成，必定會使兩岸關係更趨緊密。但此種緊密關係，切不可使台灣在民主機制及經濟發展上感到更受制於北京；而應使此種關係，有助於台灣更能維持其內發性的民主機制與經濟活力。只要ＥＣＦＡ能使台灣人民感知並證實此點，台灣人民就會支持ＥＣＦＡ，也就會因ＥＣＦＡ而支持此種建設性的兩岸關係。這樣的ＥＣＦＡ，對台灣有利，也對兩岸關係有利，所以對北京也有利。
簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，在技術及形式上可以做到不涉「一個中國」等政治規範；但ＥＣＦＡ的簽訂，亦當然有其不可諱言的政治效應，因此北京當局千萬不可對此種政治效應作出錯誤的解讀。正確的解讀是：ＥＣＦＡ一方面雖然將使「法理台獨」變成更不可能，但ＥＣＦＡ也同時已使「法理統一」急遽降低了急迫性與必要性。所以，ＥＣＦＡ的作用非在「促統」，而是要使台灣民意對兩岸關係因ＥＣＦＡ而產生正面的解讀，以建立一個「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」的「和平發展架構」。
因此，北京看ＥＣＦＡ，不可將之視作「請君入甕」的短線操作，而應看成雙贏共榮的「與卿共舞」，追求的是可大可久。換句話說，北京若想用ＥＣＦＡ「套死」台灣，兩岸關係必將仍然無解，因為北京不可能用香港化或西藏化來解決台灣問題；反之，倘若台灣能因ＥＣＦＡ而獲得新的生機與活力，則這種效應必然將是兩岸關係的重大正數。因此，我們對北京當局有二點基本建議：
一、台灣方面從「綜合性經濟合作協議」（ＣＥＣＡ），調整為「經濟合作架構協議」（ＥＣＦＡ），其中所謂「架構」（Framework），猶如拉起一條「晒衣繩」，先洗好的衣服就先晒上去，尚未洗好的就不晒；如此，即不必「包裹解決」，而可有「早期收穫」。北京方面宜贊同「架構」方案，而不採「包裹」方式，可就輕重緩急作出回應雙邊現實需求及民意期待的決策。
二、最重要的是，在簽訂兩岸ＥＣＦＡ前後，北京允宜同步宣示樂見台灣與東協及其他國家締結ＦＴＡ或他類經濟合作協定。因為，兩岸簽ＥＣＦＡ，不在「套死」台灣，而是透過加強兩岸關係使台灣有更大的生機與活力；再因台灣民意感知兩岸關係有助其對外發展的生機活力，而回過頭來更願支持及鞏固此種兩岸關係。如此一來，即成良性循環，即可「寄希望於台灣同胞」。反之，北京若將ＥＣＦＡ視為「甕」，欲封死台灣在「甕」外的世界，則屬逆天理，悖人道，反民意，兩岸關係亦將走上歧途絕路。
「胡六點」有言：「探討兩岸經濟共同發展與亞太區域經濟合作機制相銜接的可行途徑。」這即是指兩岸經貿與東協接軌的問題，或許可見，胡錦濤不是將ＥＣＦＡ視為「請君入甕」的短視者，他應當懷有「與卿共舞」、「與君共濟」的高瞻遠矚！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 4, 2009
Controversy over ECFA (formerly known as CECA) rages on. Yet Beijing has barely touched upon the subject. It is virtually silent. But it takes two to tango. What are the prospects for ECFA? Taipei must not engage in wishful thinking. The success of ECFA depends also on Beijing's attitude.
Beijing's attitude may well be the key to ECFA's success. If Beijing wants to take advantage of ECFA, if it is offering Taipei an "Invitation to a Funeral," then getting ECFA signed will be impossible. Even if it is signed, it might undermine cross-Strait relations. On the other hand, if Beijing is offering Taipei an "Invitation to A Dance," then ECFA, by doing the Tango with Taipei may improve once-troubled cross-Strait relations. It may help set up a long term framework for "peaceful development." The future hangs in the balance.
Beijing cannot help entertaining the notion of an "Invitation to a Funeral." Taipei cannot help having concerns about accepting an "Invitation to a Funeral." Short-sighted individuals in Beijing may think they can use ECFA to entrap Taipei. They may think that with ECFA they will hold the power of life and death over Taipei. If that is the case, the public on Taiwan can hardly agree to it. If the public on Taiwan feels that after signing it has been tricked into accepting an "Invitation to a Funeral," the situation will deteriorate. How will they view the Beijing authorities' treachery? How will we maintain sound cross-Strait relations?
If ECFA is signed, cross-Strait relations will most assuredly become closer. But a closer relationship must not make Taipei's political institutions and economic development increasingly subject to Beijing's control. A closer relationship must help Taipei preserve its political mechanisms and economic vitality. As long as ECFA can provide the public on Taiwan with such assurances, the public on Taiwan will support it, and ECFA will enhance cross-strait relations. Such an ECFA will benefit Taipei, benefit cross-Strait relations, and benefit Beijing.
Signing ECFA must not involve the endorsement of any technical or formal "One China" [under Beijing] political premise. The signing of ECFA will have undeniable political repercussions. The Beijing authorities must not make political hay out of such repercussions. ECFA must be interpreted correctly. On the one hand, ECFA will make de jure Taiwan independence even more difficult. On the other hand, ECFA will also make de jure reunification less urgent and less necessary. Therefore, the role of ECFA is not to "promote reunification." It is to help the public on Taiwan better understand cross-Strait relations. ECFA will establish a "no reunification, no independence, reunified, not reunified" framework for "peaceful development."
Therefore Beijing must not see ECFA as a short-term "Invitation to a Funeral," but rather as a long-term, win-win "Invitation to a Dance" that promotes mutual prosperity. If Beijing hopes to use ECFA to entrap Taipei, it will not improve cross-Strait relations. Beijing cannot use the Hong Kong or Tibet model to resolve the Taiwan question. If Taipei is able to find new opportunities for economic survival as a result of ECFA, the impact on cross-Strait relations will be positive. Therefore, we have two suggestions for Beijing.
First, the Comprehensive Economic Eooperation Agreement (CECA) has been revised at Taipei's request. It is now called the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The framework for the ECFA is like a clothesline. Clothes that have been washed are hung on the clothesline first. Clothes that have not been washed are not. Therefore there is no need for a "package deal." Instead one can enjoy an "early harvest." Beijing has agreed to this framework, and is not demanding a "package deal." It is responding to our priorities by making decisions that fulfill the practical requirements of both sides and the expectations of the public.
Second, most importantly, before and after the two sides sign ECFA, Beijing should announce that it favors simultaneously concluding, in step with Taipei, an FTA or other economic cooperation agreement with ASEAN and other countries. The signing of ECFA is not about entrapping Taipei, but about strengthening cross-Strait relations, by increasing Taiwan's economic vitality. The public on Taiwan knows that stable cross-Strait relations will promote Taiwan's economic development and increase its economic vitality. This will make the public more willing to support such cross-Strait relations. This is a virtuous circle. It allows Beijing to "pin its hopes on Taiwan compatriots." On the other hand, if Beijing sees ECFA as an "Invitation to a Funeral," as an opportunity to seal Taipei up in a funerary urn, it will be acting contrary to reason, contrary to humanity, contrary to public opinion, and cross-Strait relations will be led astray.
Hu Jintao's "Hu Six Points" calls for "the exploration of workable mechanisms for cross-Strait economic development and Asia-Pacific regional economic cooperation." This means cross-Strait economic and trade integration with ASEAN. As we can see Hu is not a short-sighted individual who sees ECFA as an "Invitation to a Funeral." Surely he is a visionary who has offered Taipei an "Invitation to the Dance."
北京的思考：請君入甕或與卿共舞？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.04 04:35 am
ＥＣＦＡ（原稱ＣＥＣＡ）在台灣已經吵得如火如荼，但海峽對岸卻只是輕描淡寫，幾乎不動聲色。然而，要兩個人才能跳探戈，ＥＣＦＡ的前景如何，不能只看台北一廂情願，也要看北京作何思考。
其實，北京的意念，也許才是ＥＣＦＡ成敗的關鍵。倘若北京是想藉此「請君入甕」，ＥＣＦＡ就不可能簽得成，即使簽成了也可能反使兩岸關係更形扭曲，更加惡化；相對而言，北京倘若有「與卿共舞」的想法，兩岸通過ＥＣＦＡ這一場行雲流水的探戈，非但可能將雙邊盤根錯節的關係理順，也應能藉此建立可大可久的「和平發展」框架。一念之差，判若天壤。
北京不免會有「請君入甕」的想法，而台灣則一定會有「不可入甕」的顧慮。北京的短視者或許會想，藉由ＥＣＦＡ將台灣「套」住，即可恣意生殺予奪。但是，倘係如此，台灣的民意如何能答應簽字？而簽成以後台灣人民若覺得「入甕」，處境惡化，將對北京當局的邪念惡意如何看待？又如何維繫一個平衡穩定的兩岸關係？
ＥＣＦＡ若簽成，必定會使兩岸關係更趨緊密。但此種緊密關係，切不可使台灣在民主機制及經濟發展上感到更受制於北京；而應使此種關係，有助於台灣更能維持其內發性的民主機制與經濟活力。只要ＥＣＦＡ能使台灣人民感知並證實此點，台灣人民就會支持ＥＣＦＡ，也就會因ＥＣＦＡ而支持此種建設性的兩岸關係。這樣的ＥＣＦＡ，對台灣有利，也對兩岸關係有利，所以對北京也有利。
簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，在技術及形式上可以做到不涉「一個中國」等政治規範；但ＥＣＦＡ的簽訂，亦當然有其不可諱言的政治效應，因此北京當局千萬不可對此種政治效應作出錯誤的解讀。正確的解讀是：ＥＣＦＡ一方面雖然將使「法理台獨」變成更不可能，但ＥＣＦＡ也同時已使「法理統一」急遽降低了急迫性與必要性。所以，ＥＣＦＡ的作用非在「促統」，而是要使台灣民意對兩岸關係因ＥＣＦＡ而產生正面的解讀，以建立一個「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」的「和平發展架構」。
因此，北京看ＥＣＦＡ，不可將之視作「請君入甕」的短線操作，而應看成雙贏共榮的「與卿共舞」，追求的是可大可久。換句話說，北京若想用ＥＣＦＡ「套死」台灣，兩岸關係必將仍然無解，因為北京不可能用香港化或西藏化來解決台灣問題；反之，倘若台灣能因ＥＣＦＡ而獲得新的生機與活力，則這種效應必然將是兩岸關係的重大正數。因此，我們對北京當局有二點基本建議：
一、台灣方面從「綜合性經濟合作協議」（ＣＥＣＡ），調整為「經濟合作架構協議」（ＥＣＦＡ），其中所謂「架構」（Framework），猶如拉起一條「晒衣繩」，先洗好的衣服就先晒上去，尚未洗好的就不晒；如此，即不必「包裹解決」，而可有「早期收穫」。北京方面宜贊同「架構」方案，而不採「包裹」方式，可就輕重緩急作出回應雙邊現實需求及民意期待的決策。
二、最重要的是，在簽訂兩岸ＥＣＦＡ前後，北京允宜同步宣示樂見台灣與東協及其他國家締結ＦＴＡ或他類經濟合作協定。因為，兩岸簽ＥＣＦＡ，不在「套死」台灣，而是透過加強兩岸關係使台灣有更大的生機與活力；再因台灣民意感知兩岸關係有助其對外發展的生機活力，而回過頭來更願支持及鞏固此種兩岸關係。如此一來，即成良性循環，即可「寄希望於台灣同胞」。反之，北京若將ＥＣＦＡ視為「甕」，欲封死台灣在「甕」外的世界，則屬逆天理，悖人道，反民意，兩岸關係亦將走上歧途絕路。
「胡六點」有言：「探討兩岸經濟共同發展與亞太區域經濟合作機制相銜接的可行途徑。」這即是指兩岸經貿與東協接軌的問題，或許可見，胡錦濤不是將ＥＣＦＡ視為「請君入甕」的短視者，他應當懷有「與卿共舞」、「與君共濟」的高瞻遠矚！
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
The KMT and DPP: In a Race to the Bottom
The KMT and DPP: In a Race to the Bottom
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 3, 2009
Late last year, in response to calls from the Ma administration, the KMT Provisional Plenary Committee substantially tightened the party's Anti-Corruption Provisions. For a moment it appeared as if it was committed to genuine transformation. But lo and behold, the KMT Central Committee discreetly created an escape clause. It announced that the provision "A candidate found guilty in the first instance will be denied nomination" would not be made retroactive. For all intents and purposes, it surrendered to the forces of corruption.
The KMT is big and powerful. Its progress on the road to reform has always been two steps forward, one step back, shilly-shallying all the way, betraying a lack of determination and perseverance. That is why voters spurned it in 2000 and why it wound up in the political wilderness for eight years. Now that it has finally regained political power, it ought to resolve to do better. It ought to let people know it has reformed. Yet the moment it runs up against anti-reformist forces, it caves in. Is this what the KMT means when it trumpets "complete government, complete responsibility?" The KMT says it relaxed the requirements for nomination of candidates because it feared a backlash from local officials. But if the KMT's much trumpeted reform turns to mush, isn't it afraid of backlash from voters?
The KMT has been repeatedly revising its eligibility standards, touching a sore spot within the party. When Ma Ying-jeou was party chairman he tightened the anti-corruption provisions to read, "A candidate who has been indicted will be denied nomination." But when he found himself mired in a major political crisis due to the Discretionary Fund case, the KMT recut the party constitution to fit him, drastically relaxing the requirement to read, "A candidate found guilty in the third instance will be denied nomination." This was done to ensure that Ma would remain eligible to run for president. As a result, the KMT Provisional Plenary Committee changed the provision back to "A candidate found guilty in the first instance will be denied nomination" from "A candidate found guilty in the third instance will be denied nomination." As we can see, determining the "right" standards for candidate nomination is no simple matter.
Can Ma Ying-jeou's Discretionary Fund case be used as an excuse to open the floodgates for the nomination process? Of course not. What the public finds most objectionable about the KMT is the caliber of its local officials, and its "black gold" elements manipulating local construction projects. At the county magistrates, city mayors, and county councilors level, criminal triads often join forces with politicians and industrialists, and engage in flagrantly lawless behavior, taking unfair advantage of local opportunities. This "seige mentality" on the part of local KMT officials is one of the main reasons for the serious gap between the north and south. The KMT has a clear advantage at the central government level, in the Presidential Office, the Executive Yuan, and the Legislative Yuan. It has a perfect opportunity to push for reform. How can it casually retreat and compromise?
True, if the threshold is set too high, some officials may leave the party and run as independents, upsetting the election scenario. But will relaxing eligibility requirements transform these indicted officials into public heroes who command the support of the electorate? That underestimates the intelligence of the voters. Hsu Tsai-li in Keelung and Wu Chun-li in Taitung were both under indictment. Their nominations were rammed through nevertheless. Their subsequent election, conviction, and sentencing severely undermined the KMT's image. The public remembers. Doesn't anyone in the KMT Central Committee know that?
Consider Diane Lee's dual nationality. The KMT condoned her behavior and shielded her. When the truth came out, she quit the party, letting the KMT take the heat, and leaving a dark shadow in the hearts of Da-an District voters. Can the KMT's image withstand such repeated traumas?
The KMT is not alone. It is not the only party eager to debase itself. When it comes to degeneracy, the DPP takes a back seat to no one. The DPP Pary Constitution originally specified that "An official who has been indicted will be stripped of authority." But Legislators Kao Chi-peng, Hsu Ling, and Tsai Huang-lang were all indicted or convicted of criminal wrongdoing. Yet the three of them are still DPP Legislators At Large. The DPP Central Evaluation Committee acts as if nothing is wrong. Even worse, last July the DPP revised its "Articles for Clean Government." It changed "An official who has been indicted will be stripped of authority" to "An official who has been convicted in the first instance will be stripped of authority. An official who has been convicted in the second instance will be expelled." The purpose was to provide Chen Shui-bian with an escape clause, and to help Kao Chi-peng and his ilk skate by. So where is the DPP's commitment to reform and rehabilitation?
DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen ridiculed the KMT's attempt to rationalize its grandfather clause. She said if the KMT repeatedly compromised its principles, it would "regress to an unspeakable state." But look at the DPP's revisions to its party constitution last year. Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. The DPP "regressed to an unspeakable state" long ago. KMT and DPP promises to end corruption have already been reduced to a race to the bottom.
The two major parties' myopic conduct in recent years has changed the face of Taiwan's democracy beyond recognition. Chen Shui-bian's lip service to "transitional justice" and "the highest possible ethical standards" merely showed how far he could degenerate in eight years. and how swiftly democracy and justice could vanish in the wind. The KMT and DPP are competing to see how far they can lower their anti-corruption standards. They are showing how easy it is for the ruling and opposition parties to jettison their commitment to reform. They are providing the public with front row seats to their race to the bottom.
兩黨比爛：「排黑條款」的倒退競賽
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.03 03:38 am
國民黨臨全會去年底大幅調高黨內「排黑條款」門檻，呼應馬政府的廉能訴求，一時之間彷彿展現了脫胎換骨的決心。孰料，黨中央最近卻悄悄擅開小門，宣布「一審有罪即不提名」的限制將不溯及既往。此舉，無異是向黑金惡勢力的反撲宣告投降。
家大業大的國民黨，在改革的道路上從來是進進退退、牽牽扯扯，缺乏決心與恆心，所以在二○○○年才遭到選民唾棄，痛失八年江山。如今好不容易奪回政權，正應好自為之，給人一新耳目的印象，卻一遇反改革力量作怪就彎腰妥協，這豈有絲毫「完全執政，完全負責」的魄力？放寬提名門檻，國民黨說是擔心地方民代反彈；但改革落到如此和稀泥，難道就不怕選民反彈嗎？
國民黨提名門檻修來改去，牽涉到黨內一段椎心之痛：當年馬英九擔任主席，將排黑條件提升到「一起訴即不提名」的高門檻，但後來他因市長特別費案而身陷重大的政治危機，國民黨遂為他量身打造黨章，把條件放寬到「三審定讞」，以免他喪失競選總統的資格。也因此，去年底才有臨全會將「三審定讞」再修回「一審有罪」的演出。可見，提名資格寬嚴的拿捏，並非易事。
然而，馬英九的特例，是否可變成濫開提名閘門的藉口？答案當然是否定的。以國民黨的生態，最受民眾訾議之處是地方民代的素質低落，以及黑金勢力操控地方建設。往往在縣市長及縣市議員這一層級，黑道藉著政治與工商勢力的連結，即可目無法紀包山包海，剝削地方利益與發展。台灣南北差距嚴重，這類「山寨心態」的地方民代橫行正是主因之一。如今，國民黨在中央府院均佔絕對優勢，正是放手改革地方的大好機會，怎麼可以又輕易退縮妥協？
的確，如果門檻過高，可能造成一些民代脫黨參選，對選局造成干擾。但放寬資格，就能把這些有案在身、且目無黨紀的人變成選民擁戴的偶像嗎？那未免太低估選民的智慧。試想，當年基隆的許財利、台東的吳俊立，都是在有案在身的情況下強行提名當選；但二人均在任內判決定罪，重創了國民黨的形象。這點，人民記憶猶新，黨中央難道毫無所覺？
再看李慶安國籍事件，國民黨縱容她、包庇她；真相大白後，她拍拍屁股退黨了之，國民黨則概括承受罵名，也在大安區選民心中留下一道永遠的陰影。國民黨的形象，禁得起如此反覆不休的磨損嗎？
無獨有偶，甘於自辱門風的，並非只有國民黨，民進黨的倒退表現亦不遑多讓。民進黨黨章原規定「起訴即停權」，但立委高志鵬、薛凌、蔡煌瑯分別因案被起訴或求刑，三人卻仍照樣出任不分區立委，中評會亦裝作沒事而不處理。更有甚者，民進黨去年七月間更大修「廉政條款」，將「起訴即停權」的門檻砍成「一審有罪停權，二審有罪除名」；名為幫阿扁的國務費案預留後路，也順便幫高志鵬等人偷渡過關，又何嘗有任何改革自新的意向？
國民黨近日做出「不溯既往」的解釋後，民進黨主席蔡英文嘲諷道：一再妥協，將使國民黨「重回不堪的年代」。但如果對照民進黨去年修訂的規格，簡直是「龜笑鱉無尾」，民進黨實已早一步重回「不堪的年代」。藍綠對清廉排黑的宣示，已淪為一場倒退競賽而不自知了！
台灣的民主，由於兩黨的短線經營，近年不斷地土崩石流，已到了面目全非的地步。就像陳水扁把「轉型正義」與「最高道德標準」掛在嘴上，結果八年只驗證了他的徹底墮落，民主和正義消散在風中。國、民兩黨競相降低「排黑」門檻，除反映朝野改革精神蕩然，也著實讓人看到政黨政治「比爛」的危機！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 3, 2009
Late last year, in response to calls from the Ma administration, the KMT Provisional Plenary Committee substantially tightened the party's Anti-Corruption Provisions. For a moment it appeared as if it was committed to genuine transformation. But lo and behold, the KMT Central Committee discreetly created an escape clause. It announced that the provision "A candidate found guilty in the first instance will be denied nomination" would not be made retroactive. For all intents and purposes, it surrendered to the forces of corruption.
The KMT is big and powerful. Its progress on the road to reform has always been two steps forward, one step back, shilly-shallying all the way, betraying a lack of determination and perseverance. That is why voters spurned it in 2000 and why it wound up in the political wilderness for eight years. Now that it has finally regained political power, it ought to resolve to do better. It ought to let people know it has reformed. Yet the moment it runs up against anti-reformist forces, it caves in. Is this what the KMT means when it trumpets "complete government, complete responsibility?" The KMT says it relaxed the requirements for nomination of candidates because it feared a backlash from local officials. But if the KMT's much trumpeted reform turns to mush, isn't it afraid of backlash from voters?
The KMT has been repeatedly revising its eligibility standards, touching a sore spot within the party. When Ma Ying-jeou was party chairman he tightened the anti-corruption provisions to read, "A candidate who has been indicted will be denied nomination." But when he found himself mired in a major political crisis due to the Discretionary Fund case, the KMT recut the party constitution to fit him, drastically relaxing the requirement to read, "A candidate found guilty in the third instance will be denied nomination." This was done to ensure that Ma would remain eligible to run for president. As a result, the KMT Provisional Plenary Committee changed the provision back to "A candidate found guilty in the first instance will be denied nomination" from "A candidate found guilty in the third instance will be denied nomination." As we can see, determining the "right" standards for candidate nomination is no simple matter.
Can Ma Ying-jeou's Discretionary Fund case be used as an excuse to open the floodgates for the nomination process? Of course not. What the public finds most objectionable about the KMT is the caliber of its local officials, and its "black gold" elements manipulating local construction projects. At the county magistrates, city mayors, and county councilors level, criminal triads often join forces with politicians and industrialists, and engage in flagrantly lawless behavior, taking unfair advantage of local opportunities. This "seige mentality" on the part of local KMT officials is one of the main reasons for the serious gap between the north and south. The KMT has a clear advantage at the central government level, in the Presidential Office, the Executive Yuan, and the Legislative Yuan. It has a perfect opportunity to push for reform. How can it casually retreat and compromise?
True, if the threshold is set too high, some officials may leave the party and run as independents, upsetting the election scenario. But will relaxing eligibility requirements transform these indicted officials into public heroes who command the support of the electorate? That underestimates the intelligence of the voters. Hsu Tsai-li in Keelung and Wu Chun-li in Taitung were both under indictment. Their nominations were rammed through nevertheless. Their subsequent election, conviction, and sentencing severely undermined the KMT's image. The public remembers. Doesn't anyone in the KMT Central Committee know that?
Consider Diane Lee's dual nationality. The KMT condoned her behavior and shielded her. When the truth came out, she quit the party, letting the KMT take the heat, and leaving a dark shadow in the hearts of Da-an District voters. Can the KMT's image withstand such repeated traumas?
The KMT is not alone. It is not the only party eager to debase itself. When it comes to degeneracy, the DPP takes a back seat to no one. The DPP Pary Constitution originally specified that "An official who has been indicted will be stripped of authority." But Legislators Kao Chi-peng, Hsu Ling, and Tsai Huang-lang were all indicted or convicted of criminal wrongdoing. Yet the three of them are still DPP Legislators At Large. The DPP Central Evaluation Committee acts as if nothing is wrong. Even worse, last July the DPP revised its "Articles for Clean Government." It changed "An official who has been indicted will be stripped of authority" to "An official who has been convicted in the first instance will be stripped of authority. An official who has been convicted in the second instance will be expelled." The purpose was to provide Chen Shui-bian with an escape clause, and to help Kao Chi-peng and his ilk skate by. So where is the DPP's commitment to reform and rehabilitation?
DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen ridiculed the KMT's attempt to rationalize its grandfather clause. She said if the KMT repeatedly compromised its principles, it would "regress to an unspeakable state." But look at the DPP's revisions to its party constitution last year. Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. The DPP "regressed to an unspeakable state" long ago. KMT and DPP promises to end corruption have already been reduced to a race to the bottom.
The two major parties' myopic conduct in recent years has changed the face of Taiwan's democracy beyond recognition. Chen Shui-bian's lip service to "transitional justice" and "the highest possible ethical standards" merely showed how far he could degenerate in eight years. and how swiftly democracy and justice could vanish in the wind. The KMT and DPP are competing to see how far they can lower their anti-corruption standards. They are showing how easy it is for the ruling and opposition parties to jettison their commitment to reform. They are providing the public with front row seats to their race to the bottom.
兩黨比爛：「排黑條款」的倒退競賽
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.03 03:38 am
國民黨臨全會去年底大幅調高黨內「排黑條款」門檻，呼應馬政府的廉能訴求，一時之間彷彿展現了脫胎換骨的決心。孰料，黨中央最近卻悄悄擅開小門，宣布「一審有罪即不提名」的限制將不溯及既往。此舉，無異是向黑金惡勢力的反撲宣告投降。
家大業大的國民黨，在改革的道路上從來是進進退退、牽牽扯扯，缺乏決心與恆心，所以在二○○○年才遭到選民唾棄，痛失八年江山。如今好不容易奪回政權，正應好自為之，給人一新耳目的印象，卻一遇反改革力量作怪就彎腰妥協，這豈有絲毫「完全執政，完全負責」的魄力？放寬提名門檻，國民黨說是擔心地方民代反彈；但改革落到如此和稀泥，難道就不怕選民反彈嗎？
國民黨提名門檻修來改去，牽涉到黨內一段椎心之痛：當年馬英九擔任主席，將排黑條件提升到「一起訴即不提名」的高門檻，但後來他因市長特別費案而身陷重大的政治危機，國民黨遂為他量身打造黨章，把條件放寬到「三審定讞」，以免他喪失競選總統的資格。也因此，去年底才有臨全會將「三審定讞」再修回「一審有罪」的演出。可見，提名資格寬嚴的拿捏，並非易事。
然而，馬英九的特例，是否可變成濫開提名閘門的藉口？答案當然是否定的。以國民黨的生態，最受民眾訾議之處是地方民代的素質低落，以及黑金勢力操控地方建設。往往在縣市長及縣市議員這一層級，黑道藉著政治與工商勢力的連結，即可目無法紀包山包海，剝削地方利益與發展。台灣南北差距嚴重，這類「山寨心態」的地方民代橫行正是主因之一。如今，國民黨在中央府院均佔絕對優勢，正是放手改革地方的大好機會，怎麼可以又輕易退縮妥協？
的確，如果門檻過高，可能造成一些民代脫黨參選，對選局造成干擾。但放寬資格，就能把這些有案在身、且目無黨紀的人變成選民擁戴的偶像嗎？那未免太低估選民的智慧。試想，當年基隆的許財利、台東的吳俊立，都是在有案在身的情況下強行提名當選；但二人均在任內判決定罪，重創了國民黨的形象。這點，人民記憶猶新，黨中央難道毫無所覺？
再看李慶安國籍事件，國民黨縱容她、包庇她；真相大白後，她拍拍屁股退黨了之，國民黨則概括承受罵名，也在大安區選民心中留下一道永遠的陰影。國民黨的形象，禁得起如此反覆不休的磨損嗎？
無獨有偶，甘於自辱門風的，並非只有國民黨，民進黨的倒退表現亦不遑多讓。民進黨黨章原規定「起訴即停權」，但立委高志鵬、薛凌、蔡煌瑯分別因案被起訴或求刑，三人卻仍照樣出任不分區立委，中評會亦裝作沒事而不處理。更有甚者，民進黨去年七月間更大修「廉政條款」，將「起訴即停權」的門檻砍成「一審有罪停權，二審有罪除名」；名為幫阿扁的國務費案預留後路，也順便幫高志鵬等人偷渡過關，又何嘗有任何改革自新的意向？
國民黨近日做出「不溯既往」的解釋後，民進黨主席蔡英文嘲諷道：一再妥協，將使國民黨「重回不堪的年代」。但如果對照民進黨去年修訂的規格，簡直是「龜笑鱉無尾」，民進黨實已早一步重回「不堪的年代」。藍綠對清廉排黑的宣示，已淪為一場倒退競賽而不自知了！
台灣的民主，由於兩黨的短線經營，近年不斷地土崩石流，已到了面目全非的地步。就像陳水扁把「轉型正義」與「最高道德標準」掛在嘴上，結果八年只驗證了他的徹底墮落，民主和正義消散在風中。國、民兩黨競相降低「排黑」門檻，除反映朝野改革精神蕩然，也著實讓人看到政黨政治「比爛」的危機！
Sunday, March 1, 2009
A Leader of the Nation during a Time of Crisis
A Leader of the Nation during a Time of Crisis
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 1, 2009
Barack Obama's recent Congressional Address was well-received by the American public. One of the most significant comments was, "He looks more and more like the kind of leader a country needs during a crisis."
Obama's example tells us that a national leader during a time of crisis should be more than a mere behind the scenes policy maker. He must also stand on the front lines, and play the role of chief in two ways. First, he must be chief salesman. Second, he must be chief communicator.
For the sake of his 780 billion US economic recovery program, Obama broke with White House tradition. He went to Congress to talk with the opposition party. He followed up by spending a week away from Washington. He promoted his policies to people in small, remote towns, face-to-face. The media said "It was as if he was back on the campaign trail." He gained swift passage of his economic recovery program in Congress. Obama's poll numbers quickly rose. All because he was able to effectively play these two "chief" roles.
Now look at Taiwan. The US has undergone numerous crises brought on by the economic recession. So has Taiwan. The United States has entered an era of crisis. So has Taiwan. The DGBAS forecasts a growth rate of negative 2.97% GDP. This figure represents a 1.1 trillion reduction in exports, a 530 billion reduction in private investment, 100,000 more unemployed, and a 9.6% decline in per capita income, affecting over 500,000 households. Taken together these pieces of the puzzle show us a crisis.
But amidst this crisis, what is our government doing? The ruling administration has trotted out an endless stream of major and minor proposals. Every one of them involves spending tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars. The debt raised is so vast even the Minister of Finance is speechless. Does anyone see the whole picture? Has anyone considered the synergies? Has anyone asked the people how they feel? The administration hardly has enough time to implement emergency measures. The entire island is in an uproar over whether to sign CECA. The ruling and opposition parties have collided head on. President Ma has been forced to go on TV as CECA's chief communicator and chief salesman.
The president deserves affirmation for going on TV to promote his policies. But his move was also a warning sign. It showed that the ruling administration still does not realize Taiwan is already in the middle of a crisis. It has yet to understand the role the government must play at such a time.
Therefore, we suggest that President Ma retreat from the front line and re-position himself as a crisis era president. Only when his role has been redefined as a crisis era president can he effectively fulfill the role of "chief salesman" and "chief communicator." Only then will he be free of concerns that he exceed his authority given the constitutional constraints of the dual leadership system.
He should emulate the example set by Barack Obama. He should demonstrate the same passion he did while campaigning, in order to sell his policies to the masses. The economic recession has not merely undermined people's financial well-being, it has also undermined their emotional well-being. If the public is allowed to communicate with the president face-to-face on a regular basis, it may help defuse public anxiety.
Ma must demand that the ruling administration demonstrate a crisis consciousness. Although his ruling administration boasts many capable technocrats, the Liu cabinet, like government officials in other countries, lack first hand experience in dealing with an economic crisis of such large magnitude. Furthermore a common problem with technocrats is that they are good with theories, but not so good with practice. They are good with numbers, but not so good with feelings. If cabinet members lack a feel for the public mood, if they lack a sense of urgency, even the best policies may provoke public discontent. Obama asked his cabinet members not to cling to "business as usual" ideas and practices. President Ma must also ask his ruling administration not to be peacetime officials in a peacetime administration.
The most serious blunder committed by governments during a state of crisis is waffling over policy. The Ma administration has made this mistake again and again. First it wants to issue Educational Vouchers. Then it wants to change their name. No sooner did it encounter criticism, then it retracted its Generation 1.5 Health Care Program. No sooner did the Pan Green opposition attack CECA, then it decided to use only its Chinese name, not its English name. No sooner did it release its trial balloon on the Luxury Tax, than it met with a public backlash. Such constant waffling causes people to lose confidence in the government's ability to revive the economy. President Ma recently called for a "Policy Implementation Conference" at the Presidential Palace. He should have called for a "Policy Clarification Conference" instead. All correct policies should be implemented no matter which way the winds might blow. Otherwise, a crisis era government will not resolve crises. It will only create more crises.
Experience tells us that a crisis era president and crisis era government can only lead a nation out of the storm by catching "the winds of public opinion." But to catch the winds of public opinion, it must ensure that the public has confidence in the government's leadership. If it is unable to inspire public confidence, the crisis will become a disaster. It will become a lost decade that allows the hard-earned fruits of six decades of economic achievements to be destroyed by a single financial storm.
危機年代的國家領導人
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.01
歐巴馬日前的國會演說贏得美國輿論普遍肯定，其中最具意義的評論是：「他愈來愈有危機年代國家領導人的樣子。」
歐巴馬的例子告訴我們：危機年代的國家領導人不能只當幕後運籌帷幄的政策總設計師，他還必須親上火線，扮演執政團隊的兩種「首席」角色：一是首席推銷員，二是首席溝通者。
為了七千八百多億美元的經濟復甦方案，歐巴馬不但打破白宮慣例，親赴國會與反對黨溝通，更連續一周遠離華府，面對面向偏遠小城小鎮的民眾推銷他的政策，輿論形容他「好像又回到了競選跑道」；復甦方案最後能在國會快速過關，歐巴馬的民調聲望能快速攀升，都與他能有效扮演這兩種「首席」角色有關。
反觀台灣，經濟蕭條帶來的多重危機，美國有的，台灣一樣不少；美國既已進入危機年代，台灣當然並非例外。以主計處預估今年負二點九七的ＧＤＰ為例，這個數字代表的是：一兆一千多億出口的減少、五千三百億民間投資的減少、十多萬失業人口的增加，及百分之九點六平均國民所得的下降，受影響的家庭計約五十多萬戶，把這些數字圖塊一一拼湊起來，呈現的就是一幅危機年代的圖像。
但在這樣的危機年代中，我們的政府做了什麼？執政團隊雖然三天一大案，兩天一小案，案案動輒百億千億，舉債數額多到連財政部長都答不出來，但誰瞭解全貌？誰檢驗過綜效？誰問過人民感受？更離譜的是，救急救危已唯恐不及，舉國上下竟為了該不該簽訂ＣＥＣＡ，鬧得滿城風雨，朝野嚴重對立，最後逼得馬總統不得不親上電視，當ＣＥＣＡ的溝通者與推銷員。
總統上電視推銷政策，雖值得肯定，但此一案例也是一大警訊，顯示執政團隊迄今仍未體認台灣已身處危機年代，仍未掌握危機政府應有的角色與作為。因此，我們建議馬總統：
酖酖他必須要改變退守第二線的角色，重新定位自己是危機年代的危機總統；只有在角色重新定位後，他才能有效扮演「首席推銷員」與「首席溝通者」的角色，而不會有逾越雙首長制憲政分際的疑慮。
酖酖他應該仿效歐巴馬，拿出當候選人時推銷政見那樣的熱情，再次面對群眾推銷政策。而且，經濟蕭條除了對民眾生活有實質影響外，社會也出現集體焦慮現象，民眾若能常與總統面對面溝通，當有助於焦慮的化解。
酖酖他必須要求執政團隊要有危機政府的認知。他的執政團隊雖然多是專業技術官僚，但一則劉內閣跟其他國家政府官員一樣，都缺乏處理此等大規模經濟危機的第一手經驗；再則技術官僚的通病是重理論、輕個案，重數字、輕感受，如果閣員缺乏與民意脈搏相通的急迫感，再好的政策也可能引發民怨。歐巴馬要求他的閣員不能再有「一切如常」的想法和作法，馬總統也應要求他的執政團隊，不能再當太平政府的太平官。
酖酖危機政府的大忌是政策搖擺，馬團隊至今已犯過多次這類錯誤：教育券忽而要發又忽而更名，一‧五代健保提出後遭到批評又收回擱置；ＣＥＣＡ被在野黨大肆抨擊後，又決定名稱「只說中文，不講英文」；課徵奢侈稅才放出風向球，就因民意反彈而收手等等。這些反覆讓民眾對政府救經濟的能力失去信心。馬總統與其在府內召開所謂的「政見落實會議」，不如改成「政策整合會議」，凡是對的政策，就該「咬定青山不放鬆，任爾東西南北風」；否則危機政府非但未解除危機，反而製造更多危機。
經驗告訴我們：危機年代的危機總統與危機政府，只有靠「民意之風」才能帶領國家航行過驚濤駭浪；而要民意成風，自然必須要使人民對政府的危機領導有絕對信心。一個無法讓人民產生信心的政府，會讓危機變成災難，讓危機的年代變成失落的年代，更可能讓台灣一甲子辛苦累積的成果在這場風暴危機中逐漸流失。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 1, 2009
Barack Obama's recent Congressional Address was well-received by the American public. One of the most significant comments was, "He looks more and more like the kind of leader a country needs during a crisis."
Obama's example tells us that a national leader during a time of crisis should be more than a mere behind the scenes policy maker. He must also stand on the front lines, and play the role of chief in two ways. First, he must be chief salesman. Second, he must be chief communicator.
For the sake of his 780 billion US economic recovery program, Obama broke with White House tradition. He went to Congress to talk with the opposition party. He followed up by spending a week away from Washington. He promoted his policies to people in small, remote towns, face-to-face. The media said "It was as if he was back on the campaign trail." He gained swift passage of his economic recovery program in Congress. Obama's poll numbers quickly rose. All because he was able to effectively play these two "chief" roles.
Now look at Taiwan. The US has undergone numerous crises brought on by the economic recession. So has Taiwan. The United States has entered an era of crisis. So has Taiwan. The DGBAS forecasts a growth rate of negative 2.97% GDP. This figure represents a 1.1 trillion reduction in exports, a 530 billion reduction in private investment, 100,000 more unemployed, and a 9.6% decline in per capita income, affecting over 500,000 households. Taken together these pieces of the puzzle show us a crisis.
But amidst this crisis, what is our government doing? The ruling administration has trotted out an endless stream of major and minor proposals. Every one of them involves spending tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars. The debt raised is so vast even the Minister of Finance is speechless. Does anyone see the whole picture? Has anyone considered the synergies? Has anyone asked the people how they feel? The administration hardly has enough time to implement emergency measures. The entire island is in an uproar over whether to sign CECA. The ruling and opposition parties have collided head on. President Ma has been forced to go on TV as CECA's chief communicator and chief salesman.
The president deserves affirmation for going on TV to promote his policies. But his move was also a warning sign. It showed that the ruling administration still does not realize Taiwan is already in the middle of a crisis. It has yet to understand the role the government must play at such a time.
Therefore, we suggest that President Ma retreat from the front line and re-position himself as a crisis era president. Only when his role has been redefined as a crisis era president can he effectively fulfill the role of "chief salesman" and "chief communicator." Only then will he be free of concerns that he exceed his authority given the constitutional constraints of the dual leadership system.
He should emulate the example set by Barack Obama. He should demonstrate the same passion he did while campaigning, in order to sell his policies to the masses. The economic recession has not merely undermined people's financial well-being, it has also undermined their emotional well-being. If the public is allowed to communicate with the president face-to-face on a regular basis, it may help defuse public anxiety.
Ma must demand that the ruling administration demonstrate a crisis consciousness. Although his ruling administration boasts many capable technocrats, the Liu cabinet, like government officials in other countries, lack first hand experience in dealing with an economic crisis of such large magnitude. Furthermore a common problem with technocrats is that they are good with theories, but not so good with practice. They are good with numbers, but not so good with feelings. If cabinet members lack a feel for the public mood, if they lack a sense of urgency, even the best policies may provoke public discontent. Obama asked his cabinet members not to cling to "business as usual" ideas and practices. President Ma must also ask his ruling administration not to be peacetime officials in a peacetime administration.
The most serious blunder committed by governments during a state of crisis is waffling over policy. The Ma administration has made this mistake again and again. First it wants to issue Educational Vouchers. Then it wants to change their name. No sooner did it encounter criticism, then it retracted its Generation 1.5 Health Care Program. No sooner did the Pan Green opposition attack CECA, then it decided to use only its Chinese name, not its English name. No sooner did it release its trial balloon on the Luxury Tax, than it met with a public backlash. Such constant waffling causes people to lose confidence in the government's ability to revive the economy. President Ma recently called for a "Policy Implementation Conference" at the Presidential Palace. He should have called for a "Policy Clarification Conference" instead. All correct policies should be implemented no matter which way the winds might blow. Otherwise, a crisis era government will not resolve crises. It will only create more crises.
Experience tells us that a crisis era president and crisis era government can only lead a nation out of the storm by catching "the winds of public opinion." But to catch the winds of public opinion, it must ensure that the public has confidence in the government's leadership. If it is unable to inspire public confidence, the crisis will become a disaster. It will become a lost decade that allows the hard-earned fruits of six decades of economic achievements to be destroyed by a single financial storm.
危機年代的國家領導人
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.03.01
歐巴馬日前的國會演說贏得美國輿論普遍肯定，其中最具意義的評論是：「他愈來愈有危機年代國家領導人的樣子。」
歐巴馬的例子告訴我們：危機年代的國家領導人不能只當幕後運籌帷幄的政策總設計師，他還必須親上火線，扮演執政團隊的兩種「首席」角色：一是首席推銷員，二是首席溝通者。
為了七千八百多億美元的經濟復甦方案，歐巴馬不但打破白宮慣例，親赴國會與反對黨溝通，更連續一周遠離華府，面對面向偏遠小城小鎮的民眾推銷他的政策，輿論形容他「好像又回到了競選跑道」；復甦方案最後能在國會快速過關，歐巴馬的民調聲望能快速攀升，都與他能有效扮演這兩種「首席」角色有關。
反觀台灣，經濟蕭條帶來的多重危機，美國有的，台灣一樣不少；美國既已進入危機年代，台灣當然並非例外。以主計處預估今年負二點九七的ＧＤＰ為例，這個數字代表的是：一兆一千多億出口的減少、五千三百億民間投資的減少、十多萬失業人口的增加，及百分之九點六平均國民所得的下降，受影響的家庭計約五十多萬戶，把這些數字圖塊一一拼湊起來，呈現的就是一幅危機年代的圖像。
但在這樣的危機年代中，我們的政府做了什麼？執政團隊雖然三天一大案，兩天一小案，案案動輒百億千億，舉債數額多到連財政部長都答不出來，但誰瞭解全貌？誰檢驗過綜效？誰問過人民感受？更離譜的是，救急救危已唯恐不及，舉國上下竟為了該不該簽訂ＣＥＣＡ，鬧得滿城風雨，朝野嚴重對立，最後逼得馬總統不得不親上電視，當ＣＥＣＡ的溝通者與推銷員。
總統上電視推銷政策，雖值得肯定，但此一案例也是一大警訊，顯示執政團隊迄今仍未體認台灣已身處危機年代，仍未掌握危機政府應有的角色與作為。因此，我們建議馬總統：
酖酖他必須要改變退守第二線的角色，重新定位自己是危機年代的危機總統；只有在角色重新定位後，他才能有效扮演「首席推銷員」與「首席溝通者」的角色，而不會有逾越雙首長制憲政分際的疑慮。
酖酖他應該仿效歐巴馬，拿出當候選人時推銷政見那樣的熱情，再次面對群眾推銷政策。而且，經濟蕭條除了對民眾生活有實質影響外，社會也出現集體焦慮現象，民眾若能常與總統面對面溝通，當有助於焦慮的化解。
酖酖他必須要求執政團隊要有危機政府的認知。他的執政團隊雖然多是專業技術官僚，但一則劉內閣跟其他國家政府官員一樣，都缺乏處理此等大規模經濟危機的第一手經驗；再則技術官僚的通病是重理論、輕個案，重數字、輕感受，如果閣員缺乏與民意脈搏相通的急迫感，再好的政策也可能引發民怨。歐巴馬要求他的閣員不能再有「一切如常」的想法和作法，馬總統也應要求他的執政團隊，不能再當太平政府的太平官。
酖酖危機政府的大忌是政策搖擺，馬團隊至今已犯過多次這類錯誤：教育券忽而要發又忽而更名，一‧五代健保提出後遭到批評又收回擱置；ＣＥＣＡ被在野黨大肆抨擊後，又決定名稱「只說中文，不講英文」；課徵奢侈稅才放出風向球，就因民意反彈而收手等等。這些反覆讓民眾對政府救經濟的能力失去信心。馬總統與其在府內召開所謂的「政見落實會議」，不如改成「政策整合會議」，凡是對的政策，就該「咬定青山不放鬆，任爾東西南北風」；否則危機政府非但未解除危機，反而製造更多危機。
經驗告訴我們：危機年代的危機總統與危機政府，只有靠「民意之風」才能帶領國家航行過驚濤駭浪；而要民意成風，自然必須要使人民對政府的危機領導有絕對信心。一個無法讓人民產生信心的政府，會讓危機變成災難，讓危機的年代變成失落的年代，更可能讓台灣一甲子辛苦累積的成果在這場風暴危機中逐漸流失。
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